The focus of this paper is the process of creating the border in Punjab as a product of a commission headed by Cyril Radcliffe. Presenting the work of the commission in the context of the decolonization of the Indian subcontinent, the paper analyzes the conflicting internal and external political interests that influenced the actions of the main actors in the demarcation of the Punjab. The paper highlights the British imperial mechanisms by which they sought to keep India under apparent control, such as the accelerated transfer of power and the transfer of responsibility to national leaders. Related to this, an evaluation was made of the role of Radcliffe and the maps created in the service of the regime as a safeguard against the preservation of British influence even after the withdrawal. By comparing cartographic and demographic data, it was concluded that the Radcliffe line in Punjab was actually the best boundary that could have arisen under given operating conditions. By exploring these conditions, the aim is to point out the real causes of the failed division of India and Pakistan whose consequences are still current in the relationship between the two countries.