

Speech Acts in Books and Films: “Alice's Adventures in Wonderland” and “Inkheart”

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Sveučilište u Zadru
Odjel za anglistiku
Sveučilišni diplomski studij
Anglistika; smjer: znanstveni

Katarina Barna

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Adventures in Wonderland” and “Inkheart”**

Diplomski rad

Zadar, 2022.

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Sveučilišni diplomski studij anglistika; smjer: znanstveni (dvopredmetni)

Speech Acts in Books and Films: “Alice's Adventures in Wonderland” and “Inkheart”

Diplomski rad

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Zadar, 2022.



Izjava o akademskoj čestitosti

Ja, **Katarina Barna**, ovime izjavljujem da je moj **diplomski** rad pod naslovom **Speech Acts in Books and Films: “Alice's Adventures in Wonderland” and “Inkheart”** rezultat mog vlastitog rada, da se temelji na mojim istraživanjima te da se oslanja na izvore i radove navedene u bilješkama i popisu literature. Ni jedan dio mog rada nije napisan na nedopušten način, odnosno nije prepisan iz necitiranih radova i ne krši bilo čija autorska prava.

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Sadržaj mog rada u potpunosti odgovara sadržaju obranjenoga i nakon obrane uređenoga rada.

Zadar, 12. srpnja 2022.

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1. Introduction

Since the beginning of human existence, change has been the only constant. Scholars of different disciplines and fields, such as anthropology, sociology and philosophy, have studied the man; however, their point of view and their strategies have changed substantially throughout different periods. Focus of study has shifted from more concrete matters, such as basic features of human behaviour or communication, to more abstract ones, such as human thought and feelings. One important aspect in all of these foci is language. Language, i.e., language use, is an indispensable component of human communication, it can affect an individual's behaviour, and it is a means of conveying one's feelings and thoughts. An important field of linguistics which in a way encompasses all the aforementioned aspects in the context of language use is the field of pragmatics. According to Birner (2013), pragmatics is the study of language and language use which considers context as a crucial aspect of every speech situation. Use of identical string of words, i.e., an utterance, can have different meanings depending on different contexts, people and cultures. One of pragmatics' central subjects which deals with these matters in greater detail are speech acts. Levinson (2017) describes speech acts as a sense in the context of which utterances do not only bear a certain meaning, but also perform actions. Having this in mind, it can be assumed that speech acts are omnipresent in different types of linguistic interaction; when a speaker utters a certain string of words, they could be stating, assuming, ordering, requesting, promising, congratulating, firing, etc. All of these actions are common in everyday human interaction, and all of them are considered speech acts. If one analyses the use of speech acts, one can get some insight into a certain situation, a person's thoughts, feelings, character, as well as cultural and social surroundings.

This paper consists of a speech act analysis of two films, namely "Alice in Wonderland" and "Inkheart", as well as the novels these films are based on (Lewis Carroll's "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" and "Through the Looking Glass", and Cornelia Funke's "Inkheart"). A theoretical background on pragmatics and speech acts will firstly be displayed, as a basis for easier understanding of the analytical part. After clarifying the speech act categorization in accordance with which the analysis will be carried out, there will be a short description of the books and films chosen for the analysis of this paper. Before methodology, several past research papers related to the topic of this paper will be displayed. The methodological part will then explain the way analysis is to be carried out (both quantitatively and qualitatively); structure, abbreviations and focus points. In the following part, some

noteworthy examples for each speech act category and each chosen book or film will be given and explained. After that part, all the analytical work of this paper will be interpreted and summed up.

2. Speech act theory

Austin (1962), one of the most relevant figures in the speech act theory, suggested that speech acts are such an obvious and widespread phenomenon that it was unusual they were not paid closer attention to at the time. Austin (1962) proposed this in one of his lectures in 1955, but these lectures have been organized into his book “How to do Things with Words”, published in 1962. However, in the preface of this book, the editor J. O. Urmson mentions that Austin himself said that these views were formed around 1939, even though he gave lectures on the topic sixteen years later. Austin (1962) noticed the importance of the phenomenon that early, while majority of other linguists and language philosophers considered its advantages only after pragmatics, the field of linguistics dealing with context, started gaining popularity.

2.1. Linguistics and context

Various fields, such as arts and humanities, IT and engineering and social sciences, have started to pay more attention to the study of context. However, since the concept itself is such a comprehensive term, there have been difficulties in agreeing upon a single definition. One attempt at describing it: “Context is thus no longer solely a social construct but rather a dynamic sociocognitive construal feeding on the contextualization of communicative action in general, and on the contextualization of communicative acts in particular” (Fetzer, 2017, p. 260). Levinson (1983) portrays context as a set of arguments that include descriptions of knowledge, commitments, beliefs, etc. of interlocutors. Regarding linguistics, context is one of the most important aspects distinguishing the fields of semantics and pragmatics, the former focusing on context-independent meaning, while the latter studies context-dependent meaning (Fetzer, 2017, p. 260).

2.2. Pragmatics

As it has already been mentioned, pragmatics is the field of linguistics of great importance for this paper. It is key for better understanding of the speech act analysis of this paper, but also of speech acts themselves. According to Yule (1996), pragmatics studies the meaning as a speaker or a writer meant to communicate it, and as a hearer or a reader interprets it. It focuses more on what a person means by uttering a certain string of words (speaker

meaning), than on the meaning of these words and phrases when standing on their own. However, the speaker meaning is not the only meaning important for the study of pragmatics; it is also necessary to interpret what a person means in a certain context and how this context influences the utterance. This contextual meaning consists of the speakers' organization of their utterances according to who they are speaking to, when, where, and under what circumstances. Attention must also be paid to the way hearers interpret what is uttered and comprehend the intended meaning of a speaker, even the unsaid (manner, facial expression, etc.). In the same way, a speaker has to decide what to utter and what to leave unsaid, i.e., communicate in a fashion other than uttering or not communicate at all, according to their relation and common ground with a hearer. Common ground is, according to Gibbs (2017), information that two or more speakers share on a personal, cultural or situational basis, i.e., shared knowledge.

If one wants to know what a person meant by saying something, the sole meanings of words and phrases (semantics) and their structure in the context of a sentence (syntax) is not enough. Aspects that should also be taken into account are the person who produced the utterance and the context it was produced in, which helps in getting a clearer picture on why a person produced that certain utterance and what they meant by it. Birner (2013) proposed an example "*There's one piece of pizza left*" (p. 11), which can have different meanings: it can be considered a warning for someone who wants to take it, an offer to someone to eat the last piece, or a scolding from a parent to a child who did not finish their meal. This example portrays perfectly what pragmatics is about – when context of an utterance is taken into consideration, the utterance can have completely different meanings and do different things.

As Mey (2001) puts it: "pragmatics is interested in the process of producing language and in its *producers*, not just in the end-*product*, language" (p. 5). He states that, if one is interested in studying the ways individuals use language, pragmatics cannot be restricted only to linguistic matters. If these extralinguistic factors are excluded, the user is neglected. The social context of the 'users' (as Mey calls interlocutors) must also be included in the study. Even though communication in society occurs mainly by the use of language, language users are social beings who use language and communicate on society's premises, meaning that society in a way controls the access they have to certain communicative and linguistic means. Pragmatics, being the study of the manner of a person's language use in communication, focuses on studying aforementioned premises and decides how they influence a person's language use. It is also necessary if one is in need of a more reasonable, deeper and fuller account of the language behaviour of users. Another pragmatics' task is providing an

explanation for different contexts having different expressions of the same content, which sometimes occurs due to religious, professional or cultural differences.

Huang (2017) describes pragmatics as one of the most rapidly growing and vibrant linguistic fields. He also states that other fields and disciplines have paid closer attention to it recently, such as artificial intelligence, philosophy of language, cognitive science, neuroscience, informatics, anthropology, sociology and language pathology. Due to such a vast disciplinary influence, it is difficult to agree on one clear definition of the field. There are two main views, i.e., schools of thought concerning pragmatics:

- a) the Anglo-American component view – this school of thought considers pragmatics as one of the core components of a linguistic theory, together with semantics, syntax, morphology, phonology and phonetics
- b) the European Continental perspective view – this school of thought sees pragmatics as a perspective on all the aforementioned components, i.e., on every part of linguistic behaviour. This view has a wider conception of the field of pragmatics (or, as it is called in this school of thought, *pragmalinguistics*). *Pragmalinguistics* not only encompasses non-core linguistic branches, but also some social sciences (Huang, 2017)

Birner (2013) named several instances where the study of pragmatics is evident in real world. She mentioned communication and miscommunication (e.g., *I'm cold* can be a request, an order or even an offer, depending on contextual factors which may be misinterpreted, leading to miscommunication), technology and artificial intelligence (a phone can document and transcribe what one is saying, but cannot interpret the intended meaning), law (one must say directly and precisely what they mean when in the area of law), etc.

2.3. Discourse analysis

Since this paper contains an analysis of a linguistic, i.e., pragmatic phenomenon, the concept of discourse analysis must be clarified (since, in terms of speech acts, discourse is to be analysed). According to Yule (1996), discourse analysis encompasses looking at language use (function and form of what is written and said) and its textual, interpersonal and ideational functions. In the context of linguistics, “discourse analysis focuses on the record (spoken or written) of the process by which language is used in some context to express intention” (Yule,

1996, pp. 83-84). The pragmatic perspective in the study of discourse is more specialized. In the discourse that is being analysed, closer attention is paid to what is unwritten or unsaid, but still communicated. More attention is paid “to psychological concepts such as background knowledge, beliefs, and expectations” (Yule, 1996, p. 84), exploring in more detail what the speaker (or the writer) had the intention of communicating. These aspects can vary depending on context, social, cultural or religious circumstances. Different utterances may be needed for, e.g., ordering your child to do something in Croatia and in India.

2.4. Speech acts

Individuals produce different utterances in order to express their intentions, beliefs, wishes, etc. These contain certain words and grammatical structures, but they also perform actions using these utterances. Yule (1996) proposed an example of a boss in a certain workplace uttering: “You’re fired”, and explained that, in that context, this is not purely a statement, but an act that ends a person’s employment (p. 47). This is a perfect example of an utterance performing an action, i.e., it being a speech act. Searle (1976) described what people do with language, referring to his speech act classes explained several sections below: “we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we commit ourselves to doing things, we express our feeling and attitudes and we bring about changes through our utterances” (p. 23).

Speech acts are a linguistic phenomenon that has drawn some attention throughout many different spheres; psychology (theory that acquiring speech acts is a prerequisite for acquiring language), anthropology (nature of rituals and magical spells), philosophy (regarding ethical statements), while in linguistics the phenomenon is found most commonly in pragmatics, semantics, syntax and second language learning (Levinson, 1983, p. 226). The speech act theory was proposed by John Langshaw Austin in his lectures which were later made into a book “How to do Things with Words”. In Levinson’s opinion, Austin’s aim was to “demolish” a perspective in linguistics that placed truth conditions at the centre of language understanding (Levinson, 1983, p. 228). Austin’s student John Rogers Searle carried on with his professor’s work, being, aside from Austin, one of the most important figures in the development of the speech act theory (Mey, 2001).

According to Yule (1996), in the English language speech acts are often given labels that are more specific, so speech acts can be complaints, apologies, promises, requests,

invitations, compliments, etc. These terms refer to the communicative intention of a speaker when producing an utterance. According to Yule (1996), “the speaker normally expects that his or her communicative intention will be recognized by the hearer” (p. 47). Circumstances that surround this utterance usually help the hearer and the speaker in this process, and, together with other utterances, make the speech event. The speech event’s nature commonly “determines the interpretation of an utterance as performing a particular speech act” (Yule, 1996, p. 48). This is evident in the example Yule (1996) provided; uttering “This tea is really cold” on a winter day can be considered a complaint because the person drinking the tea wanted it to be hot or at least warm, while if the same utterance was produced on a summer day, it could be seen as praise for making a great ice tea (p. 48). This example can also lead to a conclusion that components of an utterance alone are most commonly not enough for interpreting a speech act label. Uttering something is doing something, but it is not as simple as that; the speech act theory is a pragmatic theory on the basis of the need for interpreting the meaning of an utterance by the speaker, i.e., interpreting the speaker’s intention (Birner, 2013, p. 107). She also emphasizes the importance of context in this process.

Mey (2001) agrees on the high relevance of context; he states that “all speech is situated speech; a speech act is never just an ‘act of speech’, but should be considered in the total situation of activity of which it is a part” (p. 94). He says that context (e.g., cultural, societal, religious, relationship, situational context) can make some utterances be a taboo in some situations, while in others it is basically a convention.

Levinson (2017) explains why utterances can be seen as to perform actions. Firstly, utterances do not respond to meaning or shape of what has been said – they respond to the underlying action (or point) performed by the previous speaker during their turn. Secondly, utterances commonly include non-verbal counterparts, such as waving to say goodbye. Thirdly, in action sequences, utterances often engage with non-verbal actions. Lastly, utterances can, like non-verbal actions, lead to real-world consequences, e.g., when one bids at an auction, they are committed to paying (Levinson, 2017, p. 199).

Austin (1962) distinguished constatives, stating that “not all true or false statements are descriptions, and for this reason I prefer to use the word ‘Constative’” (p.3), and performatives, utterances that do not describe an action, but perform it. He gave a perfect supporting evidence for his entire theory, and not only for his thesis on performatives, with the following quote:

It is worthy of note that, as I am told, in the American law of evidence, a report of what someone else said is admitted as evidence if what he said is an utterance of our

performative kind: because this is regarded as a report not so much of something he *said*, as which it would be hear-say and not admissible as evidence, but rather as something he *did*, an action of his (Austin, 1962, p. 13).

When he tried to think of a way to distinguish constatives and performatives, Austin (1962) came to idea of performative verbs as a grammatical criterion for the distinction. He then proposed the structure of performatives (first person singular present indicative active), which led him to the distinction of explicit and implicit performatives (explicit performatives having the aforementioned structure). He later implemented another aspect that helps distinguish explicit performatives; the word ‘hereby’ (e.g., I hereby grant you the access to the museum).

Austin (1962) also proposes different aspects to speech acting: he named the act of producing an utterance with a specific reference and sense a locutionary act. By producing a locutionary act, one can also produce an illocutionary act, i.e., an utterance with a particular conventional force (speaker’s intention), which can also lead to a perlocutionary act (or effect), i.e., hearers’ feelings or actions caused by an utterance. Searle (1969) provided examples for illocutionary and perlocutionary acts; convincing someone (perlocution) by arguing (illocutionary), alarming someone by warning, getting someone to do something by requesting, etc. Sometimes it is hard to distinguish if an act is illocutionary or perlocutionary (action done and consequences). In many cases, illocutionary act demands a preceding locutionary act, but some illocutionary acts can be carried out without utterances (e.g., waving to greet someone).

As Bach and Harnish (1979) point out, even when a speaker says explicitly how they intend for their utterance to be interpreted, a hearer can have issues in detecting the communicative intent. The intention is even more likely to be misinterpreted when a speaker uses indirect speech acts, an act subordinate to another illocutionary act, usually literal. For example, if a speaker asks a hearer: *Can you hand me the salt?*, the question does not actually refer to the hearer’s capability of passing the salt, and is therefore not a yes/no question. It is an indirect way of requesting for salt. In casual conversation, indirect speech acts are generally more frequent than direct ones, because the use of indirect speech acts is, in most cases, more polite, according to Birner (2013). Yule (1996) states that indirect speech acts occur when there is a discrepancy between the three forms of sentence structure in English (imperative, interrogative, declarative) and the three general functions of communication (command/request, question, statement). When these do match, a direct speech act occurs.

2.4.1. Felicity conditions

Other than merely uttering a certain string of words, there are numerous other factors that have to be respected if the intended action is to be brought about happily, according to Austin (1962). He also termed the cases in which these factors are not respected as unhappy. The mere utterance is the leading act, but it is far from being the only thing necessary for a speech act to be successfully carried out. For example, if one utters: “I name this ship Joan”, there has to be a ship nearby, they have to be the owner or the person authorized by the owner to name that particular ship, they have to have an intention of naming the ship Joan, the ship has already been named, etc. Certain conditions have to be met for a successful speech act, and Austin called them felicity conditions (shorter version by Levinson, 1983):

- A. (i) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect
 (ii) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure
- B. The procedure must be executed (i) correctly and (ii) completely
- C. Often, (i) the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure, and (ii) if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must so do (p. 229).

Austin (1962) notes that an utterance is unhappy if one breaks any of these rules, but there are important differences in ways of doing that. The first distinction is between A and B together versus C rules. If one utters the wrong formula or is a wrong person with no power to perform a certain act, e.g., a person who is not a priest marrying a couple (A/B rules), the act is not performed successfully – it is not even achieved. The act is achieved in the C cases; however, it is empty or insincere (e.g., if one promises but does not intend to keep it). Austin dubbed the former cases misfires, and the latter ones abuses. He also added that not all speech acts are susceptible to misfires and abuses, and that infelicities can sometimes even overlap or be combined.

Levinson (1987) mentioned the classification of felicity conditions proposed by Searle. He organized them into propositional content conditions (clarify content restrictions), preparatory conditions (an illocutionary act’s real-world prerequisites), sincerity conditions (state speaker’s requisite feelings, intentions and beliefs), and essential condition (certain act counting as intended act) (Levinson, 1987, pp. 238-239).

2.4.2. Classification of speech acts – Austin vs. Searle

Speech acts have been more thoroughly investigated since Austin's lectures, which led to many other attempts at classification of this phenomenon, other than the original one by Austin. In this section, Austin's and Searle's classifications of speech acts will be described, them being one of the most prominent figures in the speech act theory.

○ Austin's classification of speech acts

In his lectures, Austin (1962) proposed classification of five categories in accordance with their illocutionary force (of which he was uncertain of and unhappy about, him explicitly saying so in his lectures: "I distinguish five more general classes: but I am far from equally happy about all of them" (Austin, 1962, p. 150)):

- I. behabitives – acts dealing with reactions to behaviour, attitudes and feelings, and behaviour towards others – *I apologize for what I've said to you.*
- II. expositives – acts that clarify arguments and reasons – *I argue that the Earth is flat.*
- III. verdictives – giving of verdicts by a person of power, e.g., a judge – *I find the defendant guilty.*
- IV. exercitives – acts that exercise power, influence or rights – *I order you to put that gun away.*
- V. commissives – acts that commit the speaker to do something – *I promise I will treat you better.*

○ Searle's classification of speech acts

Searle (1976) proposed his version of a speech act classification in his article "A Classification of Illocutionary Acts", while taking into account his teacher Austin's classification. He mentions that it is firstly necessary to distinguish illocutionary verbs (part of particular languages) from illocutionary acts (part of language in general), and that there are twelve dimensions of variation according to which illocutionary acts are distinguished. Three of them (direction of fit, sincerity condition and illocutionary point) are more important than others and constitute the foundation for his speech act classification. Searle's (1976) speech act categories are:

- I. representatives – commit the speaker to his/her proposition being true, expression of the speaker's belief; direction of fit: words to world; example: *He is a nice guy.*

- II. directives – acts by the utterance of which the speaker is trying to make the hearer act, or do something; direction of fit: world to words; example: *Can you pass the ketchup, please?*
- III. commissives – acts by which the speaker commits himself/herself to a future action; direction of fit: world to words; example: *I promise I'll keep your secret.*
- IV. expressives – express the speaker's psychological state; direction of fit: none; example: *Thank you all for coming.*
- V. declarations – acts that cause a change in the world when uttered; direction of fit: both world to words and words to world; example: *I name this ship Basil.*

In his article, Searle (1976) had some remarks on Austin's classification of speech acts. He firstly said that even Austin was unsure about his own classification, which indeed is evident in Austin's quote: "...I also think that the taxonomy needs to be seriously revised because it contains several weaknesses" (Austin, 1962, p. 151). Searle (1976) also points out that Austin classified illocutionary verbs, and not illocutionary acts, which are not the same thing. As one of the greatest weaknesses in Austin's taxonomy, Searle emphasized the lack of clear principle for constructing the taxonomy, which leads to many overlaps and certain acts belonging to more than one category (e.g., *describe*). He mentioned that some verbs do not even match the given definition of the class they belong to.

3. Analysis of speech acts in chosen works

The speech act analysis of this paper focuses on films and novels these films are based on. Works chosen for the analysis of speech acts are Lewis Carroll's novels "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" and "Through the Looking Glass", as well as Tim Burton's film "Alice in Wonderland". Another novel included in this analysis is Cornelia Funke's "Inkheart", and Iain Softley's film based on this novel, also named "Inkheart".

3.1. *Works chosen for the speech act analysis*

Books and films that were chosen for the analysis of speech acts in this paper are described below, in order to provide some background information for better understanding of the analytical part of the paper.

3.1.1. "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" and "Through the Looking Glass" (novels)

"Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" is a children's novel published in 1865 and written by Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson under the pseudonym of Lewis Carroll, an English writer and mathematician. This novel is one of the most famous works of fiction in the English language, as well as its sequel that was published in 1871, "Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There", most commonly known only as "Through the Looking Glass". It contradicted the children literature of that period, which had a goal of teaching children moral lessons, with its elements of fantasy, absurdity, ridiculousness and word-play (Bauer and Lowne, 2020).

The plot of "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland" revolves around a girl named Alice and her adventures which follow after her fall through a rabbit hole. She encounters unusual creatures, such as a caterpillar smoking a hookah, a talking rabbit, a Mad Hatter, a smiling Cheshire cat, a Mock Turtle, characters from cards such as Queen, King or Knave of Hearts, etc. At the end of the novel, Alice wakes up and realizes that it was all a dream.

"Through the Looking Glass", being the sequel of "Alice's Adventures", has a similar plot and represents the next adventure of the protagonist Alice. She is with her kitten, when she notices a mirror, i.e., a looking glass, which she goes through and enters an unusual world full

of fantastic creatures and occurrences. She encounters a Humpty Dumpty, Tweedledee and Tweedledum, a smiling clock, a Unicorn, as well as several chess pieces – Red and White Queens, Kings, Knights, etc. In the end, she comes back to reality and to her confused kitten.

3.1.2. “Alice in Wonderland” (film)

Even though this film is based on the novels by Lewis Carroll, its plot occasionally strays greatly from the novels’ plot. Alice Kingsleigh, a teenager misunderstood by her peers and family, runs away from her own engagement party to follow a rabbit and falls into a hole the rabbit went through. As in the novels, she encounters peculiar creatures, but the difference is that Alice now has to help these creatures end the evil Red Queen’s reign and bring back the benevolent White Queen to the throne of Wonderland. The film was released in 2010, directed by Tim Burton, starring Johnny Depp, Mia Wasikowska, Anne Hathaway and Helena Bonham Carter (*Alice in Wonderland*, n.d.).

3.1.3. “Inkheart” (novel)

“Inkheart” is a children’s fantasy novel written by a German author Cornelia Funke in 2003. It is the first of the “Inkheart” trilogy (together with “Inkspell” and “Inkdeath”). These novels were written in German, so their original titles are “Tintenherz”, “Tintenblut” and “Tintentod”. (*Inkheart*, n.d.a). Even though “Inkheart” is a novel with a supernatural dimension, its main themes are family, power and pride.

Meggie and her father Mo are the central characters of “Inkheart”. They seem like a normal family, but Meggie soon finds out that her father has a remarkable gift; when Mo reads something aloud, it comes to life. They become entangled in a dangerous adventure with villains Mo read out of a book called “Inkheart” years ago. While attempting to save their own lives and the life of Meggie’s long-lost mother they have just found, they discover that Meggie inherited Mo’s gift and it is up to her to save them all from a horrible villain called Capricorn.

3.1.4. “Inkheart” (film)

This film does not differ greatly from the novel it was based on; its plot is therefore described in the section above. The film’s director is Iain Softley, and the film was released in

2009. “Inkheart”’s cast also has some popular names, such as Brendan Fraser, Paul Bettany, Andy Serkis and Eliza Bennett (*Inkheart*, n.d.b).

3.2. Previous research on speech act analysis

Several research papers that also tackle analysis of speech acts were found. Firstly, Ardita Dylgjeri, a PhD candidate from an Albanian university, wrote a paper on analysis of political speeches (Dylgjeri, 2017). She analysed the use of speech acts in a political speech made by Edi Rama, an Albanian politician. Dylgjeri concluded that the personality of a speaker can be portrayed by their use of speech acts (the speaker mostly used commissives; promising to make the country better). Tutuarima, Nuraeningsih and Rusiana (2018) analysed the use of speech acts in a film called “London Has Fallen”. In their analysis, the most frequent speech act category was directive, which they concluded was the result of the film being an action thriller. Isnawati, Anam and Diana (2015) analysed the film “Shrek”, i.e., the speech act use of the main character Shrek, in order to analyse his character. They found that the majority of Shrek’s speech act use was directives, and they ascribed it to him wanting to show what he wants. Lastly, Anna Trosborg (1991) analysed legal speech acts of the English Contract Law. She compared these speech acts to one that can be found in everyday English conversations and concluded that they are quite different; Trosborg found legal speech acts more direct, as opposed to the more indirect ones found in everyday English conversations.

3.3. Methodology

The goal of this paper is to analyse the use of speech acts in films and books “Inkheart”, “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” and “Through the Looking Glass”, i.e., to determine the frequency of use of particular speech acts.

Research hypotheses are the following:

1. Films will contain a greater number of speech acts than books, due to more frequent occurrence of dialogue.
2. Certain types of speech acts will be more frequent than others due to differences in plot and the theme of chosen works.

In this analytical process, speech acts will be analysed in accordance with Searle's typology of speech acts (explained above). Chosen books will be thoroughly read, while films will be watched and their subtitles will be analysed. The speech acts found in these works will be counted and sorted according to their categories – this data compilation will provide a basis for the quantitative part of the analysis of this paper and conclusions in the context of previously mentioned research hypotheses. In the interpretative part of the analysis, quantity of speech acts will be displayed in percentages due to significant variations not only in number of utterances and speech acts in the chosen works, but also in number of pages (for books) and duration (for films); “Alice's Adventures in Wonderland” has 124 pages, “Through the Looking Glass” 147, and “Inkheart” 543. Difference in duration is not too great: 1 hour and 48 minutes for “Alice in Wonderland” and 1 hour and 46 minutes for “Inkheart”.

Aside from the quantitative part of the analysis, there will also be a descriptive qualitative part; some examples of the analysed speech acts will be provided (prior to quantitative results), together with their category, act labels or short explanations (where deemed necessary) and the book or film they were found in. Since a great number of speech acts was found in chosen works, only a small portion of them will be displayed in this paper, i.e., some noteworthy and prototypical instances. There will be a specific section for all the issues and borderline cases found throughout the analysis, where concrete examples found in the analysed work will be listed, along with the explanations on why they are considered problematic cases. Another section will be given regarding a common occurrence found in the books and films; interrupted utterances. In some of the interrupted cases, the speech act category can be speculated about or is even obvious, but in some it is impossible to know without an ending of the utterance. No matter the case, even with the obvious ones, the utterances will not be counted as a part of any categories. After this part the interpretation of the results and the conclusions about the analysis will follow.

In the descriptive qualitative part of the analysis, the scheme of the analysis will be structured as given below:

SPEECH ACT CATEGORY X

- **act label** (reference to where the label was taken from, or no reference if the author of this paper came up with the act label)

- 1) "Example X" – where necessary, a short explanation for relevance of the example X for the speech act category X, or context of the utterance of the example X will be given (*book or film example X was taken from*, page number for books)

Categories of declarations, borderline cases and interruptions will be without act labels, focusing more on explanations of concrete situations and context of these utterances.

In order to simplify the analysis structure, titles of the books and films will be abbreviated:

- *A1b* for “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”, book (Carroll, 2010)
- *A2b* for “Through the Looking Glass”, book (Carroll, 2013)
- *Ib* for “Inkheart”, book (Funke, 2020)
- *Af* for “Alice in Wonderland”, film (Burton, 2010)
- *If* for “Inkheart”, film (Softley, 2008)

For a successful categorization of speech acts, a list for many actions in accordance with speech act categories was made (e.g., reporting and speculating for representatives, ordering and asking for directives, promising and threatening for commissives, apologizing and thanking for expressives, and christening and appointing for declaratives). The list was made by consulting several books and articles from the list of references; Bach and Harnish (1979), even though their categories are not identical to Searle’s, Yule (1996), Levinson (1983), and, of course, Searle (1976). In the analytical part of this paper, reference to these works will be given after the name of the act label. Other than the act labels taken from these works, there will be several labels that the author of this paper identified in accordance with the explanations on speech act categories from the literature used for this paper. In these cases, no reference will follow after the name of the act label. This, however, will not be the only method used for analysing speech acts for this paper; there is a great number of indirect speech acts which have to be recognized by possessing the knowledge of Searle’s speech act categories, their explanations, meanings and goals Searle had in mind. That is why acquiring knowledge on Searle’s speech act categories through reading of the books and articles from the reference list is crucial for this analysis; the analysis is not simply finding particular actions which belong to

particular speech act categories, but understanding what the speaker of an utterance wanted that utterance to do, and what it actually did, in accordance with the context of the utterance.

3.4. *Speech acts in chosen works*

Concrete instances of speech acts found in the chosen books and films will be shown in this subchapter. They will be listed in accordance with Searle's speech act categories: representatives, directives, expressives, commissives and declarations. The order they will be listed in is the order of analysis of the chosen works; the books were analysed first ("Alice's Adventures in Wonderland", "Through the Looking Glass", "Inkheart"), and the films second ("Alice in Wonderland", "Inkheart").

REPRESENTATIVES

➤ **expressing belief** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) "I'm afraid I've offended it again!" – not expressing the feeling of being afraid, but expressing belief that somebody has been offended (*A1b*, p. 17)
- 2) "I think you'd take a fancy to cats if you could only see her." (*A1b*, p. 16)
- 3) "However, *somebody* killed *something*: that's clear, at any rate" (*A2b*, p. 20)
- 4) "I'd better go south myself as fast as I can." – could be mistaken for a commissive, but the emphasis is on the speaker's belief that he should go south (*Ib*, p. 28)
- 5) "...but I believe it's unlucky to speak in a dream." (*Ib*, p. 209)
- 6) "They will notice." (*Af*)
- 7) "We're going the right way" (*Ib*, p. 121)

➤ **suggesting** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) "In that case, I move that the meeting adjourn, for the immediate adoption of more energetic remedies –" – it should have been a declaration, but nobody listened to the speaker, and the utterance was also interrupted (can also be listed in the INTERRUPTIONS section (*A1b*, p. 20))

➤ **reporting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Here, Bill! the master says you’re to go down the chimney!” – could be mistaken for a directive, but this is a report of a directive (*A1b*, p. 33)
- 2) “He denies it” – not denying, but reporting someone’s denying (*A1b*, p. 111)
- 3) “Do you know, I was so angry, Kitty, when I saw all the mischief you had been doing” – not an expressive because it is a report of the speaker’s past feelings (*A2b*, p. 9)
- 4) “I said you *looked* like an egg, Sir” – after the utterance follows *Alice gently explained*, making it an explanation (*A2b*, p. 78)
- 5) “I’ll be picking Meggie up from school at one-thirty.” – could be mistaken for a commissive, however, it was not said as a promise or a vow, but as a report or a claim (the following utterance being “Come after that.”) (*Ib*, p. 15)
- 6) “Mo doesn’t think so!” – even though the speaker (Meggie) is stating her father’s opinion, here she is disagreeing with the hearer (*Ib*, p. 50)
- 7) “Well, I’ve promised to put on a little show for this young lady” – could be mistaken for a promise, but this is a report of a promise (*Ib*, p. 67)
- 8) “He’s going to take me to Mo!” – could be mistaken for a commissive, but is only a report (*Ib*, p. 101)
- 9) “But I swore never to read aloud again.” – if it were in present tense, it would have been a commissive, but it being in past tense makes it a report (*Ib*, p. 158)
- 10) “*I’ll look around*” – a report of a message written by a mute woman (*Ib*, p. 335)
- 11) “The man’s got no taste whatsoever!” – the speaker expressing her dislike of an illustration in a book (*If*)

➤ **observing**

- 1) “There goes Bill!” (*A1b*, p. 33)
- 2) “Oh, there’s no use in talking to him, he’s perfectly idiotic!” (*A1b*, p. 51)
- 3) “They’re dreadfully fond of beheading people here” (*A1b*, p. 79)
- 4) “Your daughter seems to be getting on all right without her, though.” (*Ib*, p. 52)
- 5) “She appears to be slaying it.” (*Af*)

➤ **theorizing** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “If I eat one of these cakes, [...], it’s sure to make *some* change in my size” (*A1b*, p. 34)
- 2) “Maybe it’s always pepper that makes people hot-tempered” (*A1b*, p. 84)

➤ **admitting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “I don’t know” (*A1b*, p. 43)
- 2) “I couldn’t help it” (*A1b*, p. 72)
- 3) “I’ve forgotten the words.” (*A1b*, p. 96)
- 4) “I think of my husband often.” (*Af*)

➤ **denying** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “But I’m not a serpent, I tell you!” (*A1b*, p. 46)
- 2) “I deny it!” (*A1b*, p. 111)
- 3) “I’m not looking for anything particular.” (*If*)

➤ **replying** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Anything you like” – a reply to a question “But what am *I* to do?” (*A1b*, p. 51)
- 2) “How should I know?” – not a question requiring an answer, but a rhetorical question; it is a reply to a question “And who are *these*?”, basically meaning *I don’t know* (*A1b*, p. 75)
- 3) “Why, because there’s nobody with me!” – a reply to a question “Why do you sit out here all alone?” (*A2b*, pp. 78-79)
- 4) “How many?” – a reply to the question “How many books do you have?” – a rhetorical question (*Ib*, p. 42)
- 5) “Hm, did I?” – a reply to the question “Did you really stick those horns on him?” (*Ib*, p. 59)

➤ **objecting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “There’s certainly too much pepper in that soup!” (*A1b*, p. 52)
- 2) “There’s plenty of room!” – following the utterance: “No room!” (*A1b*, p. 61)
- 3) “It *must* come sometimes to “jam today”” – after the utterance follows *Alice objected*, making it an objection (*A2b*, p. 65)
- 4) “For the millionth time, I *can’t* bring anyone back” (*Ib*, p. 188)

➤ **introducing**

- 1) “My name is Alice, so please your Majesty” (*A1b*, p. 74)
- 2) “This is Gwin” (*Ib*, p. 33)
- 3) “Oh, I’m Tweedledee, he’s Tweedledum.” (*Af*)

4) “I’m Mortimer Folchart.” (*If*)➤ **informing** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “It belongs to the Duchess” (*A1b*, p. 82)
- 2) “I was in Genoa once. I bought a very fine edition of *Alice in Wonderland* there” – two speech acts of informing (*Ib*, p. 109)

➤ **assuming** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Perhaps it hasn’t one” (*A1b*, p. 85)
- 2) “He must have imitated somebody else’s hand” (*A1b*, p. 118)
- 3) “I should be sent to prison, I suppose, when the day came.” (*A2b*, p. 10)
- 4) “No, I don’t think it is” – an answer to the question “Do you think it’s going to rain?”, making it a forecast (*A2b*, p. 58)
- 5) “...but you’ll get on with her all right.” (*Ib*, p. 20)
- 6) “But she’ll probably end up poor as a church mouse because she spends so much money on books.” (*Ib*, p. 38)
- 7) “I bet the author has a copy.” – not a bet (which would be a commissive), but an assumption (*If*)
- 8) “Three or four more years and she’ll be a pretty little thing.” (*Ib*, p. 133)

➤ **agreeing** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Very true” (*A1b*, p. 86)
- 2) “I quite agree with you” (*A1b*, p. 86)

➤ **explaining**

- 1) “Change lobsters again! [...] Back to land again” – explaining/describing a dance (*A1b*, p. 96)
- 2) “The piece I’m going to repeat was written entirely for your amusement.” – could be considered a commissive, however, the emphasis is not put on the speaker’s intention of repeating a piece, but on his explanation of the reason for writing that piece (*A2b*, p. 87)
- 3) “And I’m here to warn you” – not a warning (directive), but an explanation on why the speaker is there; following utterances are warnings (“Capricorn knows where you’re

staying. His men are there now waiting for you and your daughter to come home”), but this one is an explanation (*If*)

➤ **announcing** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “The trial’s beginning!” (*A1b*, p. 104)
- 2) “She’s coming!” (*A2b*, p. 27)
- 3) “So here’s a question for you.” – this not being the question, but an announcement of a question that is to be asked (*A2b*, p. 80)
- 4) “Very well, off we go south” (*Ib*, p. 26)

➤ **declaring** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Why, it’s turning into a sort of mist now, I declare!” (*A2b*, p. 13)
- 2) “I declare it’s marked out just like a large chessboard!” (*A2b*, p. 30)
- 3) “Someone has stolen three of my tarts!” (*Af*)

➤ **revealing** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “We *can* talk, when there’s anybody worth talking to.” – flowers revealing that they are able to talk (*A2b*, p.25)
- 2) “There’s one copy of *Inkheart* left.” – confessing/revealing, because the speaker was the only one who knew that (*Ib*, p. 231)

➤ **boasting** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “I’ve had plenty of practice, plenty of practice!” (*A2b*, p. 111)
- 2) “What a good thing I gave him that little weakness.” – said by a writer about a character from his story; followed by an utterance “It was a clever move.” (*Ib*, p. 406)
- 3) “But look at me now.” – not an order to look at the speaker, but boasting/bragging (*If*)

➤ **calling** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “Dustfinger!” (*Ib*, p. 11)

➤ **assessing** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Soon.” – an answer on the question “When do you think his men will get here?”, making this an assessment (*Ib*, p. 15)

➤ **insisting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “No, really, that’s just what happened!” (*Ib*, p. 117)

➤ **comparing**

- 1) “Like the flower maiden.” (*Ib*, p. 432)

➤ **describing** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “I’m falling down a dark hole, then I see strange creatures.” – a description of a dream (*Af*)

➤ **reciting/reading**

- 1) “The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame Jaws that bite and claws that catch!” – reciting a poem (*Af*)
- 2) “Once upon a time, there was a dear little girl...” – reading a story (*If*)

DIRECTIVES

➤ **ordering** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “Don’t let me hear that name again!” (*A1b*, p. 17)
- 2) “Collar that Dormouse, [...] Behead that Dormouse! Turn that Dormouse out of court! Suppress him! Pinch him! Off with his whiskers!” – some of these directives could be considered declarations, but they were not an official verdict; making it merely an order, which was not even obeyed (*A1b*, p. 113)
- 3) “Off with her head!” – everyone ignored this “sentence”, as in the previous example (*A1b*, p. 122)
- 4) “Hand it over here.” (*A1b*, p. 22)
- 5) “Do as I tell you, you coward!” (*A1b*, p. 32)
- 6) “Silence, every one of you!” (*A2b*, p. 25)
- 7) “After you, Silvertongue.” (*Ib*, p. 76)
- 8) “And not another sound.” – the speaker telling/ordering a dog to be quiet (*If*)

➤ **requesting** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “You promised to tell me your history, you know” – not a promise or a report, but requesting of fulfilment of a promise made by the hearer; it was said by Alice to the Mouse, who, after Alice’s utterance, began to tell his history, due to her indirect request (*A1b*, p. 23)
- 2) “I think you ought to tell me who *you* are, first.” (*A1b*, p. 39)
- 3) “Keep your temper” (*A1b*, p. 40)
- 4) “Don’t be all day about it!” – a request for speeding things up (*A1b*, p. 91)
- 5) “I should like to have it explained” (*A1b*, p. 102)
- 6) “I should like to buy an egg, please” (*A2b*, p. 75)
- 7) “I beg your pardon?” – even though the meaning of this utterance can be compared to an apology, this utterance produced in this way and context is a request for repeating the hearer’s previous utterance (*A2b*, p. 82)
- 8) “Wear something warm” (*Ib*, p. 19)
- 9) “I’m sorry, I’d quite forgotten your question.” – could be mistaken for an expressive, but it is a request for repetition of the question (*Ib*, p. 264)
- 10) “Pass the scones, please.” (*Af*)
- 11) “You tell me how to find her! (*If*)

➤ **asking** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “And who is Dinah, if I might venture to ask the question?” (*A1b*, p. 25)
- 2) “Who are you?” (*A1b*, p. 38)
- 3) “I’d far better help you, hadn’t I?” – could be considered a commissive as well (offering help), but an explanation which followed after this utterance, *But the King took no notice of the question*, helps the decision of putting this speech act in the category of directives (*A2b*, p. 16)
- 4) “How is it you can all talk so nicely?” (*A2b*, p. 26)
- 5) “Do martens have horns?” (*Ib*, p. 33)
- 6) “I believe your name has slipped the Queen's mind.” – indirectly asking for the hearer’s name (*Af*)

➤ **advising** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “You should learn not to make personal remarks” (*A1b*, p. 62)
- 2) “I should advise you to walk the other way.” (*A2b*, p. 28)

- 3) “When in doubt, remain silent.” (*Af*)

➤ **instructing** (Yule, 1996)

- 1) “There’s no sort of use in knocking” – said by a Footman, a sort of a servant/doorman, to Alice, who tried knocking on a door to get in; the Footman gave her instructions on how not to get the door to open (*A1b*, p. 50)
- 2) “open your mouth a *little* wider when you speak” (*A2b*, p. 29)
- 3) “Speak in French when you can’t think of the English for a thing – turn out your toes as you walk – and remember who you are!” (*A2b*, p. 34)
- 4) “And don’t let him put you off with excuses.” (*Ib*, p. 59)
- 5) “never light a fire when it’s windy” – an instruction/a warning (*Ib*, p. 316)
- 6) “Next turn on the left.” – showing way/instructing (*If*)
- 7) “You can help by staying here and being safe.” – said by Mo to his daughter Meggie, she wanted to go somewhere dangerous with him, while he wanted her to stay where it is safe, which he instructed her to do with this utterance (*If*)

➤ **pleading** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “Please, then, how am I to get in?” (*A1b*, p. 50)
- 2) “*please* don’t make such faces, my dear!” (*A2b*, p. 17)

➤ **warning** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Oh, please mind what you’re doing!” (*A1b*, p. 53)
- 2) “Look out now, Five!” (*A1b*, p. 72)
- 3) “The Queen will hear you!” (*A1b*, p. 77)
- 4) “Mind the volcano!” (*A2b*, p. 16)
- 5) “Mo, there’s someone out in the yard!” (*Ib*, p. 9)
- 6) “Watch what you’re doing! (*Af*)
- 7) “And I know he looks charming ... but you know what they say about books and covers.” – (*If*)

➤ **suggesting** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “Here! you may nurse it a bit, if you like!” – a suggestion/permission (*A1b*, p. 55)
- 2) “Shall we try another figure of the Lobster Quadrille?” (*A1b*, p. 104)

- 3) “You shouldn’t make jokes if it makes you so unhappy.” (*A2b*, p. 43)
- 4) “Don’t you think you’d be safer down on the ground?” (*A2b*, p. 79)
- 5) “Wait till you’ve tried!” (*A2b*, p. 90)

➤ **prohibiting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “No room! No room!” (*A1b*, p. 61)

➤ **criticizing/reprimanding**

- 1) “It’s high time you were all in bed!” (*A1b*, p. 26)
- 2) “I told you butter wouldn’t suit the works!” (*A1b*, p. 63)
- 3) “Nobody asked *your* opinion” (*A1b*, p. 68)
- 4) “That’s none of your business, Two!” (*A1b*, p. 72)
- 5) “You ought to be ashamed of yourself for asking such a simple question” (*A1b*, p. 91)
- 6) “it isn’t etiquette to cut any one you’ve been introduced to.” (*A2b*, p. 136)
- 7) “It’s nothing to laugh about, young lady” (*Ib*, p. 43)

➤ **imploring** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Consider, my dear: she is only a child!” (*A1b*, p. 75)

➤ **proposing** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Yes, I think you’d better leave off” – a proposition, rather than an order (*A1b*, p. 103)

➤ **permitting** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “You may go” (*A1b*, p. 112)
- 2) “You may rest a little now.” (*A2b*, p. 32)
- 3) “Everyone will go home.” – prior utterances: “Find the scent of human girl and earn your freedom. For my wife and pups, as well?” – a permission for a dog’s family to leave after being captured, but is not a declarative because the speaker who uttered this permission does not intend to let the dogs go (*Af*)

➤ **insisting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Really, my dear, *you* must cross-examine the next witness.” (*A1b*, p. 114)
- 2) “Believe me, I know what I’m talking about.” (*Ib*, p. 14)

➤ **directing** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Sentence first – verdict afterwards.” (*A1b*, p. 121)
- 2) “You’re travelling the wrong way” (*A2b*, p. 37)

➤ **interrogating** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “What have you got to say for yourself?” (*A2b*, p. 10)

➤ **urging** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “It’s time for you to answer now” (*A2b*, p. 29)
- 2) “Don’t keep him waiting, child!” (*A2b*, p. 36)

➤ **correcting**

- 1) “You’ve begun wrong!” (*A2b*, p. 49)

➤ **inviting** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “Of course you agree to have a battle?” – a question/an invitation (*A2b*, p. 59)
- 2) “I invite you to Alice’s dinner-party this afternoon.” (*A2b*, p. 125)
- 3) “Alice, meet me under the gazebo in precisely 10 minutes.” (*Af*)
- 4) “If you’d like to look around, be my guest.” (*If*)

➤ **defying** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “You couldn’t have it if you *did* want it” (*A2b*, p. 65)

➤ **provoking**

- 1) “I’m sure it must be very comfortable sleeping with a hard, rectangular thing like that under your head” – teasing/sarcasm, provoking a reaction from the hearer (*Ib*, p. 7)
- 2) “If so, he could be a werewolf.” – said by Mo to his daughter; she warned him that somebody was standing in their yard in the dark and rain, while he produced this utterance sarcastically, teasing her (*Ib*, p. 10)
- 3) “Yes, of course that almost comes to the same thing!” – Dustfinger mocking Meggie when she tried to act tough; the following sentence being *His mockery hurt like stinging nettles.* (*Ib*, p. 32)

➤ **reminding**

- 1) “Remember, you promised not to mention me!” (*Ib*, p. 257)

COMMISSIVES

➤ **promising** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “Do come back again, and we won’t talk about cats or dogs either, if you don’t like them!” (*A1b*, p. 17)
- 2) “I won’t interrupt again!” (*A1b*, p. 68)
- 3) “You shan’t be beheaded!” – after the utterance, the speaker protected the gardeners (hearers), making this a promise (*A1b*, p. 76)
- 4) “I shan’t be long” (*A2b*, p. 120)
- 5) “He’ll be gone when you get up in the morning. Word of honour.” – this was said by Mo, while the preceding utterance was said by his daughter: “Send him away, Mo!”; by uttering this, Mo indirectly promised he is going to make sure this person was gone in the morning (*Ib*, p. 13)
- 6) “I’ll never let him have it.” (*Ib*, p. 14)
- 7) “I’ll be off first thing in the morning, I promise!” (*Ib*, p. 66)
- 8) “I should think so” – accepting the proposition “do you think you could stop looking at me as if you wanted to poison me all the time?”/promising (*Ib*, p. 83)
- 9) “I will.” – a reply to “Just bring her back.”, making this a promise (*If*)

➤ **threatening** (Yule, 1996)

- 1) “If you do, I’ll set Dinah at you!” (*A1b*, p. 34)
- 2) “and don’t be nervous, or I’ll have you executed on the spot.” (*A1b*, p. 109)
- 3) “If you don’t hold your tongues, I’ll pick you!” (*A2b*, p. 26)
- 4) “If you do such a thing again I’ll have you buttered!” (*A2b*, p. 96)
- 5) “One more trick like that, though, and I’ll carve a few nice new patterns on your ugly face. And make myself a fur collar out of your marten.” (*Ib*, p. 167)
- 6) “If I find even a bookmark out of place, I’ll lock this room up and you’ll never see the inside of it again, that I can promise you.” – not a promise, but a threat (*If*)

7) “You’ll pay for your filthy story!” – though empty, still a threat (*If*)

➤ **refusing** (Yule, 1996)

- 1) “No, thank you, one’s *quite* enough!” – refusing to take another biscuit (*A2b*, p. 33)
- 2) “I’m not getting back in until you tell me.” – an ultimatum/a refusal (*Ib*, p. 29)
- 3) “You won’t get any more information out of me.” (*Ib*, p. 111)
- 4) “You’re the last man I’d give one to” (*Ib*, p. 172)

➤ **offering** (Levinson, 1983)

- 1) “let me sing you a song to comfort you” – not asking for a permission, but **offering** to sing (*A2b*, p. 116)
- 2) “How about cocoa for breakfast?” (*Ib*, p. 18)
- 3) “You can have my bed.” (*Ib*, p. 155)
- 4) “Then I’ll take you to the Hare and the Hatter, but that’s the end of it.” (*Af*)
- 5) “I want to help you.” (*Af*)
- 6) “perhaps you’d consider becoming an apprentice with the company.” – a job offer (*Af*)
- 7) “Maybe I can help.” (*If*)

➤ **swearing/vowing to** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “and a creature like you isn’t going to spoil that at the last moment, as sure as my name’s Elinor Loredan!” (*Ib*, p. 525)
- 2) “On the Frabjous Day, when the White Queen once again wears the crown, on that day, I shall Futterwacken vigorously.” – promising/vowing to (*Af*)

➤ **betting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “I’ll bet my knife he’ll be here by tomorrow at the latest!” (*Ib*, p. 341)

➤ **volunteering** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “That would be I” – an answer to the question “Who will step forth to be champion for the White Queen?” (*Af*)

➤ **speaker expressing his/her intention** (Searle, 1976) - committing herself/himself to a course of action, more general than the other subcategories of commissives; speech acts that do not belong to any other commissive subcategory, but are still commissives

- 1) “Why, the best way to explain it is to do it.” – when asked to explain an action, the speaker announces he will do the action; indirectly committing himself to a course of action (*A1b*, p. 21)
- 2) “I’ve something important to say!” (*A1b*, p. 39)
- 3) “I’ll put you through into Looking-Glass House.” (*A2b*, p. 12)
- 4) “I’m *not* going again yet” – the speaker announcing her intention **not to** perform an action (*A2b*, p. 23)
- 5) “and I’m not going to take ‘em away.” (*A2b*, p. 73)
- 6) “And here I must leave you.” (*A2b*, p. 115)
- 7) “I’m willing to take that chance.” – after the utterance by his wife, “That kind of thinking could ruin you”, Alice’s father is still intent on expanding his business (*Af*)
- 8) “Speaking of the Queen, here is a little song we used to sing in her honor.” (*Af*)
- 9) “I could help you stay hidden, but I won’t.” (*If*)

EXPRESSIVES

➤ **expressing feelings** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “You insult me by talking such nonsense!” – the speaker expressing his feelings of being insulted (*A1b*, p. 25)
- 2) “Sure, I don’t like it, yer honour, at all, at all!” – the speaker expressing his feelings of dislike (*A1b*, p. 32)
- 3) “I’m very sorry you’ve been annoyed” – the speaker expressing his feelings of empathy (*A1b*, p. 46)
- 4) “How puzzling all these changes are!” – the speaker expressing her feelings of confusion (*A1b*, pp. 47-48)
- 5) “It’s the most curious thing I ever saw in all my life” – the speaker expressing her feelings of bewilderment; the speaker, Alice, commonly uses the expression ‘curious’ for something she considers peculiar or shocking (*A1b*, p. 59)
- 6) “You can’t think how glad I am to see you again, you dear old thing!” – the speaker expressing her feeling of relief, seeing a friendly face in prison (*A1b*, p. 84)

- 7) “Never heard of uglifying!” – in the preceding utterance, Alice said she had never heard of uglifying, so this is the speaker’s exclamation of shock (context: The Gryphon lifted up both its paws in surprise. “What! Never heard of uglifying!” it exclaimed.) (*A1b*, p. 92)
- 8) “It’s by far the most confusing thing *I* ever heard! – the speaker expressing their feeling of confusion; Ibid. example 4. (*A1b*, p. 103)
- 9) “It quite makes my forehead ache!” – physical feeling of pain (*A1b*, p. 114)
- 10) “I’d far rather go without them than eat them!” – the speaker (Alice) expressing her feelings about food (dislike); she is talking to herself about a possible punishment of not being permitted to eat dinner for 50 days; by this utterance, she is expressing her feelings about eating dinner in general (*A2b*, p. 10)
- 11) “How nice and soft it sounds!” – the speaker expressing her feelings of liking something (*A2b*, p. 10)
- 12) “My precious Lily!” (*A2b*, p. 15)
- 13) “I like the Walrus best because he was a little sorry for the poor oysters.” – Ibid. example 17. (*A2b*, p. 55)
- 14) “Isn’t he a *lovely* sight?” – could be considered a question (directive), but after the utterance follows *said Tweedledum*, which makes it a rhetorical question, i.e., the speaker expressing his feelings of liking something (*A2b*, p. 56)
- 15) “I’m very glad I happened to be in the way” – the speaker is grateful (*A2b*, p. 63)
- 16) “It’s *very* provoking to be called an egg” (*A2b*, p. 77)
- 17) “You alarm me!” – the speaker expressing feeling of being alarmed (*A2b*, p. 95)
- 18) “What an idea!” (*A2b*, p. 97)
- 19) “I *am* so sleepy!” – the speaker being physically tired (*A2b*, p. 130)
- 20) “My word! – exclamation, the speaker is surprised (*Ib*, p. 12)
- 21) “A lovely place, isn’t it?” – a rhetorical question, the speaker expressing his liking of the place in question (*Ib*, p. 37)
- 22) “Good heavens, Mortimer! What a surprise!” (*Ib*, p. 40)
- 23) “Just the thing for a library door, eh?” – a rhetorical question, the speaker (Elinor) being content about her sign above the library door, expressing that she likes the sign (*Ib*, pp. 43-44)
- 24) “Look at this table!” – could be mistaken for a directive, but it is not meant as an order to look at a table, but an exclamation of discontent about the size of the table (*Ib*, p. 61)

- 25) "I still don't trust him." – the speaker expressing her feeling of distrust; could be seen as a representative (an expression of the speaker's belief), but the emphasis is on the expression of the speaker's feeling towards the person she is referring to, making this an expressive (*Ib*, p. 114)
- 26) "Has the man gone right out of his mind?" – a rhetorical question, the speaker is shocked (*Ib*, p. 121)
- 27) "Electric light is a wonderful invention!" – exclamation of joy for having found a light in the dark (*Ib*, p. 140)
- 28) "And I could wring my own neck for dragging you two into all this." – the speaker is mad at himself (*Ib*, p. 196)
- 29) "By all the letters of the alphabet!" (*Ib*, p. 340)
- 30) "Devil take these flickery little things!" – the speaker expressing his anger towards fairies (*Ib*, p. 377)
- 31) "Tonight has aged me by ten years!" – the speaker expressing her shock (*Ib*, p. 437)
- 32) "I'm pleased that you purchased the company." – the speaker expressing her feeling of being pleased (*Af*)
- 33) "Curiouser and curiouser." (*Af*)
- 34) "I feel like the words bring her back to me." – the speaker expressing how she feels when writing (*If*)
- 35) "All these years you've allowed me to think the worst of Resa!" – said by Elinor to Mo, who made Elinor think his wife Resa, Elinor's niece, abandoned him and their daughter, but she was missing. Elinor is expressing her anger towards Mo with this utterance, also trying to make Mo feel sorry for what he did, making this utterance an expressive (expressing feelings), rather than expressing belief or stating a fact (representative) (*If*)

➤ **insulting**

- 1) "Idiot!" (*A1b*, p. 74)
- 2) "really you are very dull!" (*A1b*, p. 91)
- 3) "Oh, you wicked, wicked little thing!" (*A2b*, p. 8)
- 4) "It's my opinion that you never think *at all*" – not a representative, but an insult formed as a representative (*A2b*, p. 26)
- 5) "It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards" (*A2b*, p. 65)
- 6) "You're even more foolish than I thought." (*Ib*, p. 95)

7) “Oh, you illiterate cretins!” (*If*)

➤ **accepting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Very much indeed” – an answer to the question “Would you like to see a little of it?”; accepting (*A1b*, p. 96)
- 2) “My pleasure.” – accepting other speaker’s thanks (*Af*)

➤ **apologizing** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “Oh, I *beg* your pardon!” (*A1b*, p. 115)
- 2) “I’m afraid I’m giving you a great deal of trouble.” – not being afraid, but apologizing in a way (*A2b*, p. 86)
- 3) “Your Majesty must excuse her” – an apology, even though the speaker is not apologising for himself, but for another person (*A2b*, p. 129)
- 4) “Forgive my wife.” (*Af*)

➤ **comforting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Consider what a great girl you are!” (*A2b*, p. 68)
- 2) “Don’t worry” (*Ib*, p. 38)
- 3) “Oh dear, don’t look so dismal!” (*Ib*, p. 114)
- 4) “It’s only a dream, Alice.” (*Af*)
- 5) “Good doggies.” – trying to calm the dogs (*If*)

➤ **greeting/taking leave** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “Goodbye, till we meet again!” (*A2b*, p. 90)
- 2) “Goodnight, Meggie.” (*Ib*, p. 17)
- 3) “Fairfarren, all.” – the speaker wishing a safe trip to everyone (*Af*)
- 4) “Afternoon.” – short of ‘Good afternoon’ (*If*)

➤ **thanking** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “And thank you for the warning anyway” (*Ib*, p. 16)

➤ **welcoming** (Searle, 1976)

- 1) “Welcome to the Devil’s house!” – welcoming (*Ib*, p. 163)

- 2) “My dear girl, anyone with a head that large is welcome in my court.” (*Af*)
- 3) “Welcome to our humble abode.” – although sarcastic, still welcoming (*If*)

➤ **praising/complimenting** (Bach and Harnish, 1979)

- 1) “What a beautiful belt you’ve got on!” (*A2b*, p. 81)
- 2) “What an extraordinary fellow you are!” (*Ib*, p. 418)
- 3) “You’re a clever girl, Meggie.” – complimenting (*If*)

DECLARATIONS

- 1) “The race is over!” – announcement made while the characters were still running, which made them stop running; a **change in the world** was caused (*A1b*, p. 21)
- 2) “*Everybody* has won, and all must have prizes.” – announcement made after the question on who won the race; the **change in the world** is that all contestants are winners (*A1b*, p. 21)
- 3) “Off with their heads!” – an utterance the Red Queen commonly says; when she says it for the first time, it is as a verdict, but when nothing happens and she repeats it, it is merely a directive; in this case, she said it for the first time (*A1b*, p. 76)
- 4) “You are all pardoned” – King said that to all the creatures the Queen ordered to be executed (example 3.) (*A1b*, pp. 88-89)
- 5) “If that’s all you know about it, you may stand down” – permission to stand down made by the person of power without which the witness would not be permitted to stand down (*A1b*, p. 112)
- 6) “Ten minutes allowed for refreshments!” – announcement made by the King during a fight; after which the fight stopped (*A2b*, p. 99)
- 7) “Well, now we’re quits, Dustfinger and I” – the speaker (*Mo*) making a decision to end his relationship with Dustfinger (*Ib*, p. 142)
- 8) “So... I curse you, Basta – I curse you by the bones of the dead man lying in this coffin.” – the hearer (*Basta*) is superstitious, so for him this curse was a change in the world (*Ib*, p. 458)
- 9) “Off with his head!” – *Ibid.* example 3. (*Af*)

- 10) “you are banished to the Outlands. No one is to show you any kindness, or ever speak a word to you.” – an announcement by the Queen as a sentence to her sister (*Af*)
- 11) “you are to join Iracebeth in banishment from this day until the end of Underland.” – an announcement by the Queen as a sentence to her sister’s servant (*Af*)
- 12) “By the bones of the dead man in this coffin, I curse you.[...] May his spirit haunt your every step.” – Ibid. example 8. (*If*)

ISSUES/BORDERLINE CASES

These examples show how sometimes an overlap can happen; whether due to occasional similarities of categories, or due to ambiguity of context and possible speaker’s intention for the produced speech act.

- 1) “and how funny it’ll seem, sending presents to one’s own feet!” – the context behind this example is Alice thinking about things that will probably never happen; this could be an **expressive**, Alice expressing her feelings (“how funny it’ll seem), or a **representative**, Alice expressing her opinion on an improbable situation (*A1b*, p. 11)
- 2) “Silence in the court!” – could be a **directive** (an order), but also a **declaration** (when this was said by the person in power, a change in the world happened, i.e., everyone stopped talking)
- 3) “Then I hope your finger is better now?” – could be a question (**directive**), but also the speaker’s expression of empathy (**expressive**) (*A2b*, p. 69)
- 4) “Arrest that girl for unlawful seduction!” – could be a **declaration** because this was uttered by a person in power (the Queen), but it could also be purely an **order**, because it was said in unofficial circumstances (*Af*)
- 5) “How can I ever repay you?” – could be a question (**directive**), but also a rhetorical question, i.e., an **expressive** of the speaker’s gratitude (*If*)
- 6) “I’ll meet you at the stables.” – could be a **commissive**, but also a **directive** (inviting/requesting to meet) (*If*)

INTERRUPTIONS

These examples have all been interrupted in some way and were therefore not added to the speech act categories.

- 1) “Well, of all the unjust things – “ – could be a representative, but it has been interrupted, so it could belong to another speech act category depending on the ending of the utterance (*A1b*, p. 72)
- 2) “So you see, Miss, we’re doing out best, afore she comes, to –“ – probably a representative (*A1b*, p. 73)
- 3) “She boxed the Queens’s ears – “ – interrupted by laughter, but is probably a report, making it a representative (*A1b*, p. 77)
- 4) “Not at all, she’s so extremely – likely to win, that it’s hardly worth while finishing the game” – Alice was asked “How do you like the Queen?”, and she was about to say she dislikes her, but the Queen came near her, so Alice said something else; this should have been an expressive, it started as one, but due to an interruption it ended as a representative, being the perfect example of how the ending of an utterance can change its speech act category completely (*A1b*, p. 80)
- 5) “I’ve often seen them at dinn – “ – the speaker stopped herself in order to not offend the hearers; however, it would probably be a representative (*A1b*, p. 99)
- 6) “Well, at any rate, the Dormouse said – “ – probably a representative (*A1b*, p. 111)
- 7) “I feel somehow as if I was getting invisible – “ – could be an expressive, if the speaker feels socially invisible, or a representative, if she feels, i.e., believes she is physically invisible; the ending of the utterance is needed to interpret the speech act category (*A2b*, p. 15)
- 8) “I really *shall* do it this time – “ – could be a commissive (speaker’s intention) (*A2b*, p. 24)
- 9) “That would be nonsense – “ – Ibid. example 6. (*A2b*, p. 30)
- 10) “when you get to the Eighth Square you’ll be a Queen – “ – – could be a representative (*A2b*, p. 31)
- 11) “Change engines – “ – the speaker started to choke, interrupting the utterance; it may be a directive (*A2b*, p. 37)
- 12) “They were *both* very unpleasant characters – “ – Ibid. example 6. (*A2b*, p. 56)
- 13) “There’s a mistake somewhere – “ – a possible representative interrupted by another character’s screaming (*A2b*, p. 67)
- 14) “My *name* is Alice, but – “ – – could be a representative (*A2b*, p. 78)
- 15) “Of all the unsatisfactory – [...], of all the unsatisfactory people I *ever* met – “ – could be an expressive, the speaker insulting the hearer (*A2b*, p. 91)

- 16) “You’re my – “ – it could be speculated that the utterance was going to be a repetition of the speaker’s previous utterance “You’re my prisoner!”, but it was interrupted, so there is no way to be sure (*A2b*, p. 106)
- 17) “Please, would you tell me – “ – probably a directive (*A2b*, p. 124)
- 18) “Why, don’t you see, child – “ – Ibid. example 12. (*A2b*, p. 124)
- 19) “I suppose – “ – Ibid. example 6. (*A2b*, p. 126)
- 20) “I’ve read all the ones in my room, and ...“ – Ibid. example 6. (*Ib*, p. 24)
- 21) “As brave as... as... “ – probably a comparison (representative), but the speaker could not think of a person brave enough to compare Meggie to (*Ib*, p. 505)
- 22) “You’re bound to produce little... Imbeciles!” – the utterance was interrupted by an exclamation of anger towards gardeners who planted wrong flowers (*Af*)
- 23) “We were just...” – probably a representative, the speaker trying to justify his cheating of his wife, but is unable to find a solid excuse (*Af*)
- 24) “Good thing the bloodhound is one of us, or you'd be... “ – could be a representative (*Af*)
- 25) “I don't take orders from big, clumsy, galumphing...” – Ibid. example 6. (*Af*)
- 26) “Meggie, please just...” – probably a directive (*If*)
- 27) “I make up stories about...” – probably a representative (*If*)
- 28) “After this, you teach me Dragon’s Breath... “ – probably a directive, but the ending of the utterance could change the category (*If*)
- 29) “I’ll give you ghost stories, you...” – most probably a commissive, the speaker not ending reference to the hearer (*If*)

3.5. Interpretation of the speech act analysis in chosen works

For this analysis, five speech act categories according to Searle (1976) were taken into consideration when classifying the utterances found in books “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”, “Through the Looking Glass” and “Inkheart”, and in films “Alice in Wonderland” and “Inkheart”. These speech act categories are representatives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations.

Out of 11 829 speech acts found in aforementioned books and films, 55.67% are representatives. In the three analysed books, 59.01% of the speech acts were representatives (58.33% representatives in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”, 61.33% in “Through the Looking Glass”, and 57.38% in “Inkheart”), while a smaller percentage of representatives was

found in the films; 46.63% (45.74% in “Alice in Wonderland” and 47.51% in “Inkheart”). There are several possible reasons for this difference in percentages of representatives between books and films; in these three books, there was a lot of storytelling, reading or reciting of poems, and singing of songs (representatives). These parts were either omitted or heavily reduced in the films that were based on these books. More common types of communication in films are those between a speaker and a hearer, whereas in books more descriptions and explanations can be found. Writers are not as limited with number of pages as filmmakers are with duration; even though there are films that exceed the duration of an average film, many tend to stay within the limit in order to attract greater audience. Another reason for this difference regarding the percentage of representatives in books and films may be the difference of the two media; in films, the audience can see and hear the scenery and the characters. In books, however, writers have to describe these aspects in a more detailed and creative matter (using words – descriptions, explanations) in order for readers to imagine what they are trying to convey. This is usually done with author’s notes and descriptions, but utterances have a significant role in these situations as well, which was seen throughout the analysis. These reasons are also valid for a difference in the percentage of directives in the books and films; out of total number of speech acts found in the analysis of chosen works, 30.55% of them are directives. In books, 27.46% of speech acts are directives (28.05% of directives in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”, 24.03% in “Through the Looking Glass”, and 30.30% in “Inkheart”), while in films this percentage is slightly higher: 36.29% (35.08% in “Alice in Wonderland” and 37.49% in “Inkheart”).

The next category, commissives, is not as represented in chosen works as the two previously mentioned categories. Its percentage out of all 11 829 speech acts found in this analysis is 3.89%. There is no significant difference when comparing the percentages of commissives found in the books and in the films; 3.36% of the speech acts found in the chosen books were commissives (2.64% of commissives in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”, 2.63% in “Through the Looking Glass”, and 4.83% in “Inkheart”), while commissives made 3.81% of speech acts in the analysed films (3.64% in “Alice in Wonderland” and 3.98% in “Inkheart”). The reason behind such a smaller percentage of commissives compared to representatives and directives may be the nature of commissives; they display the speaker’s intention and commit them to some future action. When a person is about to do something, they usually just do it without announcing or promising to do it, making commissives redundant in some situations. However, when people want or need someone else to do something

(directives), they have to use utterances to do so; to ask, order or instruct that person. That makes utterances a larger part of the actions of directives (and even representatives) than of actions of commissives, which can sometimes be performed without any utterances.

When it comes to expressives, they are a bit more common than commissives, but not quite as common as representatives and directives. They make up 9.72% of all speech acts found in the analysis. The percentage of expressives in the analysed books is 10.08% (10.48% of expressives in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”, 11.95% in “Through the Looking Glass”, and 7.81% in “Inkheart”), while it is a bit higher in the analysed films: 12.81% (14.74% in “Alice in Wonderland” and 10.88% in “Inkheart”). Expressives, as well as commissives, do not need utterances in some situations for conveying their point and performing the actions intended by the speaker. They state what the speaker feels, which can be shown in other ways aside from simply saying how one feels: actions, facial expressions, body language, etc.

The last category, declarations, is by far the least common one. It seems logical, because the circumstances needed for these speech acts are rare; according to Searle (1979), the speaker has to be at an appropriate power position (e.g., an umpire), at the appropriate place (e.g., a basketball court), at the appropriate time (e.g., during a basketball game), and utter the appropriate speech act (e.g., “You’re out!”) to an appropriate person (e.g. a player with five personal fouls). Though rare, there were some declarations found in chosen books and films: 0.17% of the total number of speech acts. Percentage of declarations in the books is 0.2% (0.5% of declarations in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”, 0.06% in “Through the Looking Glass”, and 0.03% in “Inkheart”), and 0.47% in the films (0.80% in “Alice in Wonderland” and 0.13% in “Inkheart”). In these works, there are characters such as queens, kings and villains that are at power positions and are able to, in the right circumstances, produce a declaration.

Two sections also mentioned in this paper are borderline cases and interruptions, but they were not taken into consideration when counting all the analysed speech acts; borderline cases, due to difficulties with deciding to which categories these utterances belong (it usually comes down to two categories), and interruptions, whose endings could change the possible speech act category, but categories of these utterances could only be speculated about. When it comes to the section of borderline cases, the examples were checked several times after having analysed all chosen works. This resulted in many cases that were firstly in the borderline section to be distinguished as belonging to a certain speech act category after all. This also applies to speech acts of this analysis in general; certain speech acts’ category had already been decided, but after revising, and after having finished the analysis of the three books and two

films and being more experienced than before the start of the analysis, several speech acts' categories were corrected after second thought. One common issue was rhetorical question, especially in the book "Inkheart". They were used a lot of times, and were sometimes answered, so it was difficult to distinguish whether they were meant as a question (directive) or as another speech act. This is where context helped the most; in this analysis, it is one of the most important things for attributing a speech act category to ambiguous utterances. Example 35. of the directive category given above perfectly shows the importance of context when deciding on a speech act category; sometimes prior or following sentence makes all the difference. Another example where context is relevant are thoughts; this was mostly relevant in books about Alice, where she encountered peculiar occurrences and beings, and many times when she had a thought, she did not say it aloud, even though in the books it was marked with quotation marks, as all utterances. However, these were only her thoughts, not utterances, so they were not included in the analysis. Sometimes she would talk to herself, but these utterances were taken into consideration, due to them actually being uttered. That is why context had to be observed closely. A similar example was identified several times in the book "Inkheart"; there were instances of past utterances, where it was mentioned that a person used to say something or had said something in the past. These examples were also not included in the analysis, because these were not present utterances, even though they were also marked with quotation marks.

While analysing the subtitles of films, most of the time the document was analysed without referring back to films, because the films have been rewatched several times, and the plot and the characters are similar to the books the films were based on. However, in some cases, there was a need for searching certain utterances in films to understand the context behind them.

When it comes to the characters' use of speech acts, sometimes there were more common uses of particular speech act categories by some characters. For example, in both books and film "Alice in Wonderland", Red Queen, being a queen, and a vicious one, often used directives; ordering people around, asking them to do something, instructing, demanding and restricting. However, if one tries to describe a character on the basis of their speech act use, it is a difficult task. Even though in the subchapter 3.2., which deals with previous researches, some conclusions were made about defining characters' personalities based on their speech act use, they could hardly be made here. Taking the category of directives as an example: there is a wide range of actions, both positive, negative and neutral, that belong to

this category. If one looks at the analysed work of this paper, it can be seen that both Red Queen (“Alice in Wonderland”) and Mo (“Inkheart”) tend to use directives. However, these two characters cannot be more different; Red Queen is selfish, uses her power to have her way, orders, commands, forbids, restricts, no matter the consequences and casualties. Mo, on the other hand, is a single parent whose main goal is to protect his daughter and bring back his wife. He uses directives when talking to his daughter; however, these are not mostly orders. He asks his daughter kindly to do something, sometimes even begs or pleads, advises, warns, suggests. A speech act category covers so many actions, that it should not be a criterion when analysing a character’s personality.

Referring back to the two hypotheses that were put forward in the methodological section of this paper; it seems that both of them were proven wrong. The first hypothesis, which says that films will contain a greater number of speech acts than books due to more frequent occurrence of dialogue, was wrong due to variations in film duration and page numbers of books. “Inkheart”, the book, has 543 pages and 6311 speech acts in total, but had to be comprised into a film of duration of 1 hour and 46 minutes, which has 1507 speech acts in total. The second hypothesis, which states that certain types of speech acts will be more frequent than others due to differences in plot and the theme of chosen works, is partially true, but for the wrong reasons. There are differences in frequency of certain speech act categories, as mentioned above. However, the reason behind these differences is not dissimilarity of plot and themes of chosen work, as hypothesized. It was already mentioned that books and films are different kinds of media, which requires different speech act use, e.g., greater use of representatives in books than in films, in order to describe what cannot be seen and heard (aside from author’s notes and descriptions, which were not included in the analysis of this paper). There were also no patterns according to which it could be concluded that there were differences due to different plot and theme. In the category of expressives, a variation of percentages was found; in “Alice”’s books and film expressives were slightly more frequent than in “Inkheart” book and film. However, the reason for this is not the difference in plot or theme of the books and films, but the character of Alice, the protagonist of “Alice”’s books and film. She is mostly the one doing the talking, and she commonly expresses her feelings. Throughout books and film, she encounters peculiar occurrences and beings, which leaves her shocked, sad, happy, confused, etc.

4. Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to analyse the speech acts' use in books "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland", "Through the Looking Glass", and "Inkheart", and films "Alice in Wonderland" and "Inkheart", to observe variations in their frequency and discuss possible reasons for these variations. The analysis was carried out both quantitatively (frequency of speech acts) and qualitatively (providing concrete examples, i.e., utterances from the analysed books and films that represent Searle's categories and act labels), because both ways were deemed important for this type of analysis. The crucial part for the analysis was acquiring knowledge on speech acts and their categories according to Searle (1976). It is logical that there is no analysis without firstly being familiar with the theoretical background in question, but here it was of great importance because there are some overlaps among Searle's categories, especially when a person utters an ambiguous speech act. Context was extremely important when deciding on debatable utterances, but sometimes even with contextual information it was difficult to distinguish the right category of a speech act, i.e., what the speaker intended with her/his utterance. Two hypotheses given in the methodological part of the paper were proven wrong; the first one, saying that films will contain a greater number of speech acts than books, was wrong due to variations regarding page numbers of books and duration of films. The second one, saying that the reason for variations in speech act frequency will be differences in plot and theme of chosen works, was wrong because the reasons were the nature of speech act categories and speech act use of different characters in chosen works. Out of all five speech act categories, representatives were the most frequent ones. It makes sense when one looks at the nature of representatives; they express the speaker's belief, covering a wide range of actions, certainly wider than any of the other categories'. However, greater percentage of representatives was found in the books than in the films, which can be attributed to films having visual and auditory aids for easier understanding of surroundings and characters. This is not the case with books; more descriptions and explanations are needed for portrayal of characters and surroundings (together with author's notes and descriptions, which were not included in this analysis), which may be the reason for the greater percentage of representatives. When it comes to directives, it was seen that different characters can have similar frequency of use of a certain speech act category, but it does not necessarily make their personalities similar. In the category of directives, actions can be positive, neutral and negative, so judging a character's personality solely based on their use of a certain speech act category is illogical, contrary to

opinions and conclusions of previously mentioned scholars in this field. People's use of speech acts can vary in accordance with different spheres and situations, but speech acts people use generally express the same notions in accordance with their categories; representatives, which convey the speaker's beliefs, and directives, which show the speaker's wish for the hearer to do something, are going to be more common than commissives, which show the speaker's intention to do something, and expressives, which express the speaker's feelings. Declarations are a rare occurrence, but this is the case due to their requirements for specific conditions. However, commissives and expressives do not necessarily need utterances or even communication for the enacting of actions; if a speaker has an intention to do something, she or he does not need to announce it, but can just perform the action. Similarly, an emotion can be expressed in a number of ways other than uttering it. Finally, it should also be noted that, since only several books and films were analysed, more works of different genres and styles should be analysed to confirm this thesis.

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- **Corpus analysed**

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6. Speech Acts in Books and Films: “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” and “Inkheart”: Summary and key words

Speech acts are a significant part of everyday communication; they show how a speaker’s utterance can not only describe or signify an action, but also perform an action on its own. The aim of this diploma paper was to determine the frequency and nature of use of particular speech acts in chosen works through analysis according to Searle’s speech act categories. For this analysis, two most important aspects were familiarising with theoretical framework and Searle’s speech act categories, and closely observing the context of each utterance. Throughout the analysis, 11 829 speech acts in total were found in chosen books (Lewis Carroll’s “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” and “Through the Looking Glass”, and Cornelia Funke’s “Inkheart”) and films (Tim Burton’s “Alice in Wonderland” and Iain Softley’s “Inkheart”). The most common speech act category found were representatives. Directives were the second most frequent category, while other categories were much less frequent than these two. The reason for this result is that actions of representatives and directives are rarely able to be performed without utterances, while it is not the case with commissives and expressives. Declarations, however, also rely more heavily on uttering, but the circumstances for this speech act category are quite rare.

Key words: speech acts, context, Searle, pragmatics, “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland”, “Through the Looking Glass”, “Inkheart”, “Alice in Wonderland”.

7. Govorni činovi u knjigama i filmovima: „Alisa u zemlji čudesa“ i „Srce od tinte“: Sažetak i ključne riječi

Govorni činovi značajan su dio svakodnevne komunikacije; pokazatelji su sposobnosti iskaza da se njime vrši određena radnja, a ne samo da se opisuje ili imenuje. Cilj ovog rada bio je utvrditi frekvenciju i prirodu govornih činova prema Searlovoj kategorizaciji u odabranim djelima. Dva najvažnija aspekta ove analize bila su upoznavanje s teorijskom osnovom i Searlovim kategorijama govornih činova te detaljno praćenje konteksta svakog iskaza. U odabranim knjigama („Alisa u zemlji čudesa“, „Alisa s one strane ogledala“ Lewisa Carrolla i „Srce od tinte“ Cornelia Funke) i filmovima („Alisa u zemlji čudesa“ Tima Burtona i „Srce od tinte“ Iaina Softleya) pronađeno je ukupno 11 829 govornih činova. Najveću pojavnost imala je kategorija asertiva (eng. *representatives*). Druga najčešća kategorija su direktivi (eng. *directives*), dok su ostale kategorije bile znatno rjeđe od dvije navedene kategorije. Razlog tome je što se radnje koje vrše asertivi i direktivi rijetko mogu izvršiti bez govora, odnosno iskaza, dok je radnje komisiva (eng. *commissives*) i ekspresiva (eng. *expressives*) često moguće izvršiti bez ikakvog govora. Deklaracije (eng. *declarations*) također ovise o govoru, odnosno iskazima, no okolnosti koje moraju biti prisutne za ovu kategoriju su rijetke.

Ključne riječi: govorni činovi, kontekst, Searle, pragmatika, „Alisa u zemlji čudesa“, „Alisa s one strane ogledala“, „Srce od tinte“.