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POSLIJEDIPLOMSKI SVEUČILIŠNI STUDIJ
SOCIOLOGIJA REGIONALNOG I LOKALNOG RAZVOJA

Ana Žuvela

**DECENTRALISATION OF CULTURAL POLICY
AND PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN
CULTURE - EXAMPLES OF CROATIAN
PRACTICES**

Doktorski rad

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Zadar, 23. prosinca 2020.

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*„Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere the ceremony
of innocence is lost
The best lack all conviction, while the worst are filled
with passionate intensity.” (W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming)*

1. INTRODUCTION

The central subject of this dissertation is the cultural policy and its evolution in the register of decentralisation and new directions in governance in culture, that particularly of participatory governance in Croatia in the period from 2000 to 2017. The subject of cultural policy inevitably raises the questions of exerting power through sets of regulations and modes of control, especially in the practical operations that are administered and exercised by government officials. This is apposed with the contemporary challenges in cultural policy development that critically reflect and question the levels of democratization in cultural policy needed for securing and widening public traits, access and participation in culture. Such circumstances call for the recalibration of conceptual, normative and technical framework of cultural policy, which is, given the particular socio-political context, not a simple goal to achieve. This is further elaborated in the articulation of detected concerns on the directions and dynamics of cultural policy change in the register of structural (or functional) decentralisation and development of participatory governance in culture. Detected concerns indicate the issues of representation, which has been ever-present *maladie* of the cultural policy discourse and practice in Croatia. Its most blatant manifestation is found in the limited permeability of cultural policy processes and the disparate levels of inclusion of institutional (politically controlled) vs. non-institutional cultural sector representatives in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of cultural policy. Inevitably, the research into cultural policy opens the questions on cycles of cultural policymaking and cultural policy process that entail the emphasis on the issues of representation and legitimacy. This approach requires the analysis of new actors in the field of culture and the promptness of cultural policy to adapt to the changing socio-economic and political environment. The challenge here lies in defining the cycles and periods of cultural policy given the transitional context and residues and convergence of pre-1990s socialist period and post 1990s capitalist democracy. Insofar, the dissertation tracks devolution of power and authority in cultural policy through the normative concept of decentralisation and distinctive types of governance, such as participatory governance in culture, which brings into light the democratic qualities in state-culture relations highlighting special relevance of non-governmental civil society actors and sub-national levels of cultural development and local cultural policy action.

To explore the state-of-art in the devolution or sharing of authority in the participatory approaches to cultural governance and policymaking in greater detail, the research focuses on the investigation of the policy framework, as well as the illustration of specific practices of participatory governance in culture. Through this approach, the issues of modernization processes can be implicitly interconnected to the evolution and transformation of cultural policy, most specifically through the topics of power devolution in the form of decentralisation and participatory governance in culture that simultaneously affirm and challenge some of the changes imposed by transformative modernisation processes such as organisational differentiation and the extension of the state capacity.

The democratisation of public policy and accompanying public system, in this case, cultural policy and cultural system, is a standard of modernisation processes. Although the Croatian experience of the modernisation process in the past three decades is marked by severe fractures and ruptures, an overarching issue is the authenticity of the discontinuities in the approaches, styles, rationales and modes of governance. In other words, when discussing and analysing cultural policy changes in the scope of its development or modernisation, it is necessary to assess whether transition yielded transformation in sense of democratisation of cultural policy, or do the dominant modes of governing still reflect pre-transitional approaches. As Švob-Đokić remarks, the transitional process is not only about a temporal dimension of changes – the importance is placed on the origin of the transition and the legacies that define the total of social and economic structures that set the transition off. For the case of Croatia, it is vital to underline that transition is not only about moving from one system to another, but that it connotes a shift of the system and total social transformation. Both topics of decentralisation and participatory governance can be understood as integral elements of modernisation processes of cultural policy, and as such as indicators of the modernisation process in line of democratisation.

Over the past three decades, decentralisation and participatory governance in culture have become highly topical in both academic and political debates on the global scale. The shift from “government” to “governance” is described as one of the most notable developments within contemporary social science. In both scientific and practical terms, it designates “a shift to societal decision-making processes that involve a larger number of actors, not only governmental but also from the

private and non-profit sector. In addition, governance refers to processes of decision-making using information flows and networks of relationships between the relevant societal actors. The shift to governance has been explained in a number of ways, from social actors wishing to be more involved in decisions, to governments wishing to be less involved, to the influence of globalization and the ways in which the rescaling of political and social actions is taking place at the present time. Governance obliges governments to connect in new ways with non-governmental actors and to create the networks and structures for successful decision-making....this is an extremely important area and one that requires clear and strategic thinking on the part of governments and civil society....engagement in the process is essential and the importance of engagement has often been underestimated. Building trust relations between participants is a necessary stage, particularly in fluid, network-based decision-making structures and this can never be an automatic process” (Andrew and Gattinger, 2005:1-2).

Decentralisation and shift to governance, and in particular to participatory governance, as this thesis will show, requires the “delicate balance of government engagement without government domination”; which poses itself as one of the greatest challenges for the process of both decentralisation and participatory governance. In these processes, especially in the cultural field, governments should “tread lightly” recognizing that the major actors are those directly involved in cultural activities” (Andrew and Gattinger, 2005:2). This is not to argue that the government is unwanted or unnecessary in the field of culture, quite the opposite. The government’s role is important in the field of culture, but the government must recognize that it is not the only and ultimate power source in the decision-making on culture and that it cannot impose the ideas and ideals to what culture should be. The analysis in the evolution of Croatian cultural policy reveals that the insistent emphasis and the retainment of control in the decision-making in the hands of the political bodies (or public bodies under the direct political control) is the overarching problem that is absolved by cultural policy’s legal framework. The balance and issue of sharing of power in cultural policy discourse have been very problematic from the beginning of independent cultural system in Croatia, noticeable in the on-going legacy in the prevalence of interests of political elites in the governing of the cultural sector, which creates not only divides but also causes lags and limitations in the cultural development.

Nonetheless, the problem of legitimacy of highly centred and institutionalized decision-making structures in the field of culture regarding cultural development, encompassing cultural policy change and system decentralisation has become a chronic hindrance for the democratisation of cultural policy and cultural sector in Croatia. This thesis addresses issues stemming from that problem that are summarized in initial questions that prompted the research:

Who makes decisions in the cultural field in Croatia? Who is represented in the process of decision making and in what capacity? Who, how and to what end has access to the decision-making process concerning the cultural sector in Croatia? To what extent are those processes decentralized and open to deliberation? What is the balance between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approach in Croatian cultural policy that should be leverage for successful governance?

This dissertation attempts to address the above questions through the exploration of literature and the analysis of Croatian cultural policy in the register of decentralisation, as well as through the investigation of examples of participatory governance in culture. The understanding of cultural policy that defines this dissertation is that cultural policy is about politics of culture in a broad sense; it is about the clash of ideas, and the discursive and material determination of the production and dissemination of cultural meaning (McGuigan, 1996 in Yuzurihara, 2004). As Croatia does not have a single, coherent document on cultural policy, the analysis covers legislative and regulative acts and documents from the sphere of culture. According to the focus of the research interest of this dissertation, the analyses don't cover all areas of cultural policy, such as media policy. The sub-areas of cultural policy that pertain to cultural activities are researched to the extent to which those areas demonstrate the tendencies and/or practices towards decentralised and participatory modes of governance.

The thesis evolved through two research paths. The first path entails cultural policy research and studies, which is a still rather ‘young’ interdisciplinary academic, field that draws (primarily) on sociology, cultural studies and political science, among others. In the line of social sciences and theory, the topic of the research involves interdisciplinary outlook and probing of several epistemological grounding, most particularly that of sociology, but with the distinctive interrelations

and influences from the political sciences, public policy and cultural studies. In order, to make a clear demarcation the interdisciplinary field that this thesis is embedded in, the very outset of the thesis brings an analytical exploration of the field of cultural policy research, “with the underlining narrative on the evolution of the academic discipline of cultural policy studies” (Žuvela, 2017:22). In this line of introductory exploration, some of the crucial questions are addressed, such as sociological validation of cultural policy research and cultural policy studies.

The second path that this dissertation follows is the one set by the researcher’s professional avidity for the topic of the thesis, but also by the conceptual concerns of the postgraduate doctoral degree that this thesis emerges from - the *Joint programme in Sociology of Regional and Local Development*. This postgraduate doctoral degree aims to “create knowledge that can be used to advance development strategies” and the focus of the programme, both theoretical and empirical is “a notion of development as fostering citizenship and subsidiarity” (University of Zadar, 2017:6). In parallel, the field of cultural policy has long been associated with the principles of citizenship and participation on the one hand, and sovereignty and nationalism on the other (Flew, 2004:3). Ergo, the topic of decentralisation processes and introduction of participatory governance in cultural policy is aligned with the capital preoccupations of the doctoral degree and its research lines within which knowledge is to be generated¹.

The structure of the thesis is divided into three main parts, articulated through three main frameworks: theoretical framework; methodological framework; and empirical framework. The theoretical framework is preceded with the preambulatory chapter to the theoretical exploration followed by two chapters; one on culture, policy and cultural policy and the other on decentralisation and participatory governance in culture. In the preface preambulatory chapter, cultural policy research and the field in cultural policy studies are explained and clarified in the context of inherent

¹ Research lines proposed by the PhD programme involve topics such as: “global transformation of culture and their impact on local culture; dynamics of Europeanization and regional/local development (so-called ‘multi-scale governance’); civil society and its activities in local communities; sustainable development and the evaluation of local community resources; innovations in public administration.....; normative and projective instrument of regional and local development-related processes” (University of Zadar, 2017:7). The scope of research lines requires probing and interrelating other areas of research and interdisciplinary cooperation, as the Guide for Student notes; “the subject-matter covered by the programme includes insights from other social sciences, such as political science, law, economics, as well as various fields of the humanities, such as cultural studies” (University of Zadar, 2017:7).

interdisciplinarity with the underlined emphasis placed on the relevance and links between cultural policy research and sociology. Insofar, the preambulatory chapter sets the academic course for the thesis by resolving all the questions on what cultural policy research is and how does it fit into the register of sociology. The issue of clarification to what is cultural policy research attempts to resolve questions on its validity and potential instrumentality, i.e. on the purpose of the research that goes beyond the scope of scientific format into the practical utilisation to various ends in the cultural policy development and changes. The preambulatory chapter provides an analysis of the dichotomous nature of the cultural policy research in the knowledge production and the issues of its integrity and utility indicated that such research should not be understood in line of *either-or* choice. The elaboration of cultural policy analysis methods, the preambulatory chapter sets the ground for the methodological choices, approaches and design in the methodological chapter. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the symbiotic relationship between cultural policy studies and sociology through the exploration of the meanings and dealings of culture and the disciplinary preoccupations by both fields, as well as detection of their points of convergence. The modernisation theory is one of those points that is elaborated as a contextual trajectory for investigation of cultural policy evolution processes, encompassing transition, transformation and democracy in the context Croatian experiences of modernisation.

The following theoretical framework features in-depth literature review on culture, policy and cultural policy and opens the exploration of the key theoretical concepts that this thesis builds on by first dividing cultural policy into its constituting segments of culture and policy. Guided with the premise that inquiry on culture and policy inevitably involves the examination of power, the analysis of the discourses of power in cultural policy weaves through the theoretical readings on power in works of Foucault, Bourdieu and Habermas and their contesting interpretations by Bennet and McGuigan, among other. The explication of power tensions is ensued with the deciphering of cultural policy, its concepts and definitions, encompassing the role of the state and the motives for support and intervention in culture that raise the questions on scope, instrumentality and ambiguity of cultural policy. These issues are explored through Williams' view on *display - proper* duality of cultural policy and are considered in the analysis of cultural policy typologies and evolutionary paradigms that have brought significant changes in the relational and situational

sphere of cultural policy. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the changes concerning civil society's involvement and the role and the position of cities in cultural policy. These two changes underscore the urbanisation of cultural policy that is a profound condition of the contemporary cultural policies and development. The focus on the locale through the dispersion of cultural policy is enabled by decentralisation processes that are explained in the subsequent chapter on decentralisation and participatory governance in culture through writings of Kawashima and elaborated by Katunarić's assessments on the decentralisation levels in South-East Europe. Katunarić's concept of *new public culture* is analysed in light of the demand for new governance schemes that would enable a more open, participatory and democratic cultural policy. Governance is thus explained within the scope of cultural governance and the development of participation agenda in cultural policy in form for participatory governance in culture, with the subsequent considerations of the 'dark side' of participation.

The methodological framework of the thesis in chapter five puts forward the key categories that express research intentions and choices in the explanation of the research perspective, researcher's position, methodological approach with the explanation of the qualitative method and interpretivism, presentation of research purpose, aims and questions, elaboration of research design and research process. The methodological framework concludes with an overview of research problems and limitations.

The empirical framework of the thesis is divided into two chapters. The first one consists of policy analysis and brings a policy analysis of the Croatian cultural policy divided into several parts that follow the main cultural policy segments presented in the theoretical part of the thesis in sequential order and temporal lines encompassing period preceding the set research timeframe. The second chapter of the empirical framework features a case study investigation of two embedded units: Dubrovnik and Zagreb. These two units demonstrate the state-of-art in practices of participatory governance in culture in Croatia, thus illustrating the practice of participatory governance in culture indicating towards components of cultural policy developments in the remit of power devolution.

The empirical framework is followed with a final chapter that involves an overview of the thesis, presentation of the main research findings, contribution to the knowledge and conclusion. This entails the discussion on the main traits of Croatian cultural policy, the extent of decentralisation of power in the cultural policy's structure, the detection of the actors that contribute to the democratisation of cultural policy and their role versus their position in the cultural system. The participatory governance in culture is discussed in comparative perspective to than of wider European framework with the emphasis on the systemic possibilities for its affirmation in the domain of cultural policy. Finally, the last chapter of places the research results in the context of implications for cultural policy.

2. SITUATING THE RESEARCH: CULTURAL POLICY STUDIES AND QUESTIONS OF SOCIOLOGICAL VALIDITY

*We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.* (T.S. Eliot, Four Quarters)

The topic of cultural policy research opens numerous questions as to how to situate it on several levels, two most prominent ones being that of academic disciplines, and the other of dichotomous nature of cultural policy research in sense of its theoretical validity versus practical applicability. For this reason, the theoretical framework of this dissertation sets off with the investigation of cultural policy research as articulated within the remit of cultural policy studies, its inherent interdisciplinary and, finally interconnection and disciplinary alignment, with the emphasis on the alignment with the field of sociology. Ensuing is the exploration of the several sociological theories that are applicable for cultural policy research, most precisely for the topic that is presented in this thesis. These theoretical frameworks and concepts include theories of modernisation and structuration, followed by the analysis of transition, transformation and democratisation.

2.1. Cultural policy research and the trajectory of Cultural policy studies

Scientific cultural policy research is conducted within the remit of cultural policy studies that have a relatively short academic tradition. Scullion and Garcia explain that cultural policy research “exists in many contexts, asks many different kinds of questions and adopts a wide repertoire of research methodologies from a raft of academic discourses” (Scullion and Garcia, 2005:113).

The field of cultural policy² is in itself rather novel with a tradition that stretches from the post Second World War period³. The first instances of cultural policy are tracked with the founding of the Arts Council of Great Britain in 1946. This was one of the first attempts to institutionalise state's support for cultural activity, but it wasn't until 1959, during the period of Charles de Gaulle presidency, that a first Ministry of Cultural Affairs was established, which happened in France with President de Gaulle then appointing André Malraux⁴ as Minister of Cultural Affairs. André Malraux had ambitious programs for reformation and innovation of cultural policy, and his work has left a paradigmatic legacy in the evolution of cultural policy, which will be disclosed throughout this thesis. Here we shall underline that one of the most important activities that Malraux instituted in the context of cultural policy research was the founding of a new *Study and Research Department* at the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. This department primarily focused on creating reliable information as a foundation for policy initiatives and planning in culture, hence, the scope of research areas was determined, but it still presents the pivotal milestone in instituting cultural policy research⁵.

The independent academic research of cultural policy affirmed itself in the 1980s and has since been developing as “a truly multidisciplinary field and in no way dominated by *one* disciplinary or theoretical perspective“ (Fernander and Jönsson, 2007:3). Insofar, cultural policy research encompasses, most predominantly, fields like critical theory and cultural studies. Influences of

2 The beginning of explanation to what cultural policy research is should, by any logic, feature the coherent analysis to what cultural policy is. However, given that the most of the first part of the literature review in the following chapter of this thesis provides an in-depth analysis of cultural policy, here we shall omit any deeper consideration to what cultural policy is. Yet, for the purpose of immediate clarification, cultural policy will be briefly identified as “an instrument of overall state policy in culture” (Katunarić, 1997:10); as “governmental strategies and activities that promote ‘the production, dissemination, marketing and consumption of the arts’” (Mulcahy, 2006 in Brueggemann, 2013:10); or as being „seen and defined as the outcome of state-driven processes“ (Paquette and Redaelli, 2015:77).

3 When stating that cultural policy emerged from the period of post-World War II, it must be noted that this statement addresses contemporary cultural policy as defined by the Welfare State provision for culture, i.e. the cultural policy as we know it today. However, as the subsequent analysis of cultural policy evolution will show in the following chapter, the origin of cultural policy is placed in 19th century.

4 André Malraux was French novelist and art theorist that held the position of French Minister of Cultural Affairs in the period from 1959 to 1969.

5 For example, one of the most prominent sociologists of culture, Pierre Bourdieu was commissioned by this department and played „a key role in the development of state-commissioned research on cultural matters (as they did more generally for social research) and, by doing so, in furthered the progress of French sociology of culture“ (Dubois, 2011:6).

critical theory provide for a critical understanding of the societal structure and abstract definition processes that are of utmost importance for unveiling power and hierarchies embedded in questions of culture (Pyykkönen, M., Simanainen, N. and Sokka, S., 2009). Cultural policy research meets Horkheimer's definitional criteria by which critical theory is only adequate if it is explanatory, practical and normative, and all at the same time (Bohman, 2005). Influences from cultural studies have broadened the scope of cultural policy research towards an "interest in demonstrating how (more) popular forms of culture (than arts) represent the power and in showing how culture is expressed as a matter of institutional practices, administrative routines and spatial arrangement – and, in turn, how people's participation in culture can demonstrate a process of signification and creative production of meanings on the part of the receives" (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009:22). Cultural studies orientations have inbred strong Marxist influence with their "healthy and thoroughgoing suspicion of "official" state politics" (Sterne, 2002:60). As Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka note, in short, both critical theory and cultural studies can be defined as concerned with questions of power and culture (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009).

Cultural policy has been described for a long time as "the missing" agenda of cultural studies (McRobbie, 1996:335 in Scullion and Garcia, 2005:116). The article by Tony Bennett⁶, *Putting Policy into Cultural Studies* has been considered as one of the capital contributions to theoretical and conceptual articulations of cultural policy studies. In the article, Bennett proposes for policy to be put into cultural studies as "to advocate that the latter be displaced by, or transformed into, something else; namely cultural policy studies" (Bennett, 1992:23). Cultural policy studies are, therefore, most simply explained as an outcome of a demand for cultural studies to become more applicable, i.e. practical.

Bennett's approach to the epistemological grounding of cultural policy studies was based on the work of Michel Foucault and his writings on governmentality, a concept that deals with the exercise and control of power through culture and the role of the communities and individuals within it (Foucault, 1995; Burchell et al. 1991; Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose 1999, Scullion and Gar-

⁶ Tony Bennett was one of the key figures in 'emancipating' cultural policy studies, first with his theoretical work, but also with the founding of *The Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy* in Brisbane, Australia.

cia,2005). The other key figure and concept in the development of theoretical cultural policy studies is Jim McGuigan who was a proponent of Jürgen Habermas's concept of the public sphere. The public sphere is, simply put, how differences are negotiated and decided upon common purposes (Holub, 1991 in McGuigan, 1996). The work by these authors has been traditionally used to construct a stronger relationship between critical analysis and providing applicable knowledge, presenting new possibilities, not only to analysts and theorists in culture, but also to agents of cultural policy (McGuigan, 1996). While Bennett is an advocate of the Foucauldian concept and has adopted the pragmatics, or „technocratic assertion“ of cultural policy studies as providing „useful“ knowledge for agencies of government and administration, omitting the balance between „critical“ and „useful“ knowledge, i.e. the issues of producing knowledge for official uses and with funding that makes the knowledge rarely question „the fundamental aims and objectives of the client organization“, McGuigan is concerned with the practical intents of contributing to the framing of policies and claims that „public will“ should have a decisive influence on „the conditions of culture, their persistence and their potential for change“ (McGuigan, 1996:22). McGuigan emphasises cultural policy research as a theoretical hybrid that should institute stronger ties between critical analysis and policy orientation in the sense of assessing the potential meanings of cultural policy from the aspect of social and cultural theory. As such, cultural policy studies open new possibilities not only for the scholars, academics and researchers but also for the practitioners of cultural policy (Žuvela, 2017).

2.2. Disciplinary directions, interests and types of cultural policy research

Foucauldian and Habermasian theoretical influence (and subsequent readings of Bennett and McGuigan) are substantial but not decisive for the cultural policy logic and meaning, both in its practices and research. The field cultural policy studies is a theoretical omnivore and, while emancipated as an academic field, it exists without any theoretical limitations or a need for a single disciplinary alignment. Key issues and questions of cultural policy that are interrelated and ever-changing, such as effects of culture on governance and vice versa, modes of regulating

culture, cultural development, the economy of culture, politics of culture, etc. seek a wider spectrum of theoretical perspectives involving, for example, sociology (sociology of culture, urban sociology), political philosophy, public policy, system theory etc. In other words, the processes of knowledge production in cultural policy research is complex, especially given the territory it covers; from culture to policy. Paquette and Redaelli note that “as there are no agreed upon definitions of what culture is in the humanities and social sciences, there is no unanimous definition to what cultural policy is....As such, cultural policy is defined differently by each discipline that claims it as legitimate object of study” (Paquette and Redaelli, 2015:77).

Cultural policy research investigates the logic and matrix of power (re)distribution, as well as relations between culture and society; between cultural forms, expressions and practices and between institutional models of governance, production and dissemination (Stearne, 2002; Scullion and Garcia, 2005 in Žuvela, 2017). The perimeter of the field that cultural policy research engages with is, in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms, a relational social space, “where agents act based on their own capacities, resources, and social position in the field” (Paquette and Redaelli, 2015:2). Insofar, cultural policy research deals with understanding and critical analysis of cultural production and reception, as well as investigation of policies that regulate the cycle of supply and demand in the domain of culture. Similar to the cultural policy itself, cultural policy research is formed by a constant tension between top-down and bottom-up orientations; between the public and private domains; and between the paradigms of (the remnants) of the welfare state and neoliberal norms.

Cultural policy is inherently interdisciplinary⁷: “it draws on the social sciences for both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies and to articulate its social and economic role, its models of application and territorial difference. From the arts/humanities, it draws on history and historiography – to understand policymaking in the past and influence its future development and

7 Paquette and Redaelli explain interdisciplinarity as addressing topics „that are too broad and complex to be dealt with in one discipline or profession (Frank et al., 2007). The main distinction between interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinary lies in integration – while multidisciplinary is about addition, not integration, interdisciplinarity „requires an understanding of the methods, epistemologies, and paradigms of disciplines themselves.....Interdisciplinary research involves developing conceptual links (Lyall et al., 2011), such as using techniques from one discipline to inform a theoretical model in another. Interdisciplinarity creates a bridge between disciplines, and a new common spaces that melds two or more disciplines (Baird et al., 2004)” (Paquette and Redaelli, 2015:12).

implementation – as well as cultural studies, from which come a concern with sign, representation and identity and, indeed, definitions and experiences of culture and its role in society” (Scullion and Garcia, 2005:122). As a part of a “new and distinctive kind of academic discipline – one that is predicated on competing (and sometimes contradictory) audience, purposes and even academic traditions”, cultural policy research is seen as being at the “forefront of reflexive research practices, implicitly questioning the role of the academy and its contributions to ideas and practice” (Scullion and Garcia, 2005:121-122). It is one of the rare academic fields that is theoretically rooted in several disciplines, conceptually robust, yet actively engaged in the processes of policy creation and critical policy assessment – from its formulation to implementation and evaluation (Scullion and Garcia, 2005; McGuigan, 2004; Lewis and Miller, 2003 in Žuvela, 2017).

Being the new kind of academic discipline, cultural policy research is often seen as an evolving academic discipline. Characterised as intellectual interdiscipline, academic research of cultural policy is not widely represented as an academic field, but is represented with own and distinctive discourse and research approach. There are several attempts to categorize cultural policy research and cultural policy studies, but in this thesis, two will be underlined; one by Pirkkoliisa Ahponen and the other my Jim McGuigan.

According to Ahponen, cultural policy research is, in principle, divided and differentiated into civil and institutional perspectives that are intertwined in practice. The argument for such division is that, in order to understand the “ways of progressing cultural democracy, we need conceptual analysis on how to approach culture from the point of view of civil society and as an institutional system” (Ahponen, 2009:75). In line with this, Ahponen underlines the necessity for making a distinction between the terms of ‘politics of culture’ and ‘cultural policy’:

“Politics of culture refers to the sphere of civil society, whereas cultural policy functions in the institutional field of affairs. In any case, the basis for a political approach to culture lies in the civil interests of free individuals. When people join together, the representative or institutional mechanisms start to structure the field of cultural policy. The focus of cultural political research can be put on the right of individuals to create, express and receive cultural products freely and sponta-

neously or on institutional responsibilities in the development of the society by cultural means. When emphasising the political construction of the field of culture by means of civil activities and the representative interests of the members of society, specific roles are reserved for both of these cultural political perspectives. When evaluating the cultural political state of affairs in a certain democratic society, we refer to the term cultural policy in connection with the institutional view, whereas the term politics of culture is seen appropriate for discussing civic affairs based on creative freedom.” (Ahponen, 2009:75-76).

Analogously, Ahponen raises the question on the contribution of cultural policy research to the development of democracy, how has the cultural policy research evaluated the progress of democracy, and how can we define the state of cultural democracy through research? (Ahponen, 2009). In posing these questions, the author refers to democracy as defined by David Held who claims that “democracy has been championed as a mechanism that bestows legitimacy on political decisions when they adhere to proper principles, rules and mechanisms of participation, representation and accountability” (Held, 2006:261). Nevertheless, the development of culture is inherently infested with the development trends and tendencies based on the qualifications of excellence and competitiveness, especially on the levels of artistic, cultural and creative expressions and productions. In this case, an issue arises in sense of how democratic is a cultural development and to what extent is cultural democracy used for ensuring cultural development’s legitimacy, that is, amidst the expansion of creative economy paradigm, dissolved and heavily dispersed in the means of superficial consumerism and creative instrumentalism (Ahponen, 2009 in Žuvela, 2017).

McGuigan’s classification of cultural policy research is somewhat more succinct and pragmatic. He divides cultural policy research into two main categories. The first category is academic research that is based on astute theoretical, philosophical and scientific study of cultural policy. The second category is administrative research based on rational *ad-hoc* methods, preceding specific needs and situations of, in an ideal situation, informed decision-making processes (Žuvela, 2017). Academic research of cultural policy features a critical and theoretically grounded investigation of selected topics from the field of cultural policy and adjoining cultural development. However, this type of research is often overlooked by those actors that constitute, govern, manage and op-

erate within the field of culture and cultural policy, and who make and implement the decisions. Moreover, academic research and dismissal of engaging with the practice of cultural policy has the tendency of detaching itself from the reality of actual policy-making, becoming, therefore “irrelevant to the debate as it evolves in the broader cultural policy sphere” (Belfiore, 2005:404). On the other hand, administrative research is driven by political and bureaucratic interests within which the primary purpose and meaning of cultural policy are reduced exclusively to, more than often short-sighted and short-termed, political purposes and logic of control and administration. In most of the cultural policy research commissioned or conducted by administrative bodies, the key topic is the economic rationalisation of culture and the arts, which inevitably marginalises the position, role and meaning of culture and the arts in the society (McGuigan, 2004 in Žuvela, 2017). However, it must be noted, that increasingly more research is conducted “within academic departments being sponsored by political or commercial agents”, leading to a progressive blurring of ‘pure’ academic research, and contributing to smaller gaps in isolation of academic research in “academic ivory towers” (Belfiore, 2005:404).

The tension between ‘critical’ and ‘instrumental’ research of cultural policy has been, in Belfiore’s words “characterized in quasi-ontological terms as inherent and inevitable and something that needs to be, at best, acknowledged rather than reconciled” (Belfiore, 2016:3).

2.3. The dichotomous nature of cultural policy research

In her paper titled *Cultural policy research in the real world: Curating ‘impact’, facilitating ‘enlightenment’*”, British cultural policy scholar Eleonora Belfiore notes that “the very identity of cultural policy studies as a distinctive field of academic pursuit rests on a long-standing and widely accepted tension between ‘proper research’ and policy advocacy, which has often resulted in resistance to the idea that robust, critical research can – or even should – be ‘useful’ and have an impact on policy discourse” (Belfiore, 2016:2). She dedicated the analysis in this paper to navigating towards a “third route” of understanding cultural policy studies, which sees “policy relevance and influence as a legitimate goal of critical research, without accepting the pressure and restric-

tion of arts advocacy and lobbying” (Belfiore, 2016:2). A dichotomist view of cultural policy studies, as stretched between providing empirically grounded and driven guidelines for cultural policy and cultural development on the one side, and exerting ‘proper’ i.e. critical and methodologically sound research is embedded in the very core of cultural policy and cultural policy studies. This aspect of analysing cultural policy research reflects the work of Michael Gibbons on modes of knowledge production. In his book, *The New production of Knowledge*, Gibbons and his team of researchers detected two main modes of knowledge production. *Mode 1* is known as basic research in the universities’ settings where problems are “set, examined, and solved in a context governed by the academic interests and codes of practice of a specific disciplinary community, curiosity-driven and based on individual creativity, often pursued without some practical goal in mind” (Ang, 2006). Cultural policy research, according to Ang, falls into the category of *Mode 2*. In *Mode 2*, knowledge production is guided by the imperative that it should be useful to someone, whether that is the government of society in general (Ang, 2006). The context of application drives the form and content of the needed knowledge that is socially distributed and involves a heterogeneous spectre of practitioners, academics, experts, all working together on a specific and/or localised topic and/or context⁸. *Mode 2* knowledge will not wipe out the traditional *Mode 1* but will supplement it and interact with it. Policy field is driven with the demands for research that will provide solutions to the problems, but placing the cultural policy research in *Mode 2*, as Ang suggests, stretches the definition of useful and relevant beyond the level of problem-solving immediacy (Ang, 2006).

The policy relevance and influence represent legitimate goals of critical research, which does not necessarily entail adopting and accepting “the pressures and restrictions of arts advocacy and lobbying, or the relinquishing of accepted scholarly criteria of research excellence” (Belfiore, 2016:4). This thesis takes this approach as a principal guideline in articulating cultural policy

8 This approach draws on Knorr Cetina’s notion of epistemic culture. As Paquette and Redaelli claim, “epistemic culture is concerned with the practical and social conditions of knowledge production in a field, rather than its philosophical grounds” (Paquette and Redaelli, 2015:110). Epistemic culture is an, so-called, “ecumenical proposition” that overcomes limitations of the epistemological paradigm debate (Paquette and Redaelli, 2015:110). Knorr Cetina puts forwards that “epistemic culture refers to those set of practices, arrangements and mechanisms bound together by necessity, affinity and historical coincidence that, in a given area of professional expertise, make up for how we now what we know” (Knorr Cetina, 2007:364 in Paquette and Redaelli, 2015:108)

research within the wider remit of sociological inquiry. In other words, having the relevance of cultural policy research in the remit of policy contribution does not imply diminished relevance in the academic quality and vice versa. When writing academic work in the extent of doctoral thesis, it comes of essential importance to solve these questions and provide clear arguments as to why cultural policy research does not have to be an *either-or* scenario, and how it maintains scholarly rigour while having the capacity to (possibly) inform potential cultural policy changes. In that line, it must be noted that most of the scientific authors and academic work in cultural policy research in Croatia⁹ has provided an impetus in developing and modernizing cultural policy in its practical application.

2.4. Cultural policy analysis methods

In exploring methodological approaches to cultural policy analysis, Gray claims that there is no “one ‘true’ way to understand what cultural policy is and how it may be analysed” (Gray, 2010: 216). This non-conforming to theoretically and methodologically operate in “hermetically sealed analytical silos” is in opposition with the tendencies of conducting research according to conventional, i.e. singular “ontological, epistemological and methodological bases upon which different approaches to analysis rest could be developed”, for which reason Gray suggests “an acceptance of a more open, if not pluralist, conception of alternative approaches” (Gray, 2010:216). However, there is a high level of caution in the development of research strategies in an inherently inter-

⁹ A completely new doctoral thesis could be dedicated to the topic of cultural policy research generally, but specifically in the case of Croatia. That research could include a much necessary evaluative analysis of state-of-art of cultural policy research, but more so of research utilization, i.e. interdisciplinary research that was made within the academic circles with the purpose of providing empirical, critical and discursive influence for conceptualisation, agenda setting and formulation of cultural policy. In this area, some of the most prominent work in cultural policy research in Croatia has been done by sociologists (i.e. Vjeran Katunarić, Nada Švob Đokić, Inga Tomić Koludrović, Mirko Petrić, Jaka Primorac, Davor Mišković, Željka Tonković, Krešimir Krolo, Valerija Barada, etc.) whose research findings and concepts inform and shape both theoretical and empirical parts of this thesis. These authors contributed to not only cultural policy research, but with research to documentation of the cultural policy evolution throughout the, most specifically, period of past three decades. It is with this work, along with the work of cultural policy scholars from non-sociological fields such as comparative literature (Andrea Zlatar, Biserka Cvjetičanin, Dea Vidović) and political science (Nina Obuljen Koržinek, Sanjin Dragojević), that research in cultural policy in Croatia can be (comparatively) analysed on the global scale in sense of cultural policy typologies and valuative, structural and systemic characteristics.

disciplinary field. It concerns ensuring that, whilst navigating through an interdisciplinary field, “care must be taken to ensure that there is actually compatibility between the structural characteristics that the disciplines that are involved display” (Gray, 2010:216). Interdisciplinary work with underlying theories is more than simply “a tasting menu where the analyst can pick and choose between whatever attracts their fancy, and neither are they simply an analytical tool-box where the researcher is free to adopt whichever piece of machinery or equipment is desired at the instant” (Gray, 2010:217).

In order to clarify and explain why some questions are important for cultural policy research, Gray sets three areas of concern that can be identified as providing a basis for investigating how particular disciplines approach key issues within the analysis of cultural policy:

- How particular disciplines and approaches attempt to define the essentially contested concept of ‘culture’;
- How they understand the idea of ‘cultural policy’;
- The dominant methodologies that are employed in analysing cultural policy (Gray, 2010:217).

These three points highlight the key distinctions between disciplines and enable overcoming the differences involved, which can make the research process easier and more coherent in the sense of following the research focus.

Culture as an essentially contested term is in the core of cultural policy analysis. It encompasses a wide spectre of meanings, which will be discussed in more detail in the ensuing chapter. Culture as a concept is capable of multiple definitions with no mechanism for determining their adequacy or accuracy unlike the central word in the subject of analysis for other policy areas such as defence, health, taxation or industrial policy, each of which can be relatively unambiguously defined and identified (Gray, 2010; Žuvela, 2017). Still, there is a certain equivalence between disciplines in interpreting the concept of culture. Disciplines like sociology, political science, cultural studies, economy etc. perceive culture, among others, as a factor of social cohesion, collective frameworks of understanding within which members of society belong and function.

Cultural policy can be defined from the perspective of cultural studies, sociology, political science, economy, urban planning and other disciplines. Accordingly, there is no agreed or clearly defined model to what exactly cultural policy consist of. For this reason, as an object of study, cultural policy has to be defined as the definition of an object of the study implies the way how it is supposed to be studied. However, there is a similarity and consensus in understanding and articulating cultural policy in all of the disciplines. This involves the role of governments in forming and maintaining cultural policies as well as wider scope that encompasses interaction with civil society, private sector, religious organisation and other non-political actors in the formulation of cultural policy. As such, cultural policy as a subject of inquiry surpasses the arrangement set or given by the state and public authorities.

The third point that Gray suggests involves a simple differentiation between positivist, interpretivist and realist methodologies. Many disciplines are linked with one, if not with all three methodologies, but most literature sources on cultural policy indicate that approach to cultural policy research from the economics is positivist, approach from cultural studies interpretivist, while approaches from sociology and political science tend to be realist, although sociology also has a strong interpretivist methodological inclinations (Gray, 2010)¹⁰.

Gray proposes the convergence of methodologies between mentioned disciplines. This can give rise to “quite distinct understandings of what cultural policies exist for, how and why they are created, implemented and evaluated, and what lessons can be learned from the analysis of particular policies (Rose, 1993 in Gray, 2010:225). Until cultural policy studies become ‘mature’ in sense of autonomous discipline, which seeks more theoretically robust repository on its own, cultural

¹⁰ Viewing sociology and political science as more inclined towards positivist side derives from the sheer multiplicity of approaches that each discipline encompasses: “both cover the gamut of potential approaches from positivist to interpretivist to social constructivist to normative with the choice of methodology to be pursued being effectively determined by the questions that the analyst wishes to pursue.... This catholicity of approach allows for the potential development of a wide range of explanations for particular cultural policies in both the sociological and political science literature, with the choice between these explanations being a consequence of how well they answer the questions that the analyst has posed. Certainly, sociology and political science would appear to make use of a much wider range of methodological strategies than are commonly to be found in cultural studies” (Gray, 2010:225), mostly in reading cultural policy as “series of ‘texts’ that are subject to the interpretations of the individual analyst rather than a set of concrete organisational practices to be analysed, even if the latter are something that the policy shift in cultural studies was intended to address” (Gray, 2010:222).

policy researchers have no choice but to juggle through the theoretical and methodological realms of other disciplines. In that line, and following the academic requirements and focus of this thesis, the relational links between sociology and cultural policy will be explored in more detail.

2.5. Cultural policy research and sociology: unravelling the paths of modernity

A large volume of work has been contributed by the sociologists to the cultural policy research and cultural policy studies, with the significant influence on the development of cultural policy and culture both on the international level, as well as in the case of Croatia. However, the explicit links between sociology as a distinctive academic field and cultural policy and cultural policy research and studies remain underrepresented in the general spectre of academic literature. The exception is found in a chapter by David Wright in the *Routledge Handbook of Global Cultural Policy* (Durrer, O'Brien and Miller, 2017) titled *Sociology and Cultural Policy*, as well as in the work of Clive Gray that has already been cited in the previously written text.

Gray has explored the case of sociological studies of 'culture' where he highlights the division between 'the sociology of culture' and 'cultural sociology'. Apart from these two titles reflecting differentiation on the methodological level, the difference between the two "involves different notions of what the 'cultural' actually consists of. One version of this is concerned with 'culture' as a set of meanings, symbols and structures (Alexander, 2006) and involves a particular form of sociological (if not semiotic) analysis. A second version is that 'culture' consists of particular arenas of action associated with particular goods and/or activities that are limited to, for example, 'the arts, cultural industries and media sectors' (Bennett, 2007:32) A third version tends to conflate 'culture' and social life, with no meaningful distinction between the two" (Gray, 2010:220). The author claims that sociological approaches to cultural policy are relatively underdeveloped and turns to the work of British sociologist Victoria Alexander who claimed that much of the work in the field of cultural sociology tends to be either the semiological analysis of individual and group meaning formation and usage, or the development of work within the sociology of the arts (Alexander, 2003 in Gray, 2010). Yet, neither pay "a great deal of attention to policy issues in a broader

sense” (Gray, 2010:223). Where ‘policy’ does arise, it is referred to in the use of the term within the scope of cultural studies, i.e. cultural policy being largely concerned with the issues of public culture, and/or is addressed and understood as governmental actions in the arts sector, i.e. the governmental actions in the arts, or arts policy. As Gray observes, “this implies an underdevelopment of the sociological literature in terms of analysing cultural policy”, but draws attention to “a great deal of work within sociology that deals with ‘cultural’ matters” and has “a large number of policy implications attached to it” (even if it is not a major focus of discussion of analysis) such as “the analysis of audiences and leisure habits, and the developing interest in concepts of cultural capital following Bourdieu (1993)” (Gray, 2010:223). Regardless, explicit focus on cultural policy in the standards sociological literature remains limited.

In his examination of the relations between sociology and cultural policy, Wright took a more thorough, ‘old-school’ approach by first delineating sociology and cultural policy to unravel the symbiosis in the historical processes that these two fields share. Culture, in its capacity to assume the “role and value of symbolic processes in social life, has been central to the discipline of sociology since its earliest attempts to explain modernity” (Wright, 2017:50). Cultural practices of citizens have been, in Wright’s words, a long-standing obsession of the state that has been systematically investing efforts into identifying, shaping, and governing those practices through the creation of formal governmental bodies dedicated to arts and culture and policies that frame and regulate arts and culture. The role of sociology in those processes lies in the contribution to defining “the problem of culture for policymakers”, as well as providing empirical techniques of social science that have “played an important role in bringing culture under the lens of government” (Wright, 2017:50).

The historical trajectory of the development of sociology on one side, and “the problem of culture” for the modern state on the other, are shared both on the temporal scale of stemming from 19th century and geographical scope of encompassing Western Europe and North America. As Wright notes, “both sociology and cultural policy have histories which reveal much about the shifting intellectual landscape of the ‘advanced’ democracies of the global North” (Wright, 2017:53). He offers the definition of sociology through a “genealogy that incorporates specific, foundational, theoretic-

cal accounts and combines them with a set of methodological techniques which can be applied to help understand social life”, and quotes Michael Burawoy’s description of early manifestations of “sociological modes of thinking that were bound up with narratives of social reform, and struggles for civil rights, such that sociology could imagine itself as an angel of history, searching for order in the broken fragments of modernity, seeking to salvage the promise of progress” (Burawoy, 2005 in Wright, 2017:53-54). Methodological tools of sociology, such as identification of social issues and production of social statistics, have, in compliance with other disciplines from social sciences such as psychology and economy, or additionally anthropology and ethnology, empirically captured the social world and have given it a distinctive theoretical form of, what C. Wright Mill called ‘sociological imagination’ (Wright Mill, 1959 in Wright, 2017). Methodological and theoretical templates of sociology have provided an important impetus for the development of evaluative strand in cultural policy and henceforth informed consequent policy formation. Most notable examples in this line from the historical perspective are research on the cultural participation (although cultural participation was then not addressed and articulated as *participation*) that originates from the 1960s exemplified in Bourdieu’s work on museum attendance, as published in his and Darbel’s study *the Love of Art* (Bourdieu and Darbel, 1969 [1991]). The statistical analysis and other observational examinations of museum’s visitors’ social patterns of experience gave way and an impetus for the development of relations between sociology and cultural policy “focussed upon the policy ‘problem’ of cultural inequality, i.e. the differential engagement of the populace of particular country or territory with its public resources” (Wright, 2017:62).

Cultural policy has a similar temporal and territorial framework of emergence as sociology. As already mentioned, the origins of the cultural policy as we know it today reach back to the mid-20th century and the post-World War II period of the proliferating welfare state (Bell and Oakley, 2015; Cummings Jr and Katz, 1987), in the same period when sociology¹¹ became “the science of and the welfare state, the political rubric under which society travelled” (Fuller, 2016:17 in Wright, 2017:61). Cultural policy project assumes the role of the state as funding both cultural

11 As Wright notes, the role of sociologists in the periods of late 1950s and 1960s was the such that they could imagine themselves as part of „progressive, democratising project in which the evidence emerging from the identification and measurement of the life experience of the populations was brought directly into the process of governing“ (Wright, 2017:61).

production and consumption while supporting civil and national institutions that have a longer-reaching legacy since the 19th century. Cummings Jr. and Katz explain that, although government support for the arts and culture can be considered quite contemporary, it is “the continuation of a tradition that fostered the flowering of Western culture” (Cummings Jr. and Katz, 1987a:3). The historical roots of public support for arts and culture lead to an overview of the evolution of policies on arts and culture that encompass a long spectre from ancient Athens (that was known as a patron of drama as a part of the state religion) to feudal Europe where prince or a bishop invested part of raised taxes in commissioning work of art or building a place of cultural production or consumption, then Renaissance where art was the product of public commission to the 18th century Europe and the growth of cities and the rise of manufacturing that created prosperous merchant classes who then supported patronage of the arts. The difference between separate contexts, i.e. the tradition of royal absolutist states such France and Austria, and the “more plutocratic, mercantilists states with more limited monarchies” such as England and the Netherlands, distinguish two general patterns that 21st-century cultural policies have evolved from¹² (Cummings Jr. and Katz, 1987a:5). The support for arts and culture, therefore, existed long before the mid-twentieth century establishment of governmental bodies responsible for governing and managing publicly funded cultural production and consumption. However, as Wright notes, the more recent phenomenon of cultural policy “is the culmination of older inter-relations between the ideals, and indeed anxieties that government have about artistic and symbolic forms of expression, democracy and self-realisation and their spread within and across the developing public spheres and modern nation-states” (Wright 2017:55).

The evolutionary trajectory of cultural policy follows relational changes and development in the forming of urban entities, new forms of labour, family life and leisure, which are connected to the shifting meanings and role of culture under the forces of modernity. The sociology’s early project was “to explain and moderate forces of modernity” by, for example, emphasising the “symbolic aspects of social life and the importance of meaning-making to the maintenance of social relations in modernity (Wright, 2017:55). But, linked to the evolution of cultural policy, sociological

¹² German and Italian so-called proto-states (for not being unified till after the 19th century) showed mixed traits between two main types.

concerns have been more restricted to the definition of culture as associated with cultural policy, i.e. cultural production, or the arts, cultural, creative and media industries. This has, along with the prevailing cultural turn in social sciences, created a “variegated set of research territories including distinct sociology of artistic forms, and a somewhat antagonistic distinction between ‘a sociology of culture’ – in which cultural forms and practices are the focus of analysis – and ‘cultural sociology’ – where ‘cultural’ describes an approach privileging the symbolic in analysing a wider range of social phenomena” (Wright 2017:57). The situation became more complicated with the rise and affirmation of cultural studies that, as an amalgam between sociology and literary studies, raised the issues and drew attention to the exploration of “popular cultural forms as sites of domination resistance and symbolic expression of identity, especially for previously marginalised groups,” which played a significant role in “re-shaping the sociological imagination for the late twentieth century” (Hall and Jefferson 1975; Hebdige 1979 in Wright 2017:57). These historical intertwining, the main points of concerns, as well as shared essentiality of key concepts such as culture, indicate that, in Wright’s words, the barriers around sociology and cultural policy are porous and less distant than they generally appear.

The analysis of cultural policy, as it is posited in the core of the research interest of this thesis, involves evolutionary processes that are both temporal and spatial, yet also structural and systemic. The shifts in these evolutionary processes, namely in the direction of decentralisation of cultural policy and participatory governance in culture that entail devolution of the power structure in cultural policy and governance can be explored through the theoretical lens of cultural policy, decentralization, policy change and participatory governance in culture, which will be explicated in the subsequent chapters. But, in a scope of a ‘grander’ theoretical narrative, or the theoretical backdrop to the cultural policy analysis, before the actual literature review on cultural policy, its’ decentralization and the emergence and introduction of participatory governance in culture, an overarching theoretical consideration will be explored, the one that can be a reference line for the processes of power devolution in cultural policy as they contribute to the democratisation of cultural policy and its modernisation.

In line with the sociological thought, the analysis in this dissertation combines the approach to the ‘macro level’ of inquiry in form of exploration of cultural policy, cultural system and its modes of governance, which can be identified as a larger picture of the social life, i.e. how is the field of arts and culture defined articulated in the particular socio-political context, and the ‘micro level’ that explores how the ‘big picture’ could translate into everyday life and functioning of cultural sector through the gradual reconfiguration of cultural policy terrain (Giddens, 1984; Gauntlett, 2008). The balance between ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels of social life that inevitably fuse and interpenetrate has been articulated through Giddens’s theory of structuration. In this theory, Giddens suggests, “human agency and social structure are in a relationship with each other, and it is the repetition of the acts of individual agents which reproduces the structure. This means that there *is* a social structure – traditions, institutions, moral codes and established ways of doing things; but it also means that these can be changed when people start to ignore them, replace them or reproduce them differently” (Gauntlett, 2008:102). Structuration is, in Giddens’s own words, quite a simple concept that allows for anticipation and imagination of another future, but also of a possibility of mobilisation and realisation of the promise of democracy in the sense that the structure can be reproduced through the “repetition of acts by individual people and therefore change” (Gauntlett, 2008:75), meaning that through the shuffle in the representational logic, we can reimagine different dispersion of power in cultural policy as devolved in decentralisation and participation governance practices. The reimagination and the rendering of a policy change are conditioned by the dynamics of pressure and influence from the actors and/or agency involved. The definitional approach to actors in this thesis follows Touraine’s understanding of social actors according to “the roles they play or are expected to play”, and not according to their statuses (Touraine, 2000:902). As per agency, as noted in *The Constitution of Society*, it refers not to “the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place (which is why agency implies power: cf. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of an agent, as ‘one who exerts power or produces effect’)” (Giddens, 1984:9). In Giddens’ outline of the theory of structuration, the logical connection between agency and power is underlined through the rather simple claim that reads: “To be able to ‘act otherwise’ means being able to intervene in the world or to refrain from such intervention with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs.Action depends upon the capability of the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of affairs

or course of events” (Giddens, 1984:14). Accordingly, roles of actors and agency imply action that “involves power in the sense of transformative capacity” (Giddens, 1984:15), i.e. the changes in the tense and complex relationship between the actors and the state - the contested communication within the “social framework defined either as a social order, as a process of social change, or as both as once” (Touraine, 2000:901). Insofar, the outline of structuration theory is befitting as a theoretical template for the investigation of the ever-tense and power induced problematics of cultural policy, more so in the line of decentralisation and participatory governance in culture.

However, for ‘grand’ theoretical narrative, the exploration will turn towards the consideration of modernization, transition, transformation and change as explained by several influential authors from various contexts such as Welzel and Inglehart and Giddens from the international level and Tomić-Koludrović, Švob-Đokić and Zeman from the national perspective. The merger of international authors with the Croatian ones is intentional and, in many respects, conceptual insofar that this thesis strives, among other, to explore and gather both theoretical and empirical knowledge from Croatian authors in order to affirm the continuity of Croatian contribution to the contemporary cultural policy discourses on the academic level. Furthermore, experiences of modernisation, transition and change are simultaneously universal, yet highly contextual. For this reason, exploring Croatian theorists seemed as indispensable in a thesis that is focused on Croatian example of cultural policy decentralisation and participatory governance in culture.

Why the theory of modernisation in the exploration of cultural policy decentralisation and participatory governance in culture? Answering this question can be set off with a simple claim that modernisation theory unravels a wide contextual trajectory for investigation of cultural policy evolution processes. In line with this, the thesis does not embark on a single theoretical line of assumption but creates a theoretical narrative from a spectre of theoretical concepts that aide the exploration of the topic from different, yet corresponding angles, encompassing transmutation and convergence of modernization processes with the transition, transformation and social change that induces democracy. All of these theoretical conceptions are relevant and illustrative for both temporal and spatial, i.e. territorial scope of the research in this thesis.

2.6. Modernisation, transition, transformation and democratisation

Modernisation theory pertains to the process of modernisation¹³, which Inglehart and Welzel explain as „an encompassing process of massive social changes that, once set in motion, tends to penetrate all domains of life, from economic activities to social life to political institutions, in a self-reinforcing process. Modernization brings an intense awareness of change and innovation, linked with the idea that human societies are progressing” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3071). These authors analyse modernization in relation to the idea of human progress that is relatively new and interrelated with the sustained economic growth that began to outpace population growth only with the rise of pre-industrial capitalism in sixteenth-century Northwestern Europe (North 1981; Hall 1989; Lal 1998; Landes 1998 in Inglehart and Welzel, 2007). This initial outset of the process of modernization was followed with the philosophies of Enlightenment and humanism that provided fertile grounds for the emergence of modernization theory. The idea of human progress in the modernization theory builds on the assumption that technological innovation, based on human intellectual achievement, coupled with economic growth and emancipation of science, would “inevitably bring changes in people’s moral values” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3072) and end with the domination of traditional values and intellectual monopoly of the religion. Inglehart and Welzel use Marxists idea in claiming that “modernization starts with changes at the “socio-economic basis,” from which it moves on to changes in the institutional and cultural “superstructure” as “most descriptions of modernization start with technological and economic changes,

13 In explaining modernization, a distinction must be made in relation to modernity. Modernity, as Giddens notes, it “refers to modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence“(Giddens, 2009 [1990]:1). Tomić-Koludrović sees Giddens’ idea of modernity as linked to “the idea of the world that is open to transformations, hence, the societies with characteristics of modernity are more dynamic and live in the future” (Tomić-Koludrović, 2015:15). She continues to differentiate modernity and modernization through exploration of several authors, such as Touraine (2009 in Tomić Koludrović, 2015) who asserted that there is one modernity, and that the term is used in singular, while modernization is a process that has a number of varieties and approaches, or Eisenstadt (2002 in Tomić- Koludrović, 2015) who wrote about “multiple modernities” that entail a “view of modernity as a new type of civilization” (Eisenstadt, 2010:2). According to Eisenstadt’s view, the core of modernity is “crystallization of a mode or modes of interpretations of the world”, a cultural program that is combined “with the development of a set or sets of new institutional formations with a central core of unprecedented ‘openness’ and uncertainty” (Eisenstadt, 2010:3). The role of human agency and autonomy in modernity is transformed while the “premises and formation of the social, ontological and political order” are no longer taken for granted (Eisenstadt, 2010:3).

tending to portray related changes in social structures, cultural values, and political institutions as reflections of technological progress” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3073).

In the line of historical trajectory, after the initial emergence in the Enlightenment era modernisation theory resurged in the wake of the Second World War (i.e. in the same period of the emergence of cultural policy and sociology) “when the capitalist and communist superpowers espoused opposing ideologies as guidelines for the best route to modernity. Although they competed fiercely, both ideologies were committed to economic growth, social progress, and modernization, and they both brought broader mass participation in politics” (Moore 1966 in Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3072). The period of 1950s¹⁴ and 1960s gave way to the ‘classical’ theories of modernization that “identified the core characteristics of modern society as the decomposition of older ‘closed’ institutional frameworks and the development of new structural, institutional and cultural feature and formations, and the growing potential for social mobilization” (Deutch, 1961 in Eisenstadt, 2010:1). Eisenstadt stated that “contrary to the claims of many scholars from the 1970s on that the best way to understand the dynamics of different ‘modernizing’ societies is to see them as a continuation of their traditional institutional patterns and dynamics, the institutional formations which developed in most societies of the world have been distinctively modern, even if their dynamics were influenced by distinctive cultural premises, traditions and historical experiences” (Eisenstadt, 2010:2).

The tendency towards the structural differentiation was seen as the most important structural dimension of modernity that was developing and manifesting in the growing urbanization and commodification of economy, among other, as well as in the rise of the new institutional formations, such as the modern state and new capitalist markets. The theory of modernization is focused on economic development, but also the promotion of values¹⁵ and the state as a central actor in

14 Development theorists, Kothari and Minogue state that there has never been a disruption of modernization theory since the 1950s, and argue that “there is a singular, though not always homogenous, development project that propels us towards modernization” (Kothari and Minogue 2002:8).

15 In the register of values, modernisation theory “aimed at imposing certain values to developing societies to boost development processes...First and predominantly, modernization theorists stress the dichotomy ‘modern’ versus ‘tradition’” (Bussmann, nd:1). Bussmann, claims that ‘modern’ – ‘traditional’ dichotomy vanished from the contemporary vocabulary on modernisation, however “promoting western values still forms a central element” in the

development. As Bussmann claims, “apart from being an economic theory, promoting values was an integral part of modernization theory”, and “the actor that is in charge of promoting economic development and spreading values is the State¹⁶” (Bussmann, nd:3). While the element of economic theory and economic development will not be given any special attention in this thesis, the elements of the state and values will be interwoven throughout the investigation on decentralisation of cultural policy and participatory governance in culture. Namely, the role of the state is a central element in cultural policy and its development, as much as the values such as pluralism, equity, accountability and diversity are vital for the introduction and sustaining of participatory governance in culture. Moreover, the ‘secular’ rational worldview and individualistic orientation that shape and influence the structural dimensions of the modernization are pertinent to readings of participatory governance in culture (Eisenstadt, 2010).

Transforming the values inherent to ‘traditional’ society, such as social uniformity and religious authority that radiate through all domains of life, from family values, communal activities, political participation, gender roles, work motivations etc. (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005), is the central element of modernisation processes. Giddens claims that society cannot be “fully modern if attitudes, actions or institutions are significantly influenced by traditions because deference to tradition – doing things just because people did them in the past – is the opposite of modern reflexivity” (Gauntlett, 2008:105). The shifting interplay between traditional and modern values and societal norms, as we shall see in the following chapters and the empirical part of this thesis, was also a key factor in the transition process in Croatia, but in different contextual, temporal and spatial circumstances. Several Croatian social scientists (from the field of cultural policy) extensively wrote about transformation and transition providing an overview of modernizations processes through different stages, either progressive or regressive, and social transformations that were implied and consequent to the transition from 1991 onwards.

development processes of contemporary world, especially in the non-Western parts, and, in the case of this thesis most important, peripheral and semi-peripheral parts of globe and Europe“ (Bussmann, nd:1).

16 The central role of the State is embedded in the origins of modernization theory and Keynesian thought that posits the State as a “the central actor in promoting development in developing countries” (Bussmann, np:4).

2.6.1. Transition, Transformation and Democratization

Zlatar defines transition as “slow and painful process with uncertain prospects for successful resolution” (Zlatar, 2001:2), that deeply affected all components of social structure. In terms of culture, Zlatar identifies transition as a process that led to “the destruction of the value system, the lowering of professional standards, and a self-referential, closed culture” (Zlatar, 2001:2). Nada Švob Đokić wrote on the processes of transition and radical social transformations since the Second World War in her book titled “Transition and the New European States” (*Tranzicija i nove europske države*) where she defines transition as a term that signifies a change from one system of social organisation and production into another, or from one, notably inferior, or weaker phase of social development into another, potentially more stable and developmentally more inductive one. Thus, the transition is mostly understood as systemic transformation, or systemic change (Švob-Đokić, 2000). Švob Đokić developed the definitional framework on transition in the article on *Cultural Contexts in Transition Processes* in which she further unpacked transition and provided differentiation between transition and transformation. The author explains transition as “long-term, multiphase and eclectic process” that is defined differently by different social sciences (Wagner, 1997 in Švob-Đokić, 2004b:9): “Transition is today widely accepted as a term that defines political, economic and social change typical of the contemporary post-socialist societies that have abandoned the socialist and are opting for capitalist system. But the meaning of transition remains rather wide and it therefore increasingly stands for change that encompasses all kinds of values and professional fields involved in redefinition of contextual structures that provide for new meanings and new types of organization and functioning of either whole societies or of particular fields of human activities. This is why the notion of transition is strongly linked to notion of transformation, which defines the type and nature of transition itself. Transformation represents an interactive social change that may (but need not) involve systemic change. It is confined to the element of the system and to different specialized activities, that may, by being transformed, reach the point at which they are transferred from one (established and known) system to the other system (unknown, not clearly structure and being just made up” (Švob-Đokić, 2004b:9).

Tomić-Koludrović sees transition as a meandering process of modernization and gives a historical overview of the term through its initial use in the academic discourse since the 1970s and 1980s when it was used for explaining the changes in the authoritarian systems of South- American and South European countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece, etc.). The process of democratic consolidation of these countries marked the second and third wave of democratization and was further developed in the process of transition in post-communist and post-socialist countries in the Central and South-eastern Europe. Tomić-Koludrović extracts and underlines the post-communist and post-socialist experience of transition as “one of the most significant transformations in Central and Eastern Europe” (Egan, 2001 in Tomić-Koludrović, 2015:16). The dynamics of transition in these countries have been tracked and measured by the levels of aptness for states accessions to the European Union. Inasmuch, the levels of transition have been divided into two sections; that of *early* transition and *mature* or *late* transition. Tomić Koludrović warns that the stages of transition should not be understood in sense of their chronological span only, but also as stages or temporal periods of deep turmoil in which the transformations processes resembled mannerisms of *manchester* or *laissez-faire* capitalism¹⁷ more than any type of contemporary approaches to regulating capitalist societies (Tomić-Koludrović, 2015:16).

In lieu of Tomić-Koludrović claims, and in line with central analytical concerns of this thesis, the transition process has to be understood from the position of the European countries in which transition implied the change of system and social transformation encompassing democratization. Insofar, transformation opens the issue of systemic change and a problem of social evolution that is inherent to modernization processes and democratization. Inglehart and Welzel suggest that the social transformations initiated by technological and valuative changes have massive consequences on societies' outlook in the following:

- Growth of mass-based human resources;
- Occupational diversification;

¹⁷ Manchester capitalism or *laissez-faire* capitalism are terms „designating the extreme form of liberalist capitalism found particularly in the first half of the 19th century, taking its name from the city of Manchester (...); it propagates the free economy without any state control and with a total disregard for the social question” (Altmiks, 2014).

- Organizational differentiation;
- State capacity growth and state activity extension;
- Mass political involvement;
- Rationalization and secularization (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3072,3073).

Out these six categories, pertinent to this thesis as theoretical references is the category of *organizational differentiation* that involves the proliferation of “an ever-increasing diversity of economic, social, cultural, and political entities”, such as associations, parties, committees, loose informal groups, and social movements, “increasing the variety and interdependence of organized social life” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3073), encompassing the constituencies of public system and sectors such as, in the case of this thesis, cultural system and sector. Additional categories are *State capacity growth and State activity extension* covering the extension of State’s perimeter and investment of State’s, or resources of public authorities in “the creation of more elaborate administrative infrastructure” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3074). Thus, “widening of state capacities as well as the diversification of state services and regulations is another concomitant of modernization”, just as mass *political involvement* that signifies each individual coming into the reach of the state thus being affected by the decision made by the states and state’s doing (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3074). This leads to a need to “legitimize state activities by mass approval, leading to universal suffrage and other forms of mass participation. Thus, mobilizing the masses into politics, whether in authoritarian or democratic ways, is a core political aspect of modernization” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3074). The interplay between state capacity growth and mass political involvement is particularly important for the participatory governance and the changing role of involved actors and agency that, as Fung and Wright underline, seek to colonize state power and transform formal governance mechanisms of state-power and institution into “permanently mobilized deliberative-democratic grassroot forms” (Fung and Wright, 2003:22).

Modernisation is conducive to democracy and processes of democratisation, although there are several perspectives and arguments whether modernization actually leads to, or ensures democracy or not, or whether non-democratic and authoritarian societies are also compatible with modernisation. Talcott Parsons argued that “social systems that do not give room to the principle of

voluntary association are unable to produce legitimacy and unable to harness people's intrinsic motivation for the goals of political system. Such as system has access only to support that it can win by force and bribes" and systems "that are unable to mobilize people's intrinsic support will be unable to compete effectively with those who can" (Parsons, 1967 in Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3076). This regards ex-communist and totalitarian systems that should, in sense of adopting democracy, either accept principles of voluntary association or fail in democratic development. Inglehart and Welzel also quote Luhmann's systems theory that predicted the failure of communist systems with the argument that "that totalitarian systems deny the subsystem autonomy that is needed to run complex modern systems in an effective way" (Luhmann, 1995 [1984] in Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3076). These theories suggest that modernization inevitably leads to democracy, for only democracies can generate legitimacy and "provide sufficient subsystem autonomy for a highly complex society to function effectively" (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007:3076).

Inglehart and Welzel have developed more nuanced interrelations between modernization and democracy in their study and book on *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. The Human Development Sequence* from 2005. In that study, the authors bring into question the economic theory on modernization and claim that socio-economic resources alone are not decisive elements for modernization, i.e. the path from socio-economic resources and development to democracy is not linear and automated (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). As the authors note in their book: "industrialization brings rationalization, secularization, and bureaucratization, but the rise of knowledge society brings another set of changes that move in a new direction, placing increasing emphasis on individual autonomy, self-expression, and free choice. Emerging self-expression values transform modernization into a process of human development, giving rise to a new type of humanistic society that is increasingly people-centred" (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:I).

The path and interrelation between modernization and democracy is gradual and set in several phases; from the first phase that mobilized the masses and made democracy possible along with fascism and communism. The following phase of post-industrialism brought powerful mass demands for democracy, "the form of government that provides the broadest latitude for individuals to choose how to live their lives" (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:I). Inglehart and Welzel's work on

exploring modernization in relation to cultural change and democracy demonstrated that values have a crucial role in the establishment of democratic institutions and that modernization is a model of social change that fosters human development in a way that it is a process in which socio-economic development brings cultural changes that make individual autonomy and democracy “increasingly likely, giving rise to a new type of society that promotes human emancipation on many fronts” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:2). Democracy¹⁸ as a phenomenon and socio-political practice is not, authors argue, a matter of “constitutional engineering” and “elite bargaining”, but depends on people’s deep-rooted orientations that “motivate them to demand freedom and responsive government – and to act in to ensure that governing elites remain responsive to them. Genuine democracy is not simply a machine that, once set up, functions by itself. It depends on the people” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005:2). Democracy has now spread all over the globe in gradual spatial and temporal sequences that Huntington’s calls *waves of democratisation*¹⁹, mak-

18 Zdenko Zeman notes that, although democracy has been recently omnipresent in the general debate on global condition, the concept of democracy has been present since the Ancient Greece, yet the modern use of the term has been proliferating since the revolutionary changes in the Western societies in during the late 18th century, while in the middle of 20th century democracy has been defined in three main definitional lines: a) democracy according to the *sources of authority* or governing power (who or what governs; e.g. the will of the people); b) democracy according to the *purpose* of governing (why are we governing; i.e. for the public good); and c) democracy according to the *processes* of constituting government (Zeman, 2004). The discussion on cultural policy in relation to the democracy resonates with the contemporary philosophical thoughts of Jacques Rancière and Chantal Mouffe. Rancier sees democracy as a dynamic and “uncontrollable” process, never completely definitive, attainable or consensual (Rancière 2016 [2010] and 2014 [2005]). Rancière argues that democracy constitutes a basic paradox, which cannot be dissolved, but only pushed, eschewed and reinstated through radical politics. Radical democracy, as Mouffe (2013) claims it, must be understood as a shift away from a focus on citizens as members of a state, where attention is mainly on duties and rights and on political representation, towards a focus on active citizenship in communities based on practised participation. Mouffe sees cultural institutions as places where radical politics, or “agonistic” politics and conflictual pluralism can materialise as an alternative to the market and the market-oriented experience economy (Mouffe 2005; Mouffe 2013 in Sørensen, Kortbek and Thobo 2016:7). Gert Biesta, the Dutch educational researcher, has provided his contribution to understanding radical democracy through the notion of Bildung, or a “subjectification” and as a concept of the active citizen within the framework of the participating/practising community – rather than a concept of the citizen identified with and represented by a group: “What is radical about this concept of subject and Bildung is that its objective is not equality (and the absence of difference), instead equality (in the different and the socially unequal/excluded) is its starting point, as formulated by Rancière in the paradigmatic essay on “The Emancipated Spectator” (2014 [2009])” (Biesta 2014 in Sørensen, Kortbek and Thobo, 2016:8).

19 The first wave of democratization started in 1820s “with the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States”, and lasted till 1926, “bringing into being some 29 democracies” (Huntington, 1991:12). The regression of this wave happened in 1922 with the coming of power of Mussolini in Italy and the reversal in the number of democracies from 29 to 12 by 1942. The victory of Allies in the World War II initiated the second wave of democratization that reached 36 democratically governed countries, only to be reversed from 1960 to 1975 back down to 30. The third wave encompasses the period from 1975 to 1990 and has produced additional 30 countries that made transitions to democracy (Huntington, 1991; Zeman, 2004). Croatia has become a democratic country in the *third wave* of democratization.

ing democracy globally recognized as *the* best (Giddens, 2000). However, in deliberating about democracy and its interrelations with modernization processes, an issue of the paradox of democracy must be raised (Giddens, 2000).

The paradox of democracy lies in the fact that democracy is spreading all over the world “yet in the mature democracies, which the rest of the world is supposed to be copying, there is widespread disillusionment with democratic processes”, bringing down the levels of trust in democratic institutions and the democratically elected representatives, i.e. politicians (Giddens, 2000:21). Democracy has played a key role in politics of the twentieth century (de Sousa Santos and Avritzer, 2005), however, the on-going tensions between rampant capitalism and democracy in the twenty-first century, propelled by rising populism and cultural backlash have resulted and fostered growing pessimism and crisis of democracy²⁰. The crisis of democracy is visible in various factors including: “citizen disaffection with politics (Campus and Andre 2014); the gross lack of political literacy (Rapeli 2013); low levels of satisfaction and trust in governments and politicians (Hay and Stoker 2009; Warren 2009); the decline in membership of political parties (Whiteley 2009); the increasing power of actors without electoral accountability, such as transnational institutions, central banks, or regulatory bodies (Vibert 2007); the failure, or ineffectiveness, of representation (Shields 2006); and the proliferation of complex governance arrangements that evade accountability and transparency (Runciman 2014)” (Ercan and Gagnon, 2014:1). Giddens proposes an explanation of the rising issues on deepening legitimacy problems of both governments of ‘old democracies’ and the ‘new democracies’. He claims that in a world based on active communication, the concentration of the power that comes only from the top-down “loses its edge”, and this pertains especially to the countries that were democratized post-1989 and that still grapple with the need for decentralization and flexibility. Giddens’ claims are partly consonant to Sader’s observation that the extreme expansion of liberal democracy, which is necessary for its realiza-

²⁰ Crisis of democracy has been a major debate in the public discourse since the earliest evolvments of democracy. The writings on crisis of democracy are present in the works of Plato and Aristotle, up to beginnings of modern era and works by Weber, Tocqueville and Marx. The upsurge and culmination in the discourse on crisis of democracy has been rising since 1970s of the previous century with writings by Jurgen Habermas on legitimation crisis and structural problems in late capitalism, as well as the influential report on crisis of democracy by Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington and Jaoji Watanuki (Merkel, 2013). In the recent decades, authors like Jacques Ranciere, Chantall Mouffe and Colin Crouch have significantly contributed to the debate on the state of democracy in contemporary times and the prospects for its survival and future reinventions and reinterpretations.

tion is, at the same time, the “cause of its crisis and historical exhaustion” (Sader, 2005:447). De Sousa Santos calls these simultaneous developments and regressions of socio-political realities in present-day a “paradoxical time”, or “a time of great advances and amazing changes, dramatically brought about by information and communication revolutions and the revolutions in electronics, genetics, and biotechnology. On the other hand, however, it is a time of disquieting regressions, a return of social evils that have appeared to have been or about to be overcome” (de Sousa Santos, 2005:vii). The paradox of current times resides in the assumptions that the promises of Western modernity, heralded as liberty, equality, solidarity and peace, have appeared to be finally in place, but it seems to be increasingly obvious that “such promises were never farther from being fulfilled than today” (de Sousa Santos, 2005:vii). De Sousa Santos’ observations resonate with Giddens’ claims of modernity being a “double-edged phenomenon” that has spread worldwide through modern social institutions creating “greater opportunities for human beings to enjoy secure and rewarding existence”, however, modernity also has “sombre side, which has become very apparent in the present century” (Giddens, 2009 [1990]:7).

These observations point towards some of the main issues of a current era marked by dystopian outlook generated through gloomy predictions and conditions in environmental concerns and climate crisis²¹, as well as the rise of populist anti-liberal and anti-democratic tendencies in global politics²² can be understood through the lens of concepts such as liquid modernity²³. Bianchi Gisse

21 In the current age of Anthropocene, climate crisis is a topic of urgency on a global scale. A number of theorists of modernization have given special consideration to the topic of climate change, such as Ulrich Beck with article „Climate for Change, or How to Create a Green Modernity“ from 2010, then Anthony Giddens with „Politics of Climate Change“ from 2011 and Max Koch with „Capitalism and Climate Change: Theoretical Discussion, Historical Development and Policy Responses“ from 2012. Sociological theoretical contribution to the stark reality of climate crisis turns towards the critique of the uncontrolled economic growth and pressing capital accumulation on global scale that has been enabled, in most simple terms, by public policies prioritizing corporate interests over public ones.

22 Žuvela and Vidović observe that “the widening gap between the democratic promise and failure has given way to flourishing populism amidst social distress and increasing inequality, a popular sovereignty that increasingly rules the world. As Lukacs (2005:223) notes, we are faced with “the prospect of modern democratic society in which the corruption of words and speech... may be governed by the manipulators of popular majorities, in which opposition parties and papers are permitted to exist, but their impression and influence hardly matter since their voices are weak. This “new barbarism”, as Lukacs calls it, is the triumph of populist politics and the governance in the name of “the people”, which uses “the people” only in name to manipulate “the people’s” judgements and opinions (Ibid.)” (Žuvela and Vidović, 2018).

23 This concept was coined by Zygmunt Bauman (2000) and it reflects the status of changes and transitions of modern times marked fluid and unstable social reality and its interactions.

notes that “we are observing the deregulation and privatization of the tasks of modernization, which have been transformed from collective, social and therefore State problems (the classic model for this is the welfare state) into individual responsibilities that are consequently faced in a fragmented way, often without the resources to do so. The liquidity of current social framework means that planning for the future falls to the individual; he or she is the only one responsible for his or her actions, creating anxiety and a permanent sensation of insecurity and uncertainty” (Bianchi Gisse, 2014:18). The state of uncertainty is closely connected with the concept of risk that Ulrich Beck sees as an essential feature of modern society. Beck writes that “risk may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself” (Beck, 1996:21). Beck’s concept of risk society was (and still is) in many ways a visionary one in sense of its cautionary predictions and drawing attention to the seriousness of the dangers that the modern society is faced with, not in a sense of those dangers being a marginal issue, but proper “gamble with our destiny” (Zeman, 2004:219). However, as it will be later explicated and argued in this thesis, both risk and uncertainty can be accepted and utilized as a part of a more positive future outlook, as a new social imaginary in form of “productive anticipation” (Rogoff and Schneider, 2008) that is needed for contouring of new collective horizons and democratic standards in the frameworks that, in the regulatory sense, shape the society, such as public policies, public institutions, public resources, etc.

Finally, the specific view on modernization, transition and transformation, and consequently democracy, ought to be taken from the contextual perspective and the lingering issues of progressive and regressive forces and destructive potential of modernization that Eisenstadt explained as “not necessarily benign or peaceful”, and interwoven with wars violence, repression and dislocation of large populations (Eisenstadt, 2010:2).

2.6.2. Modernization in Croatian experience and levels of cultural change

The spatial scope of this thesis involves a territory of a state that was a part of the federal communist country as a socialist republic, and which went through a war in the 1990s, followed by the painful process of unfinished transition and multitude of socio-political transformations, encompassing the accession to the European Union in 2013. Hence, the understanding and reading of modernization processes in Croatia is anything but linear and confirmative to the conventional canons of modernization as evolutionary experience in Western parts of Europe. In the specific case of Croatia, modernization process was conditioned by differential variability in relation to the non-Western European regions with communist and socialist legacy on one side, and the Western European project of modernity on the other.

The literature and theoretical sources do not provide much analytical background to the cultural and structural dimensions of modernization in pre-1990s Croatia, then socialist republic in the federative state of Yugoslavia, especially in the remit of evolutionary changes in cultural policy. Several authors take an approach of defining modernisation processes in Croatia according to a line of sequential stages. Rogić, for example, defines Croatian experience of modernisation as “*not* being a unified process in which the thought of internal developmental continuity would have a guaranteed relevance and position” (Rogić, 2001:39). Rather, this author suggests a more plausible claim of several “modernisation attempts” or models demarcated by precise structural divides (Rogić, 2001:39): “certainly, it is the least wrong to differentiate two, *now already diachronically finished*, modernisation attempts (with adjoining templates) and another one which is still being formed in the liquid times” (Rogić, 2001:39). The first stage of modernisation, according to Rogić, fits into the historical framework from 1868 to 1945. The second stage of modernisation falls into the period from 1946 to 1990, while the last one is visible in the period post-1990s” (Rogić, 2001:39)²⁴. The first stage refers to the period of Croatian reality under the domination

24 In his chapter „Three Croatian modernisations and the Role of the Elites“, Rogić proposes and explores the thesis of the three-tiered modernisation process in Croatia in correlation to the fluctuations in the position and roles of the elites. The author quite elaborately expounded the definition of the elites underscoring the attributes of nobility, morality and their (failed) transition from the aristocracy to the citizenship and the issues of national identity of Croatian elites and „techniques of its reductions to the appropriate deal-making configuration“ (Rogić, 2001:45).

of Austro-Hungarian Empire when the mobilisation of the modernisation process was enforced “top-down”, which was again repeated in the second stage when the ideal of modernisation of the society was dispersed under the aegis of “yugoslavionism”. In both first two stages, Rogić detects Croatia as “an empty peripheral area”, Croatian society as “peripheral society” in which opportunism is “a rational practice” (Rogić, 2001:45). The affirmation of the peripheral position poses itself as important for the deliberation on the limited possibilities of modernisation in the peripheral societies that rely on the imitation as there is no other way to overcome, overrule or compensate for the existing deficits in knowledge, capacities, mobilisation of money etc. in comparison to the central societies. The period from the 1990s onwards is marked by normative modernisation process that is yet again imposed from above, but this time in the form of various supra-national and political alliances (such as United Nations, European Union, NATO, World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund etc.) that configure the globalised setting. Internally, the mishaps of the third stage of the modernisation processes are found in the role of “political entrepreneurs”, i.e. the group that was supposed to shape the template of the third Croatian modernisation, yet as Rogić states, they did not have a clear idea on the rational continuation of the modernisation process. Insofar, the transitional period od post1990s and the main characters of the “political affectation” limited the process on already mentioned “top-down” modernisation (Rogić, 2001:69). The entire modernisation of society, only plausible if grounded on the capacities “from below”, stays in the shadow of the unfortunate transition characters and processes.

Rade Kalanj’s writings on transition, consolidation of democracy and question of culture claim that the changes in the Eastern-European countries stemmed from the necessity for modernization, but also from the crisis of legitimacy that indicated the inevitable end of political power as it was then in place, and the need for the change in political rule (Kalanj, 1998). Modernization is, Kalanj argues, the only source from which political systems can draw and sustain their legitimacy. The modernization process is explained as “complex and multidimensional transition” that involves a wide spectrum of interrelated dimensions such as economic development, civic and political freedoms, free market, the freedom of voluntary association, autonomy of cultural, religious and moral sphere, etc. (Kalanj, 1998:11). The fall of the socialist rule based on the chronic deficits of legitimacy is defined as the first phase of transition in our Croatian context.

The next two phases include transitional cuts, shifts and turns, while the third phase signifies consolidation of democracy (Kalanj, 1998). Modernization experience in socialist period Croatia was the so-called “top-down modernization”, which resulted with modernity quite different from that in developed liberal democracies with which “real socialism” was competing with, trying to prove its advantages on symbolic and ideological levels (Sztompka, 1993:137; Ray, 1997:547 in Kalanj, 1998:11-12). Attaining proper levels of “real modernization” was not possible by either converging changes or reforms, but “by full disintegration of the social legacy of the socialist rule” (Kalanj, 1998:12). Regarding the consolidation of democracy, Kalanj makes an explicative argument that the democratic consolidation depends on the following conditions: “structuring, building and **restoring of legitimacy**; forming and operational functioning of **civil society**; an **economic strategy** that enables development, modernization and partaking in global processes; the distributive system of **social justice** and consensual conflict solving; **rule of law** as the rational foundation of functioning democratic rule; free forming and expressing of **democratic political culture**” (Kalanj, 1998:17). In transitional countries, most of these conditions are hindered by non-democratic behaviour of democratically elected political elites, as well as “authoritarian nostalgia” of numerous political actors, followed by creating legal frameworks that suit interests of governments and/or political parties, absolution of “formal democracy” as an alibi to augment real political power, clientelism and arbitrary political behaviour that works beyond the formal and institutional levels of political processes (Misztal, 1996 in Kalanj, 1998:18). In other words, for democracy to be consolidated, it is not only necessary to have a free political election, but for the elected political elites to democratically rule and continuously legitimize that rule. Legitimization of the democratic rule is closely linked with the forming and functioning of civil society. Civil society is a “counterbalance, a control mechanism and corrective of formal state government, a network of institutions and organizations that prevent state’s centralization, oligarchization and arbitrary operation. It is a sphere of open play and articulation of interest that mediates between individual-citizens’ demands and decisions that are made and implemented by the state apparatus” (Kalanj, 1998:19). It (civil society) augments the power of social actors and gives them the opportunity to participate in the political processes beyond strictly formal channels of political parties, parliamentary and governing bodies, and to use that participation for exerting influence in forming the *res publica*. Civil society, insofar, fills the void and enlivens traditionally divided

space between women, men and the state. With its influence, civil society creates and ensures better conditions for the structuring of good and moderate governance. The restricted political space is widened with the inclusion of civil society and stretched beyond the conventional political games of attaining power towards opening and including the most diverse demands that are expressed in the plural societal context (Kalanj, 1998). As Kalanj states, if a different mode of political discourse and paradigm is possible, it is possible because of the rise of ideas and facts from civil society (Kalanj, 1998). These claims made by Kalanj on the role of civil society in the modernizations processes have a strong similarity and resonance with the work of Frank Fischer in his elaborations on the role of non-governmental organisations in the practices of participatory governance, in particular in the register of “on the “people’s self-development” and empowerment as primary goals, emphasizing, political rights, social recognition, and economic redistribution in the development of participatory approaches (Rahman, 1995 in Fischer, 2016:3).

The role of the civil society as actors of change in the process of evolution of cultural policy is quite important for the topic of this thesis. However, the issue of democratic consolidation is highly problematic in the circumstances of transitional cultural habitus that is structurally conditioned to reproduce old social relations in a new distribution of power resources. In other words, the new “regime of knowledge and power” does not necessarily imply the true cultural change (Kalanj, 1998:35).

In the sense of values and social change, Katunarić brings an overview of the cultural dimension of social change with the focus on the remit of Eastern Europe. Drawing on extensive literature sources, (Huntington, 1991; Sztompka, 1993; Castoriadis, 1994; Schudson, 1994; Kalanj, 1995, Le Grand et al., 1992; and Kawashima, 1997 in Katunarić, 1997:9), Katunarić distinguishes three levels of description of cultural change: “a) the level of transformation of values, e.g. from collectivism to individualism; b) the symbolic level, e.g. where history and cultural heritage are used as symbolic ‘ornaments’ fostering the sense of collective unity (mostly in form of nationalism, which is, nevertheless contradictory to the tendency under a/); c) the level of institutional change, e.g., abandonment of old institutions and methods of organisation in culture in favour of new ones entailing free initiative and linkage to the market demand for cultural services” (Katunarić, 1997:10). These levels

of cultural change are indicative and interrelateable to the processes of cultural policy evolution and change, i.e., they provide a 'theoretical blueprint' against which the changes in the paradigmatic and practical development of cultural policy can be analytically detected, juxtaposed and compared. As Katunarić states, "the three-level approach can be taken only as a broader framework for describing the cultural situation in present-day Croatia, as well as the processes that constituted the cultural development of Croatia as part of Yugoslavia" (Katunarić, 1997:10).

The changes that happened after 1991 with deep socio-political transformations, which led the newly-founded nation into a transition period, unravelled modernization processes that were driven with the aim of both continuing and discontinuing with the modernization experiences and practices of the previous socialist system. Kalanj explains continuity as patterns of authoritarian political culture, "unclean conscious" regarding egalitarianism, disregard for the rule of law, kleptocratic behaviour towards public goods and resources, as well as towards influencing the logic of the market, intolerance for shaping the public interest, etc. (Kalanj, 1998:12). Discontinuity encompasses free periodical political elections, multiparty political system, privatization of public resources, economic processes based on market principles, pluralism of media, etc. (Kalanj, 1998). By decommunizing of society in the post-1990s period, the immediate formation of the paradigmatic rule of the modern democratic culture that creates and shapes the citizen was not attained. Insofar, Kalanj notes that transition was a sort of abbreviated, compressed "process of integration into capitalist modernity" – what took a long time in the development of capitalism (phases of prosperity, crisis, recession, unemployment, etc.), happened very quickly in transitional circumstances and created "shocking and reactive social consequences" (Kalanj, 1998:13).

A more detailed account of the Croatian experience of transition, social transformation and cultural change in relation to the cultural policy will be presented in the empirical part of this thesis, but here what needs to be underlined is, on a general level, the unrealistic nature of the objective of modernization processes in post-1991 Croatia. As Mrduljaš and Kulić note, the implementation of the modernization objectives "was slowed by technical and economic limitations or incompetence and the particular interests of the governing elites....Also, the crucial interdependence between dominant ideologies and modernizations stifled critical thought, which was scarcely and only par-

tially articulated, with limited effect on social reality” (Mrduljaš and Kulić, 2012:7). The authors argue that “such dynamics of modernizations” was not specific for Croatia and ex-Yugoslav region where the number of “profound social changes resulted in frequent adjustments of modernising concepts, or in stagnation and standstills” (Mrduljaš and Kulić, 2012:7).

Poljanec-Borić (2006) writes about the legacy of modernization processes in Croatian experience from 1945 to 1990 in the article “From Paradoxical Modernization to Self-managing Postmodernization. The Discussion on the contemporary development of Croatian society” (*Od paradoksalne modernizacije do samoupravne postmodernizacije. Rasprava o suvremenom razvoju hrvatskog društva*). This scholarly article argues that the process of paradoxical modernization of pre-1990s period in Croatia was transformed into a process of self-managing postmodernization. In making this argument, Poljanec Borić theoretically explains the paradox of the modernization processes in the Eastern parts of Europe as having totalitarian political elites managing development in a way that three distinctive approaches that define historical trajectories of modernization as a) “backwards” industrialization; b) chaotic urbanization; and c) catatonic bureaucratization (Rogić, 2000 in Poljanec-Borić, 2006). Consequently, the collapse of paradoxical modernization leaves the society in which it was implemented in “semi-modern” (Županov, 2001 in Poljanec-Borić, 2006) condition “with an institutional and spiritual heritage that is different to that of authentic modern societies” (Schoepflin, 1993 in Poljanec-Borić, 2006:361). For this reason, it becomes evident that the transformation processes in the Eastern parts of Europe are articulated differently than those in the Western parts of the European continent since the residual, yet still dominant social elites (or structures) intervene in the processes with different value system than those in the West²⁵.

25 One of the more recent and interesting takes on the modernization processes in Croatia in relation to the previous socialist period is found in the concept of *unfinished modernizations* that has been elaborated in the publication titled “Unfinished modernizations. Between Utopia and Pragmatism” (Mrduljaš and Kulić, 2012). The research project of Unfinished Modernizations focused on architecture and urban planning of socialist Yugoslavia from various perspectives that explored relations between architecture, planning, society and politics. While the research did not explicitly deal with cultural policy per se, it involved public policy areas that are implicit to cultural policy and also indicative and illustrative for detecting the state of processes of modernization in Croatia. As the authors and editors of the publication state, “the process of modernization, with all their different motivations and effects, can be an instructive lens when researching how architecture and town planning were linked to social context” (Mrduljaš and Kulić, 2012:6). The use of the plural in the title of the research and publication is explained through understanding modernizations as “multiple and fragmented processes” especially in the context of Croatian regional surroundings that is “marked by interruptions, attempts at establishing continuity, and the repeated versions of the concepts of modernization” (Mrduljaš and Kulić, 2012:6). The authors continue to explicate modernization processes in Croatia, i.e. then Yu-

Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić describe the differences between Eastern and Western European countries “as a consequence of different position these societies and culture occupy in the modernization process. While those compatible with the “advance economies” are part of a “post-industrially modernized” social context, the post-socialist ones largely reflect the phenomena typical of the first, “simple” modernization” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b:9,15). The „first“ or „simple“ modernity is a concept that Beck uses to explain the social condition of industrial society and the „social change it brought in relation to pre-social institutions“ (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b:14). Koludrović-Tomić and Petrić note that the “first” modernity never affected various aspects of social organization as the “second” modernity that “is directed at everything that “first” modernity left “unmodernised”: family and gender roles, workplace relations, individual biographies and sense of belonging. Central to it is the process of individualization, forcing social actors to question and reflect upon all the basic assumptions, limitations, and contradictions of modernity. This thinking through is done at an individual level, in a “risk society” context, where everybody is forced to make decisions, increasingly without resort to the disappearing traditional collective support mechanisms, ranging from the family to the nation-state. The societies faced with “second modernity” are marked by an increase “in post-traditional forms of social organization....” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b:14, Tomić-Koludrović, 2007:14). Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić quote Beck in stating that the societies of first or simple modernity still pursue the memories or idealized principles of social organization that include “[n]ational state society, collective patterns of life, full employment society and rapid industrialization with the ‘unseen’ exploitation of nature” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b:15). In terms of social structure, Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić see transitional societies at best as “mixed societies”, simultaneously undergoing processes “engendering both “first” and (to a significantly lesser extent)

goslavia: “These processes, whether intentionally or consequentially, showed a certain degree of independence or divergence from how they played out in international centres of modernity, which was essentially affected by the ‘between’ position: between socialist East and capitalist West, the economically developed North and the underdeveloped South, progressive cultural experiments and re-traditionalisation, between innovative political conceptions and repressive mechanisms of ideological control. Under such conditions, an unprincipled blend of pragmatism and utopia may have seemed necessary both to the governmental elites that carried out the modernisations, and also to the widest strata of the citizenry who expected, if with anxiety and doubt, a better future from these modernisations. Our understanding of the Yugoslav context, then, is based on a reading of two positions ‘between’: one related to the global and the other to the inner contrasts that fundamentally marked the modern history of the region” (Mrduljaš and Kulić, 2012:6).

“second” modernity phenomena” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b:18). These authors upheld and elaborated their “mixed society” thesis with the claim of Croatian society being “characterised by a simultaneous evolvement of two modernisation processes of different nature and levels of intensity” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:13). The understanding the process of modernisation in Croatia as bilayered is close to aforementioned Rogić’s concept of three stages of the modernisation process in Croatia. While Rogić’s concept that reaches into Croatia’s 19th century socio-political and cultural context, Tomić and Koludrović construct their concept²⁶ on the analysis of the “modernisation process in the socialist past of the country” as that “segment of the modernisation process has left a particular beating on its present and is closely connected with the discussion of the components of present-day Croatian cultural identity” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:14). The differentiation between the proposed two strata of modernisation is depicted though the assessment of “postmaterialist values” that Inglehart affirms as indicative of “a technologically and economically developed society” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:13). Some of these values were present in socialist Croatia, as they developed some urban centres and in some (limited) strata of the population (mostly youth), hence for that period, and not only for the stated reasons, the process of modernisation is observed as “pseudo-modernisation”, “partial modernisation” or “semi-modernity” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:18). The transition period that followed brought, yet again, inconsistent levels of “postmaterialist” or “individualist” values, which creates significant lags in the course of the social, political, economic and cultural integration processes in the international level. Tomić-Koldurović and Petrić underline a nostalgia of the “the idealized principles of social organisation in the social past. These idealized memories are bound to include “[n]ation state society, collective patterns of life, full employment society and rapid industrialisation with the ‘unseen’ exploitation of nature, in short, numerous elements that Beck summarize as typical of “first modernity” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:18). In other words, while EU integration process can be seen at the individual level as conducive to a set of values resembling those that were considered “post-materialist” in the late social period, at the

26 Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić highlight Rogić’s concept of „three modernisations“ according to the given periodisation as „useful because it enables us to concentrate on a highly idiosyncratic segment of the „first modernity“ changes that took place in the socialist period of Croatian history“ (Tomić-Koludrović, 2007:14). However, on a more general note, these authors assess Rogić’s concept as being constructed out of „segments and different guises of the same modernisation process, which in Beck’s terminology could all be classified as „first modernity“ phenomena“ (Tomić-Koludrović, 2007:14).

collective level it can revive and reinforce the element of “simple modernity” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:19). In short, the condition of chronic inconsistency and “back and forth” sways in the modernisation processes and the “simultaneous existence of the elements of “first” and “second” modernity in the same social space” (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:20) support the thesis of a Croatian society as “mixed society”.

What does such context mean for the evolution of cultural policy in the direction that seeks modernization and democratization of the cultural system and the change in the principles and modes of governing cultural sector? How does the framework of modernization, encompassing transition, transformation, social and cultural change, as well as democratization, foster or/and suppress cultural policy changes in line of decentralization and the introduction and development of participatory governance in culture? Are those type of changes even possible in a “mixed society”?

This thesis does not directly confront these issues that are dealt with more implicitly through the exploration of changes in cultural policy in the line of decentralization and participatory governance in culture. The following chapters will analyse all of those key concepts that this thesis addresses.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3. CULTURE, POLICY, CULTURAL POLICY: KEY CONCEPTS, DISCOURSES OF POWER, SCOPE AND CHANGES

„Because research results cannot be presented without a well-defined conceptual framework, conceptual definitions are of utmost importance for framing and keying...the relevant research subject. Framing refers to a process which both influences and is influenced by the participants of cultural activities, whereas keying can be understood as tuning, setting, or even rooting of a concept in the context of a certain theoretical view“

(Ahponen and Kangas, 2004:9).

The main aim of this chapter is to follow the first part of the thesis that unravelled disciplinary conundrums and provided both theoretical and socio-political context by analysing the key concepts that this thesis is built on. Consistently, the literature review in this part of the theoretical framework is divided into two chapters, encompassing approaches to understanding cultural policy through its constituent parts of culture and policy, the discourses of power in cultural policy, definitions of cultural policy, cultural governance, decentralisation in cultural policy, participatory governance in culture and cultural policy change. These concepts and their theoretical grounding not only shape the analysis of the indispensable literature but also serve as guideposts for the methodological part of the thesis, i.e. forming of the research questions and provide referential points for empirical analysis.

3.1. Cultural policy defined: from *culture* to *policy*

The analysis of the cultural policy compiles academic definitions that extend in parts towards the authors that source the knowledge on cultural policy from extensive practical experience in the field. The definitional multiplicity provides a sequential timeline from which it is possible to track the progression or regression, even *status quo* in the approaches, modes and levels of understanding cultural policy, its role, relevance, main issues and developmental goals and potentials.

The most conventional, yet necessary way to uptake exploration of the cultural policy concept is to analyse it through its main constituent parts; *culture* and *policy*. This approach in the analysis of cultural policy is adopted from Bell and Oakely (2015), who wrote in their book on cultural policy on culture in cultural policy and policy in cultural policy. Here, we shall take the same sequential order of explication, and will take culture as the first category for definition, followed by public policy.

3.1.1. *Culture* in cultural policy

One of the possibly most tedious and demanding tasks in writing on cultural policy from the scientific or applied perspective is to define culture²⁷. The conventional first step in that direction is to resort to Williams' seminal definition from his book *Keywords* in which he defined culture as "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (Williams, 1988 [1976]:87). This definition surely adds to the weight of complexity of culture but is restricted to the English language, and meaningless on its own accord. In the text that followed this popular sentence on defining culture, Williams interpreted the evolutionary shift in the etymological meanings of the term. In its first uses, culture "was a noun of process: the tending *of* something"

27 In 2002, Gray noted that there were over 150 definitions of the word "culture", and it is plausible to think that just as many, if not more have been coined since. "Culture" is a "classic example of "an essentially contested concept", one that is capable of multiple definitions and with no clear "system for choosing between these as to what the term actually means" (Gray, 2002:2). Accordingly, culture has become somewhat sensitive term that is often used without consistency, which can cause confusion in determining to what is meant by culture and what is being examined as "cultural" (Gray, 2002).

that went from tending to crop and animals to cultivation as a part of general social processes, which was in French and German language used “as a synonym for *civilization*: first in the abstract sense of a general process of becoming ‘civilized’ or ‘cultivated’; second, in the sense which had been already established for *civilization* by the historians of the Enlightenment” (Williams, 1988 [1976]:89). Similar evolutionary meaning of culture is found in writings of Terry Eagleton who explained culture as a concept that is derived from nature with original meanings of “the tending of natural growth” (Eagleton, 2000:1). The meaning of culture as a process of *cultivation*, i.e. an inherent part of “general social processes” opens a broad field of engagement for articulations of culture in cultural policy and the directions in which cultural policy can or should operate. The civilizing nature of culture as “an idealised practice to which humans can and should aspire” as it “represents our better selves and can help us to re-think and indeed remake our world” continues to influence cultural policy and has been part of its rationale since the nineteenth century (Bell and Oakely, 2015:17). The nineteenth-century legacy in defining culture is found in “two contrasting approaches: culture as a set of artistic practices or products, and culture as an anthropological signifying system marking human society off from nature” (Bell and Oakely, 2015:16-17).

This understanding of culture is reiterated in Miller and Yudice’s explanations of culture as connected to policy in two registers. The first register is *aesthetic* and involves artistic output emerging from creative people and being judged by aesthetic criteria (Miller and Yudice, 2002). The second register is *anthropological* and takes “culture as a marker of how we live our lives, the sense of place and person that make us human – neither individual nor entirely universal, but grounded by language, religion, custom, times and space” (Miller and Yudice, 2002:1). The aesthetic register thus differentiates populations and social groups *within* themselves (i.e. the levels of cultural capital for the appreciation of high culture or other non-popular forms of artistic expressions), while the anthropological register differentiates *between* populations and social groups (i.e. which countries are culturally more ‘rich’ or ‘potent’ and which are not) (Miller and Yudice, 2002).

Apart from these textbook approaches of defining culture with some of the classical quotes and authors, we shall also attempt to define culture in a more political, if not ideological way that raises the issue of culture in present times. This way of interpreting culture surpasses the limited

constraints of the operational meaning of culture within the remit of cultural policy and opens the possibility to think culture in cultural policy in a more dynamic and problematic setting of on-going socio-political transformations. On that note, it has to be stated that culture has always been a marker of social distinction (Benhabib, 2002), consciously „intended to mark out class differences and to safeguard them: as a technology invented for the creation and protection of class divisions and social hierarchies” (Bourdieu, 1979 in Bauman, 2011:4). This trait of culture is linked to the concepts of culture from the 19th century, when due to modernization process “nature and man were ever more frequently seen as separate entities”, and through new secular worldview, culture obtained new use and meaning (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009:11). The meaning of culture in the 19th century became attached to the “level of collective development”, but it also became a “commonplace to identify ‘culture’ with art and poetry” (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009:12). Consequently, art became recognized as “the most advanced level of ‘culture’, indicating the societal evolution” and produced by “remarkable individuals” (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009:12). In the writings of Matthew Arnold, “culture is an idealised practice to which humans can and should aspire; it represents our better selves and can help us to re-think and indeed remake our world” (Bell and Oakley, 2015:17). This is the traditional understanding of culture that has shaped cultural policy on its narrow path defined by a focus on art and its civilizing nature (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009; Bell and Oakley, 2015:17). However, throughout the second part of the last century and the beginning of the current one, an anti-elitist reconceptualization of culture has been taking place, wresting it from the elite “sentimental characteristic of the aesthetic” (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009:12) and making it a property of the wider population with the mission to democratize culture by universalizing its applicability (Dominguez, 2000).

Eagleton notes that, although culture is still not politically sovereign, it is part of the “shape of the world politics of the new millennium”, becoming “intensely relevant to the world in which the joint wealth of the three richest individuals is equal to the combined wealth of 600 million of the poorest” (Eagleton, 2000:51). In those circumstances, culture becomes a matter of disputes that are not about the differences between opera and soap opera, i.e. cultural tastes and values, but about increasing discrimination and injustice often resulting in social unrests, steep divides and

inequalities, up to terrors of ethnic cleansing and radical discriminations. This stance is sustained by Held and Moore who underline that culture has become “a focal point for both consumerism and for conflict” (Held and Moore, 2008:1). They observe culture as a “major force in social, economic and political transformations”, and see culture “contesting, amplifying, and altering the nature, direction and understanding of globalisation processes” (Held and Moore, 2008:1). Similar to Miller and Yudice who see culture connected to policy in two main registers – the aesthetic and the anthropological (Miller and Yudice, 2003:1), Held and Moore define culture in the context of contemporary globalisation in its broadest sense – “from the anthropological notion of culture as a system of meanings, values and symbols through to popular views of culture as religion, ethnicity, nationality and politics, and narrower senses, as business practices, elite culture and art” (Held and Moore, 2008:1).

In the wide spectrum of understandings of culture and in correspondence with the research interest, we resort to an explanation of culture as creative power, a transgressive human enterprise that seeks to retain its “useless” character, reaching beyond and above current realities. This is articulated by Hannah Arendt who observes that “culture finds itself under threat when all objects of the world, produced currently or in the past, are treated solely as a function of the vital social processes – as if they had no other reason but satisfaction of some need – and it does not matter whether the needs in question are elevated or base” (Arendt, 1968 in Bauman, 2011:107). In the scope of research interest of this thesis, culture is seen as a plethora of artistic and cultural practices, expressions, experiences and aspirations, while in a wider spectre, culture is perceived as a political issue of contemporary times – as an “arena of intense political controversy” and “one of the most puzzling aspects of our current condition” (Benhabib, 2002:1). With *culture* becoming a “ubiquitous synonym for identity, an identity marker and differentiator”, we are repeatedly faced with different social groups engaging in the name of whichever aspect of their cultural identity and becoming “contestants in the public sphere of capitalist democracies”, creating characteristically tense struggles for redistributions and recognition (Benhabib, 2002:1). Culture is, thus, the ever-changing and dynamic terrain of meaning-making and key symbol, a lens which gives, as Wright observers, particular views of the world, of “how people should be and behave and what should be seen as the ‘reality’ of their society and history: in short; an ideology” (Wright, 1998).

Furthermore, there are several approaches to the interpretation of culture as a resource that are taken into consideration. Yudice bases his interpretation on the analysis of the ever-increasing role of culture, which has expanded in an unprecedented way into the political and economic spheres while the conventional notions of culture have been emptied out (Yudice, 2003:9 in Švob-Đokić, 2004b:7). To this end, McGuigan argues, quite rightfully, that in its endless ability and complexity of being everything, the use of „culture“ has proliferated to „such an extent that it has become virtually meaningless“ (McGuigan, 2004:9). This has led to the increasing instrumentality of cultural policy with culture (and particularly the arts) becoming tools for the attainment of non-cultural goals. The instrumentality of cultural policy can be linked to a broader set of diverse societal changes – from strong political influences in the (re-emerging) totalitarian political systems to acceptance of a commodified conception of public policy in capitalist democracy (Gray, 2007). The instrumentalisation of cultural policy has specific consequences for both their “design and intentions that underlie them”, as well as with alterations and creations of ideological conditions (Gray, 2007:203). But, most notably, the uses and misuses of culture in cultural policy in sense of instrumentalization find the fair share of their rationale in postulates and logic of public policy.

3.1.2. *Policy* in cultural policy

Policy as a concept refers to regulating aspects of politics that imply coordinated actions and opportunity for stakeholders and observers to influence the process, which gives complex meanings to public governance (Colebatch, 2008). In the words of Leslie A. Pal, “policymaking is the art of developing responses to public problems” (Pal, 2013:414). Public policy presumes a congruence of *polis* (the area it governs, including its governmental and economic institutions) and *dēmos* (the people it both represents and governs). This congruence has been created and maintained by the nation-state in its present-day form since the 19th century, while the academic pursuit of public policy emerged at the beginning of 1950s (Sapru, 2011). Some of the infamous definitions of public policy include those of Thomas Dye who, rather simply, stated that “public policy is anything a government chooses to do or not do to” (Dye, 1972:2), which is supported by Shaun P. Young who explained policy-making as the fundamental activity of governments (Young, 2013).

What does the government mean in these definitions? The term ‘government’ involves the whole constitutional order of democratic rule, from parliament and procedures of passing the laws to the national government and the work of national ministries and agencies. However, the government in public policy, i.e. cultural policy does not involve only these levels of authority. It also involves supranational levels (bodies of, for examples, European Union), as well as sub-national levels such as regional, local and communal (district) authorities. Public policy, cultural policy alike, operate on different territorial scales making complex cartography of governments’ meanings and levels of involvement.

The cycles of public policy-making encompass five stages: agenda setting, policy formulation, legitimation, implementation, evaluation, and subsequent policy maintenance, succession or termination (Cairney, 2012 in Bell and Oakley, 2015:48). It is through this public policy-making cycle or process that governments establish the framework within which all citizens must function, and it is “the process via which governments decide both which societal goals to pursue and how to (best) pursue them” (Young, 2013:1). The policy-making process deals with the issue of *who* makes the policy and opens the possibility for inclusion of a whole array of interest groups, actors and voices to he play a role in and influence policy-making; from civil servants to civil society, think tanks, academics, consultants, workers from the particular sector that policy deals with, etc. In that line, William Jenkins defined public policy as “a set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selections of goals and the means of achieving them within a specifies situation where those decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” (Jenkins, 1978:15). Correspondingly, Colebatch underlines that policy doesn’t only have to do with government, but with governing, which is like “a pattern of interaction between different participants, a process of “pulling and hauling”, in which different players try to shape activity in a way which reflects their particular perspective” (Colebatch, 2009 [1997]:11).

In exploring the literature on public policy, the first instance that becomes obvious is the notion of complexity of the study of public policy (Peters and Pierre, 2006), as well as the notion of process in the analysis of public policy (Hill, 2010). The first instance of complexity that Peters and Pierre

underline is the tendency of approaching public policy as a singular area of government activity (culture, agriculture, defence, taxation, etc.), while “focussing on the “single lonely policy” may vastly oversimplify the interactions of multiple policies in producing outcomes for citizens” (Peters and Pierre, 2006:2). For example, the impact of government decisions in the cultural sector is not only reliant on issues regarding cultural matters only but also, as the following parts of this thesis will show, issues pertaining to urban and spatial planning policies, education policy, economic policy, etc. Simply put, public policies encompass a whole web of decisions, not just decisions in a single area. Hence, the process of creating public policies is a multi-layered one. It is a political process in the widest sense, which includes multiple different actors: politicians, pressure groups, public officials, professionals in public service, but also those that perceive themselves as passive users of policies. As Hill (2010) suggests, the process of public policy creation is a dynamic one and the definitions of the problem change over time. The process is not isolated from other processes; it will be influenced by other policies and it will influence other policies.

Peters and Pierre note that the influence of politics on policy is plentiful and depict how “governments of different ideological orientations tend to make different choices with respect to how the state should allocate its resources and how those resources should be mobilized” (Peters and Pierre, 2006:3). Here, it must be underlined that the public policy, as well as policy orientations in social sciences, “emerged from a context in which liberal democracy, having been severely challenged by the anti-democratic forces of Fascism and Bolshevism, could easily seem the only viable form of democracy” (Torgerson, 2007:15). The image of democracy, especially in the lines of discursive or deliberative democracy²⁸, envisions “vital public discourses playing a significant role in shaping the policy domain” (Torgerson, 2007:15). However, the democratic character and legitimacy of public policy are continuously challenged by the “gap” between policy rhetoric and policy practice, and between policy intentions and outcomes that reflect the role, relevance and needs of cultural actors (among other). Yanow explains this gap as a consequence of “ambiguities in policy language; the

28 Deliberative democracy as a term was first used in the 1980's by Joseph Bessette to describe a „political approach focused on improving the quality of democracy“ (Held, 2006:232). The main aim of deliberative democracy is to enhance „the nature and form of political participation, not just increasing it for its own sake“ (Held, 2006:232). Broadly defined, deliberative democracy is „any one of a family of views according to which the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate political decision-making and self-governance“ (Bohman, 1998:491 in Held, 2006:237).

lack of appropriate incentives to induce cooperation on the part of ministerial or local agency staff; poor organizational design of the agency; blocked communication flows between national, regional and local levels of government” (Yanow, 1996:3). Hill adds that all discussions on the processes of policy creation should encompass a thorough consideration of the nature of authority in a particular state, as it contributes to understanding the divisions and/or withholding of the power (Hill, 2010). The controversy surrounding the power devolution is essentially a question on democracy that differs from one state or national context to another one, through a set of models that all offer different perspectives and opportunities for participation in power.

While certain areas of public policy are well covered by relevant policy literature, the arts and culture area has generally not received much attention from public policy analysts. Not to speculate over the reasons why it is so, the fact is that the sector is virtually neglected in public policy literature while most cultural policy literature is actually loosely disguised special pleading (Craik, 2007). The words culture and policy are not restricted to the arts and public administration respectively, although they certainly include those meanings. When a concrete, regulating aspect of organizing “things and acts in indicated by policy, ‘culture’ as an abstract concept, has to be reified in some sense” (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009:11). As culture is, as a concept, vast, ambiguous, vague, public and intimate, the cultural policy concept, which implies that something as fragile and ambiguous as the production and circulation of symbolic meanings must be regulated, becomes problematic (McGuigan, 1996 in Žuvela, 2016). While a smaller part of the public is astounded with the idea that something ethereal like culture is being placed in the frames of something as ‘rigid’ as public policy is, a larger part of the public finds the possibility that culture is even worthy enough to be part of the public policies unwarranted (Wood, 2003 in Žuvela, 2016). This is an illustration of the contradiction that is inherent to culture, a clash of idealism and materialism; idealists see culture as a universal common good and a transcendental phenomenon, while materialists find culture to be a “product of socio-economical experience” (Wood, 2003 in Žuvela, 2016:16). The clashes and differing ideas are inherent to public policy and processes and are analogue to inherent tensions between agency and structure that constitute the power relations in the cultural policy domain.

3.2. Discourses of power in cultural policy

Any discussion about the process of public policy creation must include an examination of power in a particular state, including the claims about who (re)presents the dominant power (Hill, 2010). As it has been mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, the power is one of the key concepts in cultural policy, grounded in cultural policy studies links to critical theory, which places the arts and culture in a critical position towards the social power, i.e. aims to provide a critical understanding of societal structure and processes that are of “uppermost importance to unveiling power and hierarchies embedded in questions of culture” (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009:22). Correspondingly, power is in the core focus of cultural studies’ influence on cultural policy, especially in research on how popular forms of culture constitute power and how culture is expressed through institutional practices, administrative routines, spatial arrangements – and, in turn, how people’s participation in culture can demonstrate a process of signification and creative production of meaning on the part of the receivers (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009:22).

Bruce Baum (2000) reread the concept of power as it was apprehended by one of the most influential English-speaking philosophers of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill. For Stuart Mill, power, in its basic sense, is a capacity to influence change and/or to achieve desired goals. Stuart Mill’s understanding of power and authority is, in basic form and a broad sense, relatable to the Max Weber’s definition of power as the capacity or a “change of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of other who are participating in the action” (Gerth and Wright Mills, 1958:180). This basic conception was extended and outlined with a broader understanding of social and political power, stating that control of state power i.e. political power, is rooted in social agencies lying outside the machinery of government. Therefore, the government of a country is shaped in regard to the distribution of these elements of social power, and it can be supposed that the strongest power in society will make itself the strongest power in the government (Baum, 2000).

The essential notion in the theory of James G. March is that greater the power, greater is the ability to restrict outcomes, meaning that if one cannot by one’s action lessen the range of outcomes in a

situation, then obviously one has no control and if one can lessen, then one can control to that degree (March, 1966). Analogously, the ability to restrict outcomes is the essence of influence or the essence of power and power is defined in terms of constraints on outcomes (Cronin, 1996). Possession of resources such as wealth, authority, reputation, attractiveness, relations, kinship, and similar, confers power, or it can even be claimed that that is power itself. Besides physical or social resources, the possession of informational resources is important, thus is often said - knowledge is power, i.e. the whole Western philosophy since Plato has viewed power as antithetical to knowledge, as something that distorts the perception of the truth (Cronin, 1996). Later, Michel Foucault will expand this idea further, claiming that there is not “any knowledge that does not constitute at the same time some power relation” (Cronin, 1996:58). However, this claim should lead to the expected conclusion that the truth secures the emancipation from domination (Cronin, 1996).

In the 1970s, Michel Foucault argued that the view that “power involves one individual or group exercising control over another misrepresents how power functions in a modern society” (Cronin, 1996:57). Hence, he introduced an innovative and radical shift to a relational view of power as a function of a network of relations between subjects as opposed to the substantive conception of power as exercised by and over subjects. But this modern power, which he named disciplinary power, does not involve a special relation of authority or control alongside other social relations, it rather functions “through a multiplicity of social relations - economic, familial, sexual, etc. - to form a field of force relations that encompass the whole of society” (Cronin, 1996:57). Foucault contested the standard interpretation of social and political power as a force emanating from a single source. Rather, power is a kind of force circulating through society and constituting a mesh in which all people operate. This somewhat detached treatment of the subject seems problematic because it does not allow for an inner and reflective dimension of personal identity and thus inclines to reduce a subject to a set of acquired behavioural reflexes (Foucault, 1978; Cronin, 1996). Foucault’s theory has been widely influential, at the same time being accepted by many, and provoking strong resentment in others.

Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power, on the contrary to Foucault’s, gives an account of the role of the subject in the exercise of power and resistance. In developing his theory, Bourdieu borrows

the theory of practice from anthropological studies of tribal societies and assumes an implicit theory of modernization (Cronin, 1996). Both social structure and the habitus²⁹, where habitus as one of the central concepts of Bourdieu's theory stands for a system of schemes of production of practices and system of perception and appreciation practices, "undergo fundamental transformations with the transition from traditional to modern forms of social life" (Cronin, 1996:67). As opposed to non-literate societies in which culture is a shared possession of the whole group, in modern societies with the codification of cultural knowledge and practices, specialist producers of symbolic goods emerge and claim a monopoly of the competence to produce legitimate culture and "competition between rival producers open up the dominant view of the world to contestation and struggle" (Cronin, 1996:68). Cultural competence required to codify practices is not equally distributed among members of different social classes, thus the cultural capital³⁰ accumulated within the specialized fields translates into symbolic capital, i.e. the power to impose the legitimate vision of the social world, and thereby to reinforce - or to challenge - social divisions (Cronin, 1996).

Cultural field is structured by relations of power between actors and agents possessing different degrees of the competence specific to the field, or cultural capital, and where the relations of power at a given time are the outcome of past struggles for cultural capital. Bourdieu views the state as a *field of power* in which agents who occupy dominant positions in the restricted cultural fields struggle for control over the power invested in the institutions of the state to impose the official representations of the social world (Bourdieu, 2012 [2014]); Cronin, 1996). With this definition, Bourdieu 'upgraded' his previous reflection on the state as the "monopoly of legitimate physical

29 Bourdieu explains that „the conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce *habitus*, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them" (Bourdieu, 1990:53).

30 Cultural capital is closely related to inherited economic capital, since families seek to maintain and improve their social position by converting wealth into cultural capital through education and cultural consumption by injecting the right dispositions and attitudes that will later be translated into economic opportunities. In that way, the social field becomes polarized into a dominant pole of those who are rich in economic and cultural capital and a dominated pole of those who are insufficient in both forms. Therefore, modern societies can be viewed as a space of social positions in which agents are distributed according to their total volume of capital – economic and cultural, and whether they are on an upward or downward social curve (Cronin, 1996).

and symbolic violence”, which was made as an addition he made to Weber’s definition of the state as the “monopoly of legitimate violence” (Bourdieu, 2012 [2014]:3). However, the field of power, as Bourdieu sees it, should not be confused with the political field, which is one of the specialized fields of cultural production and includes politicians, professional producers of political discourses, who compete with other cultural producers for control over the power invested in the state. Hence, the power of the state cannot be analysed exclusively in terms of the political process. The real “problem of legitimacy for Bourdieu is that the established order is for the most part accepted as unproblematic and that, with the exception of crisis situations, the question of the legitimacy of the state is never posed. The dominant class is so successful in imposing its domination because it can count on the complicity of the dominated which is extorted through the state-sanctioned inculcation of the norms of the dominant culture” (Cronin, 1996:72). The norms of the dominant culture are legitimated by the state, which ensures that the dominant classes enjoy a monopoly over the symbolic power to shape agents’ self-understandings. In modern societies, the universal becomes the monopoly of the state and of those who can appropriate the power. Bourdieu assumes that all universal values are merely particular values that have been universalized through the mechanisms of symbolic power. This is why Bourdieu is sceptical about the possibility of overcoming “relations of domination through the institutions of representative democracy”, as “political discourses of legitimation are open to manipulation by those who monopolize the symbolic power to represent particular interest as universal; but even more important is the fact that the internal logic of political struggles between politicians and parties within the political field tends to reproduce rather than to undermine relations of domination in the social field” (Cronin, 1996:76). Consequently, Bourdieu finds the primary locus of resistance to power in the scientific field, rather than in the political field, “since scientific representation of social practice can dispel the mystification underlying symbolic domination by revealing the arbitrariness of the social divisions it serves to legitimate” (Cronin, 1996:76)³¹.

31 It has to be noted, however, that in case of scientific field being subordinated to the „logic of conversion of economic into cultural capital, struggles within the scientific field are likely to contribute to the reproduction of relation of domination by reaffirming the dominant view of the world“ (Cronin, 1996:76).

Finally, back to Foucault and his theory of power as a Nietzschean life force circulating through society and constituting a capillary network in which all people operate. Foucault saw the work of the modern state as an increasingly invisible implication of people in the exercise of power around bodily issues that not only “challenged the ways identity and sexuality were historically fused, but also began to provide a new mapping of power” (Bratich, Packer and McCarthy, 2003:4). Foucauldian discourse on power, however, made the most notable influence on the cultural policy field in the register of the power as elaborated through the concept of governmentality. In his *History of Sexuality* Foucault explained what he meant with neologism governmentality that he was then yet to coin:

“This word [government] must be allowed the very broad meaning it had in the sixteenth century. Government did not refer only to political structures or to the management of states; rather, it designated the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed – the government of children, of souls, of communities, of the sick (...) To govern, in this sense, is to control the possible field of action of others” (Foucault, 1977 in Scott, 2001[1994]:228).

Bratich, Packer and McCarthy give a simple explanation to the governmentality concept as referring to “the arts and rationalities of governing, where the conduct of conduct is the key activity. It is an attempt to reformulate the governor-governed relationship, one that does not make the relation dependent upon administrative machines, juridical institutions, or other apparatuses that usually get grouped under the rubric of the State. Rather...the conduct of conduct takes place at innumerable sites, through an array of techniques and programmes that are usually defined as cultural” (Bratich, Packer and McCarthy, 2003:4). Governmentality can thus be defined as the conduct of conducts and means, as Foucault elaborated, three things: first, “the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population” (Foucault, 1978:102)³². Second, governmentality refers to “the tendency that, over a long period

32 In referring to the ensemble, Foucault is talking about an art of government; the activities or practices of government, or even the game of government – an art by which some people are taught the government of others and some let themselves be governed (Foucault, 1978:103).

and throughout the West, has steadily led to the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power, which may be termed government” (Foucault, 1978:102). Third, governmentality is the process by which the state “gradually becomes governmentalized” (Foucault, 1978:103).

Tony Bennett argued that Foucault’s notion of governmentality and his general analysis of social power is especially well suited for a research praxis that can intervene into the policy and thereby make a difference (Frenander and Jönsson, 2007). Moreover, the Foucauldian model of governmentality facilitated an appropriate understanding of modern forms of rule, new forms of political power, the proliferation of public policies and systems of social administration that affect the conduct of individuals (Scullion and García, 2005). In words of Foucauldian theory, Bennett sees “governmentalisation of social relations as a necessary and inescapable horizon of contemporary social and political life” (Bennett, 1998:61). McGuigan explains Foucault’s concept of governmentality as referring to “the administrative apparatus of modernity, the emergence of the modern state and powers of social regulation” (McGuigan, 2004:15). In the register of modern state’s role in cultural policy, this “entails recognising that changing how cultural resources function in the context of relations of power usually involves modifying the ways in which cultural forms and activities are governmentally deployed as parts of programs of social management” (Bennett, 1998:61).

Bennett proposed that Foucault’s theory of governmentality is “better to “think with” than Gramsci” when it comes to cultural policy analysis and studies (Bennett, 1998:62). Gramsci argued that the modern state reproduces “the existing social order not by mere domination but by hegemony through which the state induces people to accept the capitalist social order as morally right” (Gramsci, 1994 in Bo-Seon, 2006:63). In such constellation, “cultural policy can be seen as a hegemonic apparatus to force the dominated class to internalize the conformist values through the inculcation of high culture: government’s cultural program pacifies social tensions and preserves social order by creating national identity” (Bo-Seon, 2006:63). Gramsci’s theory of hegemony builds on the critical understanding of the role of the state as ‘an educator’. The state had to educate the great mass of population that had to be brought to “a particular cultural and moral level which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the inter-

ests of the ruling class” (Gramsci, 1971:258 in Bennet 1998:65). Foucault revised the concept of state power, or the idea of power stemming the single focal point or government apparatus onto civil society, through reformulation of power that derives from the strength of the state is “dependent upon the proper disposition of humans and things” (Bratich, Packer and McCarthy, 2003:4). To provide arguments for Foucault’s governmentality, Bennett interpreted Raymond Williams’ conceptualisation of culture as “generalized process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development” as the historical evidence that “culture” is often used object and “the instrument of governmental policy in regulating social dynamics and relations, in general social life” (Bennett, 1997 in Bratich, Packer and McCarthy, 2003:6). Bennett’s idea on taking first Foucault’s concept of “police” as a “distinctly modern form of power which intervenes in citizens day-to-day lives in a noncoercive fashion in order to simultaneously nourish the life of the individual and the State” (Bratich, Packer and McCarthy, 2003:6), then of “governmentality” can be understood as loaded with policy pragmatism in which the cultural researchers and workers alike substitute critical reasoning and distance towards government and dominant governance typologies for modification of “functioning of culture by means of technical adjustments to its governmental deployment” (Bennett, 1992:406). This is linked with the issue of perpetual anxiety over relations between the State and intellectuals, and the never-ending “reform vs. revolution” debate among left intellectuals and activists” and the problem of political representation (Sterne, 2002:60). What Cunningham observed in this contestation, is a lack of “a social-democratic view of citizenship” and a need to move away from the *command* metaphors and from “rhetorics of resistance, oppositionalism and anti-commercialism on the one hand, and populism on the other, toward those of access, equity, empowerment and the divination of opportunities to exercise appropriate cultural leadership” (Cunningham, 1993:137). For this end, McGuigan, proposed for cultural policy to keep a critical distance to the political practice with the theoretical concept of “the public sphere” by Habermas: “Fundamental [...] is the normative view that, in a democratic society, ‘the public will’, however that is understood and constructed, should decisively influence the conditions of culture, their persistence and their potential for change”. (McGuigan, 1996:22).

McGuigan affirmed and supported Habermas’s perspective of ‘the public sphere’ being a prerequisite and a “normative guide” to democracy, i.e. a “normative reference point” (Fernander, 2008:7).

Habermas's focus on democratization involved a strong focus on political participation as "the core of democratic society and as an essential element in individual self-development"³³ (Kellner, 2000:3). One of the key insights from the Habermas's considerations on the public sphere is the observation on the restructuration in which "big economic and governmental organizations took over the public sphere, while citizens became content to become primarily consumers of goods, services, political administration, and spectacle" (Kellner, 2000:3). Stemming from the model of "bourgeois public sphere" of late 18th and 19th century that entailed mediation of the contradiction between bourgeois and *citoyen*, the public sphere "described a space of institutions and practices between the private interests of everyday life in civil society and the realm of state power. The public sphere thus mediates between the domains of the family and the workplace -where private interests prevail - and the state which often exerts arbitrary forms of power and domination" (Kellner, 2000:4).

Habermas's notion of the public sphere is democratically activated by "social movements, pressure groups and critical intellectuals. By addressing questions of key public controversy, these individuals and groups seek to highlight a number of critical problems and questions. Thus, a public sphere can say it is effective according to the extent to which it is able to connect with wider public norms" (Wang, 2017:214). Wang notes that Habermas's commitment to democracy has been influential in the critical analysis of and within the cultural domain, but as McGuigan raises an issue, these discussions have been repeatedly faced with the need of reframing "as private capital within a public administration has become a key issue to be discussed in the cultural policy field" (Wang, 2017:214). The main idea here is that cultural policy, as a field, should be "defended in terms of the public values that are necessary to create a democratic society by expanding these dimensions by looking at the affective dimensions of culture" (Wang, 2017:214). The discussions on precisely these tensions in the cultural policy field, both in its academic, i. e. theoretical and applied, i.e. practical scope seek for more concentrated analysis of what cultural policy is and how it functions.

33 Habermas's seminal work *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* from 1962 „contrasted various forms of an active, participatory bourgeois public sphere in the heroic era of liberal democracy with the more privatized forms of spectator politics in a bureaucratic industrial society in which the media and elites controlled the public sphere“ (Kellner, 2000:3).

3.3. Deciphering cultural policy: concepts, definitions, scope, typologies, paradigms and changes

“Cultural policies reflect the fact than [humanity] today is faced with the choice between seeking a purblind and despairing escape in nihilism, or resolutely confronting the future.”

(Girard with Gentil, 1983:186).

The issue of power and the concept of hegemony is present in Katunarić’s explanation of cultural policy. He defines cultural policy as “an instrument of overall state policy in culture” by which the state seeks to “ensure the hegemony of a certain type of political power in the cultural field” (Katunarić, 1997:10). Cultural policy as hegemony is a conception that sees “public involvement in the cultural domain through the prism of “governmentality”; that is, the process by which the state comes to manage individuals” (Mulcahy, 2006b:266). In such sense, which has striking resemblances to the present-day Croatian context, the hegemony of cultural policy is secured when “the dominant culture uses education, philosophy, religion, aesthetics and art to make its dominance appear normal and natural to the heterogeneous groups that constitute society” (Miller and Yudice, 2002:9 in Mulcahy, 2006b:266). However, by understanding hegemony not as monolithic, but as a fluctuating balance of diverse interests by various groups, Katunarić suggests that cultural policy can offer alternatives as overlapping and conflicting guidelines (Katunarić, 1997:10). This line of approach in defining cultural policy is very much parallel to McGuigan’s understanding of cultural policy as essentially being about “the clash of ideas, institutional struggles and power relations in the production and circulation of symbolic meanings....” (McGuigan 1996:1).

Cultural policy, as a subset of public policies, covers the wide-area from legislation processes (creation, implementation, evaluation) to the reflexive discussions that encompass the interpretation of actions. They are merged with progressive social and cultural directions, in the goal of imagining alternatives, models and structures of future cultural politics. Previously stated definitions of public policy and culture suggest, as Mulcahy observes, two general notions: “first, that governmental actions (or inactions) constitute value choices, that these choices are policies, and the

policies are politically determined; second, that the decisions of public officials are implemented by the production of goods and services that produce discernible societal outcomes. However, as a policy, public culture differs substantially from these criteria if only because the programs funded are often markedly atypical and the societal impacts difficult (if not impossible) to assess” (Bennett, 2004 in Mulcahy, 2006b:266).

In the aggregate, cultural policy describes the values and principles which guide any social entity in cultural affairs. Cultural policies function by the logic of public policies that have been explained in the previous sub-chapter; from processes and cycles of policy-making to the vertical (in sense of territorial perimeter, or *where* decisions are made) and horizontal axes (in sense of *who* makes the decision, i.e. which levels, types and profiles of institutions, organization and actors are included in the decision-making processes). Most often, cultural policies are made by public authorities, from the levels of micro-authorities, i.e. district councils to national levels involving state’s parliaments, but also by many other supranational bodies and institutions, as well as organizations from the civil and private sector. As stated in *Webster’s World of Cultural Policy*, cultural policies provide guideposts for those making decisions and taking actions which affect cultural life. Augustin Girard, the first and long-standing Director of the Studies and Research Department of the French Ministry of Culture put forward a definition of cultural policy in the book *Cultural development: experiences and policies*:

“A policy is a system of ultimate aims, practical objectives and means, pursued by a group and applied by an authority. Cultural policies can be discerned in a trade union, a party, an educational movement, an institution, an enterprise, a town or a government. But regardless of the agent concerned, a policy implies the existence of ultimate purposes (long-term), objectives (medium-term and measurable) and means (men [*sic*], money and legislation), combined in an explicitly coherent system” (Girard, 1983:171-172).

The state support for the arts and culture as a backbone of cultural policy is not new. The history of providing means for flourishing and creation of the art has roots in the ancient Athens that was “patron of drama as a part of the state religion” (Cummings and Katz, 1987a:3). Most of the

world's artwork is a legacy of support that was given through commissioning that art, from the Renaissance times through feudal Europe up to present-day. The support by the monarchs and/or the church gave the first foundations of what was later transformed into government, i.e. public support for the arts. However, since 1945, the programs for the support for the arts have “expanded tremendously”, both geographically (for example to the Anglo-Saxon world that joined the countries of Western Europe that had a long-standing tradition in public support for the arts), and in size as the “monetary commitment of national governments to preserving the cultural heritage of the past, facilitating cultural participation in the present, and fostering the development of new cultural achievements for the future mushroomed” (Cummings and Katz, 1987a:3). Hence, the cultural policy that we know today is the lasting consequence of the processes of modernization and the welfare state that has prevailed after the Second World War (Bell and Oakley, 2015). As it was stated in the first chapter of this thesis, the outset of the modern cultural policy was marked with the establishment of British Arts Council in 1946 and was brought to another level in 1959 when French president Charles de Gaulle created Ministry of Culture, led by the renowned author André Malraux as the first Minister. From that point on, cultural policy was recognized as an important responsibility for governments in all Western democracies (Frenander and Jönsson, 2007).

Dubois and Mulcahy observe that “cultural policy regimes reflect the histories of nation and state building, the institutional configurations and the modes of government specific to each country” (Dubois, 2013:2), thus also reflecting “the historical experiences and value systems that have characterized its social development (Mulcahy, 2017:vii). Thus, to understand the cultural policy or cultural politics of a country, one must understand its political culture, as cultural policies of governments vary according to the difference in political cultures (Mulcahy, 2017): “This variety reflects not only differing national traditions in the organization of public functions and the delivery of public services, but differing philosophies and objectives regarding the whole area of culture and the arts” (Cummings and Katz 1987a:4).

To this end, Mulcahy argues that cultural policies thus need to be “understood not simply as administrative matters, but as reflections of what is called a *Weltanschauung*, that is, a world-view that defines the character of a society and how its citizenry define themselves” (Mulcahy,

2017:viii). Dubois claims that the evolutions of cultural policies are results from the interaction between political and cultural levels that consist in adding new layers of institutions, orientations and discourses rather than in radical changes, in “a way that contemporary cultural policies can be viewed as the sedimentation of previous ones” (Dubois, 2013:2). This is particularly interesting observation when analysing and reflecting on transitional cultural policies, or the evolution of cultural policy in the countries that have endured significant socio-political transformations.

Cultural policy involves state support to both cultural production and consumption and the role of the state in making the decisions on that support. The state has intervened in the cultural field as to subsidize cultural practices and arts for a number of reasons and purposes that McGuigan critically categorizes as nationalistic, propagandistic, redistributive; in general, regulating the production and circulation of symbolic forms (McGuigan, 2004). Likewise, Pick and Bennett identify a range of motives behind governmental intervention and involvement in the field of culture and the arts (Pick, 1988; Bennett, 1995). For Pick, these include a range from promotion of “national glory” to maintenance of “order and control” (Pick, 1988:114,127,128), while Bennett sees government’s interest in culture and arts linked to the “national prestige” or “the welfare state” (Bennett, 1995:205,211,213,294). Most of the authors that critically examine State’s motives of intervention in the culture and the arts agree that interests and concerns that are not fully consonant with the specific content of arts and cultural policies lead those motives. Pick used this argument to, as Gray notes, beat the governments with a stick for involving themselves in areas where “they do not rightfully belong: either for reasons of irrelevance, or that arts and cultural policies cannot achieve what governments want, or that they achieve it at an irresponsible cost” (Pick, 1998 in Grey, 2007:204).

Governments can have different objectives in providing support to the cultural field. The economic rationale has been an increasingly popular means of justification state’s spending on culture. The most prominent direction of this style of government provision for culture is one of the cultural industries and cultural tourism that contribute to the economic growth and “may serve as magnets in schemes of urban and regional development” (Cummings Jr. and Katz, 1987b). This direction of cultural policy development has been dominant in the past three decades led by the

doctrine of the cultural and creative economy that will be further expounded in the part on cultural policy paradigms. Gray sees these discussions about the foundations upon which governments can justify the existence of cultural policies as significant insofar as they “implicitly recognise that policies can be seen to have a wider set of secondary effects than simply those affecting arts and culture. It is how these effects are utilised that would appear to have the greatest impact on how arts and cultural policies are used by governments. In this respect, the intention that lies behind the policies that are pursued becomes a central feature of how they are to be understood. It also implies that there is always an element of instrumentality in public policies (they are, after all, designed to achieve something): what is important is “the form of this instrumentality” (Gray, 2007:205). The concerns about the instrumentality of cultural policies, i.e. using arts and culture for non-cultural or artistic purposes and goals are warranted as they indicate the changes in the “governmental attitudes towards, and uses of, cultural and artistic resources within society” (Gray, 2007:205). In that line, Gray underlines the fact that was already mentioned about all public policies not being singular both in their processes, as well as in the motives and outcomes being a result of the context they exist in: “cultural and arts policies are the result of conscious choices that are made by political actors, either to garner support from particular class fractions (Volkerling 1996) or in response to a perceived need to manage the changing, and competing, pressures arising from broader re-structuring within societies” (Gray 2000 in Gray, 2007:205).

The governments’ reach and influence on cultural policy are largely determined by the scope of cultural policy as well as its proneness or characteristics of instrumentality and ambiguity.

3.3.1. The scope of cultural policy: issues of instrumentality and ambiguity

The twentieth-century idea of “cultural policy” was focused upon a “comparatively narrow conception of culture – referring to practices that are principally about communication, meaningful exchange and pleasure” (McGuigan, 2004:15). David Thorsby writes that the scope of cultural policy was once very straightforward and easily recognizable in the “works of art and literature, music compositions, theatre performances, and so on – and the individuals and organisations that

might be targets for cultural policy occupied an identifiable corner of the economic and social landscape – artists, performing companies, music ensembles, etc., on the supply side, and the ‘arts audience’ on the receiving end” (Thorsby, 2010:14). Mulcahy’s definition of cultural policy outlines the scope of cultural policy, i.e. the remit of its practical applicability. He also sums cultural policy to government activities “with respect to the arts (including the for-profit cultural industries), the humanities, and the heritage” (Schuster, 2003:1 in Mulcahy, 2006b:267) and strategies that promote the production, dissemination, marketing, and consumption of the arts” (Rentschler, 2002:17 in Mulcahy, 2006b:267).

Cultural policy encompasses a terrain much wider than that of the traditional forms of arts policy that focused on providing financial and organizational support for ‘classical’ spectre of cultural activities, artistic expressions or domains of cultural and artistic work such as fine and visual arts, performing arts and drama, contemporary arts, contemporary dance, ballet, opera, museums, historic preservation and renovation of heritage, literature etc. (Mulcahy, 2006b). In short, the core of cultural policy, that has had variables in time and space (i.e. has varied from one national context in a specific period of time to another) has traditionally included “historical heritage, support of professional artists, and traditional cultural institutions such as libraries, museums, theatres and concert halls” (Dubois, 2013:5). However, contemporary cultural policy has stretched into the domains of audio-visual arts and industry, broadcasting³⁴ and cultural and creative industries that surpass conventional notions of high-culture, arts or even publicly needed forms of cultural work and artistic expressions³⁵. This is not the definite stretch of the cultural policy that, depending on the policy context, variably involves other sectors or such as popular “cultures, language, sports, media, leisure, after school and social activities, cultural education, or the amateur arts” (Dubois,

34 Television and radio have been long considered as a separate broadcasting policy, however, they have long functioned as “major supporters of the arts by purchasing the work of performing artists on a massive scale, by developing audiences for live performances, and sometimes even by making direct grants to artistic organizations. Moreover, television and radio have become major vehicles for delivery of the arts” (Cummings and Katz, 1987b:359).

35 In the sense of scope of cultural policy, this thesis deals with the narrower scope of cultural policy, i.e. it does not take into specific considerations the field of cultural and/or creative industries as a specific sub-field of cultural policy. Rather, it deals with these areas of cultural activity only in implicit way, i.e. to the extent sub-fields of cultural policy involvement in the main research preoccupations of the thesis.

2013:5), as well as, for example, areas of gastronomy, sports, nature preservation, i.e., all that can fall under the anthropological register in articulating culture in policy.

The scope of cultural policy has been largely conditioned by the changes in the contemporary global context, most notably by the intensive processes of transitions, globalization and prevalence of the neoliberal capitalism led by enforcement of managerial logic in the public sector have established an understanding of arts and heritage as “resources” that are “used in the service of ends such as economic growth, employment, or social cohesion” (Isar, 2009:52). In the past three decades (and more specifically in the past decade), the philosophy of austerity and business ethos in the public sector introduced the diminishment of the allocation for funding the arts and culture with simultaneous expansion of the cultural policy scope and expectations, all contributing to the rising instrumentality of cultural policy that has already been mentioned. The instrumental logic of cultural policy is not only that it generates economic growth, which is “the most powerful rhetoric of cultural policy and the most important legitimisation principle for public support of culture” (Mangset, 1992:51 in Røyseng, 2008:2), but it includes one of the most perilous traits of populism in culture and cultural policy. This is certainly favouring of the nativism, promoting “mono-culturalism over multiculturalism, national self-interest over international cooperation and development aid, closed borders over the free flow of peoples, ideas, labour and capital, and traditionalism over progressive and liberal societal values” (Inglehart and Norris, 2016:3). This applies to one of the most serious challenges to contemporary cultural policies encompassing geo-political changes that brought a significant increase in “transnational flows of people and cultural goods, the development of diasporas, and the ‘virtual mobility’ produced by the internet and mobile telephony” (Mercer, 2006:83). The new global condition has placed immense pressure on the frameworks and nations and policies that are “proving inadequate to address the realities of cultures which are both subnational and transnational in their allegiances and belongings” (Mercer, 2006:83). Insofar, in the words of Colin Mercer, what we have learned in the past 20 to 30 years, is that cultural policy has become newly strategic in its remit and potential (Mercer, 2006). On one side, the changes in the scope of cultural policy are expressing more serious approaches to the issues of “(i) identity and citizenship in a world which is increasingly post-national in its dynamics and flows, (ii) security and dignity of persons, communities and nations, (iii) quality of

life in its profoundest sense as a combination of personal, economic, environmental and social life options” (Mercer, 2006:84). On the other side, the already stated prevalence of neoliberal capitalism, the commodification and economic utilization of cultural practice and resources have been established as benchmarks and justification of cultural policies, from their rationale to the scope, role and representation.

Gray wrote on the ambiguity of cultural policy in sense of the difficulties in defining the content of cultural policy sector and specific ways and approaches organisations that have a responsibility for cultural policy take in dealing with “the complexity that sectoral imprecision generates” (Gray, 2015:67). Ambiguities in the scope of cultural policy pertain to the ambiguity in the content of cultural policy (i.e. does cultural policy have a clearly-defined aim, whether it is one aim or a number of the, and “whether they will inevitably have multiple potentials, and often unintentional, consequences at different levels of effect”); policy expectations (i.e. are the results of cultural policy ‘purely’ ‘cultural’ or do they involve other economic, political goals and effects); policy mechanisms (i.e. clearly defined appropriate actors that put cultural policies into effect, which appropriate instrument and organisations and used to put policy into practice); policy outputs (i.e. “being able to identify what the focus of policy evaluation would be for investigating policy success or failure”); policy outcomes (i.e. identification of the policy consequences – are they analogue to the policy aims, or “are spill-over effects to be included”); and policy evaluation (i.e. the difficulties that ambiguities will lead to in “developing evaluations that are themselves unambiguous”) (Gray, 2015:68). These ambiguities, should they exist, are one of the key issues and challenges for the policy-makers to solve, along with the questions on why ambiguities even exist, what they mean for the functioning of the cultural sector, what are the consequences of ambiguity and what are the implications of ambiguity for the cultural policy research (Gray, 2015). Gray notes that the policy consequence of ambiguity is that:

“it opens policy sector to a great deal of internal debate between proponents of different positions, with this being exacerbated by the high levels of policy uncertainty and the existence of problematic preferences that are inherent within it. Ambiguity can be a means to avoid having to deal with the deeply-held and deeply-felt positions that policy actors have adopted and, as such, the

idea that there will actually be a means to fully resolve these differences is probably unrealistic, as ambiguity deliberately avoids the idea of resolution in favour of a much more fluid notion of policy. Thus, the arguments can change, and the policy fashions can alter, but there is unlikely to be any definitive solution to continuing cultural policy concerns and interests, even if workable compromises....are achievable” (Gray, 2015:76).

The ambiguity thesis is interesting and valuable for the case of Croatia where cultural policy is explicitly not defined³⁶. Instead, what we have are the cultural effects, sometimes unforeseen, of social action. Moreover, ambiguity of cultural policy inevitably opens the questions on policy representations and executions, along with the dynamics and discrepancies between these two categories. We’ve already written on the policy gaps, i.e. discrepancies between policy rhetoric and policy practice. In the scope of cultural policy, Raymond Williams has written about this gap as policy *display* and policy *proper*.

3.3.2. The *display* - *proper* duality of cultural policy

The representational duality in cultural policy in Williams’s work shows bipolar contrasts of the state’s role in relation to culture in which the state is not only the central organ of power but of *display*. In Williams’s words “you don’t have to look far in any particular society to see a culture which is not recognized as cultural policy or an arts policy specifically, but which is culturally concerned with display” (Williams, 2014 [1984]:305). Cultural policy as display refers to “theatrical element of the constitution”, i.e. to the performability of “the actual display of certain aspects of state power” (Williams, 2014 [1984]:305-306):

36 In stating that there is no explicit cultural policy it has to be noted that there are generally two registers of cultural policy in sense of its manifestation – *explicit* cultural policy and *implicit* cultural policy: “while explicit cultural policy is used to describe cultural policy suggestions that are labelled as such, implicit stands for any political strategy that affects culture, i.e. practices and values, but that may not be expressed as cultural policy (Ahearne 2009 in Lindsköld, 2015:9).

“There is usually a public performance of power, often in form residual from much earlier periods; a great occasion for producing costumes, for presenting a version of the national heritage. Quite quickly (and one should not forget this historically) elements of the arts are consciously involved in this, over and above the actual state rituals. Thus there is a *stately* sense of cultural policy” (Williams, 2014 [1984]:305-306).

Williams argues that it would be wrong to overlook this as a cultural policy’s “first sense” because one can then progress onto “a second sense of the State”, which, in a manner of a modernized world, has “the attitude towards the arts and embellishing either the public power or the proffered orthodox idea of the nation” extended “to areas of genuine artistic practice” (Williams, 2014 [1984]:305-306). This sense of the state involves *proper* cultural policy that is primarily policy for the arts “in relation to a whole and very diverse life, rather than the representation (which has happened through many different social orders) of the arts as purveyors of the most evident delights as attachments to their quite other purposes” (Williams, 2014 [1984]:305-306).

In his interpretation of Williams, McGuigan notes the general purpose of cultural policy as the display is to “embellish the prevailing social order” through two sub-categories or senses: the first is *national aggrandizement*, symbolized through the “pomp and ceremony” (McGuigan, 2004:62). Second sub-category is *economic reductionism*, represented in the major shift towards business orientation in culture and the arts “pronounced in rationalizing public cultural investment, including ‘leverage’ for economic growth and promoting the interest of corporations” (McGuigan, 2004:63).

The cultural policy *proper* is defined through the first category of *public patronage of the arts* as sustained through the policy legacies of the welfare state, although with a wider scope of cultural policy. As McGuigan, explains, “the whole point of the public arts patronage had been to subsidize and protect the fine arts, including classical and experimental theatre, from market failure” (McGuigan, 2004:63). This was (and still is) done under the assumption most of the art forms would not survive the cultural marketplace and could not compete with commercially driven mass-popular culture. However, the mass-mediation of popular culture came with the policy issues of *media regulation* that Williams classifies as the second sub-category of cultural policy

as proper. The third sense of cultural policy as proper is the *negotiated construction of cultural identity* that transcends the nation-state, which is “both too large and too small” – too small to sustain genuine national cultural policies in the times of relentless globalization, and too big to promote the “diversity of cultural policy” and aptly represent the vast spectre of localized micro-cultures (McGuigan, 2004:63-64). To this end, Williams proposed outlining a policy that “can move beyond the state cultural policy and its evident dangers” of losing “powers of directions and policy” and turn to the supranational dimensions such as European dimension, as well as to turn to *civic* tradition “which in terms of European history has a much finer record in cultural policy than that of any State” (Williams, 2014 [1984]:310). Williams, hence, concludes that “State as a public power which merely enhances itself with the fine arts, which engages in its own reproduction using the arts and culture for its decoration and imagery, and not really for the development of the arts themselves” should be complemented, or even substituted with the civic-policy level that fosters the public power, that he described in his words:

“I believe there is a possibility of defining a principle of holding the artistic means of productions in public trust, but then of leasing them by a variety of possible arrangements to self-managing groups of artists of all kinds, who will get the use of those means of production in relation to a state policy...It is in that direction that - with the civic emphasis and with a broadening European emphasis – we should be moving” (Williams, 2014 [1984]:310).

This line of thinking in imagining and proposing another future of cultural policies is consonant to the writings of Vjeron Katunarić and his propositions on the *new public culture*, that will be explained in more detail in the following chapter. However, deliberations on the prospects of the cultural policy cannot be fulfilled without taking into consideration the traditions of the state relations with culture. The literature on cultural policy sees these traditions as models or typologies that have categorized according to the modes of the State’s patronage and public support of the arts and culture.

3.3.3. Typologies of cultural policy

The traditions and historical legacies, philosophies and rationales behind providing and securing public support for the arts, as well as the approach to cultural policy research based on analysis of diverse administrative frameworks of regulating and governing culture have yielded several readings of cultural policy archetypes. The first instances of such approaches to analysing cultural policy stem from the 1980s and the work of Milton C. Cummings Jr. and Richard S. Katz (1987) in the publication they edited under the title of *The Patron State. Government and the Arts in Europe, North America and Japan*. In their introductory chapter, the editors of this study claim that, given the differences in national situation, tradition and motivation, governments have different objectives and means of entering and regulating cultural field (Cummings Jr and Katz, 1987a). Accordingly, administration and instruments of cultural policies can be differently organized: the most common variant is the “normal public administration approach” in which “provisions or encouragement of culture is regarded simply as one more public functions to be run by the regular public service according to the normal established procedures” (Cummings Jr and Katz, 1987a:12). This would be the “French Ministry model” where a “single ministry, headed by a cabinet minister, would be in charge of all cultural policies, ideally providing both comprehensive coordination and planning and high-level advocacy for cultural programs” (Cummings Jr and Katz, 1987a:12). The other variant of “normal public administration approach” involves several ministries sharing responsibility for cultural programs, such as the case of Italy. The third organizational form that governments used in organizing cultural policy is “quasi-public foundation” (Cummings Jr and Katz, 1987a:12). The examples of this type are Arts Councils of Great Britain, Arts Councils of Ireland and National Endowment for the Arts in America. The main aim of this type was to remove the support for the arts and culture from the direct influence of national politics and government’s agendas, i.t. to “insulate” culture and the arts from politics³⁷. The fourth model or type is where the government assumes the role of an impresario in the sense that “rather

37 Although the main idea behind this type of government’s intervention in the cultural field is to reduce political influence, it must be noted that government still made the executive decision on the expenditure for of the public funds for the arts and culture, but then passes the fund to the agency or foundation to allocate and disperse funds according to their criteria (Cummings Jr and Katz, 1987a:12). Also, the members of the boards of these agencies and foundations are appointed by the governments as well as the executive persons that lead and manage these organisations.

than supporting cultural institutions, the government simply runs them itself” (Cummings Jr and Katz, 1987a:12). The examples of these models are national broadcasting companies or public institutions such as museums and /or national orchestras, etc.

Another indispensable article for cultural policy research according to the typology spectrum and idiosyncrasies is a paper titled *The Arm's Length Principle and the Arts: An International Perspective – Past, Present and Future*, written by Harry Hillman-Chartrand and Claire McCaughey and published in the book *Who's to Pay for the Arts? The International Search for Model of Support* (Cummings, Jr. and Schuster, 1989). In this article, in a similar line to Cummings Jr and Katz, the authors developed a categorisation of four distinct types of cultural policy that are linked to the socio-political and cultural traditions of the specific contexts where they emerged from, such as United States of America, United Kingdom, France and post-communist (then still communist) states. The four alternative State models that these authors presented are *Facilitator*, *Patron*, *Architect* and *Engineer*.

The *Facilitator* State “funds the arts through the foregone taxes” with the objective to “promote diversity of activity in the nonprofit amateur and fine arts” thus supporting the “process of creativity, rather than specific types or styles of art” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:48). There are no specific standards or art that are supported by the Facilitator that relies on “the preference and tastes of the corporate, foundation and individual donors” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:48). The United States of America is the classic example of the facilitator state with the policies of financing arts through incentives to private donations in the form of foregone taxes (Belfiore, 2004).

The *Patron* State model denotes the ‘indirect’ support for the arts and culture through the arm’s lengths councils and/or agencies. It has already been written in that this model is often mentioned as a more de-politicized way in governing and supporting culture, however, it is not entirely so as the “government determines how much aggregate support to provide” and the government appoints the key persons in the council (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:49). What government does not do is to decide where and who is going to get support to which extent and for what reasons.

Rather, decisions are “generally made by the council on the advice of professional artists working through a system of peer evaluation”, thus supporting the process of creativity and “promoting standards of professional artistic excellence” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:49-50). Belfiore notes that the “arm’s lengths principle” takes a central position in the Western public policy and its most known examples are found in the Anglo-Saxon world, from Great Britain, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, to the Republic of Ireland, Australia and New Zealand.

The *Architect* State model signifies most common framework of governing in Western Europe and it involves funding of the arts and culture through Ministry or a Department of Culture. The process of decision making is highly bureaucratized but acts as a part of the social welfare objectives insofar that is “tends to support the art that meets community rather than professional standards of artistic excellence” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:50). In this model, the role and the existence of the artists and cultural workers are dependent on the membership in official artists’ unions and associations, i.e. “the status of the artist is explicitly recognized in social assistance policies” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:51). The upside of this model is the social security of the artists and cultural workers, while the downside is indicated as a possibility of a creative stagnation as a result of a long-term bureaucratized processes, as well as an inclination towards inertia that can result in “the entrenchment of community standards developed at a particular point in time, leading to stagnation of contemporary creativity” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:50). The most explicit examples of the *Architect* State are France, Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries.

The *Engineer* State model describes totalitarian tendencies in cultural policy. Quite simply, in the Engineer model, the State “owns all means of artistic production” and supports “art that meets political standards of excellence”, while not providing support for the ‘free-flow’ of creativity, but “focuses creative energies of artists toward attainment of official political goals” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:50-51). Decision making is reliant and dependant on the final words and interest of the political commissaries as cultural policies are subjected to “the obtainment of political goals, and artistic decisions are made and modified according to changes in the government’s political priorities” (Belfiore, 2004:14). Although totalitarian in its core rationale, the Engi-

neer State is attractive to many Western governments in “constructing a commercially viable arts industry in which the profit motive, or “capitalist realism”, plays an ideological role analogous to “socialist realism” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:52). Finally, Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey³⁸ explain that, although these models are “mutually exclusive in theory, in practice most nations combine some or all of them” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:53), as the roles of the state “*vis à vis* the arts have been progressively converging, so that “[m]ost countries have, to varying degrees, adopted all four modes of public support” (Hillman-Chartrand and McCaughey, 1989:72 in Belfiore, 2004:14).

The variations in the convergence and transformation of cultural policy models are infused with the evolutions and changes in the cultural policy paradigms, or the shifting trends in the dominant *modus operandi* of culture and its relations towards its social environment.

3.3.4. Cultural policy paradigms

There have been several developmental stages or paradigms³⁹ between the Second World War in the remit of cultural policy through which we can follow the major changes that affect the relationship between culture and the society (Bonet and Négrier, 2018). In this thesis, we shall resort to two readings of these changes; one is by Croatian sociologist Vjeran Katunarić from 2007, while the other is by Spanish economist and cultural management academic Lluís Bonet and French political scientist Emmanuel Négrier from 2018. These authors have been selected

38 Apart from these American authors, a significant contribution and re-articulation to the cultural policy typologies was done by Serbian and Croatian cultural policy scholars, Milena Dragičević-Šešić and Sanjin Dragojević. Their approach to categorizing cultural policy typologies took more succinct approach to segmenting cultural policy according to the basic models of cultural functioning, encompassing primarily historiographic, and not geographic, trajectory of cultural policy evolution. This involves basic structural processes; aspiration and interests of national elites; interest of relevant agency and actors in cultural policy and praxis; and cultural legacies (Dragičević-Šešić and Dragojević, 2008). The models suggested by Dragičević-Šešić and Dragojević are: The Liberal model; The Parastatal model; The State administrative enlightening model; The State prestige enlightening model; and The national emancipatory model. The models take a different angle and semantics of articulating the similar (if not the same) instance of State control over culture, hence the examples of the models pertain to similar, i.e. the same geographies.

39 Bonet and Négrier address the question of paradigms as „a way to better define what a public policy is: not just a programme, in the narrow sense, but also a worldview derived from general principles, as well as norms that ensure their translation into a concrete reality and instruments to implement them“(Bonet and Négrier, 2018:65).

to provide not only a comparative overview of on geographical scale but also over time. In the analysis of cultural policy paradigms, a special emphasis will be given to the paradigm of cultural democracy as it is most applicable to the topic of this thesis, most specifically to the democratic mandate and quality of cultural policy.

According to Katunarić, paradigms or stages of cultural policy evolution can be divided into the following categories:

- *idealistic stage* (monocultural with the predominance of the high culture criteria);
- *materialistic or professional stage* (encompassing cultural democracy, welfarism and ethnification of cultural identity);
- *marketization stage* (prevalence of the neoliberal hegemony); and
- *nationalistic stage* (entails fostering of national unity through spectacularization) (Katunarić, 1997; 2007).

These categories do not have strict perimeters, i.e. they overlap and are in many aspects similar to the qualifications of cultural policy paradigms that Bonet and Négrier divide into four lines: *cultural excellence*, *cultural democratization*, *cultural democracy* and *creative economy*. On the topic of this thesis, all of these categories have specific visions of audiences and participation logic. The paradigm of *cultural excellence* held the role of audience subordinate to the decision-making of the endogamous group of professionals that excludes those who do not share the dominant hierarchy of values. The excellence paradigm fits well with the non-commercial artistic forms and works, which need government support due to their inherent non-appeal to wider audiences or masses. As Bonet and Négrier claim, the system of excellence is still alive; the permanence of this paradigm, despite its negative traits such as fostering of elitism, is explained by: “a) the difficulty of finding alternative criteria for maintaining the autonomy of art and heritage against other prevailing systems (economic, social or political); and b) the expansion of cultural expression able to claim public support and the consequent adaptation of the criteria for quality and excellence used in such cases (and promoted by more eclectic or post-modern views)” (Bonet and Négrier, 2018:66).

The second paradigm of *cultural democratisation* had the purpose to “facilitate access to the broadest number of people to high-quality cultural goods and services that, without government support, would not be supplied by the market” and this is consonant with Katunarić’s idealistic stage (Bonet and Négrier, 2018). When cultural policy-makers in Europe first began their post-WWII program of “democratizing high culture,” they tried many different approaches: blockbuster museum shows were promoted like movies to draw big crowds; ticket-subsidy programs were designed to lure less affluent people into the concert halls, or artists were bused out to perform for captive audiences in schools and hospitals; to name a few examples (Girard and Gentil, 1983). In the context of Katunarić’s work, the idealistic stage happened right after the Second World War when cultural policy faced the difficulties of legitimation in relation to the high-brow bourgeois culture. This entailed the project of securing mass literacy for populations as cultural creativity was reserved for privileged strata of society that did not reflect or address the needs of the non-privileged, non-urban populations (Katunarić, 2007). Cultural democratization was, hence, seen as a paradigm that essentially aimed to bring the most established genres of culture to a wide audience. As such, it has been labelled as elitist and has been counteracted by alternative paradigms of cultural democracy that developed in the 1960s and propelled through the 1970s onwards as a criticism by cultural workers and artists, generously aided by the emerging academic community surrounding the field of cultural studies, towards the social and cultural deficits of the two preceding paradigms.

The objective of “cultural democracy is to provide for a more participatory (or populist) approach in the definition and the provision of cultural opportunities” (Mulcahy, 2017). When it comes to taste, *cultural democracy* implies cultural relativism; it suggests that there should be no privilege given to any form of cultural expression - “cultural democracy postulates the possibility of each social group obtaining recognition of its own cultural practices and gaining support for them” (Pyykkonen, Simanainen & Sokka, 2009). Overcoming the notion of static and hegemonic understanding of culture, the emergence of the cultural democracy concept brought significant changes in the cultural policy formation such as an emphasis on cultural access and participation, questions of multiculturalism and cultural diversity, as well as inclusion, cultural rights and the recognition of local and community cultural values. In essence, cultural democracy was a shift from a *top-down* to a *bottom-up* policy; that is, the government’s responsibility is to provide equal opportunities for citizens to be culturally

active on their own terms. As such, cultural democracy provides a stronger legitimization of the principle of state subsidy with the concept of culture as a “process in which we are all participatory” (Dueland, 2001:22). Katunarić titled this stage of cultural policy evolution as the professional stage as it encompassed empowerment of the professional capacities of cultural workers in the sense of decentralized decisions making (with the emphasis on self-management approaches in the governance of culture). Professionalism took over from the unionist culture and had done with the old ideological patterns of collective values in the arts and culture for more pluralist and open articulations of what culture and arts could be (Katunarić, 2007).

Substituting monocultural concept of culture for a pluralistic one, cultural democracy was practically applied through the capillary system of cultural and political decentralization, but also through the development of the analytical arguments of audience development. A most notable example in this line is a research on the cultural participation that originates from the 1960's Pierre Bourdieu's work on museum attendance, which he published with Alain Darbel in the study *The Love of Art* (Bourdieu and Darbel, 1969 [1991]). The statistical analysis and other observational examinations of museum's visitors' social patterns of experience gave way and an impetus for the development of cultural policy “focussed upon the policy ‘problem’ of cultural inequality, i.e. the differential engagement of the populace of particular country or territory with its public resources” (Wright, 2017:62).

The link between citizens and communities with public resources is one of the main qualities of cultural democracy and advancements in cultural policy evolution. To this end, we must take a moment to reflect on its historical time of origin and development with the emphasis on the socio-political context. Cultural democracy is closely linked with the processes of modernization, with the establishment and development of the welfare state, with the development of cultural policy itself and more refined variations of the public support for culture, but also with the overall development of the human and cultural rights discourse⁴⁰. Cultural democracy matured along

40 The period of the development of cultural democracy collides with the aftereffects of the milestone document in the history of human rights, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In the Article 27. of the UDHR states that “(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits”; and “(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and

with the modernization forces of social evolution that created perspectives for self-expression, new institutional formations, occupational diversification, organizational differentiation and mass political involvement, among others. As modernization processes are conducive to the processes of democratization, it can be asserted that cultural democracy was a consequence or a parallel process to flourishing of democracy in a post-world war II era, but that it also surpassed the political borders of democratic regimes. For example, in the previously socialist state of Yugoslavia, cultural democracy was a strong cultural policy paradigm in the period post-1960s when culture was introduced as a new social substance that had to be lessened of the hierarchical relations and bureaucratisation. Rather, the aspirations, needs and interest of the community were placed centre-stage for cultural policy that had to overcome alienation from the people. The state of cultural democracy in sense of citizen empowerment through culture and providing systemic 'space' for the bottom-up voices, needs and solutions was in many aspects elaborate and functional in the pre-democratic Croatia through the system of self-management (that will be described in more detail in the empirical part of the thesis), which adds to the argument that cultural democracy is, or was a policy paradigm, or a trend at the time that spread across Europe not necessarily conditioned by democracy itself, its progression or regressions.

The original concept of cultural democracy that fosters the 'power to the people' or positive notions of populism nourishes the democratic qualities of any political system, i.e. it seeks to engage and open the perspectives for all the spectre of multiculturalism to find its space and operate from that within the cultural system. The values of culture derived from interpreting cultural democracy as counter-resistance towards cultural elitism have been embedded in the key objectives of most present-day cultural policies in European countries. Pillars of cultural democracy such as affirmation and promotion of cultural diversity, multiculturalism, intercultural dialogue and cooperation, cultural rights and ethics, cultural participation, access to culture, and multi-stakeholder or participatory governance have been now key themes of action for a number of supra-national and supra-governmental bodies and agencies such as UNESCO, Council of Europe, European Parliament,

material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author" (document accessed online at <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> on 02.10.2019). This article still carries a paramount significance as the inspirational source and guideline to contemporary developments of cultural rights.

etc. Insofar, cultural democracy has been revived through the rise of cultural commons approach with the emphasis on the empowerment of citizens as active subjects and stakeholders in public policies that rely on open and participatory decision-making. However, this notion of participation in culture stretches much further than the conventional understanding of participation as complementary quality to cultural and artistic production, or as a demand that should justify the public subsidy of the supply side. This cycle has its rooting in the paradigm of the cultural economy in which the justification for state support for culture must be validated by number and profiles of audience. In the creative economy paradigm, the role of the audience is linked to “their role as consumers or users who make business financially viable, whether directly or indirectly” (Bonet and Négrier, 2018:67).

The *creative economy* paradigm has been emerging since the 1970s, first in the academic discourse and as a cultural economy paradigm. During the 1980s it gained the momentum as a dominant course of cultural development. Creative economy fostered the discourse of the cultural industries once stigmatized by the Frankfurt School through focusing on “the direct economic impact and externalities of the cultural sector, traditionally considered more as a domain of expenditure” (Bonet and Négrier, 2018:67). The original version of the creative economy paradigm, the cultural economy paradigm, claimed that the public investment in culture has to be justified with the measurable outcome – from audience attendance to job creation and contribution to the gross domestic product. By the end of 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, cultural economy was quickly replaced by the creative economy paradigm and the models of ‘creative’ cities, ‘creative economy’, and other markers of the cultural policy of late modernity such as competitive culture, branding culture, and ultimately creative entrepreneurship as an acceptable model of cultural and artistic work.

Similar to the models or typologies of cultural policy, the paradigms of cultural policy are not singular in sense of their “reign”, but function in the “simultaneous coexistence” and result in cultural policies “that are complex from an interpretative standpoint” (Bonet and Négrier, 2018:67). However, it can be asserted that, in the present times, the creative economy paradigm has instituted the dominance of the neo-liberal approach to understanding and practising cultural devel-

opment, which has left a strong influence on all paradigms. The most notable one is the effect of neoliberal approach on cultural democracy in the sense that the vertical nature of cultural policy and cultural programmes are flattened with the aim of making the cultural and artistic creation that much more appealing and attractive to the wider masses. This has subdued the crucial problems in the issues of top-down, centre-periphery relations in cultural policy. Diluting the critical and inspirational edge of cultural and artistic creation with the presumption that the cultural needs of all society's members are alike has been blurring the lines between participation, instrumentalization and populism. In other words, while the cultural and artistic production is increasingly becoming regulated with the dominant "free-market" logic, the abolishment of the elitist and hierarchical approaches to the processes of cultural and artistic production, dissemination and consumption are not matched with the changes in the cultural policy structures that still function in a restricted, hierarchical and centralised manner. This is where the paradox of the cultural policy development happens – in order to increase levels of accessibility, i.e. consumption, accessibility becomes dependant of financial capacity while the levels of accountability are decreasing. Here, we touch upon some fundamental changes in the field of culture and its connection to the social context. Cultural development inherently includes developmental tendencies that are based on the qualifications of excellence and competition, particularly on the level of creative expression and production. It is difficult to connect these qualifications with principles, rules and mechanisms of participation, which are inevitable elements of cultural democracy, without 'at the same time losing or compromising the meaning of the cultural content of cultural policy or politics of culture' (Žuvela, 2017:13). In that sense, questions arise as to what degree democratic elements are maintained in cultural development and how much participation and cultural democracy legitimize cultural development, which, due to the imperative of creative economy and digital technology, finds the means for its expansion in entertainment, pure consumerism and creative instrumentalism (Ahponen, 2009). In other words, opening cultural policy towards participation as an acting principle does not imply an 'anything goes' and 'everything is culture' discourse because, in that way, the field of culture and cultural policies will lose their essence, sense and basic rationality (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009).

Finally, the nationalistic paradigm that Katunarić notes is not present in Bonet's and Négrier's analysis. This could be explained with Katunarić's reading of the nationalist paradigms and its' illustration through the situation in Croatia, i.e. transitional and/or post-transitional country from the 1990s onwards. The nationalist paradigm stems from the circumstances of the transformation of sociocultural values in Croatian citizens under the influence of deep structural changes in society (Katunarić, 2007:199). It encompasses the situation of rising inequalities and impoverishment of the population that leads to lesser funds and time for cultural expenditure. Simultaneously, culture became a new teleology. As Katunarić notes, regulatory acts that serve as the official frameworks of national cultural policy show that the concept of "national interest" is the "organic nucleus of the teleological and practical sphere of cultural policy", which is indicative of the nationalistic paradigm exemplified in the "boosting of national unity" through "spectacularization" in which cultural policy is embedded in state's agenda on both national and international levels (Katunarić, 2007:201).

The shifts in the paradigms of cultural policy have brought afore some of the changes in the cultural policy structure, focus and rationale that are of importance for the topic of this thesis, and those are the role of the civil society and the rise of the city in the cultural policy.

3.3.5. Cultural policy changes and the role of the civil society

The changes in the relational dynamics and fluctuations of the state and its evolution in the democratic sense, which involved deconcentrating and reordering of power structure according to the external and internal pressures, gave way to the establishment and the rising importance of the role of civil society⁴¹ in cultural policy processes. Insofar, the relationship between cultural policy

41 Kregar and Petričušić define the concept of civil society broader than a group of non-governmental organizations and perceive it as „a wide range of organizations that are concerned with public issues“ (Diamond, 1999:222 in Kregar and Petričušić, 2013:46). The civil society is hence understood as “the intermediary associational realm of social life organized between state and family, made of organisations that are formed on a voluntary basis by citizens to protect their interests or shared values and, though bound by a legal order, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state (White 1994:379; Diamond 1999:221). It provides “the basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control” (Huntington, 1984:204 in Kregar and Petričušić, 2013:46).

and civil society has been a matter of debate for decades. Referring to the cultural policy paradigms, as well as the issues of the scope of cultural policy and its horizontal power dispersion in the sense of who has the access to the decision making and policy formation, civil society sector has been gaining an irreplaceable position of markers of modernization and democratization of cultural policy, and especially in the development of the cultural democracy paradigm. In that line, Ahponen raises the question on the role of the civil society as fundamental for the open and democratic functioning of cultural policy in which civil society takes part in policymaking as a counterpart or companion of public institutions (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009). The thesis on the importance of civil society departs from the claim that “participation is a necessary element for organizing creativity for the use of society”, which implies that “civic purposes require active citizens” (Ahponen, 2009:76). The emphasis on the civic aspect of cultural policy adds to cultural policy’s civilizing and democratizing aims, as well to the balancing of the vertical and horizontal axis of the cultural policy decision-making structures.

More than often, the role of the civil society is referred to as the third sector that Kangas defines as an elastic concept situated between “between the public and the private sector, and it includes activities of associations, cooperative societies, communities, networks and the grassroots level” (Kangas, 2004:67). Ahponen and Kangas underline that “the social aspect is inevitably included in cultural policies, as cultural activities cannot be connected to the society without being mediated by associations, organisations and institutions” (Ahponen and Kangas, 2004:14). In that sense, “cultural associations have been important agencies in organising the ways of handling cultural activities by public means. They have had a mediatory role between individual creativity and institutional resources. When members of associations launch voluntary activities, they represent the vitality of the civil society in its different forums, bringing out solidarity, communality and trust” (Ahponen and Kangas, 2004:14-15).

The role of the civil society has been distinctive in the different phases of cultural development and cultural politics in the society “in the nation building process, in the formation of the welfare state” as well as in activating citizens and responding to new demands for the principle of cultural partnership (Ahponen and Kangas, 2004:15). As Ahponen and Kangas note: “cultural associa-

tions have had a distinctive role in maintaining the expertise in their field and therefore the right to speak for their members has been a specific reason for their existence. They have promoted their own cultural identity when working as nation-builders. This way they have also contributed to national integration mechanisms and further to the powers of the state. Their position now has to be defined anew because the concept of civil society cannot be limited to the nation state only, but it must aim to cover joint-European organisations in the name of European unification and European cultural identity” (Ahponen and Kangas, 2004:15). This is further affirmed by the recommendations of the European Union that consider that it is important to “establish an extensive network of free civic associations and foundations”, or, in other words, the “creating of joint-European volunteer organisations and networks is desirable” (Kangas, 2004:82). As a result, European cultural terrain is today enmeshed with a number of civil-society based networks such as Culture Action Europe⁴², Trans Europe Halles⁴³ and Kooperativa⁴⁴.

The role of the civil society in culture was elaborated in a Council of Europe’s Policy note 6 titled “New relationships with the third sector”. The authors of the Policy note, Fisher and Fox, noted the relevance of civil society work “as committed to the principles of participation empowerment, combating social exclusion and strengthening democratic values” (Fisher and Fox, 2001:5). This publication from 2001 opens with the introductory chapter that highlights the unfavourable position of civil society being under threat. The post-1989 European context was marked by the political upheavals, deep structural and economic changes in central, but particularly in the south-eastern parts of Europe. The beginning of the 1990s brought over widespread trends in states’ disengagement from previous public sector responsibilities. This has led to “bewilderment and confusion and threatened social cohesion and self-confidence” (Fisher and Fox, 2001:7). The situation in the 1990s in many ways resembles that of today, just on a different scale: the migrant crisis (then of people from eastern parts of Europe, today from eastern parts of the globe); the rise of the extreme nationalist and populist agendas; political ‘blind-eye’ and obliviousness towards the is-

42 More information on the Culture Action Europe network is available online at <https://cultureactioneurope.org/> (accessed on 02.10.2019).

43 More information on the Trans Europe Halles network is available online at <http://teh.net/> (accessed on 02.10.2019).

44 More information on the Kooperativa platform is available online at <http://platforma-kooperativa.org/en/about/who-we-are/> (accessed on 02.10.2019).

sues of equality, human rights and political freedoms; and growing mistrust and disbelief in public institutions. In such conditions, the role of civil society becomes ever more significant, especially in the sense of fostering civic engagement and active participation in public affairs (Kregar and Petričušić, 2013:53). The participation of the civil society in public policies processes and policy deliberations “leads to inclusive and effective policies, if conjugated with adequate allocation of resources and sound management” (European Commission, 2012:6 in Kregar and Petričušić, 2013:53). The necessity and the focus of the involvement and influence of the civil society on policy formulation and action are underlined in the text of the UNESCO’s 2005 *Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* in which Article 11 states that: “Parties acknowledge the fundamental role of civil society in protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions. Parties shall encourage the active participation of civil society in their efforts to achieve the objectives of this Convention” (UNESCO, 2005:21). The Article 12 on the promotion of international cooperation, states that Parties shall “reinforce partnerships with and among civil society, non-governmental organizations and the private sector in fostering and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions” (UNESCO, 2005:22). Further, Article 2 affirms that cultural diversity can only be protected and promoted if human rights, including those established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are guaranteed (Firmin, 2018:87). Among the rights set out in the Declaration are civil society’s fundamental rights of association, peaceful assembly and expression (Firmin, 2018:87).

Kregar and Petričušić follow the line of Putnam’s thoughts in stating that rights of the civic community should be equal as “such a community is bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, not by vertical relations of authority and dependency. Citizens interact as equals, not as patrons and clients, nor as governors and petitioners. [...] The more that politics approximates to the ideal of political equality among citizens following norms of reciprocity and engaged in self-government, the more civic that community may be said to be” (Putnam, 1993:88 in Kregar and Petričušić, 2013:53). The authors continue to claim that “participatory civic community implies virtuous citizens that are “helpful, and trustful to one another, even when they differ on matters of substance” (Putnam, 1993:88-89 in Kregar and Petričušić, 2013:53). Such a community is characterized by dialogue, respect for the other and recognition that we are de-

pendent on each other in various ways. And, finally, by stressing that the norms and values of the civic community “are embodied in, and reinforced by, distinctive social structures and practices” (Putnam, 1993:89 in Kregar and Petričušić, 2013:53).

By involving citizens in the process of participation, the democratic structures are strengthened, and this particularly applies to the local levels. Indeed, a partnership and on-going dialogue between local authorities and civil society organizations should be promoted most specifically at the local level, as civil society organizations “guarantee useful entry points for policy input in decentralised contexts. This enhances the responsiveness of national policies to local realities” (European Commission, 2012:6 in Kregar and Petričušić, 2013:53). Insofar, the involvement of civil society in policy formation and modes of cultural governance is closely linked to the urbanization of cultural policy and the growing infiltration of the free market logic in the (public) cultural sphere that has been further advanced with the creative city theories that emerged during the 1990s (Matarasso, 2015). The role of civil society in “socio-economically fragmented and unequal urban agglomerations” (Jiménez, 2012:243) is perceived as vital in affirming and securing cultural democracy. Weak interaction with civil society and poor public participation in processes of cultural governance and management indicate cultural policy inadequateness in responding to rising issues of social cohesion, sustainability, growth of civil society initiatives and irreconcilable dilemmas and expectations on cultural development and its immediate as well as long-term social effects (Jiménez, 2012; Barbieri Muttis, 2012).

This brings us to another major change that has reconfigured the field of cultural policy, both in its territorial and structural scope. This is the shift from the national focus of policy generation and implementation to the dispersion on the local levels and the rise of the city as the focal point of contemporary cultural policies.

3.3.6. Cultural policy going local - the role of cities in cultural policy

Since its inception in the second half of the 20th century, cultural policy has been articulated within the framework of the nation-state, while the regional and local policy and activities were mainly seen as somewhat subordinate to the centralized national policy (Häyrynen, 2005 in Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009). The intervention of the state into the field of culture led to the homogenization on an ideological level in which the representation of national culture was concealed in symbols and disseminated to all strata through the promotion of national heritage, the fine arts, etc. (Pyykkönen, Simanainen and Sokka, 2009; Grodach and Silver, 2013). A volume of literature on cultural policy deals with the problematic issue of state-centred cultural policy, investigating power relations and opening critical discourses on deconstructing representational culture, contesting cultural values, multiculturalism, cultural participation and cultural democratization among other. These issues inevitably shifted the discussion on cultural policy on its formulation “in relation to the cultural needs of the population in their everyday lives (art according to the people’s own conception) instead of formulating it in relation to extraneous aesthetic standards” (Kangas, 2004:24). The focus on the sub-national (spatial) dimension of cultural policy was adapted through the lens of cultural democracy and local struggles to maintain and develop cultural values of minorities and all sub-cultural groups that were ignored by the institutional structures. As a consequence, the process of de-fragmentation of particular national culture narratives opened the prospects for more extensive and inclusive cultural differentiation and distinctions that both shape and are being shaped by institutionalized arrangements (Volkering, 1996). The decentralization process can enable the policy change⁴⁵ from both from the aspect of changes “in-

45 Barbieri (2012) explains policy change from a particular perspective of cultural policy. He understands the direction of policy change as being a primary element for analysing the distribution and exercising of power between those who are included (or excluded) in the formulation of cultural policy, between those actors whose preferences are accommodated and those whose are not. In his methodological approach to policy change study, Barbieri focuses on the role of policy discourse in cultural policy change and investigates how and when policy discourse can “condition either significant continuity or significant change in cultural policy outputs” (Barbieri, 2012:14). Relying on particular socio-historical context of particular cultural policies, a variety of factors is considered when analysing cultural policy change, underlining the role of the policy subsystems, such as the type of actors and activities that are prioritized or marginalized in the cultural policy agendas. In line with Schmidt’s approach, Barbieri is interested in the dynamics of cultural policy change and refers to duality in analysis of the cultural policies history and evolution on one side and studying cultural policy change taking exogenous or endogenous factors into account on the other. While the former approach can be used in exploring gradual developments, for example, from democratization of culture to cultural democracy, the latter opens the issue of reconfiguration of the State as a consequence of crisis of Welfare State, glo-

dividual interests and preferences, in institutional rules, or changes in ideational frameworks and in institutional discursive practices” (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004 in Barbieri Muttis, 2012:14). More precisely, decentralization can provoke effects that reach beyond initiating the change of the old cultural policy, system and functions that essentially remain the same, just dispersed outside the core centre, reproducing its old-self.

While decentralization will be analysed in greater detail in the ensuing parts of this thesis, here we shall give more attention to the city and the rise of a “specifically *urban* form of cultural policy” (Grodach and Silver, 2013:2). Throughout history, cities, as ever-changing dense urban conglomerates, have been points of mobilization and concentration of human creativity. They served as magnets of social, cultural and financial capital and have been emanating cultural dynamics, innovation, development tendencies and directions. As such, a city is a structure with special capacities to preserve and further develop civilizational goods, a symbol of the possible, a utopia that gives a new view of the reality, offers anticipatory views into the new, novel and different. As Katherine Sarikakis notes: “cities have invariably played a central role in the construction of world connections, from the ancient *polis* to the modern metropolis, across political, social, economic and cultural levels” (Sassen, 2012:xxiii). Cities have become, in Saskia Sassen’s words, new strategic sites for “the exploration of the major challenges confronting the society, challenges which tend to become concrete and urgent in cities” (Sassen, 2012:xxiii). In the past several decades, as globalisation processes accelerate, cities have (re)emerged as the main command centres of the world; not only or just confined “within national geopolitical borders, but also with an expanded and complex international role to play” (Sarikakis, 2012:17).

The genesis of the rising importance of urban cultural policies in Western Europe has been explained by Franco Bianchini who wrote how culture was disregarded and relatively unimportant, non-controversial area of local policymaking during the 1950s and 1960s. However, during the

balization, privatization etc. as well to establishment of new balances between traditional actors of cultural policy and governance. Barbieri supports the establishment of relationship between socio-economic, structural and the agency of actors as he believes that policy change should not assume reductionist explanation of the collective action – “an explanation that understands the development of cultural policies as mere result of instrumentally motivated action of certain interest groups” (Barbieri, 2012:16).

early 1970s, the most innovative and high-profile initiatives were developed across a number of countries such as Italy, West Germany, Britany and France. These initiatives were led by “left-controlled local authorities, which broke away from the tradition of attributing a relatively neutral, non-political values to cultural policy” (Bianchini, 1993:9). The emergence of the new cultural strategies and the focus on the locale was related to “the rise of the post-1968 urban social movements - feminism, youth revolts, environmentalism, community action, gay and ethnic/racial minority activities” (Bianchini, 1993:9). These shifts were connected to the cultural dimension in two registers. First, the urban movements “were often associated with an ‘alternative’ cultural sector encompassing experimental theatre groups, rock bands, independent film-makers and cinemas, free radio stations, small publishing houses, radical newspapers and magazines” (Bianchini, 1993:9). These transformative steps in the local levels corresponded to the postulates of the cultural democracy paradigm insofar that they adopted and promoted very broad and inclusive meaning of the term of “culture”, combining “in imaginative ways old and new, highbrow and lowbrow elements” (Bianchini, 1993:9). The second point of interconnection with the cultural dimension is that the “the new urban social movements saw cultural actions and political actions and inextricable” in the sense that it was impossible to detect and define the precise line of demarcation between the two. The important aspect of this dimension is the subordination of cultural needs and issues of the people in relation to ‘more significant’ economic and political priorities were rejected. This opened the prospect for the ‘bottom-up’ policy-making that promoted welfarist objectives such as encouragement of “public life to all residents and not just to the privileged” and community rebuilding, which counteracted the trends “towards social atomisation and the domestication of cultural consumption by reasserting the function of city centre as a catalyst for civic identity and public sociability” (Bianchini, 1993:10). However, during the 1980s, “the shift towards neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism by most national governments in western Europe was accompanied by a squeeze in local government finance and subsequently expenditure” (Bianchini, 1993:12). As a reaction to the cutbacks in public budgets that were a result of macro-economic pressures and recession from 1973 and 1979, by 1980s city decision-makers realized that they have to create their own strategies that could respond to growing social and economic problems. Cultural policies were one of these strategies. The subsequent re-positioning of the city as a ‘command point’ in the world economy has been unravelling in parallel with the prevailing

influence of the creative economy paradigm in cultural development. The utilization of creative industries on the re-design of cities in sense of improving their “internal and external images” (Bianchini, 1993:15) has become the main component of the new contextualization of the place and key factor in changing contemporary cultural geographies. Bianchini underlines that “cultural policies were used as symbols of modernity and innovations” in many cities that “wished to develop sectors of the economy such as fashion, craft and design-based manufacturing and high-tech industry, that depend for their success on cultural inputs” (Banchini, 1993:15-16). Such cultural policies bridged the wide socio-economic gaps left from declining or vanishing remnants of industrialisation that capacitated cities “with the decline in working time and the increase in the proportion of disposable income spent on leisure activities” (Bianchini, 1993:1). They opened the pathways to the era of post-industrial cities in which “the consolidation of cultural policy’s functions as a strategy for economic development, city marketing and physical regeneration” (Bianchini, 1993:2) gave rise to the contradictions and tensions that define contemporary cultural fiend and cultural policies.

Isar *et al.* wrote about the cities that are “becoming protagonists in cultural policy and politics whose importance equals and sometimes exceeds that of national government” (Isar *et al.* 2012:7). In that line, these authors make a comparison between city of the 20th century as a laboratory of modernity to the city of contemporary times in which the globalisation pressures and issues seem to peak (Isar *et al.*, 2012). However, focus on the locale does not imply total neglect of the national level. Rather, it is assumed that the nation-state’s position in articulating vibrant and up-to-date cultural policies is diminishing and is primarily concerned with the identity-building and preservance of the national culture, or in Raymond Williams’s words, with cultural policy of *display*. Simultaneously, “factors of scale, accessibility and participation combine increasingly to ensure that a great deal of innovative policy making is being made at the city level. Many of the exciting cultural visions, projects, exchanges and networks and developments of the day are to be found in or generated by cities rather by nations” (Isar *et al.*, 2012:3). Still, national governments withhold the authority in setting the regulatory frameworks and structures, which are then adopted on local levels. In that sense, the development of local cultural policies cannot be isolated from the analysis of the national arrangements and dynamics, though cities develop their own agenda and strategies.

The rising role of the city in cultural policy and culture-driven urban development has not been an experience without serious issues and problems. Local strategic planning led by the imperative of economic growth has yielded numerous typologies or directions for utilizing culture in urban planning and development. As a result, discussions on the urban cultural policy have been saturated with debates on the benefits that creativity can bring in branding a city. In their article on creative spaces, Nancy Duxbury and Catherine Murray problematize the issue of globalization that erodes nature of space and place and argue for a 'cultural ecology' approach to build spaces within communities of any scale that is "constructivist, holistic, and based on both physical and social infrastructure" (Duxbury and Murray, 2010:1). They observe that "cities and nation states designed 'flagship' spatial amenities to provide magnets for foreign capital, attract the creative migrant class, and expand cultural tourism during the financial crisis triggered by footloose manufacturing plants and loss of jobs offshore. But such instrumentalizing of creative space as an 'amenity' in tourism-led growth strategies failed to explore the relationship of creative spaces to endogenous creative processes" (Duxbury and Murray, 2010:2). Under the influences by high-tech districts and their economic spin-offs, cities have been investing in cultural-economic hubs and generators of growth, "with locality conceived as a resource or visual stimuli, and energizing 'buzz' and brand based on tradition and reputation" (Drake, 2003 in Duxbury and Murray, 2010:2). Similarly, the competitiveness of cities has seen the proliferation of unsustainable forms of cultural tourism that turns into mass tourism mostly in heritage cities (Venice, Rhodes, Dubrovnik, etc.), whereby cities are evolving into big historical theme parks, as their residents flee those cities forced out by high real estate prices and inaccessibility to the regular dynamics and services of urban life.

These trends of culture-led city developments have been heralded by the policy obsession of promoting creative prefixes of cities and cultural amenities. Concepts such as *creative city*, *creative districts*, *creative quarters*, etc. have proliferated the development of the urban entrepreneurship and the new approaches to real-estate development. By competing for cultural and creative visibility on the global scale, the period of the past four decades has been marked with the paradox processes in which the cities across the world (but most notably in the Western hemisphere, encompassing the US and Europe) have invested tremendous efforts to brand their uniqueness and through these processes have become globalized to the extent that their uniqueness has been dilut-

ed with a bland of global concepts, brands and approaches to reconfiguring urban landscapes. By naming what is essentially profit-led real-estate development as a creative or innovative practice in local cultural planning, cities across the world have exposed their urban, social and cultural tissues to the stringent market forces and corporate interests that irreversibly changed urban landscapes through painful processes of gentrification, impoverishment, exclusion and displacements. Urbanization of cultural policy has been consistent with the prevalence of economic interests and managerial reasoning that cause the switch in the beneficiary of policy “from the nation, community and citizen to the entrepreneur, commercial organization or individual consumer” (Turner, 2012 in Bell and Oakely, 2015:7). This change in politics of cultural policy, from communal principles of public good to individualized interests, market transactions and commercial success marks the current policy setting for new institutional formats in culture. In this line, Bell and Oakely make a caution that “if we don’t keep paying close attention to what is happening in cultural policy, we may end up with a market-led system with minimal regulation or with decisions taken ‘on our behalf’ or ‘in our interest’ that are in reality neither of those things.” (Bell and Oakely, 2015:7). Furthermore, to move from profit and market-oriented culture, “economic process of regeneration, gentrification, and commercialization of cities” (Hristova, Dragičević Šešić and Duxbury, 2015:2) local cultural and urban policies have to create a framework for more participatory bottom-up approaches in culture.

Creative local cultural and urban policies and strategic planning are proving to be unsustainable because their makers ignore issues such as social justice and inclusion, and shifted their interests from artists, local community and local culture to large artistic products that can be circulated globally. In order to avoid “city competitiveness” that “became established in urban policy and rhetoric” (Matarasso, 2015:129), local cultural and urban policies have to examine alternative approaches that would be culturally sensitive to local issues, inclusiveness, justice and multicultural reality. As Anheier and Hoelscher articulated “new tasks ask for a new approach of steering away from the old administrative top-down style towards multi-stakeholder governance” (Anheier and Hoelscher, 2015:21). Since these new approaches include building collaborative social processes, diversity of knowledge and perspectives and participation of citizens in the planning and governing, the potential of art and culture is found not in marketable branding, but the empowering

citizenship and fostering relationships between various stakeholders, from local authorities and administration, through formal cultural collectives to the local community. As stated in the previous chapter on civil society in culture, in cooperation between civil and public partners “both sides are empowered and strengthened so that civil society does not hesitate to offer its help to local government, and local government becomes closer to its citizens and their needs” (Hristova, Dragičević Šešić and Duxbury, 2015:4).

However, the ideals of local civic-public alliances and cities as commons are easily romanticized and “portrayed with pastoral images in a value-laden way” (Kawashima, 1997:354). In that manner, it is rather easy to overlook that empirically, “local politics are as susceptible to oligarchy as any organisation, and they are subject to the possibility of ineffectuality and low accountability”, especially in the register of public authorities (Kawashima, 1997:354). The question of capacities of local politicians and administrators and their openness and responsiveness to the local needs and aspirations is open to empirical investigation, as well as to the analysis of the normative channels of power dispersion, i.e. the processes of decentralization.

4. DECENTRALISATION OF CULTURAL POLICY AND PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN CULTURE

Theoretical analysis of decentralisation in cultural policy starts from expounding of the general terms and meaning of decentralisation, which is then focused on decentralisation processes and types of decentralisation in the specific case of cultural policy. The investigation of the literature on the categories of decentralisation in cultural policy in the form of cultural, fiscal and political decentralisation continue with the more contextual view of decentralisation in South-East Europe. To this end, Katunarić discusses the trends and tendencies in the decentralisation of cultural policy through a three-tiered conceptual framework that categorises decentralisation experiences in distinct approaches or paradigms encompassing the concept of *new public culture* and the re-consideration and alignment of cultural development and system with a different meaning, position and collective purpose of culture. The concept of *new public culture* inevitably seeks new and participatory governance systems that entail the involvement of various social (non-governmental) actors and re-organisation of power. The term of governance and the concept of cultural governance are analysed in the last part of this chapter with the focus on the development of participatory agenda in cultural policy in the form of participatory governance in culture.

4.1. The concept and types of decentralisation

In basic terms, the concept of ‘decentralisation’ denotes to “a process or situation of transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to intermediate and local government or quasi-independent government organisations and/or private sector” (Neven, 2004:1). Decentralisation is a term that implies differentiation according to the contexts where it is applied as a policy practice. For this reason, decentralisation has been categorised or devised into distinctive types that are specific, yet substantially generic to be inferred across diverse geographies, political and administrative structures, and policies.

Many authors distinguish several types of decentralisation from several different points of reading. Here, we shall give an overview of decentralisation types first from the general level, then from the particular viewpoint of cultural policy. According to Neven, the basic types of decentralisation are *political, administrative, fiscal* and *market decentralisation* (Neven, 2004:1). Political decentralisation is closely linked with the democratic principles insofar that it enables democratisation by giving citizens (directly or through their representatives) a possibility to influence the formulation and implementation of policies. This is achieved through devolution of central authority to the local levels, or levels that are as close as possible to the social context that respective policies refer to. Political decentralisation implies a better connection with the communities and citizens and relies on civic participation in the decision-making processes. For this reason, decentralisation and participation are seen as having a symbiotic relationship. Neven claims that “the process of decentralization can itself enhance the opportunities for participation by placing more power and resources at a closer, more familiar, more easily influenced level of government”, but also notes that the symbiotic relationship between decentralisation and participation can lead to contradictory policy guidelines:

“on one hand, mechanisms for citizen participation could be considered a helpful pre-condition when evaluating the prospects for successful decentralization. Accordingly, the design of decentralization should take into account the opportunities and limitations imposed by existing channels of local participation. On the other hand, the lack of participatory mechanisms could be considered a motivation for decentralization and can help create local demand for more participatory channels to voice local preferences. This note discusses each of these dimensions - participation as a means to successful decentralization and as a goal of decentralization” (Neven, 2004:2).

Decentralisation is structurally codified in the legislative framework of constitution, laws and regulations. It is within this framework that decentralisation should obtain its basic principles and objectives, and gain its flow through channels and capillary pathways between different levels of authority. Legislation prescribes different architecture of decentralisation that either enables/fosters or hinders authority devolution in different areas of public policies and different public sectors, encompassing cultural policy and cultural sector.

4.2. Decentralisation in cultural policy

‘Decentralisation’ is a multifaceted term that has suffered from conceptual confusion (Neven, 2004; Kawashima, 1997), which has subsequently led to arbitrary usage of the term and interpretations of its application in cultural policy. Decentralisation has two main aspects that cause confusion. These pertain to cultural activities and their territorial dispersion, and to political structures that administer them: “these two aspects of decentralisation are in symbiosis in much discussion, seeing decentralised decision-making as a prerequisite for diffusing cultural activities” (Kawashima, 1997:343). Accordingly, the debate on decentralisation can signify different things in different contexts. Specific contextual understanding and practices of decentralisations have yielded different typologies. For example, in Swedish cultural policy, it is declared that “cultural policy shall promote decentralisation of activities and decision functions in the field of culture” (Council of Europe, 1990a:21 in Kawashima, 1997:343), while in the Great Britain decentralisation is seen as a response to the “need to devolve decision making from the centre, to increase arts provision across the entire country and to encourage wider access among all sections of the community” (House of Commons, 1982:22 in Kawashima, 1992:343).

In short, though decentralization as a process implies territorial dispersion of cultural policy’s competences and resources it is also a method for devolution of the power of authority, enabling amplification of cultural democracy and participative governance practices. As a means of decreasing political concentration in decision-making, decentralization is based on the principle of subsidiarity⁴⁶, but also the shifting roles between the nation-state and the city as focal points of new cultural trends, policies and developments.

⁴⁶ Subsidiarity is a norm in cultural policy in many nations and can be recognized as the most applicable method for participatory policy-making and governance, referring to the relationship between the centre and the local, but also to the relationship between government and non-government (Kawashima, 2004). Primorac explains the principle of subsidiarity in cultural policy as a method that, in the case of European Union, grants the autonomy to Member States in decision-making in culture. Insofar, European Union has limited authority in the field of culture that is supplementary and not executive (Primorac, 2017). The supplementary measures of the European Union pertain to specific areas such as mobility, cultural heritage, and non-commercial cultural cooperation and exchange (Primorac, 2017).

Most of the confusion in defining decentralisation's meaning in cultural policy stems from the approach in which the decentralisation is related to the levels of per capita expenditure on culture. However, this approach is not corroborated with the evidence that people who live in a place or a region with the high cultural expenditures have a better cultural life and access to cultural goods and activities than those who live in an environment where culture is on the lower end of expenditure line.

Kawashima offers a conceptual map where various meanings of decentralisation are attached and distinguished, rather than compounded into one single, albeit stretched, category. Conceptually, decentralisation is roughly categorised into three main areas: *cultural*, *fiscal*, and *political* (Kawashima, 1997; 2004). Each area "is distinct from the others in two respects: one in terms of its location within the framework of cultural policy process....., and another in relation to 'actors' in policy within which inequality is found" (Kawashima, 1997:343).

4.2.1. Cultural, fiscal and political decentralisation

The *cultural decentralization* is concerned with inequality in cultural opportunities among the population; *fiscal decentralization* is about the disparity of public expenditure, while *political decentralization* involves the distribution of political and administrative power for decision-making and implementation in cultural policy (Kawashima, 2004:5):

"Cultural decentralisation is first and foremost a policy objective and should be assessed in light of policy outcome. It is to combat inequality in cultural opportunities among people. Fiscal decentralisation, in contrast, should be about policy measures, or inputs, which are concerned with uneven distribution of public expenditure among cultural producers. It sometimes addresses disparity of spending levels made by different authorities. Political decentralisation, meanwhile, is about policy measures or policy administration, hence it concerns the power balance between different decision-makers or funding authorities" (Kawashima, 1997:343,344).

Register of political decentralization in cultural policy has a scarce theoretical foundation, and largely builds on economic and political science which elaborates this register into two evaluative parts, that of efficiency value and governance value⁴⁷. Kawashima explains political decentralization as “diffusion of political and administrative power for making and implementing cultural policy. It is concerned with disparity of power between different spending authorities or decision-makers. In most cases, it refers to the relationship between central, regional and local bodies. It may, however, refer to the horizontal diffusion or responsibilities among different bodies within a single tier of government, for example between the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Education. An extreme version of political decentralisation refers to the transfer of power from government to non-government sector; i.e. the market, the industry, the voluntary sector, and private individuals. In public policy writings, examples can be found where the term decentralisation refer to shifting responsibility from the public sector to the private commercial sector, and to the voluntary sector” (Bennett, 1990; Burns et al, 1994; Gaster, 1994; Stoker, 1987 in Kawashima, 1997:346). This contributes to the widening of the idea that only the state or public authorities can be patron and governors of the arts and culture. Kawashima claims that the devolution of decision making to private individuals is the ultimate forms of political decentralisation of decision-making power. Such practice in the decision making on arts and culture is found in political contexts of direct democracy such as Switzerland where the use of public referendums enable the citizens the opportunity to make decisions on political or communal issues for themselves, which leaves the politicians with less leeway to pursue their own interest and fosters more responsibility for the community among citizens (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2000).

Political decentralisation is complementary to the cultural decentralisation for it is often argued that the “decision making should be at the level closest to the people who would benefit from

47 In political decentralisation, we find the argument of ‘efficiency value’, i.e. it is believed that decentralised government is more efficient and that sub-central units of cultural policy can tailor services by efficiently “matching the resources to the need which they presumably know better than the centre would” (Irjala and Eikas, 1996:11 in Kawashima, 1997:352). ‘Governance value’ points towards values achieved through decentralisation other than efficiency or economy. This brings us in the field of political sciences and the theories of democracy. According to these theories, the decentralised structure of government serves in “stimulating community spirit, all of which contribute to the enhancement of the democratic State and political stability” (Kawashima, 1997:353). When this line of thinking is applied to cultural policy, it can be argued that “decentralisation is good for democracy, and necessary so as to involve local people with artistic creation and participation, and to promote a participatory style of policy-making” (Kawashima, 1997:353).

the policy” (Kawashima, 1997:347). In the context of cultural policy, “political decentralisation serves better to encourage grass-roots arts activities, and it ensures that artists can choose to live and produce creative works outside the cultural capitals, all of which will benefit local resident⁴⁸. A decentralised structure of cultural policy is desirable also because it is less monopolistic and bureaucratic, more flexible, and more responsive to the needs in the regions” (Girard, 1983:172,173 in Kawashima, 1997:353-354). As such, political decentralisation supplements cultural decentralisation but has been accepted and affirmed as a policy goal in its own right. This is most evident in the discourse on the democracy in cultural policy, the rising debate on the participatory forms of governance in culture that is now present not only in the Croatian context but in wider debates on policy changes on the European level.

Kawashima elaborates cultural decentralization through the identification of barriers in access to culture, which can be geographical, socio-economic, physical and cultural. While the geographical barrier represents the most common usage of the decentralization term in the literature and policy documents, the purpose of the spatial diffusion of arts-related facilities and activities and its benefits to the audience and population at large is the primary concern of cultural decentralization (Kawashima, 2004:6). Cultural decentralisation is hence preoccupied with access to culture⁴⁹ in sense of enabling equal distribution of arts and cultural activities across the population. Although, barriers in access to culture can be geographical, socio-economic, physical, and cultural (Kawashima, 1997:345). In this respect, cultural policy should enable (or ensure) equal opportunity for citizens of any social, ethnic, physical and economic denomination (race, ethnicity, gender, disabilities, etc.) to have an equal opportunity/possibility for participation in the arts and culture.

48 Decentralisation of powers was one of the most important factors encouraging the cultural renaissance of provincial cities in western Europe, particularly in Spain, Italy and France during the 1970s. In Italy, the growth of urban cultural policies was related to the decentralisation reforms that created a comprehensive system of regional government with a new tier of regional capitals, which included cities like Milan, Turin, Naples, Bari, Florence and Bologna, which could then draw on the resources of municipal, provincial and regional councils to finance their cultural policies. This created a huge rise in the expenditure on culture by Italian municipalities, as well as the increased number of specialised civil workers in the fields of culture and cultural policy.

49 Access to culture refers to „an essential right of all citizens“ (Uzelac *et al.*, 2016:88), „being understood in terms of reducing relevant obstacles (physical, financial, social or psychological), as well as, fostering opportunities, the issue of access to culture forms part of the broader reflection on the importance of culture in the society. It has been placed in the cultural policy focus with the aim to contribute to cultural development, social inclusion, quality of life, democratisation of culture, human rights, etc.“ (Uzelac *et al.*, 2016:89).

Kawashima puts forward two scenarios for implementation of cultural decentralisation; with or without political decentralisation. Cultural decentralisation *without political* decentralisation is “carried out without either exchange of resources between different tiers of government, or the changing of the political/administrative structure of government”, and such forms of decentralization can be “executed, whether by the centre or the local” (Kawashima, 1997:355).

Cultural decentralisation can be unravelled from the centre without political decentralisation in three ways:

1. “the centre can set up within its structure a unit which promotes the regional development of cultural policy (deconcentrating). Regional offices of the unit will be located around the country and will work regionally. But it is first and foremost the centre which posts its personnel to the regions, decides the objectives and aims of regional cultural policy, and sets standards and norms which regional offices should comply with” (Kawashima, 1997:355). This strategy is found in the countries with a strong role of the Ministry of culture, i.e. the in cultural policies of the *architect* typology such as in France, but also, as the empirical part will show, this instance of functioning is typical for transitional countries such as Croatia;
2. “the centre can build cultural facilities and arts organisations across the country”, which “was one of the most common strategies employed in the early post-war decades by governments in Europe” (Kawashima, 1997:355). The classic example of this is the creation of the cultural centres of the homes of culture (*Maisons de la culture*) in the 1960s, which were supposed to spread into all urban and rural areas. As Evans notes, the proliferation of arts and cultural centres was a combination of ‘post-war idealism’ and ‘60s revolt’ that resulted in the strengthening of local administrations and growing artistic freedom and experimentation: “arts centres did not tend to replace traditional and historic theatre and museum buildings, but created a more contemporary and less institutional setting for arts participation and spectating, but one that was also outside of the music and dance hall tradition, and which therefore defined their class base” (Evans, 2001:94);

3. The centre can arrange or enable “the touring of art exhibitions and performances nation-wide”, which is a common practice in countries like Sweden where national arts and cultural institutions are obliged to perform throughout the country (Kawashima, 1997:356). However, “in sharp contrast to such top-down planning, another form of cultural decentralisation, without any central-local contact, is through voluntary, spontaneous, and unplanned grass-roots movement...In countries where the control of local government is less rigid it has generally done well to enrich local dimensions of culture” (Kawashima, 1997:356).

Cultural decentralization *with* political decentralization can be divided into two parts: “it can be formulated through the transfer of power between the centre and the local. The alternative formulation is to enhance the power of the local, without reducing the power of central. Thus, while the first strategy involves a zero-sum game, the second is a ‘win-win’ situation” (Kawashima, 1997: 356). The transfer of power in cultural decentralization with political decentralization can be realized in many shapes and can be utilized to various degrees through “deploying tangible resources such as money and law, and also intangible ones such as information, administrative guidance and prescriptions on the organisational structures of local government” (Rhodes 1992:90-91; Mangset 1995 in Kawashima, 1997:357). Different constellations and volumes of resources yield different forms of political decentralization, but the main aim of the cultural decentralization with the political decentralization is to increase the resources of the local level without making any reduction on the central level (Kawashima, 1997). These instances of cultural decentralization with political decentralization are dependent on the statutory possibilities and means, i.e. the cultural decentralization is correlational to the constitutional and regulatory empowerment of the local authorities of arts and cultural provision. The problematic issue in positing cultural decentralization as a policy objective is that “policy makers seem to have done without developing the definition and measurement of the concept of cultural decentralisation, and have instead relied upon easily obtainable indicators of fiscal decentralisation” (Kawashima, 1997:352)⁵⁰. This has been done in

⁵⁰ Fiscal evaluations and measurements of the cultural field have become a norm, especially with the prevalence of the creative economy paradigms and the logic of the commodified cultural field. In his article, *Four Waves of Evaluation Diffusion* (2010), Vedung explains current trends and state-of-art in policy evaluation through four different waves of evaluation correlated with the wider, more general discourse on the contemporary canons of public governance. For example, Vedung (2010:263) considers evaluation as an „incredibly widespread governance formula“ linking it to the rise of neo-liberal wave of evaluation that started in the 1980s, making a turn towards market orien-

spite of the fact that it has been quite difficult for any government to “ignore the ideal of ‘culture for all’” (Kawashima, 1997:341), which is chartered on the principles of culture as public good and paradigms of cultural democracy.

Fiscal decentralisation is conceptually distinct from the cultural decentralization and refers to the distribution of public expenditure in the arts and culture. This type of decentralisation is focused upon the positions, mandates, levels of responsibility and representation, as well as relations of and between funder and producers of arts and culture. Kawashima (1997:345) sub-divides fiscal decentralisation into three units: the first is to equalise and balance public expenditure on arts and culture on the regional level. This is an obvious response to the centralised inclinations to leave the most of public expenditure in arts and culture in the capitals. The second sub-division of fiscal decentralisation concerns the “ratio between central and sub-central authorities in the national picture of public expenditure on culture” (Kawashima, 1997:345): “Very often, advances in cultural decentralisation are mistakenly claimed with the aid of this concept, by the illustration of an increase in local government’s share in total public expenditure. It may well be, however, that the apparently increased contribution by local government is simply due to the withdrawal of the centre. Such a misleading argument is often made, because perhaps it is the most accessible figure, and it is thus easily picked up as an indication of cultural centralisation/decentralisation” (Kawashima, 1997:346).

The third sub-division refers to the “de-concentration of public subsidies among different groups of cultural producers” (Kawashima, 1997:346). Concentration of subsidy is often correlated to the organisational and/or institutional status of the cultural producers. This predominantly pertains to the wide gaps in the proportions of budgets that are allocated for institutions in relation to (mini-

tation, only to develop into evidence-based wave in 1990s, when, as author claims, evaluation business completely exploded. It has since become an efficient means of providing legitimacy for public policy action through assessing measurable achievements. The actual scope of evaluations narrowed down to sharpened focus on measurable results and weakened interest in the processes, which is truly problematic for the cultural sector that relies on the process of artistic and cultural creation. Prevalence of the “free” market logic, controlled moderation and continuous diminution of the role of the State and public sector places preference on the categories of leadership, privatization, service-based public domain, customer focus and outsourcing. This amounted to a “pressure on the public sector to institutional and spatial scope, particularly its competencies in the economy and management” (Katunarić, 2004:20).

mal) percentages given to the non-institutional cultural sector. This is also linked to the differences between funding proportions for mainstream genres of arts and culture in comparison to, for example, contemporary and alternative artistic and cultural practices.

A degree of fiscal decentralisation is often used to illustrate the levels and modes of political decentralisation. However, Kawashima suggests that “money does not tell the whole story in the relations between governmental units” (Kawashima, 1997:347). Mangset (1995) identifies five resources of the centre, ranging from legislation, finances, organisation, information and professionalism that indicate that “money transfer from centre to local does not necessarily involve the discretionary power to spend to, not to mention overall autonomy in decision-making” (Kawashima, 1997:348).

Although there are clear demarcations between the three main categories of Kawashima’s concept of decentralisation, the three categories are non-exclusive in the practice. Namely, cultural centralisation cannot be achieved fully without political decentralisation, while fiscal decentralisation is part of political as well as cultural decentralisation⁵¹. In analysing the need for decentralisation and its merit as a policy method, Kawashima tackled the idea of decentralisation being a merit *per se* in the policy domain. The merits of decentralisation rely on the belief that decentralised structures serve societal values better and are more effective in ensuring and fostering democracy in cultural policy. Yet, decentralisation in cultural policy is, as already mentioned still quite under-researched and complex in meaning, which suggests that decentralisation becoming a norm in cultural policy is sustained with insufficient argumentative grounds. Kawashima reviewed existing theories on decentralisation in order to provide an analytical explanation on assumed values and benefits of decentralisation. One of the main values in cultural decentralisation is seen as its potential to achieve equality in cultural policy, though this might not be evident in the practice of cultural policy decentralisation. This value is supposed to provide the rationale for the state’s policy objective, while policy in “turn functions to achieve values and it influences them” (Ka-

51 As Kawashima stressed “the concepts are distinct – not a matter of semantics – but practical discussion of not always allow them to be neatly pigeonholed” (Kawashima, 1997:348).

washima, 1997:350). This implies the state intervention in the market, which would otherwise produce, sustain and develop greater inequalities:

“This is the mechanism by which cultural decentralisation is legitimised as a policy objective. But equally, the forms of policy impinge upon the value of equality: one of the classic arguments against public funding for the arts is that it tends to subsidise the activities of the better-off, who are the dominant audience, and it thus perpetuates (or promotes) inequality among different socio-economic groups of the population” (Kawashima, 1997:350).

Institutional arrangements can also benefit from decentralisation because they will facilitate responsiveness and accountability. Decentralisation has an added value for the policy itself. Since local needs vary, diversity of policy between areas will emerge, which will offer wider options of residence for people to choose from; “diversity will lead to policy innovation” (Kawashima, 1997:353).

Decentralisation as a means of power devolution and decreasing political concentration of decision-making in cultural policy formation, implementation and evaluation, can be recognized as the most applicable method for participatory policy-making and governance, referring to the relationship between the centre and the local, but also to the relationship between government and non-government (Kawashima, 2004). Correspondingly, Katunarić (2003) poses cultural policy centralism as “intimately connected with building of nation states”, securing permanent state protection to the institutional ideal of national culture as “no other arrangements, including liberal market and civil society organisations, are believed to take care of public culture” (Miller, 1995 in Katunarić, 2003:1). Insofar, explaining decentralisation seeks a contextual approach to critical examination, which is, for the Croatian case, found in Katunarić’s work from 2003.

4.2.2. Katunarić’s contextual conceptualisation of cultural policy decentralization

In his study on decentralization in South-East Europe (SEE) from 2003, Katunarić explored decentralization in the context of transitional countries with immature and newly founded demo-

cratic governments. In his observations, Katunarić critically analysed the political flows and tendencies of cultural policy centralism that is intimately connected with building of nation-states. Structured and supported centrally, the author claims that it is difficult to achieve decentralisation that is autonomous, self-reliant socio-political action of a certain local or regional community, which would be its core pledge, mostly so in connection to the sustainable or any type of local development. Stemming as a project of the centre, the core purpose of the decentralisation is defeated, making decentralisation “a descending order or an issue of power-struggle between centre and periphery” (Katunarić, 2003:1). The tense relationship between centre and periphery is the ever-present controversy of power-struggle in the decentralisation debate, especially in the context of demands for linguistic, religious, ethnic or cultural autonomy. In this line, Katunarić brings polycentrism into the discussion and explains the differences between those two practices and concept as formal rather than substantial by underlining the main issues that define decentralization:

“Decentralisation mostly expands the existing model of culture or even consolidates the central governance in culture by devolving a portion of central competencies, that are considered less important, to local levels. For example, the Nordic countries welfare system, including long term policy planning and development, has been maintained in 1990s, amid increasing importance given to major cities as financiers and facility providers for artists. Likewise, decentralisation in France has generated a centralist backlash under pretext that former was lacking in Paris standards of efficiency and excellence. In England, the lack of legislation has undermined regional and local autonomy (Heiskanen, 2002). However, even in the cases where decentralisation and autonomy are supported by legislation, counter-tendencies of “structural centralism” take over the old hierarchy of cultural policy system, mainly through arm’s length and similar bodies or through new technocratic doctrine of Network Society. Such a way, “truly democratic modes of bottom-up decentralisation” are obstructed” (Heiskanen, 2002:26 in Katunarić, 2003:2).

This is not the last of the decentralisation issues and hindrances. Decentralization as a method for policy change and authority diffusion is missing “another end” or, as Katunarić raises a question, some other objective in “terms of different meaning and functions of culture” (Katunarić, 2003:2). A

result of this might be “a working concept of culture that really ‘decentralizes’ the old cultural meanings and functions, ceasing with exclusive links between culture and political power, culture and administration, culture and expert power, and, eventually, culture and business that is interested only in converting cultural goods into commercial markets (mass culture) by fostering the populist notion of the ‘sovereignty of consumption’ (McGuigan, 1997), with no public standards for culture in the sight” (Katunarić, 2003:2). In order to develop such new forms of culture without old pre-emption, fears or discontents, a vision of such a culture must be set out beforehand in national and local strategic goals of cultural development, as well as of civil society organisations, for to be validated as “another end” of decentralisation policy. Otherwise, it is not strange that new democracies in SEE countries exhibit certain disbelief in decentralisation, for it looks to them as an instrument that turns culture back to pre-national (centrifugal) past, or a channel through which the public culture disappears into the black hole of global trade and market in which, nevertheless, the old democracies and their cultures, unlike new democracies and their cultures, “still gain more than they lose” (Katunarić, 2003:3). For this reason, the author established a three-dimensional conceptual framework to identify objectives of decentralization as a methodological structure for researching decentralization of cultural policies in SEE, but also for the encouragement of formulation of such policies.

The first objective called *Titanic* refers to the reduction of central competencies in cultural policy and foresees only an exclusive set of privileged national institutions maintaining the protection of the state, while the others are left on their own in insecure fluctuations of local cultural policies and competitive markets. The second objective is called *balancing burdens* of the old cultural functions that leads to the establishment of “fair-chair” arrangement between the state, local administrations and private economy. This objective accepts different proportions of hybridization and levels of assimilation of the old public culture into the commercial environment. However, “this “hybridisation” turns out to be an assimilation of the old public culture into commercial environment, such as soap-opera production, rather than other way around” (Katunarić, 2003:4).

Lastly, the third objective author posits in new emerging forms of culture which remains in the sphere of public culture but develops in the direction of sustainable cultural development, interpenetrating with the other systems like education, science, environmental protection, tourism,

economy etc. in which culture can provide significant added value. Currently, this objective is hypothetical and can “be observed only in weak traces there were attempts are made at making the public spaces attractive to people interested to meet artists, but also many other, yet unknown, people as well” (Katunarić, 2003:4). This prospect of unknown, of possibility as a potential and opening up the public resources towards this essentially risky yet urgently needed endeavour is the definite line of decentralisation as an instrument of a genuine modernisation of cultural policy. This objective of decentralisation is called the *new public culture*, and is conceptualised as an emerging form of culture, “which retains in main the status of public culture and enjoys the public financing, both local and central as well as domestic and international NGO” (Katunarić, 2003:4).

Following this three-conceptual framework, Katunarić suggested several propositions:

- The process of decentralisation does not necessarily lead to the change of the centralised system of cultural policy; “the old system becomes more flexible and more diversified and is even able to reproduce itself in its former versions” while regional or local cultural systems “must not produce essentially different cultural functions and outputs” but replicate the features of the centralised system (Katunarić, 2003:5).
- If the process of decentralisation surpasses a certain (political) threshold, it may lead to the direction of the second objective or the very start of the *new public culture*, although the latter is still a hypothetical construct, while most of the decentralisation process remains “a balance between state-managed and liberal policy that is established, whereby elite, alternative, industrial, commercial, educational and other functions of culture are differently allocated within governmental and nongovernmental sectors” (Katunarić, 2003:5). Any liberalisation of cultural policy, i.e. privatisation of cultural (formerly public) resources is “likely to perpetuate a culture and cultural policy system” in the terms of *Titanic* or *balancing burdens*, and weakens bottom-up, democratised participation (Katunarić, 2003:5).
- The difference between decentralised and polycentric cultural system is formal rather than substantial: “a-centric forms of public culture pertain different meanings and roles of culture with regard to other spheres of community life, such attracting more and more people to participate in cultural life and cultural policymaking. In central or polycentric systems, which foster oligarchic or meritocratic, i.e., exclusive, forms of cultural policy and cultural practice, broader

forms of people participation in culture is an illusion. Others, namely, who do not belong to such a space of culture and policy, remain eternally recipients, a passive public, and clients, or are simply irrelevant and outsiders” (Katunarić, 2003:5-6).

In order to apply the comparative analysis of the decentralisation process in relation to the proposed objectives in SEE countries, Katunarić provided a methodological framework with the purpose to map “the actual processes of cultural decentralisation in SEE countries”: to prepare a “framework for comparative analysis of the objectives, instruments and practices of decentralisation in culture and cultural policy”; and to provide a guideline for “co-ordinated efforts of the triangle of actors in parliamentary, administrative and third sector domains” that could “lead to a redefinition of culture and cultural policy goals suitable to developing broader, bottom-up interests in public culture and policy participation” (Katunarić, 2003:6). To this end, Katunarić researched decentralisation trends and tendencies in SEE through a set of questions, such as “which instruments are used in the case that a policy of decentralisation is more ambitiously procured and what actual practices tell about the implementation of such instruments? Where the process of decentralisation is eventually aiming to? Is it explained as a part of a long-term process the end of which is figured out by strategic objectives or goals, or is it just short term, contingent and not clearly oriented process toward a policy end?” that inevitably lead towards official documents and policy analysis for answers (Katunarić, 2003:6). One of the important research resources was a table of cultural policies profiles for 29 countries on The Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends from which Katunarić extracted the countries of the SEE region⁵² and mapped the decentralisation process in each country according to the proposed ten-point scale ranging from point 1 as a decentralised scenario of complete centralised and state-controlled cultural policy to point 10 as a total decentralisation, deetatation and privatisation (Katunarić, 2003). Not a single country on the list scored past “centralised system” and “centralised structure”, Croatia included. However, Croatia, Bulgaria and Slovenia were the only three countries that listed the existence of arm’s length bodies in culture. Katunarić’s general remarks on centralised/decentralised systems in the SEE observed problems in the practices and policies and in instruments of decentralisation that are not clearly defined. Objec-

⁵² The included countries were Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia and FR Yugoslavia.

tives of decentralisation policies are “sometimes obscured, although they are often officially defined in the terms of enhancing efficiency or subsidiarity of cultural institutions and production. Decentralisation is often introduced by the pretext of streamlining the national expenditures for some local cultural institutions and activities that were fully financed in the former socialist system. This way, a circle of protected institutions of national significance is consolidated and financially secured, while other institutions are or will soon be left to fortunes and whims of local authorities or to a competitive market environment. The question is whether this way some important cultural institutions or activities are switched off without appropriate explanation or can they be considered merely as losers in a power struggle?”(Katunarić, 2003:7-8). Highlighting the difficulty in justifying the policy of centralism of decentralisation, Katunarić continued to raise fundamental, chronically neglected questions in the public cultural policy discourse and planning, such as:

- ” alike the old cultural policy suited to the former system, new cultural policy reflects values of the new social and political order. However, what are these values exactly, beside national uniqueness and cohesion (for internationalism is officially abandoned)? Individualism, collectivism or both (for social, political and organisational cultures in the East, as much as in the West, are really different /cf. Hofstede, 1994/)?;
- ..if diversity or multiculturalism, identity, creativity and participation are such new values... which of these values may precisely be achieved via decentralisation, and why not through centralism?..;
- ..maintaining a status quo, making the cultural policy system neither completely centralised nor decentralised to a certain degree, cannot prevent further erosion of cultural functions in post-Communist societies. Also, imitating or taking advice from western neighbours or other western countries that have achieved a good balance between central, regional and local competencies, and between state, private and non-governmental not-for profit sectors in culture, must not produce the same results as in transitional countries, nor it really does..;
- ...it seems that role of culture and cultural policy in the periods of profound changes, as it is the actual one, may again be precious, provided that it does not replicate the culture of nationalism or imperialism, i.e., the reactive tendencies, and that decentralisation of culture may clearly

be the means for creating a concept and practice of culture and cultural policy that enable the SEE countries to live, co-operate and integrate into a European world where cultures are not anymore the appendices of power, supremacy or conflict strategies, but are privileged ways to communicate and work out the best qualities of nations, communities and individuals on the basis of equality, trust, freedom, creativity and solidarity. May such a vision be incorporated into the agenda of decentralisation?" (Katunarić, 2003:8-9).

Ultimately, Katunarić warns that there is no level of decentralisation that is or will be able to re-compensate the job permanency and security that was a standard in the previous socialist system. However, the current system of impossible dualism in cultural policy in which one side of the cultural sector and workers, i.e. the institutional cultural sector remains protected with the status of public employees entailing job permanence, secure income and workers' rights, while the other side of the cultural sector, i.e. the non-institutional side operates under strenuous insecurities and are depleted of any recognition and protection from the public authorities is highly problematic and unsustainable.

Katunarić's concept of decentralization is compatible with McGuigan's reading of cultural policy as not being about the politics of culture in the most general sense, but more about "the clash of ideas, institutional struggles and power relations in the production and consumption of symbolic meanings"(McGuigan, 1996:1). Starting with the Eagleton's premise that the "public cultural sector represents the capability of a community to get different people into a common space of dialogue and co-operation by means of all forms of culture, i.e. patrician, plebeian or alternative" (Eagleton, 2000 in Katunarić, 2004:20), Katunarić provides arguments for growth of the public sector in culture "which may bring together different cultural stakeholders, various economic interests and a heterogeneous public into a commons space of dialogue, cultural production and expressiveness" (Katunarić, 2004:20).

Consequently, the author instituted already mentioned the concept of the *new public culture* (NPC) which questions the position and collective purpose of culture in so-called peripheral countries

(in sense of cultural prestige and development) amidst intense transitions and transformations, but also provides “another end” of decentralisation policy (Katunarić, 2003).

4.2.2.1. The New Public Culture

In its ideal form, NPC presents a potentiality of including diverse qualities needed for the development of public infrastructure and policy, “from building a continuum of public spaces to providing symbolic tools of cultural governance” (Katunarić, 2004:20). NPC is compatible (yet not compliant) with the key European agendas in cultural development such as affirmation of cultural diversity and promotion of inter-cultural dialogue, decentralization of cultural policy and (inter) regional cultural cooperation. A conceptual differentiation is marked between *old public culture* and *new public culture*. The former is explained as based on family – state – market triangle, while the latter is based on “polygonal and a-centric structures” (Katunarić, 2004:23). Distinctions between *old* and *new public culture* are presented through more detailed differing characteristics in the following table:

Table 1: *Old and New Public Culture* characteristics (Katunarić, 2004:27).

	Old Public Culture	New Public Culture
Space/time	Capitals, major cities, major squares, “sleepy” provinces cum villages usually mobilized either to reinforce or subvert central political order (e.g. nationalism); on the private side, home-centred, eventually “televised”, daily life, takes and overwhelming part of the individual time-budget.	Reducing polarity between urban and rural, public and private spaces, via continuums of infrastructures, activities and higher participation in public life; transversal communication and co-operation between (former) provinces; time economy is polyvalent.
Needs	Paternal figures providing protection and leadership in public space, and maternal figures in home space.	Equivalence and reciprocity, mutual care, cooperation and equality both in public and private spheres.
Economy	Mass production for mass consumption in homes or in public gathering, provided by monopolistic companies. Developmental gaps expanding that cannot be reduced or closed.	Lead production for diversified public or consumers, provided by immense number of different producers. Products, exchange values and growth continually redefined according to a variety of different values.
Technology and media	Work and media patterning of one-way movement of products and messages, and of “special authority” of media as a technical instrument.	Work and media technology, including ICT, as instruments for the attainment of goals that constitute individual freedom, joy and solidarity with other at the same time.
Society	Rising socio-economic inequalities provisionally compensated for by popular vote and universal suffrage – a “stretched onion” structure. Vertical borders and horizontal boundaries tend towards eternalizing, with an emphasis on gender gap.	Socio-economic inequalities compensated for by relatively high standards for minimal threshold/poverty line – “diamond” structure. Borders and boundaries to be softened or transcended with desegregating gender relations.
Politics	Populist and majoritarian democracy.	Pluralist democracy, minorities protected and respected.
Identities	Categorical, mono, exclusive.	Relational, multiple, inclusive.
Sociocultural capital	Bonding; crowds/mobs; borders/blocks; verticality	Bridging; “swarms”, networks, oval/global; horizontal
Arts and aesthetics	Monumental; gate-keeping by/for white/Western/male creators and producers.	Expanding margins of creativity and productivity among vast and heterogeneous population.
Expressiveness	Pretending; masking of private interests.	Spontaneity, sincerity.
Legislation	Either too complex and bureaucratized or deregulation prevails in favour or releasing free-market, yet monopolistic, arrangements.	Simple and non-sizeable aimed at stimulating creativity and productivity via both free-market, mixed and state arrangements.
Governing	Mainly centralized or polycentric to protect elite qualities in traditionally pre-empted or new pre-selected instances via administrative or arm’s length bodies.	Decentralized; expanding number and kinds of participants in policy-making via enlarged and mixed bodies.
Management	Managers appointed by government or by private owners/stakeholders. Managerial results directly dependent on employers’ actual demands.	Managers elected by various constituencies and are oriented to meet, by consensus or by negotiation, demands of many different stakeholders as well as public/customers.

The differences between the proposed *Old* and *New Public Culture* characteristics indicate several things. First, the two columns represent the “ideal types rather than (real) types in the sense that the new incorporates the old, and vice versa” in the sense that they don’t “cancel each other in practice” (Katunarić, 2004:26). Second, the two columns do not exclude each other, but the *New* provides a contemporary (in sense of time and necessity) continuation and upgrade of the past, while not following the same patterns of normativity. Their dichotomy is more “teleological and counterfactual, rather than casual and descriptive” as it envisages a “new layer of public culture without providing any evidence of its evolution within the old layer” (Katunarić, 2004:26).

In sense of modernisation processes, the shift from *Old* to *New Public Culture* is consistent with the condition of late modernity and the change from *life politics* (the politics of self-actualization) with *emancipatory politics* (the politics of equality), which will lead us, as Giddens claims, a new fruitful era (Giddens, 1991;1998). In this new era, the role of the two profound changes in the cultural policy evolution, that of the association and role of the civil society and the other of the rise of the locale, i.e. the city, opens a mandatory category of the NPC, which is “a continuum of public spaces” that are open as mediating sphere between “private/real Self and ideal/unrealized Self” (Katunarić, 2004:29). Katunarić explains that “a continuum of public spaces” may “facilitate the reshuffling of human needs that determine the qualities of productions, and consumption, ambience in workplaces, and also determine the shift towards building a bridging social capital that has remained rudimentary in the old public culture” (Katunarić, 2004:29).

The important explication that Katunarić provides is on the economy of the NPC. Starting from the premise that, historically, under the “merit of the Fordist as much as the Bolshevik state”, and specifically in the field of culture under the merit of French Ministry of Culture under André Malraux and Jacques Lange, the lack of monetary power necessary for the process of social emancipation was re-compensated to the lower social strata by securing and making inexpensive economic and cultural goods accessible (Katunarić, 2004). This has enabled “a relaxation of the authoritarian grip on micro-social spheres, first of all, families, where the emancipation of women was facilitated thanks to their entering into job markets or the public sector bureaucratic economy” (Katunarić, 2004:33). However, as Katunarić continues to unravel “the economic functions of

public culture have been considerably diminished meanwhile. The new tide of privatization seemingly neutralizes the added values of the old public culture, aiming at creating value exclusively through monetary exchange. The latter shapes a puppet-like rather than human other, restoring at the same time pre-democratic relationships between proprietors and disposed” (Katunarić, 2004:33). Now, the added values of the NPC are expected to derive from the “rehabilitation of non-monetary exchange and not-for-profit activities”, which should be supported with the local production of cultural activities and services rather than with the imports from the global corporations and conglomerates (Katunarić, 2004:33). Ultimately, this will be “manifested in building a healthier, more educated, lovely and socially cohesive milieu that is also open to external entrepreneurs and other actors whose assumptions of culture, economy and social life are similar to or compatible with designers and protagonists of the NPC” (Katunarić, 2004:33).

With NPC, the future development of public culture connotes subjugation of monumental and iconic cultural formats, narratives and symbols, as well as the prevalence of cultural industries mass consumption logic in favour of dynamic arts production and cultural activities. The NPC is focused on the revival of the sense of local culture in the peripheries, which cannot, nor wish to, outgrow new centres. It is conducive to pluralist democracy and decentralized axes of governing, both on the scale of territory and agency by being open to “various artists, experts, professionals and audiences, and to different sectors, with a common objective to expand public participation and enhance circulation and communication between different publics” (Katunarić, 2004:35) To this end, the concept of NPC creates conditions for the transformation of traditional institution to a participatory institution that involves all stakeholders (funders, staff, audiences, local communities, volunteers, etc.) into co-governing and co-creating content and values. Following this shift, institutions should make adjustments in the structure and organizational format since, “participatory governance requires a cultural and structural change, where the organization demonstrates to be ready to share institutional decision making with a wider public” (Sani, 2015:7). Adopting a new direction with the integration of participatory approach into the institutional logic, plenty of benefits would arise for public institutions, such as engagement of citizens, increasing “sense of collective ownership in community” as well as developing “the sustainability of the cultural organizations involved in the long run” (Sani, 2015:9). However, the most vital aspects of NPC

entail the introduction of new governance schemes that would enable for open, legitimate and inclusive cultural policy frameworks and governance in culture.

4.3. From governance to cultural governance

The governance⁵³ debate has been widespread throughout social science literature since the late twentieth century. Governance is a system of rule that functions only if accepted by the majority, by which it differs from the government which can function in face of “widespread opposition to their policies” (Rosenau, 1992 in Schmitt, 2011:20). The meaning of governance is linked to the inability of the state to “resolve all the tasks and demands placed upon it by society” (Birch, 1982; Crozier et al.,1975; King, 1975 in Pierre, 2000:4). It refers to “sustaining co-ordinations and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and transnational organisations” (Pierre, 2000:4). Generally, governance is seen as a “reaction to the fact that the traditional terms of sovereignty and government no longer appeared suitable for describing processes of making binding decisions and enforcing them in the present era” (Schmitt, 2011:19). What previously were “indisputably roles of government are now increasingly seen as more common, generic, societal problems which can be resolved by political institutions but also by other actors” (Pierre, 2000:4). By default, governance involves governmental institutions but is more encompassing of informal, non-governmental sub-systems and mechanisms. The rise and recent popularity of the governance topic in the field of social sciences indicates the deficiency of older concepts, as well as the need of new terms to describe and keep up with the transformations in socio-political circumstances and increase in particular interest for inclusion from various social actors (from governmental agencies and academia down to local communities and audiences) through open and participatory negotiation processes.

53 Concepts of governance emerged in the Anglophone academic world in the 1980s and 1990s, although the term also appears in older texts, for instance in Ruggie (1975). The term governance was modelled on but deliberately distinct from the term government, in the sense of a formal government or system of government. Both terms are derived from the Latin *gubernare* (steer [ships], but also control, govern), which in turn comes from the Greek verb *kybernein*, which means steering in the navigational sense.

The topic of governance narrows its wider focus from the social sciences to a more specific field of culture and cultural policy through cultural governance. The contemporary concept of cultural governance refers to policy, governance, management and cultural administration and concerns establishment of a balance between top-down and bottom-up approaches which could result with relevant policy changes. Baltà Portolés, Čopič and Srakar have made a contribution to the topic of cultural governance with the “Literature Review on Cultural Governance and Cities” in which they detected cultural governance as composed of two sub-areas. The first one involves “the new approaches to the formulation and implementation of sectorial cultural policy that are inspired by the interaction between the state, the civil society and the market” (Baltà Portolés, Čopič and Srakar, 2014:185). The second area signifies „the improvements in the steering and supervision of cultural organisations that lead to efficiently, expertly, independently and transparently operating cultural organisations” (Baltà Portolés, Čopič and Srakar, 2014:185). Baltà Portolés, Čopič and Srakar place cultural governance in a broader political context referring to the burning issues of the modern world that include:

“legal-rational legitimacy monopolized by elected politicians in the post-national situation when states are no longer capable of coping with the ever-growing social demands; the emergence of a civil vision of democracy based on the re-organization of power (going beyond public consultation and deliberative democracy and denying parliamentary democracy as an exclusive channel to policy decision-making); the shift from government to governance as ‹our joint and uneven terms of engagement with the complex field of economic, social, political and cultural power relations in which we are all stakeholders› (Mercer, 2012), the process such as privatization, decentralization, incorporation etc., which do not only mean fragmentation of the decision-making systems but also the withdrawal of the state from the public sector and the emergence of new problems (environment, security, exclusion etc.) which do not fit into sectorial policies” (Baltà Portolés, Čopič and Srakar, 2014:187).

Raymond Weber distinguishes four levels of cultural governance: the *meta level* (political vision and legitimacy/mobilization); the *macro-level* (political institutional reforms and structural democratic changes); the *meso-level* (political regulation and competence capacity, transfer of

know-how, sectoral interventions) and the *micro-level* (organization of regulatory systems and administrative modernization, civil participation and the civil society empowerment) (Raymond Weber, 2010). Through a number of rhetoric questions, Weber emphasizes the contradiction in defining governance, which can be interpreted as technique to better manage economic globalization according to neoliberal ideology, as well as a mobilized utopia that allows us to “return to founding a participatory and inclusive democracy, which is based on the network of participation and citizen cooperation” (Weber, 2010:3).

For UNESCO, governance is a multifaceted system and is to be grounded on “principles of freedom and expression, equality, openness, balance and sustainability. A functioning system of governance for culture involves a range of governmental and non-governmental actors and requires spaces to ensure the active participation of a diversity of voices in policy-making processes as well as shared responsibility in policy implementation“ (UNESCO, 2013:6). Governance is determined by *political will* and *technical factors*. The former is determined “by the level of priority given to the cultural sector by public authorities and society in general”, along with the level of involvement of civil society and cultural operators in creating “a political environment conducive to the development of the cultural sector that meets their needs”, while the latter depends on “the human and financial resources available in the sector and, more specifically, on the capacities and skills of the various public institutions and stakeholders in formulating relevant and effective action-orientated strategies” (UNESCO, 2013:6). All of these literature sources show a strong potential in opening up the alternative ways of understanding new models of governance in culture that seek to increase involvement and participation of diverse actors, most notably civil society, in pursuing democratic channels of representation and legitimacy in cultural policy.

The topic of cultural governance is mostly tacitly explored by cultural policy researches, while cultural policy practice and decision-making see governance as a means to either political or managerial ends. Either way, placing governance in the domain of cultural policy from the research perspective inevitably leads to the unknown terrain of a deep divide between theoretical articulations and practical implementations of power relations stipulated by policy structures. Innately and analogous to cultural policy and decentralisation, cultural governance is preoccupied with the

ever-persistent power struggle that shapes not only the logic of cultural sector's functionality but also the basic meaning, positioning and understanding culture as well as managing and administering intricate relations within the cultural domain. Hence, cultural governance can be identified by a twofold dialectical relationship with human agency and institutions or relationship between ideas and concepts on the one hand, and institutions on the other hand (Schmitt, 2011).

Finally, it must be underlined that governance is not, by all means, a synonym for policy, though elaboration of any policy in the public interest demands a strong emphasis on governance. Wei understands governance as a specific aspect of policy and as “the set of institutions and structures that define how public goods... are created and delivered to citizens and the private sector and how public policies are made.” (Wei, 2001 in Isar *et al.*, 2012:5). As evident from the previously presented text, exploration of cultural governance is attainable through multiple approaches – those that perceive cultural governance as a consequence of policy rationale and actions and the other that perceive governance as an executive extension of governmental action and an indication of prevailing ideological patterns with consequent power relations that constitute cultural policy. Either way, the relationship between cultural policy and cultural governance can be understood as a classic “chicken-egg” analogy. Cultural governance is right at the intersection of the cultural policy studies and cultural policy practices influenced by theoretical concepts and determined practical (political) realities. The contemporary concept of cultural governance refers to policy, governance, management and cultural administration and concerns establishment of a balance between top-down and bottom-up approaches which could result with relevant policy changes and reforms. The determinant of “culture” in cultural governance can be derived from a combination of Foucault's notion of police with Raymond Williams' conceptualization of culture as the “generalized process of intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic development” (Williams, 1983 in Bratich, Packer and McCarthy, 2003:5). More particular of Williams' reading and interpretations of culture for the topic of this thesis is his adoption of R. H. Tawney's notion of common culture which Williams developed from its original idea of “dissemination of high culture to the masses through education and culture policy” to a more dynamic and processual conception an “educated and participatory democracy” (McGuigan, 2014:93).

The concept of a common culture is the unavoidably connected to the crucial differential aspect in defining governance, as Čopič and Sarkar (2012) suggest, at the aggregate public administration level and management at the operational, i.e. organizational level. Current cultural governance provisions in Croatia remain consistent with the historical trajectory of culture being of public value, hence this thesis explores reformative potentials of public governance in culture that is constructed on two levels – the first includes new approaches in the formulation, implementation and change in cultural policy that is influenced by the interaction between the state, the civil society and the market, and the other implies development in the institutional frameworks and organizational structures that lead to expanded inclusion and participation of diverse actors. These reformative potentials, initiatives and aspirations are consistent with the model of participatory governance that has been present in other public sectors for a number of decades, while it has been applied in the cultural field more recently and in the specific areas of culture. Insofar, participatory agenda in arts and culture represents an innovative issue in the discourse of cultural policy; it has been seen as one that could fulfil the widening gap between the promise and failure of cultural democracy and influence democratic deficiencies that culture is facing.

4.4. Development of participation agenda in cultural policy: participatory governance in culture

Participation is an umbrella term (Sani, 2016) loaded with diverse meanings and understandings, and covering a wide-ranging terrain of practices, where it is important to recognize the distinction between *cultural participation* and *participatory governance in culture*. Such distinction is, in greater part, consonant with to the difference in the meaning of participation as *taking part* (which is more in line with the sociological thought), and participation as *sharing power* (which is more in line with the perspective of political sciences and public policy).

The two categories of *cultural participation* and *participatory governance in culture* have obvious overlaps, but should not be conjoined in their meaning lightly. Both categories aim at ensuring equal opportunities of “enjoyment of culture through the identification of underrepresented

groups, the design and implementation of initiatives or programmes aimed at increasing their participation and the removal of barriers” (Bollo *et al.* 2012:7) and imply access to culture. Unlike cultural participation, participative designs and principles in cultural policies and in governance and management of arts and culture rest on the idea of devolving and decentralisation of power structures that define existing decision-making structures in cultural policy and cultural domain in favour of more democratised and empowered models, based on shared responsibility, accountability and greater legitimacy. Hence, participatory governance deals with expanding the parameters of what constitutes an engagement with arts and culture and with expanded meaning and practice of what constitutes taking part in and of itself (Rogoff 2005). It is not (only) about reconnecting cultural institutions and organisations with the public in order to demonstrate their value and relevance, but it is about exploring the origins of the new shapes, meanings and relations of culture. These directly lead to the discussion on the topic of decentralisation and the transference of cultural policy from national to (micro) local and regional levels.

The question of participation of citizens at different levels and in various formats is nowadays considered as one of the most important issues in the domain of cultural and artistic practice as well as in the cultural policy discourse. Consequently, it is present worldwide as a key theme in the theory and policy on cultural development. Participation is not a new concept - it is indivisible with modernization and democratization of culture and cultural institutions, emphasizing the importance of the involvement of citizens in cultural life, and is consistent with the cultural democracy that promotes and affirms cultural diversity by diminishing barriers between the high and low culture. Participation has a long tradition in different areas of society and it operates across various geopolitical contexts and organizational settings.


During the last century, the relation between the state/public authority and citizens has profoundly changed, and many areas have developed critical reflection on dominant meanings of participation practices. However, the methods of participation depend on the political construction of countries, sectors, disciplines, etc. Parallel to the right of freedom of expression and the right to rest and leisure, the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), defined the right to participate in the cultural life which obliged “the part of governments (at national, regional

and local levels) to ensure that this right is upheld” (UIS, 2012:7). Placing participation in the context of human rights shows that “right to culture” has been a key foundation of cultural policy and must be treated as a principle, especially across Europe where citizen’s participation has become an inseparable component of cultural practices. Since the existing “data on cultural participation shows that a significant part of the population still does not participate in mainstream cultural activities such as going to the cinema or reading books” (European Agenda for Culture, 2012:5), it is not surprising that Council of European Union, in many of its documents, emphasized, “the importance of achieving a better and fairer distribution of chance to participate in culture” (European Agenda for Culture, 2012:5). But, with the financial and economic crisis affecting many countries in last years, public interventions and policies are mostly related to other fields (social services, health, national security, etc.) leaving the cultural life as well as participation in culture in the margin of public interest. Consequently, we are witnessing rising abandonment of cultural right in human rights. Current reality serves the “well-educated high-earning citizens” as “keeping culture in the margin of the development of participatory policies means maintaining an elitist vision of culture” (Laaksonen’s, 2010 in UIS, 2012:69). At the same time, the notion of participation spreads wide towards the various levels and forms of participatory practices, such as participatory arts, participatory culture, participatory policy and decision making, participatory governance, etc. This new paradigm is a result of communication and technology development, which led to the cultural shift from consumers to producers due to fast changes happening in all stages of culture cycles (creation, production, dissemination, exhibition/reception/transmission and consumption/participation). The increasing popularity of digital media and its complex impact on society, as well as the rapid proliferation of cultural and creative industries, has changed the position of culture in our everyday life – it is not any more part of the leisure time but an integral part of life. As Besch and Minson stressed, the forms of community participation in decision making vary “from central government initiatives to the most hierarchical private organizations, from social movements of the new Left to those of the new Right, and from childrearing to parental intervention in the school community” (Besch and Minson, 2001:52).

In the domain of culture, we can find varied meanings and practices of participatory governance. In the Brainstorming Report on participatory governance in the context of cultural heritage, experts

and practitioners stressed that the term “governance” refers to government, authority and organizational management. The concept “participatory” means “activities in which people take part” (Voices of Culture, 2015:2). So, the involvement of participatory concept to the three mentioned aspects “implies that government, authority and management should be shared with people, with the citizens to whom the public cultural resources belong” (Voices of Culture, 2015:2). Therefore, the concept of participatory governance is defined as a sharing responsibility in governance between many stakeholders - who have “a stake in what happens” (Wilcox, 1994:5), such as local administrative, public institutions, private institutions, NGOs, citizens initiatives, representatives of local communities, artists, etc. In the context of cultural heritage, it “is a process of releasing authority on the one side and empowerment on the other, as well as the adoption of a management model, which allows for decisions to be taken by communities rather than individuals” (Sani *et al.*, 2015:10).

Power relation is the central point of the notion of participatory governance, or as Arnstein stressed “the redistribution of power” gives the opportunity to citizens “to be deliberately included in the future” (Arnstein, 1969:216). But it is important to take into account that participatory governance is a process with many variations of participation of various stakeholders who engage in decision making. In Arnstein “typology of eight levels of participation” (Arnstein, 1969:217) that is illustrated in the picture below, each number on the scale represents the level of citizen’s power (from manipulation and therapy, informing and consultation, over placation and partnership to delegated power and citizen control). Only the latter one - citizen control which means “the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power” (Arnstein, 1969:217) can be understood as true participatory governance. Namely, this highest level of participation gives citizens “degree of power (or control) which guarantees that participants or residents can govern a program or an institution, be in full charge of policy and managerial” (Arnstein, 1969:223).



Picture 1. *The ladder of participation* (Arnstein, 1969). Image sourced from Vidović and Žuvela (2018:24).

In most part, participatory governance can be connected to the inability of the traditional state and representative political apparatus to deal with a range of contemporary social problems. Participation is expected to overcome or assist in curing all of the democratic deficiencies that our political, economic, social and ultimately cultural systems are experiencing. Frank Fischer situates participatory governance in what Hajer calls “institutional void”, or institutional cracks of the traditional state where the practices of participatory governance are reflected in a “proliferation of new forms of social and political association” (Hajer, 2003 in Fischer, 2006:20). Participatory governance, as a variant or subset of governance theory, has contributed to the creation of new spaces “constructed and shaped by a different brand of social actors” (Fischer, 2006:20). This implies the rise of the political and social relevance of the civil society and non-governmental actors that, by questioning the legitimacy and accountability of the state, open new organisational spaces taking over public activities to “such a degree that some see them as reconfiguring public sector” and affecting policies of the mainstream institutions (Fischer, 2006:20).

Fundamental to participatory governance is the creation of alternative participatory institutions and alternative political cultures that can support them. Grounded in the theory of participatory democracy, participatory governance offers a theory and practices of public engagement through deliberative processes that emphasize democratic engagement, in particular through deliberative practices (Fischer, 2012). This is elaborated by Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright (2003a, 2003b) through their concept of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG). For Fung and Wright, empowered participatory governance is one of the solutions for the erosion of democratic vitality, political passivity and retreating to privatism of society through strategies that can advance values like egalitarian social justice, community and solidarity, as well as individual liberty combined with popular control over collective decisions. EPG relies „upon the commitment and capacities of ordinary people to make sensible decisions through reasoned deliberation and are empowered because they attempt to tie action to discussion“ (Fung and Wright 2003a:5). This is part of the broader aim to discover and imagine democratic institutions that are more participatory and effective than the familiar formula of political representation and bureaucratic administration. As a practice, EPG is state-centred in the sense that it colonizes state power and transforms formal governance modes and institutions. Most of the activists' efforts in areas like environmental protection, or urban renewal and planning seek to influence the outcomes of the state and/or local and regional authorities' decision-making processes through outside pressure. In doing so, the most successful of those efforts manage to advance some of the EPG's principles of practicality, participation and perhaps deliberation in civil and political organizations or their mode of thinking. Nevertheless, they do not yield sufficient influence on rethinking the format of institutions that represent and carry public sectors. EPG approach targets just that - reforming official institutions along the mentioned principled of participation, practicality and deliberation. „This formal route potentially harnesses the power and resources of the state to deliberation and participation thus making these practices more durable and widely accessible“ (Fung and Wright, 2003a:22).

Additionally, interesting points on participation are found in the domain of arts and art history, such as work by Nina Simon on the participatory museum (2010), followed by Irit Rogoff, who wrote on participation in visual culture (2005). From the curatorial practice of visual arts, Nora Sternfeld (2012) produced significant work where she defined participation as not being simply

about joining in the game, but being also about having the possibility to question the rules of the game: the conditions under which education, the public realm and representation within institutions happen. When understood in this way, participation can indeed make a difference.

The literature review on participation in culture strongly indicates the times of development of an experimental platform for the “post-representative” cultural institution in the form of “productive anticipation”, i.e. an actualisation of the (better) future as a potential and a possibility (Rogoff and Schneider 2008). This calls for deliberation on creating institutions that will, instead of being created “on” something and “for” someone, be created, managed and governed “with” those who the institutions stand for (Simon, 2010)⁵⁴. In other words, what reads as a common ground in the work of all mentioned authors, despite their differences, is the need and belief in “challenging the representative, identity-borne and consensus-typified democracy/community in favour of a lived, diverse and also paradoxical and agonistic or dis-sensual togetherness” (Sørensen, Kortbek and Thobo, 2016:9). Participation, in that case, “must acknowledge the fragile and unpredictable, yet intense, insistent and affectively invested as opposed to the conditioned, calculated and thereby ultimately indifferent” (Rogoff, 2012 in Sørensen, Kortbek and Thobo, 2016:10). To be able to imagine and anticipate is vital for the emergence of a new institutional culture that, instead of reflecting what already exists, can open up new public spaces where activities can take place that has not yet been firmly defined and where the unavoidable paradoxes and the inherent uncertainty can become a dynamic driving force. However, the literature and practice on participatory governance in culture do not exclusively propose this concept as an all-encompassing solution to contemporary problems and deficits of democratically challenged cultural policy. Rather, the ‘dark side’ of participatory governance is increasingly becoming a matter of debate and caution for both academic and practitioners dealing with participatory praxis.

54 With the specific regard to the framework of a museum institution as a participatory setting, Simon developed a four-tier scaled framework of participation which is relevant for other contexts, such as the one of cultural heritage. This framework is project-configured and does not envisage the transfer of authority and/or power sharing that is galvanized by the participatory governance in the direction of achieving better more democratic cultural policy and governance. However, Simon’s work is a practicable signpost as to how to organize and get participation going in a cultural (institutions) setting.

4.4.1. The 'tyranny' of participation

The 'tyranny' of participation has been highlighted by several authors that critically point towards the lags between the promises of participatory governance as a transformative policy option and the end-effects that have been rendered as the 'failures' of participation on the ground. The pitfalls of participation have had diverse deliveries. Cook and Kothari's book *Participation: The New Tyranny?* argues that participation often fails to make the changes in power relations and politics, hence participation having a low impact on the depoliticisation processes on local development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). On-going is the scientific research project *Cultural Participation, Stories of success, histories of failure* conducted at the School of Performance and Cultural Industries at the University of Leeds. The project examines the participation myths, i.e. the success stories that are told about failed participation, and research that legitimises those failures in order to sustain the dominant narratives that 'calcify' cultural policy, wedding it to the same methods, strategies and arguments about why observable patterns of cultural participation differ and how such differences should be reduced and removed⁵⁵. The imperative of participation can be also interpreted as an instrumental approach in appropriating the innovative edge of the up-and-coming initiatives and legitimizing the decisions and the directions of policies that have already been made, or affirming the existing practices of participation that are built on the logic of big numbers and measurable effects. Jancovich has challenged the latter approach of articulating and understating participation as a way to "justify the invested funds in cultural institutions and organizations. Such an approach, emphasizes Jancovich, empowers the positions of cultural elites and limited processes of cultural policy innovations, thus creating a greater crisis of legitimacy and democratic deficits in cultural policy" (Jancovich, 2017 in Vidović and Žuvela, 2018:31). In the register of democratically charging practices of participation, the criticisms are made in the line of the lack of "the importance of understanding the ways in which participation relates to existing power structures and political systems as a basis of moving forwards" (Hickey and Mohan, 2004 in Gaynor, 2013:3). Gaynor underlines the importance of participatory governance initiatives focusing on themselves in the sense of who participates, how and to what end whilst quoting

⁵⁵ Information obtained online at <https://ahc.leeds.ac.uk/performance/dir-record/research-projects/1274/cultural-participation-stories-of-success-histories-of-failure> (23.12.2019).

Chambers' seminal questions "whose reality counts?" (Chambers, 1997 in Gaynor, 2013:3) in sense of the imperative to rethink all given assumptions about knowledge, capacity and formal institutions contained in the public sphere in which participatory governance is applied in. In the context of development, Gaynor's observations sustain Cook and Kothari's criticism of participation as "the tyranny of developmental processes...with colonial and instrumental character, which relates to the manipulation of a neoliberal agenda implementation by supranational organizations, under the umbrella of constructed participation, and to the coercion of local communities, mainly in developing countries" (Cook and Kothari, 2001 in Vidović and Žuvela, 2018:27).

The approaches, policies and practices for participatory governance in culture will be examined in the Croatian example in the empirical part of the thesis according to the methodological framework that is presented in the ensuing chapter.

METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter brings a detailed overview of the methodology that was chosen as the most fitting for attaining the aims of the research into decentralisation of cultural policy and participatory governance in culture in the Croatian example. Positioned in the middle section of the thesis, the methodological chapter is understood as a conduit that provides structural binding of the theoretical and conceptual references with the empirical aims, or rather it provides the academically grounded guidelines towards reaching the research objectives and aims. Accordingly, the chapter explains the methodological approaches, procedures, process and protocols that were undertaken and were continuously reflected and assessed for their aptness in relation to the topic of the thesis and its interdisciplinarity.

5.1. The research perspective

The research into the topic of decentralisation of cultural policy and participatory governance in culture Croatia has been driven by many factors and influences. The first one is the chronically misbalanced issue of representation and unequitable inclusion in the decision-making processes, as well as in the entire cultural policy cycle. In the sense of typologies of cultural policies and systems, this issue classifies the dominant model of decision making as well as the relation between the state and culture. The second one is the level of resilience by policy frameworks, which implies slow and inconsistent processes of change, especially in the perspective of the changes that are instigated from the bottom up. The third factor is correlated to the first and second ones as it involves the assessment of the level of decentralisation and levels and modes of authority devolution in the cultural governance in the Croatian context.

Although we find the substantial trajectory of cultural policy research in Croatia, the developments in national cultural policy have not been always analysed from a perspective which takes

into account social relations and practices that put the policy into action. Regarding the tradition of policy formation in Croatia, which is subjected to short-term swaps in the position of political power, cultural policy research is conducted in the circumstance of profound anxiety about present and uncertainties about the future. Accordingly, it responds to immediate, *ad-hoc* occurrences in the interim space between cultural sector realities and policy-making in culture. As a result, cultural policy research in Croatia is robust in volume, yet systematically inconsistent in historical and theoretical continuity. Furthermore, in the cultural policy research in Croatia, as it has been written in the first chapter of this thesis, there are gaps in the periodical research of the cultural policy progressions or regressions, which hinder the possibility to have a systematically documented, illustrated and analysed the trajectory of cultural policy development over longer periods. Specifically, the register of the decentralisation, more so in the sense of power devolution, and the efforts to further democratize and modernize cultural policy through the instigation of participatory designs of governance in culture have been sporadically and fragmentally addressed by the research. Insofar, cultural policy-making, the inputs and outputs of the cultural sector and cultural policy research exist in separate areas that randomly interconnect. For this reason, the pivotal motive behind the research topic of this thesis lies in the fact that research concurrently follows the introduction of decentralized, participative methods of governance that is exemplified through the analysis of emerging or standing institutional and organisational formats in culture based on the decentralised and participatory structure and which require policy legitimation and change. These examples are illustrated as a croquis of emerging practices, as in-the-making cases of participatory governance which are seen as Croatian circumstances for their further development.

As per spatial and temporal frame of reference, the research is situated in Croatia in a temporal period that encompasses the time from 2000 up to 2017. To provide the research with the contextual depth, the situational analysis takes into consideration the systemic legacies from the pre2000s stretching into pre1990s socialist period as well as cycles in socio-political changes that define the time of Homeland war followed by transition and post-transition stage, as well as the period before and after of accession to the European Union. This complex historiographic trajectory is a sufficient research theme in itself, hence the separate stages will not be analysed in-depth as much

as explicated as a socio-political backdrop for investigation of development in the domain of specific sub-fields of cultural policy

5.2. The position of the researcher

It could seem like a vain endeavour to place the part of the methodology chapter on the position of researcher before the explanation of the research design and research process, but in the case of the research that forms the substance of this thesis, the clarification, or the narration on the position of the researchers imposes itself as rather important. Namely, the proposed research strategy implies that the researcher has embarked in the research process with a certain degree of knowledge and familiarity with the topic, as well as access to documentation sources and main actors in the cultural policy change processes in Croatia. The researcher has extensive experience in working with the cultural sector, both from the position of working within the sector (public administrations, public institutions, arts organisations etc.) and working “around and about” the sector (scientific and applied research work). The researcher has been involved in the research on the topics of this thesis through the engagement in several research projects. Most notable one for this thesis is research project “Approaches to Participatory Governance of Cultural Institutions” that was conducted by Kultura nova Foundation with the support by UNESCO’s International Fund for Cultural Diversity⁵⁶ and in which the author of this thesis held the role of the principal researcher. Additionally, the researcher has been engaged in the numerous policy projects that seek the research-based background such as the local and national strategic documents in culture (*Analysis of the Cultural Policy provision in the Republic of Croatia*⁵⁷; *The Strategy of Cultural Development of the City of Dubrovnik 2015 – 2025*⁵⁸; *The Management Plan for the Heritage Complex of Lazareti 2015 - 2020*⁵⁹, etc.), as well as research that pertains to the specific area of

56 More information about the project is available online at <http://participatory-governance-in-culture.net/> (23.10.2018).

57 The document is still in the progress of editing work and is due to be published in the coming year of 2020.

58 The document is accessible online at <https://www.dubrovnik.hr/vijesti/strategija-razvoja-kulture-8027> (04.11.2019).

59 The document is accessible online <http://www.dubrovnik.hr/gradsko-vijece/2016/11/plan-upravljanja-spomenickim-kompleksom-lazaret-2016-2020.pdf> (04.11.2019).

cultural work, projects and organisations, namely projects that are organised within the remit of the European Social Fund programme for Croatia titled “Culture in the Centre – the support for the development of public-civil partnerships in culture”, which has the aim to facilitate and promote the principles of participatory governance in the field of culture through strengthening the cooperation between civil society organisation and public administrations⁶⁰. The researcher has been involved, so far, in the development of the various forms of attempts for the establishment of participatory governance in culture in several Croatian cities and municipalities: Dubrovnik, Krapina, Svetvinčenat, Rijeka, Zadar, Zagreb, and has also been involved in the tracking and studying similar examples and practices abroad (Madrid, Naples, Bern, Brussels, Amsterdam, Skopje, Zürich, etc.). These layers of professional experience bring invaluable research insights into the topic, especially considering that some the research results in the empirical part of this thesis are transferred or adopted from the research project that the researcher has engaged in in the previous periods, most notably the research project “Approaches to Participatory Governance of Cultural Institutions”. It is important to note that the researcher’s involvement in the topic of this thesis is on-going in the sphere of researcher’s work but also in the sphere is researcher’s private life and involvement in some of the participatory governance in cultural practices in a capacity of an active citizen and cultural audience, which tends to shift a position of researcher from the neutral investigatory line towards creating empirically grounded arguments used for advocating necessary changes in the cultural policy structure, governance and formation. The personal and professional emersion and familiarity with the context and the concept of the research add to the complexity of the researcher’s position and can cause an issue in the objectivity of the research given that the view into the problematics of the research topic is as much as internal as it is external. The reference to this issue has been found in the doctoral thesis by a British scholar Sophie Hope who wrote on her position of a researcher as “both a participant in the research and the researcher, drawing together the strands and reflecting on the meanings produced through the practice” (Hope, 2011:61). To this end, Hope uses a quote by Denzin and Lincon:

60 More information on the European Social Fund programme will be provided in the empirical part of the thesis.

“Gergen and Gergen foresee a future where research becomes more relational, where working the hyphen becomes easier, and more difficult, for researchers are always both sides of the hyphen...” (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:1021 in Hope, 2011:62).

Accordingly, in Hope’s words, “as a heterogeneous, dialectic concoction, the research moves from the representation of experience towards inhabiting and practising new ways of articulating the inherent power-relations and that support and surround the researcher” (Hope, 2011:62). Some numerous other sources and references could complement this original reference of Hope’s view on the research’s positions in an interdisciplinary field and in a multifaceted role, rationale and aspirations of the researcher that could be cited here, such as Denzin & Lincoln’s assessment of the role of the researcher as a human instrument in the mediation of data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003), or Greenbank’s observation that the qualitative researcher must describe a relevant aspect of self, including any biases and/or assumptions, any expectations, and experience to qualify his/her ability and capacity to conduct the research (Greenbank, 2003). The complex role of the researcher in the case of this thesis indicates the approach to the research that unmistakably sways into the arena of, on the general level, qualitative study and interpretivist approach.

5.3. Methodological approach: qualitative method and interpretivism

This research in this thesis is an *a priori* a *qualitative study*. The methodology used for this thesis involves typical approaches for researching cultural policy phenomena, insofar that analysis builds on methodological pluralism, scrounging on a wide range of disciplines and readings of both theory and practice. Theoretically and methodologically, this thesis is built around converging approaches from various academic disciplines, most predominant being sociology and political sciences, though there are strong and distinctive influences from the field of cultural studies. Accordingly, the methodology relies on a multimethod research approach. Hope explains multimethod research as one which “attempts to combine methods that are often cast as being odds with each other” refusing “the academic compulsion towards disciplinary coherence” (Holliday, 2000:517 in Hope, 2011:62). The multimethod, multifaceted methodological tactic is a response

to the rationale of the research, a logical consequence of the ontological shape of this thesis that is determined by the focus on the interpretation and (de)construction of the cultural policy texts and discourses, more so than with the emphasis or ambition of building a volume of generalised empirical facts or evidence. Insofar, as it has already been emphasised, the methodological approach in this thesis turns from the positivist orientation and scientific objectivity that is value-free towards the qualitative approach that aims to unravel the view and understanding of “culture, society and behaviour” (Parsons, 1995:71) through the analysis of cultural policy, its discourses and evolutions, encompassing progressions and regressive stages and tendencies. In doing so, the insight stretches into considerations on how cultural policy discourses “came to take the form they ultimately did” as they could always take a different turn (Hogan and Doyle, 2009:3). In that sense, it could be asserted that the proposed research takes a decisive turn towards *an interpretivist approach* and can be seen as systematic, longitudinal (Blaikie, 2009), or sequential (Yin, 2007; Thomas, 2011), but not rigidly straightforward. Analogously, the research approach implies a “thick” or rich description and analysis attained through the interpretivist method that is “concerned with notions of reality or truths as socially (and never neutrally) constructed through language and shared meanings” (Seale, 2004:75). The research, thus, strives to foster and promote an “insight, understanding or dialogue” around and concerning cultural policy (Seale, 2004:72), as well as its dynamics in the democratic modes of power devolution, specifically articulated through the decentralisation of the cultural system and the introduction of participatory governance in culture.

In other words, though the research will be conducted for a large part through the analysis of the cultural policy texts, it is oriented towards realities, situations, actors and elements that have shaped cultural policy changes in Croatia and that remain under-researched. Moreover, the topic of the research is a “live” one, in a sense that the processes that are being researched are still underway, and the researcher, as it has been already stated, is still involved in those processes in several capacities. Insofar, the research is focused on those examples of cultural policy developments that are the result of policy change provoked by bottom-up needs but also top-down recommendations (in sense of supranational agencies and bodies) for the democratic and sustainable development of cultural policies.

5.4. Research aims and questions

Focused on deciphering and understanding the cultural policy discourse, as well as the actions and positions of those involved in that discourse, the research in this thesis has an overall purpose to provide understanding and knowledge about processes of cultural policymaking in the register of decentralised and participatory models of cultural governance in Croatia. It has the aim to study the framework of cultural policy in Croatia, its proclivity towards change in the register of power devolution and to examine the changes in processes of decentralisation and representation of participatory governance in the domain of cultural policy. To that end, the thesis has several sub-aims, which involve:

- a) analysis of the cultural policy framework with the emphasis on the reasons behind the need and changes for decentralised cultural policy and participatory governance in culture in Croatia;
- b) detection of the actors or stakeholders who have access or have been included in the cultural policy devolution process;
- c) investigation of the role of those actors through normative frameworks of cultural policy decentralisations and devolution in participatory modes of governance; and
- d) exploration to what extent has cultural policy been decentralised towards more democratic, participatory and open governance in culture in the form of examples of new and emerging participatory governance frameworks in Croatia.

Throughout the analysis, the research attempts to follow and interpret the transformations in the cultural policy narrative that is defined by different socio-political traditions and situations. This encompasses several stages of cultural policy. The first one relates to the socialist period (pre-1990s period); the second to the ‘acute’ transition phase (1990s period); the third to the ‘newly introduced democratic’ stage (2000s period); and the final one to the dichotomous stage of the financial crisis and European accession (post-2008 period). Not all stages are equally substantial and the boundaries between them are not necessarily clear and definite.

Current cultural governance provisions in Croatia remain consistent with the historical trajectory of culture being of public value; hence, research for this dissertation explores reformative potentials of public governance in culture that is constructed on two levels. The first includes new approaches in the formulation, implementation and change in cultural policy that is influenced by the interaction between the state, the civil society and decentralization, while the other implies development in the institutional frameworks and organizational structures that lead to expanded inclusion and participation of diverse actors. According to this, a disclaimer is due to be underlined in the sense of the scope of cultural policy that is to be researched. The presented research will only involve the public part of the cultural sector with the focus on the public interests, effects and outcomes in culture. This implies clarification of several levels of inquiry. Firstly, the research will cover those areas of cultural work and production that are not profit-driven, as well as actors in the cultural sector, fields and policy that belong to the non-profit, public and civil society categories.

Research has not been guided by established hypotheses, but by a set of research questions that are derived from the theoretical framework and literature sources presented in the previous chapters of this thesis. In addition, questions have been influenced by the researcher's experience and a long period of engaged observation and analysis of cultural policy developments. The key questions directly reflect some of the theoretical concepts that were presented in literature review chapters, such as Katunarić's reconceptualization of the meaning and purpose of the decentralization process in culture, as well as Fischer's and Sørensen, Kortbek and Thobo's constructs on participatory governance that propose deepened democratic qualities in cultural policy. According to both literature and the researcher's experience, the research questions stem from pattern recognition in Croatian cultural policy, by which we try to make sense of some basic "rules" that define the tendencies in decentralizing aspects and evolving models in participatory governance in culture. On a broader level, the proposed research questions relate to the process of modernization as we track in in the evolution of cultural policy through two specific registers, that of decentralisation of cultural policy and the development of the participatory governance in culture. These two registers, which are explicitly featured in the thesis title, are not only detected as a (chronically) problematic issue in the developmental path of Croatian cultural policy but conveniently bear the conceptual and theoretical capacity to provide a cursory reflection on the state of cultural policy's

modernization in the specific context. By doing so, the research into decentralisation of cultural policy and the evolution of the participatory governance in culture carries can be potentially used in the future research of cultural policy modernization processes.

Research questions that follow research purpose and aims, which include the analysis of origins and causes of cultural policy changes in Croatia from 2000 up to 2017, focusing on the processes of policy changes in the specific rubric of decentralized and participatory models of cultural governance, are the following:

1. How is Croatian cultural policy structured; what are its main traits, legacies and trends?
2. How decentralised is Croatian cultural policy? How is decision-making authority in Croatian cultural policy shared among different actors? Who are those actors, and what is their role?
3. What are the tendencies of decentralized devolution of power in the cultural policy decision-making in Croatia?
4. What are the initiatives and examples of decentralised cultural policy and participatory cultural governance in Croatia, who is leading them, how, where and why?
5. Why are decentralisation and new models of participatory necessary in the context of Croatian cultural policy?
6. How do the existing and emerging examples of participatory cultural governance influence changes in cultural policy on local and national levels?


These six questions correspond to the overall research interest and are compatible with the proposed research methodology.

5.5. The research purpose

The questions are predominantly articulated with “what”, “how” and “why” which indicates the research purpose as being *descriptive* and *explorative* (Blaikie, 2009). Still, the issue of research purpose can be interpreted from different, borderline contesting, theoretical perspectives. Namely, in sense of research purpose, according to Thomas (2011) and Yin (2007), it can also be asserted that the research is instrumental, explanatory in purpose, illustrative/descriptive in approach, and interpretative in orientation. The instrumental purpose entails that the research is conducted with a particular purpose, rather than a sheer interest. Specifically, the topic of cultural policy change and new paradigms of cultural governance based on principles of participation is not (only) linked to the practices that are underway and developing, but to informing necessary changes in cultural policy that will enable forming of new institutional models that promote and sustain contemporary renderings of cultural democracy paradigm based on decentralised and participatory cultural policy designs. Illustrative/descriptive approach may depict that the research object is not theoretical - while the research is not atheoretical (in sense of lacking theoretical framework, quite the opposite) and is more configurative-idiographic, it does not seek to test specific theories and construct new ones (Eckstein, 1975; Levy, 2008; Thomas, 2011). The ambition of the inductive path of research is to provide knowledge on the topic of the research as an end in itself “rather than as a vehicle for developing broader theoretical generalisations” (Levy, 2008:4), although, as it has been noted in the methodological approaches, the sketching of a new theoretical horizon is not excluded from the plans of research work in the foreseeable future.

5.6. Research design: interpretative policy analysis and embedded case study

The research design divides the analysis in this thesis into two main parts; the *interpretative policy analysis* and *a case study with two embedded units*.



Picture 2. *Research design scheme*

The first part consists of interpretative policy analysis and the analysis of the secondary data. The research in this part rests on the investigation of detecting the cultural policy texts that are determining the structure, scope and main traits of cultural policy in Croatia, and its levels of decentralisation, i.e. the levels of devolution of decision-making authority and policy provisions that are conducive for participatory governance in culture. The actual data collection in the process of policy analysis is conducted on the level of interpretation of *mute evidence*, i.e. written texts and artefacts, which is generally accepted research process of data collection in the process of policy analysis. This involves the interpretation of the secondary data, i.e. scientific and expert texts on the evolution of cultural policy in the Republic of Croatia covering materials that provide knowledge on the periods in cultural policy evolution from pre1990s up to 2017.

Reading of policy texts is in the core of policy analysis and is vital for the crafting of the interpretative approach while adding to the value of the descriptive and explorative purpose of the research. This includes locating the meaning, not in the policy texts alone, and the author's intentions, but

the ramifications in the experiences, opportunities and limitations that the text of policy documents implicate in the reality of cultural sector's functioning and perspectives of development. This includes the critical examination of policy "gap" between the policy rhetoric, problems, intentions and outcomes (Yanow, 1996). Bacchi developed a helpful research tool for such analytical process titled 'What's the Problem Represented to be?'. This approach rests on the "premise that what one proposes to do about something reveals what one thinks is problematic (needs to change). Following this thinking, policies and policy proposals contain an *implicit* representation of what is considered to be the 'problem' ('problem representations'). For example, if the Croatian cultural policy extends into bringing legislation for the founding of the foundation that will provide support for civil society organisations in contemporary arts and culture, then the implications are that there is *a lack of public support for civil society organisations in contemporary arts and culture*, i.e. lack of such support is the problem. A similar situation is, for example, with the founding of the cultural councils and the involvement of the civil society actors in the decision-making processes. The same goes for all the mentioned upgrades of cultural policy that happened over the designated research period. As Bacchi notes, the task of 'What's the Problem Represented to be?' ('WPR') analysis is to read policies to discern how the 'problem' is represented within them and to subject this problem representation to critical scrutiny. Bacchi's approach is consonant with Yanow's articulation of interpretative policy analysis in sense of seeking the policy purposes that include other than explicitly state intentions (Yanow, 2015). Interpretative policy analysis, therefore, shifts the analytic focus to meaning-making in its expressions and communication instead of instrumental rationality in explaining human action (Yanow, 2015). This line of analysis draws on 'communicative media' that includes "text analogues", i.e. nonverbal communication during meetings, policy evaluation and agency routines (Taylor, 1971) as an ethnographic participant-observer method, as much as it draws on the actual textual and other language-focused sources (Yanow, 2015). "Interpretation" in this account, takes certain ideas from hermeneutics – mainly its focus on meaning, on epistemic (or interpretative) communities, on the recursiveness of the hermeneutic circle and the possibility for multiple meanings/interpretations of policy-related elements – without getting caught in its historically-situated insistence on a specific, and thereby limiting, set of rules for interpreting. Joined with phenomenology's insistence on the role of live experience in shaping meaning-making/interpretation, these ideas have proved generative to the

understanding of public policies, their processes and practices, from affirmative action to whaling” (Yanow, 2015:404).

In order to cover the “policy gap” and the problem representation, interpretative policy analysis, or the interpretation of the policy texts and documents is enriched with the analysis of the policy research from specific periods in Croatian cultural policy evolution. This specifically entails reading of the scientific and expert articles, papers, journals, studies and publications that correspond thematically and temporally to the points that are being analysed. The main aim of the interpretative policy analysis is to read into policy processes, implementations and policy ideas that are put into practice. As stated by Pressman and Wildavsky, such analysis seeks to account for the failures, or mentioned gaps of public policies in doing what they were supposed to, largely out of a normative sense that those policies, in the case of this research, Croatian cultural policy should be and needed to be, successful, given its social justice aims (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973 in Yanow, 2015). Yanow sees the failures of policy “as deriving from poor policy design (either a logic of problem-solution that was erroneous or policy language that was ambiguous) or from inept bureaucrats and bureaucracies (including faulty organizational design, lack of proper motivational incentives, poor information and communication, or interfering agency politics)” (Yanow, 2015:407,408). Such analysis affirms the discourse of power embedded in cultural policy (elaborated in the third chapter of this thesis) through investigating the routinization of power dimensions of regulative and post-legislative policy implementation by rendering them visible.

The interpretative policy analysis follows the model of the policy process that emerged, based on the separation of politics and power from organizational action, as instrumental-rational: it treats the policy process as “a set of stages in a linear, assembly-line fashion marked by a top-down decision-making authority, the instrumental, goal-oriented rationalism that Shore and Wright call “authoritative instrumentalism” (Shore and Wright, 2011:4). Moreover, this thinking typically assumed that “legislative intent is (or should be) capable of being made clear and known; that language itself is capable of being made transparent (with respect to its referent) and unambiguous; and that the policy process (meaning from policy formulation through implementation) is exclusively rational and instrumental. In this view, there is no reason for governmental bodies to legis-

late policies that are incapable of being implemented, nor should they” (Yanow, 2015:408,409). The challenge to this top-down, instrumental-rational model of policy-making and implementation has been developing from the practice that these policies (attempt to) regulate, by actors that directly experience the “street-level”, i.e. grassroots socio-cultural effects and advocate for the process of policymaking to be inverted and re-conceptualized. Historically, interpretative policy analysis emerged from this type of critique that centred on the potential for multiple possible interpretations of lived social realities that shifted a significant section of interpretative policy analysis towards the discursive, dialogical turn, which, “among other things, counters the denial of agency to those on the “receiving end” of policies” (Yanow, 2016:412). This research attempts to combine these two key elements – the interpretative analysis of the policy text and “text analogues” as a way of exploring the normative framework in which specific topic gains communicative meaning, while on the other side, the research focuses on the “receiving end”, i.e. the role of actors and practice that those policies foster and/or hinder. The latter is investigated through an exploration of cases that best illustrate the efforts invested in creating decentralized cultural policy structures and participatory governance frameworks. As the most suitable design for this line of research, the case study has been chosen.

The proposed research will be conducted as a case study that corresponds to the overall methodology insofar that it is instrumental and explanatory in purpose and interpretative in approach. Both explanatory purpose and interpretative approach are the most common and classical methods of conducting case study (Thomas, 2011). The framework of the case study investigates practices of participatory governance in culture on the examples of socio-cultural centres in Croatia. The examples that illustrate the state-of-art in the tensions towards more open and democratic cultural policy provisions are selected according to the criteria of being grassroots initiatives that meet propositions of decentralisation processes and principles of participation in cultural governance and are studied for their interrelational influence to the cultural policy change and development. This is explored through two embedded case studies located in Dubrovnik (Lazareti) and Zagreb (Pogon). Accordingly, the research involves a single case study with an investigation of the lineaments of its structure and with the emphasis on understanding what is going on both currently and in retrospective. In order to encompass both examples as units of case study research,

the single-case design will include embedded or multiple units of analysis (single policy/cultural policy + multiple (two) units). The research design is elaborated, planned and conducted through the research process that follows the main aims of the thesis. Most of the case study evidence and data is collected from the desk research on the context that shapes the case study units, i.e. local surroundings, policy analysis of the specific local setting, i.e. extending the policy analysis from the previous chapter and focusing it to the distinct situation. The researcher's familiarity with the case study units and long-term first-hand involvement with the case of Lazareti implies a significant repository of information obtained through observation, which adds to the repository „field evidence“ (Yin, 2011). The observation entailed the focus on the category, i.e. the item of research that has the salience to be a part of the qualitative research process. In that line, the observation focused on the interactions between the actors that are included in the participatory governance in culture designs, as well as the „actions“ taking place that pertain to the cases in questions (Yin, 2011:145). Observing these categories gave clues for the conceptualisation of the interview process. The case study involves interviews to strengthen the validity⁶¹ of the research process and findings, but mostly to gain insight into the *how* and *why* of the participatory governance in culture initiatives and examples in Croatia and understand the role and position of the civil society actors on one side and the role and position of the local government on the other. Although interviews provide primary data in the research, the data from the interviews is not the core and only source of data. Rather, interviews are designed with a specific purpose to obtain information that will complement the policy analysis in the register of detection of gaps between the policy rhetoric and practice. For this reason, interviews structure was not strictly set but was set up as an open-end semi-structured mode (Thomas, 2011), a type that Yin calls „qualitative interviews“ in which the relationship between the researcher and the respondent is not strictly scripted and

61 Validity is highlighted by Maxwell as referring to „the correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, explanation, interpretation, or other sorts of account“ (Maxwell, 1996:87 in Yin, 2011:79) The case study in this thesis takes a multimethod approach to combine several qualitative research tools for gathering data and evidence and is designed according to the Maxwell's checklist for combating threats to validity in qualitative research. The points used for the research in this thesis are:

- *Intensive long-term (case study units) involvement* that assist production and competition of “in-depth understanding of the case study units situations, including the opportunity to make repeated observations and interviews”;
- *“Rich” data* that involves covering the case study units observation and interviews with detailed and varied data;
- *Respondent validation* that serves to obtain feedback from the organisation studied, “to lessen the misinterpretation of their self-reported behaviours and views”(Maxwell, 2009:244-245 in Yin, 2011:79).

in which „researcher does not try to adopt any uniform behaviour or demeanour for every interview. Rather, the qualitative interview follows a conversational mode, and the interview itself will lead to a social relationship of sorts, with the quality of the relationship individualized to every participant“ (Yin, 2011:134). This methodological choice is consistent with the afore elaborated researcher’s position that is defined by the (long-standing) professional and personal involvement of the researcher with the topic and social and professional associations with some of the actors, i.e. respondents that are included in the interviews list. Accordingly, the interviews’ protocol, that will be described in more detail in the ensuing text, served as a „conversational guide“ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:145, 161-164 in Yin, 2011:139) in a process that was geared towards making the respondents feel more open on possible controversial issues (Yin, 2011). Given that the participatory governance in culture and the power devolution in cultural policy and governance entail sensitive and potentially contested forms of partnerships between civil and public actors, this approach was in setting the interviews was vital.

5.7. Research process: data collection, timing, selection and analysis

The process of the research is consistent with the research design by being divided into two main parts. In the first part, decentralisation and participative governance in culture are analysed through cultural policy text and documents. Specifically, this includes the analysis of national documents on cultural development, regional and local strategies of cultural development, a selected repository of governmental, both national and sub-national, regulative acts and provisions, which involve aspects of decentralisation and power devolution in decision-making, encompassing provisions for participatory designs in cultural governance. The materials are obtained and analysed through the desk research in their printed form or through the internet sources. An emphasis is placed on the systemic stepping stones in the power devolution such as establishment or governance bodies, agencies and/or institutions, which involves an investigation on the legislation on public institutions, cultural institutions, the governance of cultural institutions, as well as legislation on the local and regional self-government, etc. The focus of the analysis is placed on the possibilities for inclusion of non-political, non-institutional actors in the decision-making processes,

on their roles and capacities, as the ramifications that this makes in the context of widening the decentralised and participatory remit of cultural policy. To this end, the pattern recognition for such practices is followed on national and selected local levels. The policy analysis, hence, tracks the policy changes and its trickle effect from the national to local levels (and vice-versa), for it is inconclusive to analyse decentralisations and cultural governance on national and/or local levels exclusively. To substantiate the Croatian paradigm and situate it on a more comprehensive scale, the research will provide a cursory policy analysis through the trajectory of trends and tendencies of the supra-national and European bodies and agencies in the domain of decentralisation of cultural policy and participatory governance in culture.

The second part of the research concentrates on the local levels specifically through the analysis of existing and emerging models of new participatory cultural governance in two different examples in Croatian cities (Dubrovnik and Zagreb). These are the embedded or nested nuts within the wider case study. The research, in the second part draws on the data selection, collection and analysis obtained from the research project “Approaches to participatory governance of cultural institutions” that has been aforementioned. The locations have been specifically selected for the differences that they demonstrate in the context, as well as in the actual practices of examples in order to gain the focus on *why* and *how* of the processes of participatory governance in culture and decentralised decision-making in cultural policy and governance. The examples are, as subunits of inquiry, *key cases*, i.e. good examples of participatory governance in culture practices (Dubrovnik and Zagreb), as well *local knowledge cases*, i.e., the researcher has a familiarity with them (Dubrovnik and Zagreb) (Thomas, 2011). Namely, the example in Dubrovnik involves the first initiative of civil society organisations in Croatia that gained a long-term contract from the local authority (for the period from 2000 to 2025) for the use of UNESCO protected heritage site of Lazareti for purposes of socio-cultural centre. Since 2000, the civil society actors have been investing efforts to ‘legalize’ the participatory governance design in sense of establishing a participatory governance structure for Lazareti. In Zagreb, we find the first-ever institution in Croatia and the surrounding region that is based on civil-public partnerships between an alliance of civil society organisations in Zagreb and the City of Zagreb. Both cases meet the criteria set in the design of the research insofar that both cases are grassroots initiatives that meet the propositions of

decentralisation processes and principles of participation in cultural governance. Still, the cases have a significant span of differential factors – from the context and original concepts to the time and spatial positioning, which adds to the richness of the analysis. The process of collecting information and evidence places an emphasis on understanding what is going on both currently and in a retrospective in both examples and includes several qualitative methodological tools specific for case study inquiry.

The process of the research for the case study, i.e. for its embedded subunits of inquiry was set and conducted through the project “Approaches to participatory governance of cultural institutions”. The process of data collection in this project encompassed several qualitative methods of data collection and analysis such as:

- a) creating the *city profile*, i.e. analysis of the context, in which every location was explored through several categories in order to detect and obtain data on the specificities of the local social, economic, political and cultural situation. City profiles were construed through a desk research investigation of the relevant policy documents, observations and drawing information from the official statistics, media sources, etc.;
- b) conducting desk research of the policy frameworks relevant and determining for the situations and development of the local case. This includes analysis of the secondary data, media coverages on the two cases, articles, papers, research studies and reports, as well as graduate and postgraduate (doctoral) theses that involve the topic of cultural policy upgrades in the sphere of democratisation and modernisation led by the civil society actors, documents from the internal archives from the case of Lazareti and Pogon;
- c) open-end semi-structured interviews were conducted with the representatives of the socio-cultural centres in Dubrovnik and Zagreb (i.e. persons that run civil society organisation(s) that use the space of the socio-cultural centre on the mid do long-term basis and have continuity in the production of artistic, cultural and/or social content in that space), and;
- d) open-end semi-structured interviews with the representatives of the local authorities (i.e. representatives of the city administration);

e) making and noting direct field observations and collecting accounts from respondents, i.e. representatives of the organisations and institutions featured in the case study.

The research in both case studies was conducted in the period in several periods throughout the year of 2017 and the results were published in the publication *Do it Together. Practices and Tendencies of Participatory Governance in Culture in the Republic of Croatia* (Vidović, 2018). Effectively, the two chapters on Dubrovnik and Zagreb presented in that publication are featured as case studies in this thesis (Žuvela, 2018a; 2018b).

The list of categories that were investigated for the city profiles, along with the questions used for the open-end semi-structured interviews for both points c) and d) are included in the appendices part of this thesis along with the structure of the case-study for each subunit of the inquiry. The main aim of creating a city profile was to obtain the necessary data on the context of the case, i.e. the socio-political, economic and cultural setting. The analysis of the context was furthermore focused on the documents and materials about the actual case. The materials for the desk research into both cases were obtained through the contact and communication with the representatives of the embedded cases. In the case of Lazareti, Art Workshop Lazareti kindly enabled the researcher with access to their archives that have been systemically organised to document the thirty year-long existence and work of this organisation that has spearheaded the initiative for the socio-cultural centre in Lazareti. The archives of Pogon were accessed online through their website and the communication with the representatives from the Alliance Operation City.

Interviews covered two main groups of respondents of interest – those that are at the source of the policy rhetoric and practices, and the other that are the ‘receiving end’. The interviews thus involved civil society actors, i.e. representatives of the formal (Pogon) or informal (Lazareti) socio-cultural centre and representatives of the local government, i.e. local public authority. In the case of socio-cultural centres, the category of “civil society actors” implied representatives of the civil society organisations that hold the organisational commitment in the governing and/or programming scheme of the socio-cultural centre. So, the representatives of the particular civil-society organisations were not interviewed for the information about their organisations, but about

their position, role, views, assessments, projections etc. on the participatory governance in culture in the case of the socio-cultural centre that their organisations are a part of. The representatives of the local government involved the executive level of the city authorities that are in direct charge of the policy formations and implications in the remit of cultural policy and other policies that influence the development of the participatory governance in culture in the examples of the socio-cultural centres.

In Dubrovnik, three interviews were conducted with the representatives of the socio-cultural centre (Lazareti), i.e. with the persons representing the civil society organisations that are committed and involved in the still informal socio-cultural centre in Lazareti and three interviews with the representatives of the local authority (City of Dubrovnik). Each interview for both groups of interviewees lasted from one to two hours. Originally, the planned time for the interview was an hour, but due to the open end semi-structured formate of the interview, the planned time was exceeded, especially with the representatives of the socio-cultural centres.

In Zagreb, four interviews were conducted with the representatives of the local socio-cultural centre (Pogon) and three interviews with the representatives of the local authority (City of Zagreb). Same protocol as in Dubrovnik was applied in Zagreb in sense of contacting the interviewees and sending them information about the research project beforehand, in order for them to prepare, which was required by the representatives of the local authority. Interviews in Zagreb were recorded and were transcribed by the researcher. All recorded and transcribed materials were returned to the Foundation Kultura nova, i.e. the public body that was carrying out the entire research project within which the case studies of Dubrovnik and Zagreb were conducted by the author of this thesis and singlehandedly processed and written out in the form that they are presented in this thesis.

The analysis of the data obtained through the research was done by converging of data sourced from the policy analysis, with the data from the analysis of the secondary data in the case study and the data sourced from the interviews in the case studies. Yin recommends convergence of data as an often-overlooked approach that is enabled by the fluidity of the data collection process

(Yin, 2011). The role of convergence or triangulation⁶² of data “carries great importance in doing qualitative research” as it may be “thought of as a frame of mind rather than as a methodological technique”, i.e. something that helps the researcher to keep the “eyes and ears open for corroborating or conflicting ideas or data” (Yin, 2011:153). The data analysis was, thus, implemented as a dynamic process weaving together recognition of research themes, interrelating repeated patterns of meanings in a thematic analysis⁶³ (Braun and Clarke, 2006). However, this was not analysed through the pre-set coding or frequency, but the sheer instance that the collected information, either through the policy analysis, context analysis or narratives obtained through the interviews, accounts and observations, involve important significance for obtaining answers to the research questions. Themes that captured important significance for the data in relation to the research questions followed the main interest of the thesis, i.e. decentralisation, participatory governance in culture, devolution of power/authority and the role and position of the non-institutional actors in those constellations of cultural policy. In the process of data analysis, attention was given to the themes “emerging” from the data that can provide additional quality to research findings but can also propose a new direction for the continuance of the research beyond the scope of this thesis.

5.8. Ethical considerations of the research process

As it has been written in the previous text of this chapter, the research relies on the interpretative policy analysis and embedded case study, which are both categories compliant with the qualitative methodology. Policy analysis involves reading, analysis and interpretation of the policy texts, encompassing a whole myriad of text typology – from legislation to written records of one-off decisions made by a certain level or an individual of authority. By default, all of these texts are public documents and should be freely accessible to anyone, researchers included. Any disruption in the accessibility to the public text is resolved with the activation of the *Right of access to*

62 Yin defines triangulation as „an analytic technique, used during fieldwork as well as later during formal analysis, to corroborate a finding with evidence from two or more difference sources“ (Yin, 2011:313).

63 Braun and Clarke define thematic analysis as a “method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes your data set in (rich) detail. However, it also often goes further than this, and interprets various aspects of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998) (Braun and Clarke, 2006:81).

information, which is a fundamental human right protected by numerous international convention, the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (in the Article 38) and the Law on the right of access to information (OG 85/15). Hence, the ethical aspect of the policy analysis is granted by the legislation in the sense of access to the policy texts, while the researcher took utmost care not to utilize the policy text for interpretation that would, even in the minute form, contain a negative, derogative and hateful approach to interpretation. Additionally, any policy analysis, being devised for scientific or for applied purposes, contains the capacity to influence directly or indirectly, prospective decision-making processes and advocacy processes for policy change. Insofar, policy analysis must be conducted with trustworthy integrity while the researcher must maintain the critical distance from the political debate and sustain from reinforcing prevailing views in the policy conversations and academic investigations (Mintrom, 2010). To this end, the researcher followed five ethical principles set by Thomas G. Plante (2004) encompassing integrity, competence, responsibility, respect and concern.

A smaller part of the research process refers to conducting interviews with the two separate groups of actors that are pertinent for the topic of the study and that have been explained by profile in the preceding text. For the process of conducting the interviews, careful consideration was given to the ethical component of this part of the research process. First, a list of respondents was made for each case according to the knowledge and data obtained before the research segment of interviews. Considerable time and effort were invested into devising questions that would fit both case studies for which the previously obtained knowledge indicated to have substantial differences in the points of origin, modes of operation and governing structures, among other. Each respondent received information about the research topic and purpose with the questions that were sent to them beforehand, which allowed them time to prepare for the interview. Each interview was conducted conversationally with one respondent at the time and before each interview and the matter of confidentiality was addressed right at the outset of the interview. The matter of confidentiality was dismissed by a number of representatives of the public authority with the explanation that their position is of public service and that the topic of the interview was of public interest, hence that they waive the right of anonymity. Regardless of this stance, their contribution has been included in the research findings has been noted in the same manner of confidentiality as for

the other respondents that were not representatives of the public authority. The identities of the respondents were thus entirely confidential and their answers and contributions in the interviews have been noted in the codes as stated in the following table:

Table 2. *The list of the research respondents and their codes*

CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONDENTS	PUBLIC AUTHORITY RESPONDENTS
Lazareti (Art Workshop Lazareti): A1	The City of Dubrovnik, Mayor's Office: D1
Lazareti (Deša): A2	The City of Dubrovnik, Department of Culture and Heritage: D2 and D3
Lazareti (Luža): A3	The City of Zagreb, Department of Culture: R1 and R2
Pogon: C1 and C2	The City of Zagreb, The City Assembly: R3
Pogon (Alliance Operation City): C3 and C4	

The author of this thesis was in the team of four researchers (Davor Mišković, Mirko Petrić, Leda Sutlović and Ana Žuvela) that were commissioned for the purposes of conducting the research for Foundation Kultura nova. The utmost vigilance was taken in the writing of this thesis not to overstep the ethical considerations of authorship, hence the only part of that research that was used for this thesis is the one that involves sole authorship of the author of this thesis, and this involves two case studies, that of Dubrovnik and Zagreb. The rest of the research results from the “Approaches to participatory governance of cultural institutions” project are duly cited and referenced as the rest of the literature sourced in this thesis. The official confirmation letter from Foundation Kultura nova is in the appendices of this thesis attesting that the researcher of this thesis was the author of the Dubrovnik and Zagreb case studies and that Foundation Kultura nova, as the owner of the research materials, gives permission for the case studies to be presented and included in the doctoral thesis of the researcher.

5.9. Research problems and limitations

The topic of the research is not widely spread in as a phenomenon in cultural policy research of cultural policy practice. For this reason, it poses itself as an extraordinary challenge in sense but

also becomes demanding in sense of modest literature resources on the topic (decentralisation of cultural policy, participatory governance in culture), leaving the researcher to lead the exploration through diverse academic terrains and sub-fields of cultural policy. Further research limitations are the limited accessibility to the number of needed information as well as policy documents. Statistical impoverishment of cultural sector in Croatia is a problem that surpasses this research and is a matter of a wider debate on cultural (policy) research, development of evidence-based policy and evaluation of existing cultural policy, its sub-fields and separate elements of the cultural and arts sector.

This research involves a lot of discussion and conversation with local actors in culture, starting with local community and representatives of the cultural sector down to administration officials and individuals that withhold the power of political decision-making (or are a member of the political elite with decision-making authority). Negotiating conversation time and topics with some of those groups can be challenging and difficult for keeping research plan and timetable in line. Yet, on an overall level and so far, the research has not been burdened with obstacles in the process that have proven to be unsolvable.

EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

6. RESEARCH FINDINGS: POLICY ANALYSIS

Following the research design presented in the previous methodological chapter, the empirical framework of this thesis is divided into two chapters. The first one brings a policy analysis of the Croatian cultural policy divided into several parts that follow the main cultural policy segments presented in the theoretical part of the thesis in sequential order and temporal lines. Hence, the first chapter comprises six parts that bring the investigation of the cultural policy in Croatia, from its phases relating to the socialist period (pre-1990s period); to the ‘acute’ transition phase (1990s period), over to the ‘newly introduced democratic’ stage (2000s period) encompassing European accession (post-2008 period). The first parts that do not pertain to the period that is in the core research interest of this thesis are illustrative, i.e. they do not engage in proper policy analysis of the time involved (pre-1990s and 1990s, up to 2000s) in sense of the analysis of the cultural policy documents and legislation. Rather, the analysis in those parts builds on policy documents such as cultural policy reports for supra-national bodies (UNESCO and Council of Europe), as well as research work done by cultural policy scholars on the cultural policy development in those periods. The inquiry into times that preceded research period enables the identification of the cultural policy legacies in the register of decentralisation and participatory governance in culture.

The analysis in these first parts situates the dissertation in the context that temporally and conceptually refers to stages and paradigms in cultural policy evolution with clear resonances of modernisation processes along the way. Moreover, the analysis of the said periods gives an overview of a wider cultural policy community history and discourses. The inevitability of this contextual location is needed as the analysis in the empirical framework refers to the historical legacy in cultural policy formation, but does not investigate it thoroughly. Accordingly, cultural policy phases, or stages, are not equally addressed in the analytical sense, and the boundaries between them are not necessarily clear and definite. The policy analysis then concentrates on the parts of investigation of cultural governance in Croatia, encompassing the analysis of decentralisation of cultural policy and the participatory governance in culture. Decentralisation as a policy action and

system of power dispersion in sense of territorial transfer of authority and devolution of authority in decision-making processes is consistently pursued throughout the analysis in the first section – from the very first stages of Croatian cultural policy in the pre1990s period to the research period up to 2017. This analysis is further supplemented with an investigation of the supra-national policy documents that have, or could have an effect and influence on the development on the Croatian trends and tendencies in decentralisation and participatory governance in culture. The second section of the empirical framework features two case studies, Dubrovnik and Zagreb, that demonstrate the state-of-art in practices of participatory governance in culture in Croatia, thus illustrating and indicating towards the main components of cultural policy developments in the remit of power devolution.

6.1. Part one: the pre1990s era - cultural policy in the Yugoslav period

Until 1991⁶⁴, Croatia was one of the six republics constituting the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As stated in the *Cultural Policy in Croatia. National Report*, along with Slovenia, it was “economically the most highly developed republic of former Yugoslavia” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:3). Due to having spent most of the historical time in the sphere of the Western civilisations, Croatia has always had an affinity to be perceived as a western country. In deliberating the provisions of cultural policy in the pre1990s Croatia, the attention must be drawn to the aspect of difference in the sheer size of Croatian republic as part of former Yugoslavia and the amount of constituency in a number of people as well as representation of diverse cultures. Yugoslavia was a country with a population of over 22 million and with a great variety of cultures, languages and ethnic characteristics, complemented by a wide array of religious denominations (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish, Protestant). For its rich diversity, Yugoslavia was regularly named “Europe in miniature” (Majstorović, 1980). Composed out of six republics and two autonomous provinces, Yugoslavia had a decentralisation system that reflected the multinational composition of the country and provision of self-management socialism. *UNESCO Report*

64 Croatia declared its independence from former Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 25th June 1991.

on *Cultural policy in Yugoslavia* notes that cultural pluralism was the central determinant of cultural policy. Yugoslav cultural pluralism did not serve the purpose only as the declarative co-existence of different cultures, or the cultural pluralistic *décor* for Yugoslav statehood. Rather, multinationalism and multiculturalism were the constitutive elements of the federal state. Still, despite the “brotherhood and unity” principle that served as a backbone for maintaining and nourishing pluralism, obvious discrepancies between the development of individual nations and nationalities were manifested in the field of culture.

The cultural practices emerging from separate national cultural contexts, interacting and permeating one another, formed so-called Yugoslav culture and cultural policy in Yugoslavia. Cultural policy at that time can be divided into the three main stages: “1.) centralized and state controlled; 2) transitory (beginning of decentralization and self-management), and; 3). self-management stage” (Gjanković, 1981; Leko, 1987; Prnjat, 1979; Ivanišević, 1987 in Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:21). The first stage of post-1945 cultural policy in Yugoslavia was constructed as an antonym to the pre-Second World War cultural momentums in which national culture was, following the example of the European bourgeois, divided into classes, i.e. rich bourgeois, poor peasantry and workers (Majstorović, 1980). This period can be identified as an idealistic stage or cultural excellence paradigm cultural policy with a prevalence of high culture criteria (Katuarnić, 1997; 2007; Bonet and Negrier, 2018). Such cultural policy was confined almost exclusively to larger and more important ‘national cultural institutions’, which were under the authority of Ministry of Education while their staff withheld the status of civil servants (Majstorović, 1980). Citizens’ organisations of that time “supported the development of the bourgeois culture which was identified with the social experience, way of thinking, prestige and system of values of the bourgeois class. Cultural events and activities organized by them, which predominated at that time, were funded through voluntary contributions to various cultural societies, or on a market basis” (Majstorović, 1980:20). In the *UNESCO Report on Cultural policy in Yugoslavia* from 1980, the chain of decision making is explained critically as being made of “anonymous and amorphous bodies hidden beneath the general authority of the state” with no responsibility to the public for the policies they formulate. (Majstorović, 1980:20). Decision-making bodies were accountable to the single political organisation and not to the public, which confined cultural policy rationales within the con-

straints of the prescribed ideological, political and aesthetic boundaries, as Majstorović observes, even at the cost of cultural mediocrity (Majstorović, 1980). Such cultural policy was detached from the public control and exposed to the influence of the closed forum of administrative and political control, with no clear criteria in setting the priorities in the development plans in culture. The rule of socialism was in many respects phantom of widely accessible and formidable system, yet the decision-making processes caused most of the cultural sector to have to comply with the political prerogatives. This was explained as giving in to the “spirit of mediocrity and conformism” pervading “creative effort replacing the creative risk and moral challenge that should be put to society in order to improve the quality of life” (Majstorović, 1980:27).

The phenomenon of institutionalism or the unequal treatment of the actors in the cultural sector was ever-present in Yugoslav cultural policy, but most notably so in the first stages of cultural policy development. This phenomenon entailed understanding culture only in the “budget-administrative logic which failed to see in culture the *raison d’être* of life as a whole and the means of humanizing relations between people and looks at it only as embodied in cultural institutions” (Majstorović, 1980:27). Cultural institutions were favoured and prioritized in financing schemes, while the rest of the sector suffered from fluctuations in the financing from the public budget. New initiatives and more progressive protagonists of the cultural scene had a more difficult path into the cultural field in sense of obtaining necessary funds, cultural valorisation and social recognition.

The second stage of Yugoslav cultural policy, i.e. post-1945 period was marked with the expansion of the education system as an all-pervasive element of Enlightenment “by means of compulsory primary education”, encompassing the main objective of the “achievement of general literacy” (Prnjat, 1979 in Katunarić, 1997:10), as well as deconstruction of the bourgeois notion and domination of the cultural domain (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999). Large cultural institutions remained a focal policy of the cultural policy provision, but with the new mandate of bringing culture closer to the working people. The period of 1950s and 1960s coincided with the trends of industrialisation and urbanisation of federal republics on the internal level, which resulted in steep growth of cultural needs and interest in cities and towns. On the external international level, the axis of cultural development followed the trends in elementary diffusion of culture that were

spreading over Europe, mostly instigated by the French minister of culture, André Malraux. The elementary diffusion of culture entailed progression of cultural democratisation to cultural democracy paradigms in the form of capillary dispersion of cultural activities in the organisational and institutional formats that were adaptable to the different social needs and contexts. Possibly, most prominent examples of this approach to cultural policy and cultural planning are the proliferation of cultural centres in 1960s Europe⁶⁵. This networked logic of organisation of culture was connected with the critique of the statist or state-centred culture and transfer of state ownership

65 Cultural and/or arts centres are a specific typology of cultural amenities. The first model of cultural and/or centres can be tracked in the models of arts centres that were present in the „eighteenth-century coffee-houses, nineteenth-century working men’s club, mechanic’s institutes, in the socialist people’s palaces (‘clubs’), and more recently in the ‘little theatre’ movement of mainly amateur dramatic societies, between the First and Second World Wars“ (Evans, 2001:90). Cultural centres have characteristics that distinguish them from the other arts facilities insofar that their “multi-use and multi-form aspect that identifies an arts centre as distinct from single-use facility, reflects its physical nature (i.e. design, layout), while its accessibility in the widest sense, e.g. new audiences, defines its *location*: ‘A *Maison de la Culture* is defined in terms of the kind of audience that constitutes it’ (Malraux, 1966). The scope and scope of arts resources were to be capable of creating a *synergy* between differing levels of ability and experience, arts forms and opportunity: amateur and professional; youth and adult; diverse culture (multicultural); mixed arts, crafts and media; local, regional and national networks and so on....Arts centres thus sought to break down barriers between passive consumption (‘audience’) and active participation, and between art forms and practice and therefore create links in the ‘production chain’” (Evans, 2001:95). An ideal cultural centre is an institution with permanent and polyvalent socio-cultural and artistic activities, which are open to different groups of the public. Its actions are flexible and developed according to the changing cultural needs and demands in the centre’s environment through the promotion of cultural activities and through cooperation and exchanges at a national and international level. To sum the definitional span, “cultural centres are always intended to be multi-purpose“ (Fache, 1992:146 u Malešević, 1995:12). The role of cultural centres has gone through substantial changes in the evolution of cultural policy of first Socialist Republic of Croatia and then the independent state of Croatia. The rationale behind their initial founding and dispersion was not confined to the processes of cultural democratisation, but to the literacy project of the socialist nations of Yugoslavia. Hence, the role of the pre-1990s Croatian cultural centres was situated in-between the libraries and community cultural institutions, as well as a strong counterbalance to the social gathering around religious organisations. The emphasis of the cultural centres as a part of the cultural system was placed on the fundamental values of humanism, solidarity, democracy and freedom (Švec Španjol and Vujnović, nd), which corresponds to the values rooted by the processes of the modernisation (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Eisenstadt, 2010). In that line, cultural centres could be interpreted as being the points of the all-wide national both enlightenment and modernisation process. Their functioning developed from the ‘enlightening’ role, into the vital points of communities’ cultural life and mediators of cultural policy. A written by Rogić and Mutnjaković in 1984: “centres for culture are not envisaged as a bureaucratic institutions that will buy and sell culture, and in which a group of people, that will do that for their livelihood, will “produce culture” and make workers and citizens happy with their enlightening cultural actions, with mediation in culture, and basic organisations of cultural manifestations while collecting profits for that job, etc. It would basically be a place for professional creation of cultural policy and for conceptualised realisation of cultural actions, for professional preparations of plan and programmes in culture, and for gathering of all professional and amateur workers, animator, enthusiasts in the field of culture. It is not possible to develop a single type of cultural centre, but a more of them, depending on the economic development, class and social structure and other relevant circumstances from one community to another” (Rogić and Mutnjaković, 1984:51). In the transition period, a whole network of cultural centres underwent a transformation, or were left to limber in an institutional void or non-existent regulations that would contour the scope, relevance, rationale and the role being the cultural centres in independent Croatian cultural system. A number of cultural centres become open community learning centres, while a smaller number retained the function of cultural centres inherited from the previous, pre1990s period.

into social or public ownership. Culture became a new social substance that had to be lessened of the hierarchical relations and bureaucratisation. The main threat to culture and cultural policy was the “possible substitution of its restive creative spirit and its critical function for political and creative conformism” (Majstorović, 1980:26). The aspirations, needs and interest of the community became positioned centre-stage for cultural policy that had to overcome alienation from the people, as the promotion of welfare, cultural democracy and social identity marked this professional stage of cultural policy.

With the introduction of cultural democracy paradigm that marked the third stage of Yugoslav cultural policy, the interpretation of culture in Yugoslavia changed, establishing new fundamentals for cultural policy, which were to replace statist culture with socialized culture. This process was not restricted to culture, but was a part of the whole transformation to self-management society: “the conversion of state into social property and changed labour relations are the principal issues in the programme of self-management democratic forms”⁶⁶ (Majstorović, 1980:29). This radical change in the modes of decision-making entailed higher levels of productivity as a result of the new conditions and opportunities for the labour force. However, their productivity, or efficiency by contemporary terms, was not an objective in itself. Rather, it included the “cultural objectives, social care, culture of managing social resources, care for communal development and its advancement, aesthetic of the working environment, protection of the human environment, co-operation and solidarity among people etc.” (Majstorović, 1980:30). System of self-management opened new prospects for new relations and changes in the daily operations in many spheres. Culture was no longer exclusively linked to a single power source, nor imposed signifiers. The scope of culture widened from the cultural practices and art onto the other spheres of human creative efforts, encompassing communal planning, physical labour, social services, education and science, among others. A strong shift towards decentralisation had enabled local communities to devise the solutions for their needs and reflect their own experience, concurrently fitting into the common social goals, which is consistent with the modernisation tendencies on a wider geopolitical

⁶⁶ Majstorović explains that, in practical terms, this mean that the distribution of the surplus value was decided upon the decision made by the work organisations creating the surplus. In the self-management procedures, work organisations decided whether they want to use the surplus to raise their salaries, invest in the residential needs for their workers, meet the social, cultural or educational needs of the community, etc. (Majstorović, 1980).

scale, manifested in, as stated in the modernisation chapter of the thesis, “the development of new structural, institutional and cultural features and formations, and the growing potential for social mobilization“ (Deutch, 1961 in Eisenstadt, 2010:1). In a practical sense, the possibility and responsibility of decision-making were diffused, planning was decentralized so that each commune and municipality made their cultural development plans. Different levels of cultural planning were coordinated, from institution up to the municipality, i.e. the city, province, republic and the federal government. Only the most fundamental common needs were prescribed from the federal level. The perils of decentralisation through the system of self-management included “powerful inclination to view cultural development and cultural needs first in the light of local ambitions and the narrow interests of a work organisation or cultural institution” (Majstorović, 1980:38).

The self-management period brought “softer” considerations towards the acceptance of the “free” market. Yet, the market relations stirred contradictions with cultural objectives. Namely, in 1971 calculations were made by which it became apparent that national culture comes costly for small nations – for example, it was more expensive by five to six times to publish a book in one of the Yugoslav languages than it was to publish in English or Russian. These calculations indicated that culture must not be left to the market forces, as it would be disastrous, especially for smaller nations of former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that culture could not be isolated or protected from the market; hence the public bodies that provided corrective instruments, i.e. state subsidies that interfered with the market laws. One of the most market-prolific cultural activities was the domestic film industry. Although the films were co-financed by the republic (up to 30% of the overall budget), their production involved (independent) work organisations and the films “earned” their status and finances in the international festival scene. The tax exemption was introduced for certain forms of cultural and artistic work, as well as incentives such as financial assistance for young writers, musicians, composers etc. (Majstorović, 1980).

The pressure from market laws was eased with the setting up of the self-interest communities that covered various areas of activity – from public health and education to culture. The communities’ memberships consisted of all those concerned in the specific area of activity, encompassing experts and workers. The Constitution of Yugoslavia identified the self-managing communities

as “associations through which working people and other citizens satisfy their personal and common needs and co-ordinate their interests, governed by the principles of mutuality and solidarity” (Majstorović, 1980:65). In the field of culture, interest communities were divided into different types: communal, regional, city and republic or provincial. They covered the funding, labour conditions and functioning of cultural institutions. This thesis does not investigate the operational logic and normative side of the self-interest communities in-depth, as the scope of the topic surpasses the level of the research interest of the thesis. However, the system of self-management and self-interest communities cannot remain unmentioned in the analysis of Croatian cultural policy rationale and legacy in former Yugoslavia, especially in the discussion on the legacy of participation in the decision-making processes and the cycles of public policies. Katunarić assesses the self-management stage as the most complex one in cultural policy as it affirmed the dyad of decentralized democratic principles and welfare values on one side and the sustainment of the central political control on the other. For this reason, the “essential difference between the financing of the culture through decentralized, self-governing bodies and classical budgetary financing, or taxation, was never clear...” (Katunarić, 1997:12). The final framework of self-management in the 1980s, where it became an “unconvincing façade of a one-party power system that finally tried to save itself by restoring on-nation (Serbian) hegemony”, prevented self-management legacy to remain one of “the most inspiring objectives of democracy” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:23). A critical overview of the self-management period was made by Županov who asserted that socialist self-management failed the expectations of federal reformist as well as of international sympathisers (Županov, 1995). He provides two basic arguments for such assertion: 1) self-management did not change, by any means, the “oligarchic distribution of power in the enterprise, moreover, the oligarchic tendencies were even strengthened in the last period”; and 2) “self-management did not change the authoritarian culture of enterprise. Hence, the performance of the system, even on the micro-level, was insignificant. The performance on the macro-level could not thus be any better: distribution of power in the oligarchic – territorial decentralisation did not change that pattern...” (Županov, 1995:57).

Self-management phase was the last one in the development of cultural policy in socialist Croatia. In the context of differentiation between the Yugoslav nations in 1980s, right before the collapse

of the federal State, Croatia stood out for two reasons: first, Croatia had the greatest number of people employed in culture, and second, Croatia was the only republic with all legally prescribed forms of organisation in culture (Ivanišević, 1987 in Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999). In the sense of the stages of paradigms of cultural policy evolution, it could be asserted that *the market stage*, or the creative economy paradigm⁶⁷ as a reaction to welfarism where states relinquish cultural goods and services to market regulation, did not have its equivalent in former Yugoslavia.

Lastly, Zlatar explains the rationale that led into the transition period as being pragmatic rather than strategic where the loss of common Yugoslav cultural space “had to be compensated for by establishing an autonomous, independent national state and the creation of a new set of values and new cultural policy” (Zlatar, 2001).

6.2. Part two: the 1990s era – transition times

Transition, or undergoing a change of status or a condition, was brought over in Croatia by historical inevitability identified through the decline of socialist and communist rule in the whole region of Central and Eastern Europe that culminated with the decline of the Soviet Union in 1992. As previously stated in the chapter on modernization, Zlatar defined transition as “slow and painful process with uncertain prospects for successful resolution” that deeply affected all components of social structure (Zlatar, 2001:2). The characteristics and norms of the economic and political side of the transition are given most consideration and have consecutive effects – from a highly polemic issue of command economy⁶⁸ and political dictatorship to privatisation and capitalism, from

67 It is highly problematic to which extent is this stage or paradigm applied presently (and recently) in Croatian cultural policy, especially in the rubric, for example, of commodification and deregulation of cultural goods and services, mostly exemplified by, for example, exploitation of cultural heritage for tourism industry and the expected in the financially measurable returns from the public investment in the arts and culture.

68 With culture being ideologically charged and sensitive territory of social reflection and action, it takes a lot of caution not to cross the slippery lines of rationality by swiftly using the connotations of the signifiers like “totalitarian” and “authoritarian”. Miller and Yudice suggest that these signifiers belong to bourgeois social science and media that link “forms of social and governmental organization that were quite distinct (for example, the liberal state socialism in Hungary in 1956 and the fascist National Socialism in Germany in 1938)” (Miller and Yudice, 2003:107). The authors assess that such essentialisation is “more about the desire of the West to differentiate itself from alternative by lumping them together, than it is an accurate category” (Miller and Yudice, 2003:107). Affirming that something does

single-party domination to multi-party democracy (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:244). However, as already mentioned, the cultural effects of the transitional processes are greatly disregarded and marginalised. Consequently, the nature and the effects of the transition have been installed into the daily lives of the (post)transitional reality, yet are “partly visible or barely accessible for practical evaluations” (Švob-Đokić, 2004a:1)⁶⁹. To prevail this absence of a theoretical account of transitional changes, cultural transitions have been analysed in comparison to the cultural changes, social and cultural developments in Europe and the wider world. This has shed particular attention to countries of the Western Balkan and region of Southeastern Europe where the last twenty years have been marked by the introduction of radical reforms. Švob-Đokić divides these reforms into two strata. The first “brought liberalization, the stabilization of economies and privatization, the political extinction of socialist institutions and the introduction of democracy” (Švob-Đokić, 2004a:2). The first stage of reforms was marked by the violent conflict, demographic decline, the decline in social, cultural and economic values and loss of professionalism. The second stratum of reforms brought an imperative to concentrate on “good governance”: the improvement of the regulatory apparatus, the move towards independence of monetary and fiscal institutions, the strengthening of corporate governance, the eradication of corruption, the enhancement of the functioning of the judiciary etc. “, i.e., in short “the “qualitative change” (Švob-Đokić, 2004a:2).

link such governmental norms, the authors borrow the idea of *command economy* to describe the non-market form of cultural provision. In such provision, the State assumes the centre-stage in “planning, creating, policing and revising cultural practice”. Miller and Yudice propose command economy as a positive approach to cultural provision, challenging the assumption that *laissez-faire* economy, market based approach is “natural” to Western cultural production while, for example, Stalinism “overwhelmed and deformed an art that otherwise-if granted its own integrity-would take on the forms and social functions of the arts in the West” (Rueshemeyer, 1991 in Miller and Yudice, 2003:107). On the other end, Croatian philosopher Mario Kopic offers quite different view of the command economy. Kopic refers to the late Serbian politician and Prime Minister of Serbia (2001-2003) Zoran Đinđić, who said that if politics should become a conduit for attainment of cultural programmes and goals, we should expect increase in in unsolvable conflicts: “because in the sphere of value – and that is culture – there is no reconciliation. Those who speak in other language and who have other culture become an obstacle for own national identity” (Kopic, 2012). According to this author, the main characteristic of the command economy imply that the political elites control social processes (life processes included) in their totality, with “ people being under direct command control of the political elites, which forcefully defends itself from the democratic processes and rules all sources of life” (Kopic, 2012). Political elites ensure their own reproduction on their own territory, while keeping the international political relations under rigid control. In such system, paternalistic supra-state dealt with “production, distribution, education, science, culture and all other relations with the world” while all attempts from the “autonomous civil initiatives in those domains were characterised as smuggling, crime, ideological aberration and such” (Kopic, 2012).

69 In the sphere of culture, transition in Croatia (all former Yugoslav states included) evoked revisionism, extreme rise of nationalism and revival of national myths and susceptible histories (Švob-Đokić,2004).

In the modernisation chapter of this thesis, more precisely, in the subchapter on modernisation in Croatian experiences, Katunarić's three levels of description of cultural change were introduced as:

- “the level of transformation of values, e.g. from collectivism to individualism;
- the symbolic level, e.g. where history and cultural heritage are used as “symbolic” ornaments” fostering the sense of collective unity (mostly in the form of nationalism, which is, nevertheless, contradictory to the tendency under a); and
- the level of institutional change, e.g., abandonment of old institutions and methods of organisation in culture in favour of new ones entailing free initiative and linkage to the market demand for cultural services” (Katunarić, 1997:9).

Katunarić notes that, in the latter sense, culture is just a technical term used as a “randomly defined category into which certain activities are placed and called culture, while others...are not” (Vestheim, 1995:58 in Katunarić, 1997:9). This implies the changing scope and scale of governmental and public bodies that have the jurisdiction or authority over the field of culture – in some instances, it included other categories like sports, technical culture and education⁷⁰. “Random definitions” of culture indicate not only the dynamics of its structural and semantic differentiation, but also the position of culture within the “more powerful” areas of state power, political and economic interest (Katunarić, 1997:10).

With the three-level approach, Katunarić aimed at elucidating the situation in 1990s Croatia, encompassing the elements that constituted cultural development in Croatia as part of the former Yugoslav federal state. Following is the elaboration of each separate level:

i) The transformation of values

⁷⁰ The domain of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia amalgamated education, sports and technical culture from 1994 to 1998, then, for a period after 2003, it included protection of natural environment. On the sub-national levels, there are still several larger Croatian cities in which culture is administered from the department of social affairs, encompassing sports, technical culture, services for war veterans, social care and culture. The capital city of Zagreb, for example, is one of those cities that does not have an autonomous Department for Culture.

Transformation of values was a highly paradoxical process; although the individualism was pronounced as a growing value in society in contrast to the old communist collectivism, new nationalist ideology was simultaneously creating new ethnocentric, bigot form of collectivism. Due to the war, and consequent chauvinistic leadership in the country, cultural values system was obliterated. Cultural latitude was closed and self-referential with obvious features of xenophobia.

ii) Symbolic level

On this level, history and cultural heritage are used as symbolic ornaments fostering the sense of collective unity. Croatian culture was no longer defined through its quality of cultural capital but through repetitive insistence on merely national classification. The ruling party went that far in identifying Croatian as “not-Serbian”, that they removed any traces of Serbian that might ‘contaminate’ their new language (Miller&Yudice, 2002:6). The new social elite was achieving mostly in the form of nationalism, which is, nevertheless, contradictory to the pluralist and de-ideologisation tendencies.

iii) Institutional change

The institutional change was regarded as the functional one; in order to have free initiative and linkage to the market demand for cultural services, institutions abandoned old methods of organization in favour of new ones that involved greater individual autonomy. Still, institutional autonomy granted by the transition is markedly inconspicuous, as institutions are still dependent on the government for funding and managing mandates.

From 1990 to 2000, Croatia was under the consecutive rule of right-wing party of Croatian Democratic Union (CDU). Zlatar records how within the first three years of their administration, their rule “had taken on a shape of a one-party, totalitarian political system” (2001:2). Right-wing totalitarian regimes have the same equivalent intolerance towards the independent intellectual - a middle-class individual as rigid communism methods (Zlatar, 2001:6). Zlatar argues that in socialism, middle-class culture sustained urban mentality and stood “in resistance to a totalitarian political system, which cancels and denies the right to individuality” (Zlatar, 2001:6). In nineties Croatia, on a declarative level, the middle-class culture was promoted as a value while in reality middle class was

“subjected to impoverishment, social degradation and marginalization” (Zlataar, 2002:7). The new value system was extremely anti-intellectual and incorporated misinterpreted aspects of capitalism; all organic elements of values structure were purchasable; from higher education degrees and social reputation to artistic and cultural integrity: “the basic system of middle-class values, in which one’s expertise and professionalism guaranteed a job and the job well done guaranteed good earnings was completely destroyed. The most horrifying consequence of the transition period and war is not the material impoverishment of Croatian society, but the utter destruction of value systems that used to apply to specific fields and human activity.” (Zlataar, 2001:7). The erosion of the socialist welfare state and period of war left Croatian cultural sector “smaller and more impotent than ever”, while the brain-drain caused for the creative potential to diminish its capacities, especially in the aspect of competitiveness with the international artistic and cultural scene (Zlataar, 2001:7). Under the “pretext of functional rationalization, commercialization, or of national priorities in culture”, the cultural capital of the nation was depleted, while the development gap between Croatia and the developed countries was becoming wider (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:254).

During that first period of independence, in the domain of value, Croatia has failed to resist what Katunarić refers to as the classical problem of democracy: preventing the outbreak of wild passions and lowering of the mass taste and firming “coalition between politics and culture” (Katunarić, 1997:23). This served as a trigger for “an explosive mass of defensive feelings and messianic ideas” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:7), leading to what could be detected as regression of the unfinished modernisation project. According to Katunarić, people’s attitudes towards political changes have been mostly positive, despite authoritarian tendencies that were obvious during the 1990s. Yet, there has been a clear feeling of political despair and impotency among the people, with blatant distrust in politics: “democracy is seen as a game of musical chairs played by the political elites, and not as a mechanism of participation and decision-making and influence “from below” (Katunarić, 1997:13). This trend in general disbelief and mistrust in political elites and institutions sustains until nowadays and is reflected in the decreasing levels of the population participating in the general voting⁷¹.

71 For example, in 1990s, 74% of the population voted in presidential elections, while this percentage went down to just over 50% in 2005 and 2010 elections. In the most recent presidential elections in Croatia, more particularly from the second round on 5th January, 55% of voters participated in the general elections for the Croatian president.

As stated by Cvjetičanin: “in the process of democratization, the role and influence of the state in culture undergoes a change. The state tries to reduce its own funding of cultural institutions and artistic creation, leaving them to the action of the market forces and private initiative (government budgets for culture are more than modest in most countries in transition, averaging between 0.6 and 0.8 per cent of the annual budget). An increasingly important role is played by regions and local communities (‘territorial collectivities’); new forms of support for culture are sought (sponsors, foundations, patronage) and attempts are made to privatize and commercialize parts of the cultural infrastructure. The Polish historian Bronislaw Geremek describes the situation in the following terms: ‘Today, the state no longer has a bad conscience, and sponsors and patrons do not have it yet. Neither the one nor the other support culture.’” (Cvjetičanin, 1995).

The transition period encompasses the first two phases of decentralisation out of four that are identified by Koprić: the first multiparty system in the old (i.e. pre-democratic) institutional frameworks (1990–1993); centralisation and etatisation (1993–2001); administrative decentralisation (2001–2013); and Europeanisation (2013– onwards) (Koprić, 2018:15). The first and second phase encompassed the period of the first period of cultural policy evolution, i.e. the transition period that has been marked by strong centralisation by grouping public functions, civil servants and public finances under the authority of the central government while placing the local self-government under the control of the county prefect as an official representative of the central state government. The establishment of a rigid centralised system of public resources was depicted as “one of the main problems in the Croatian system of governance” (Šeparović, 2001, 2003, 2010; Petak, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2006; Petak, Kasapović, Lalić, 2004 in Petak, 2012:73). This line of development of fiscal and political decentralisation in the 1990s was in the opposition to the trends of development that was dominantly present around the world (Petak, 2012). Given that the pre-1990s period was marked with high decentralisation capacities, achieved through “an extremely high scope of local governments’ jurisdictions” and the “liberalization of the socialist self-management orientation” that strives to level the “governance structures towards the standards of democratic order and market economy”, the whole period of the 1990s, i.e. the first two stages of decentralisation in Croatia were unmistakably regressive (Petak, 2012:73). Regressive

decentralisation tendencies are characteristic for the countries of vulnerable democracy, which ultimately lead to poor involvement of the citizens in the improvement of the governance quality.

The policy provision from the 1990s relied on the financing systems of “cultural funds” that was a model inherited from the former state (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999; Zlatar, 2001). From 1993, a new approach was introduced – a “model of public needs”. This model implied that cultural sector would apply to the public call, a short-term competition according to which the Ministry of Culture (in many cases the minister himself/herself) would make a decision on what was to be funded at to what extent. Until today, the Public Needs model prevails while it remains incomprehensive to what Public Needs in Culture are and upon what criteria they are (re)established⁷². Moreover, the Public Needs are expressed in conjunction with the national, regional or municipal interest which also opens a whole set of unclear categories. In the 1990s, this enabled for the ideological axe to be the crucial factor in decision-making: “countless artistic and cultural projects were left outside the confines of official culture funded by the Ministry of Culture, so they had to look for other sources of finances, most frequently from foreign foundations” (Zlatar, 2001:16)⁷³. As a result, the foundation The Open Society Institute – Croatia⁷⁴ became ‘the parallel Ministry of Culture’ and provided financial support for many ‘unsuitable’ cultural and artistic practices – from non-profit media to contemporary art forms and formation and development of a strong civil society sector in culture. The significance of the Croatian Open Society Institute in the field of arts and culture was analysed by Tonković and Sekelj through the role of The Soros Centre for Contemporary Art (SCCA) in Zagreb. SCCA - Zagreb was part of The Centers for Contemporary Art network that were supposed to contribute to the normalisation and ease the transition period by ensuring “the conditions for the full participation of artists from the former

72 We find the articulation of *cultural needs* in the *Cultural policy and development of culture in Croatia. Red book and other documents* (Šuvar and Grubiša, 1982) as well as in the article *Cultural Needs* (Rogić, 1988). Yet, there are no sources of explanations to what culture needs mean and are in the post 1990 period.

73 Although the National Report diplomatically notes that, to their best knowledge, “the Ministry has never initiated the banning of any work with an “objectionable” content” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1997:28).

74 The Open Institute Society – Croatia was a part of the global Soros Foundation Network that opened its offices in Croatia in 1992 and functioned till 2006. The Open Institute Society – Croatia main task was to develop the Open Society Index to help promote public policies by “assessing a society’s degree of openness in six key areas: education, rule of law, media, economic rights and entrepreneurship, transparency and democracy, and minorities and marginalized groups” (Open Society Institute, 2006:88).

socialist countries in the global arts exchange” (Tonković and Sekelj, 2016:81). The important note that is stated in Tonković and Sekelj’s analysis is that SCCA-Zagreb was, together with the Open Society, one of “the first organizations that adopted a professionalized and project-oriented work model. According to Paul Stubbs, such an organizational structure marked a turn from the so-called first wave of citizen activism in Croatia, which this author attributes to the influence of foreign donors who preferred bureaucratic and technocratic organizational structures and practices” (Tonković and Sekelj, 2016:84). The activist work in the field of culture progressed into the formation and affirmation of a number of strong, potent, nationally and internationally acclaimed civil society organisations that contributed to the democratic and modernizing evolution of the cultural field in Croatia predominantly in two segments – upgrades of existing cultural policy structures and decision-making processes, and the production, dissemination of artistic work accompanied with dynamic national and international cultural cooperation. Most of these actors and activities in the transition period were financed by sources other than national and local cultural budgets, mostly of international origin. The mainstream and state media labelled the beneficiaries of the alternative sources of funding as “black, green and yellow devils”, accusing them of treason and nostalgia for Yugoslavia. These tendencies have been present even in the recent period in Croatia⁷⁵ (Zlatar, 2001:6).

The “model of public needs” opened the first stage of decentralisation of cultural policy as the law that articulated the public needs (Law on Financing Public Needs OG 47/90, OG 27/93, OG 38/09) determined for counties, towns and municipalities in Croatia to establish their Programme of Public Needs in Culture. This opened the direction towards the spatial decentralisation of cultural policy or territorial dispersion of decision-making in cultural governance. However, in sense of structural or functional authority devolution, this approach to decentralisation only expanded the centralised model onto different level through devolving a portion of central competencies (that are mostly considered as less important) to local levels (Katunarić, 2003). Decentralisation

75 Cultural sector in Croatia, most notably the civil society and non-institutional and non-governmental organisations in arts and culture, as well as non-profit independent media, have endured fierce attack from the extreme right-wing cultural minister Zlatko Hasanbegović. In a mandate that lasted from January 2016 to October 2016, Hasanbegović had set the agenda on wiping out all points of critical, progressive and reflexive artistic action and cultural thought in favour of nationalist and revisionist programmes.

was not one of the focal points in the long list of priorities given by the Ministry of Culture in 1996. The priorities were: “1) preserving the cultural heritage; 2) re-creating the representational image of national cultural identity (festivals, Croatian design, publications in foreign languages) and history (lending a spectacular note to historical themes, e.g. through staging historical battles in Croatia); 3) fitting both the above into Croatia’s tourist offer; 4) further computerization of cultural planning and cultural activities; and 5) encouraging coordination and cooperation on all levels of governmental administration” (Katunarić, 1997:15).

These priorities served the national culture that was in line with ethnocentric and neoconservative values and obsessed with the “investigation of mythical Croatian identity” (Zlatar, 2001). Nevertheless, the culture of the nineties Croatia was not shaped in this xenophobic form, but also had a different, juxtaposed version. That *other* culture was made of independent intellectuals, cultural workers, artists and independent organisation who were open for communication, contemporary, critically examining and interpreting the present. Zlatar described it as “culture of translation, a culture of connection, a culture of change” (Zlatar, 2001:9). These two cultures formed a phenomenon of *cultural dualism*, the parallelism of two cultures and two values systems that most accurately marks the situation in Croatian culture of the 1990s. It is debatable to what extent has the dualism been balanced out or has it persisted to be the main idiosyncrasy of the cultural system despite the “maturing” process of Croatian democratic state.

6.3. Part three: Cultural policy now - the post1990s period - 2000s onwards

Following the approach in the analysis of the pre1990s cultural policy, it must be underlined that, as stated in the latest National census from 2011, Croatia has a population of 4.2 million. This number has been steadily decreasing with the continuing emigration on Croatian citizens to the countries of the European Union. Although there are no exact data to the extent of the “Croatian exodus” that mostly involves emigrant aged between 20 and 39 years old (Draženović, Kunovac and Pripuzić, 2018), Eurostat’s numbers show Croatian population to be at 4.07 million at the be-

ginning of 2019, which is the lowest number since 1957⁷⁶. The multinational composition of the country includes over 90% Croats and 87% Catholics⁷⁷. This “reductionism” in the sheer number of population and shrinkage of the (multi)cultural context has to be taken into consideration when deliberating on cultural policy. Also, significant influence on the cultural policy development in post-1990s Croatia has been left by the pauperisation of the population in the 1990s that caused considerable changes on the quality and quantity of cultural participation, cultural interest and consumption of culture in Croatia. Majority of people received their cultural values in front of the television and from the influence of Catholic Church, while a minority public and “counter-elite” was linked to the “products and values of democratic political culture” (Katunarić, 1997:14)⁷⁸.

As per official cultural policy, there is no such specific document or strategic guideline on the overall national level, or explicit orientation of the priorities and course of cultural development. Although, there have been examples of countries where not having a policy was a policy in itself⁷⁹, in Croatian case, not having an explicit policy is not a policy. Rather, not having a policy can be interpreted as a consequence of short-term planning, a surplus of political interference and lack of consensus on the understanding what is the role, sense and meaning of culture along with needed or favourable direction of cultural development. As said by Cvjetičanin and Katunarić,

76 The predictions from the same Eurostat’s graph on Croatia’s change in population estimates that Croatia will have less than 3.5 million people by 2050. Information obtained online at <https://balkaninsight.com/2019/10/31/croatia-faces-long-term-stagnation-of-demographic-decline/> (04.12.2019).

77 Information obtained online at http://www.dzs.hr/Hrv_Eng/publication/2012/SI-1469.pdf (06.03.2017)

78 The situation in this rubric has insignificantly changed in comparison to present day with the same influences being dominant in the majority of the population with the “minority” opening, maintaining and nurturing international ties and cooperation with strong creative and professional competencies and capacities (Katunarić, 1997; Švob-Đokić, 2010).

79 Some of the examples of “no policy” policy are United States of America and Republic of Ireland. In the USA, they resisted the pressures from Europe to consolidate cultural system under a coherent policy and claimed American cultural exceptionalism. USA pursued the policy of no policy until the international community pressed which resulted with United States’ withdrawal from UNESCO in 1984 with the explanation that UNESCO policies served for anti-US political ends. In the case of Republic of Ireland, the Irish state did not establish any formal instrument for cultural policy during the first thirty years of its existence. In 1993, the Irish government established the Department of Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht, concentrating the provision for the arts and culture under single governmental body. Still, it was only in 2015 that serious consultations have taken place in Ireland in regards to the lack of coherent national cultural policy, which included the open consultation process on Draft Document *Culture 2025 - Éire Ildánach*. The document was officially published on internet pages of the Department of Arts, Heritage, Regional, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs in August 2016. (Accessed online at http://www.ahrrga.gov.ie/app/uploads/2016/07/culture_2025_framework_policy_document.pdf, 14.04.2017).

“on the whole, the explicit strategic objective of Croatia’s cultural policy has not been developed to the degree that one can talk about completely systematic cultural policy. It is sooner a combination of intuition, *ad hoc* approach and systematic elaboration, as on the other levels of policy” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:25).

What is explicit about non-existent, non-official cultural policy in Croatia is that culture is reduced to being treated as a sector, like any other – health, national security, defence, etc. This cultural sector is regulated through a number of legal acts and documents, which can be read as policy provision for the cultural sector, i.e. cultural policy. The policy itself is occupied with certain activities and is used to mean government decision or a framework of rules by which arts, cultural activities and creative practices can be, in narrow explanation, regulated, promoted, and given perspectives for development (Wallach, 2000; Bell and Oakely, 2015). In addition to the regulative framework of normative acts and documents, contours of Croatian cultural policy can be read from a several documents that have had the ambition overtime to capture the cultural momentum of the nation and its supra and sub-national cultural relations, aspirations, needs and possibilities⁸⁰. Furthermore, tendencies in cultural sector fluctuations and development can be analysed in the strategic documents of local cultural development. Those documents have been modestly developing across Croatia during the past ten years, only to exponentially rise with the process of Croatian cities candidacy for European Capital of Culture 2020. During the candidacy period (from 2014 to 2016), all candidate cities⁸¹ had to adopt strategic plans for local cultural development up to 2020 (and beyond). The prerogative of having the strategic direction in the development of culture was not supported, fostered or coordinated by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia, but was mandated as one of the application categories in the European Capital of Culture tender. The strategic documents have been approved by the local representative bodies, i.e. city councils and as such can be seen as concrete policy fundament or upgrade in the domain of strategic cultural planning and development on the local levels. However, all of the mentioned

80 These include, for the most part, *Cultural Policy in Croatia. National Report* from 1999; *Strategy of Cultural Development – Croatia in the 21st Century* from 2003; and Croatian profile in *Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe* at culturalpolicies.net.

81 Croatian candidate cities of European Capital of Culture 2020 title were Dubrovnik, Đakovo, Osijek, Pula, Rijeka, Split, Varaždin, Zadar i Zagreb. The title itself was won by city of Rijeka.

documents have been serving their purpose as referential backgrounds, while their implementation as operative policy provision documents cannot be analysed due to the lack of monitoring and evaluative processes that would track the progression of the strategic documents' implementations and effects. Hence, while the local strategic documents can be analysed for their content in sense of policy rationale, intentions and values, the actual analysis of the content in correlation to the effects, or any type of visible results in sense of changes in the local cultural terrains due to the implementation of local strategies for cultural development is unattainable.

As already stated, up to 2000, cultural policy in Croatia entailed centralized governmental intervention in the cultural sector, with the special emphasis on national traditions (Primorac, Švob-Đokić and Obuljen Koržinek, 2015) and preoccupation with building of nation-state and “national aggrandizement”. In other words, from the outset in the 1990s, the core of Croatian cultural policy has been continuously (with brief interregnum periods) used to instrumentalise culture to create and reiterate national identity (Bell and Oakely, 2015). This corresponds to the with the fourth stage of the cultural policy development, the nationalistic stage identified by “fostering a sense of national unity” (Katunarić, 1997:13). However, from 2000, after the institution of the new left-wing government led by the Social Democrat Party, a “more balanced approach to tradition and a new evaluation of the national and the multicultural components was undertaken, together with steps towards further decentralisation and direct co-operation with NGOs” (Primorac, Švob-Đokić and Obuljen Koržinek, 2015).

In the *Strategy of Cultural Development – Croatia in the 21st Century* from 2001, the importance of culture⁸² is emphasised and elaborated through a number of aims and tasks ranging from the legislation, financing and decentralisation to new communication technologies in culture and sociocultural capital, all focusing on *culturally sustainable development*. Many points and questions of crucial importance were raised by this publication. One of those is the issue on the comprehension and meaning of culture as “means” and culture as an “end”, in a sense of the need to balance

82 Culture in that document is defined as „all forms of intellectual and artistic expression of symbolic social identity, belonging, behaviour and customs, and such industrial products, including the media, produced for spending leisure and shaping people’s attitudes“ (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2003).

and keep these two meanings of culture interactive. Making divisions between the culture for the sake of culture on the one side, and culture for the sake economic or political ends on the other side inevitably leads to “a dead-end street” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2001:15). Accordingly, Cvjetičanin and Katunarić suggest that the barriers between the high, traditional, and mass culture should be abolished in most parts in order to make artistic work, especially that from the local production, much easier to achieve and access (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2001:15).

Key objectives of *Croatia in the 21st Century* document included democratisation of culture, increasing of active participation in culture and popularisation and proliferation of arts and culture in the educational system and through the media (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2001). This was in line with the general objectives of the cultural policy stated in the Croatian profile on the Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe. Those include the pursuance of values such as “cultural pluralism (aesthetic and multiethnic), creative autonomy, the increase and diversification of sources for financing culture, polycentric cultural development, encouraging cultural participation and co-operation between the public and the private sector to increase efficiency, quality, employment and innovation” (Primorac, Švob-Đokić and Obuljen Koržinek, 2015)⁸³. These objectives are figuratively and declaratively correct and consonant with the trends in European and wider international cultural policy development, though there are no consistent links and correlations between this display of cultural policy objectives and the proper, i.e. the actual policy action. What can be linked with these objectives are the positive changes that happened in the period after 2000 marked by the exponential growth of non-institutional cultural sector leading the systemic recognition and establishment of the *independent cultural sector*⁸⁴ comprising a wide array of

83 These objectives are formed from multiple layers of readings of separate strategic documents from the domain of culture, encompassing Ministry of Culture’s strategic plans to the already mentioned publications from 1999 and 2003.

84 *Independent cultural sector* or *independent cultural scene* is a term that has been introduced in the public discourse since 2000 by its actors. Višnić claims that „the term „independent culture“ can in its widest sense refer to all those organisations that (a) have not been set up by the state or by other external organisation, but have established themselves; (b) that independently decide on their organisational structures, bodies and processes of decision-making and management; and (c) that depend on neither the state or any other entity for their programme content or finances. In this context we are referring to a specific field of cultural activities that can be distinguished on several levels following three criteria: the form of organisation, the manner in which it works/is organised, and the contents and orientation of its activities. ...Hence, we are talking about non-profit organisations, informal initiatives and artistic organisations that operate through new forms of work practices and are open to wider public participation. In addition, these structures are mostly characterised by dynamism and flexibility, a direct community approach, and a readiness

civil society organisations in culture (predominantly working in the field of contemporary arts and culture and stemming from the grounds of aforementioned support from the international sources during the 1990s), to the systemic efforts made towards the introduction of decentralised modes of decision-making in sense of power devolution. These include the institution of Cultural Councils in 2001, followed by the establishment of the first hybrid institution based on civil-public partnership POGON – Zagreb Centre for Independent Culture and Youth in 2008. The founding of Kultura nova Foundation, the first public body with the purpose of “promotion and development of civil society in the Republic of Croatia in the fields of contemporary arts and culture” followed in 2011⁸⁵. In the field of creative industries, more specifically, audio-visual arts, we must mention the establishment of The Croatian Audiovisual Centre (HAVC), an arms’ length, or government-backed strategic agency for the audio-visual sector in Croatia. HAVC was founded in 2008. All of these ‘policy upgrades’ will be investigated more in the analysis of the governance in culture from 2000 till 2017.

These policy developments are attributed to the persistent advocacy and strengthening role and pressure for the involvement of the non-governmental, civil society cultural actors in policy formation that have been pushing for the more open and democratic functioning of cultural policy. The role of civil society is crucial in the process of de-fragmentation of national culture narratives and for opening the prospects for more extensive and inclusive cultural “differentiations and distinctions that both shape and are being shaped by the institutionalized arrangements” (Volkering, 1996 in Žuvela, Vidović and Uzelac, 2016). However, the reality of the involvement of civil society in the decision-making in culture has been a persistent issue and chronic disorder of the

to react quickly with a mixture of professionalism and enthusiasm and voluntary work. They are also characterized by activities developed in very diverse fields of culture and arts and well by a mutually creative interaction (contemporary arts in all fields, popular culture, contemporary theory, new media and new technologies, youth culture etc.), involving a wider social consciousness and activist orientation which are now very evident. Inter-sectoral connections and overlapping programmes are very common (e.g. with youth sector), as well as a strong orientation towards cooperation (at local, national, regional and international levels), mostly with other complementary cultural organisations but also with social organisation from other fields” (Višnić, 2008:10). Vidović explains that the term *independent culture* substituted preceding terms of *alternative cultural sector* as it didn’t adequately cover the scope of cultural work and activity that was happening outside the remit of institutional sector (Vidović, 2013). *Independent cultural sector* thus, and in short, denotes civil society organisations that engage in “progressive, experimental, critical and socially engaged artistic practices, as well as contemporary critical theory” (Vidović, 2013:65).

85 Information obtained online at <http://kulturanova.hr/eng/about/history> (10.04.2017).

Croatian cultural policy. As Obuljen and Žuvela Bušnja wrote, there are substantial discrepancies in the levels of inclusion in the processes of policy formulation and decision-making: “while some of the institutional arrangements existed even before the 1990s and democratic transformations, the unformal process of consulting with the civil society has not yet been adopted as the most effective way of strategic decision-making in the field of cultural policy” (Obuljen and Žuvela Bušnja, 2008:108). The reasons behind the limited status of the civil society actors in the decision-making in Croatian cultural policy will be provisionally located in the analysis part on the legal frameworks for cultural governance. Still, the focus on the representative, institutional culture has been the key characteristic of Croatian cultural policy throughout the period 2000s, extending the legacy of institutional centrism from the 1990s period. This implies that the position of cultural institutions is privileged in cultural policy’s scope, and structure from organizational status (including the employment arrangements and working conditions for workers in cultural institutions) to the established allocations that are granted by the public budgets, as well as the appointment of management boards and directors. Cultural institutions in Croatia have been encouraged to sustain their public mandate and political relevance corresponding to the historical periods of their origin, which are ideologically and by overall social, political and economic system diametrically different to current times. Institutional centralism and insufficient functional differentiation, featured in huge disproportions in public authorities support and budget designation to the institutional, non-institutional and private cultural sector, is the cardinal dispute of Croatian cultural policy as it directly affects the financing of culture and cultural production⁸⁶. The role of the state and public administration is still dominant in taking permanent care of public cultural institutions, while the public sector remains “basically incapable of taking care of a growing number of young artists and cultural professionals condemned to remain outside the protected zone and look for their opportunities in the tiny field of competitive market” (Katunarić, 2004:21).

On the local levels of cultural policy, the situation is quite uneven. The most of *lex generalis* (general legislation) and *lex specialis* (specific legislation) in the field of culture prescribe the involve-

⁸⁶ The research into the discrepancies in allocation of the public budget in culture finances towards the institutional to non-institutional actors of the cultural sector shows that the ratio is 90% to 10% in favour of institutional actors with the tendency of less than 10% for the non-institutional sector. This data has been repeatedly confirmed by consistent reading of the annual local and national budgets for culture.

ment of the local governments as founding and primary governing bodies of the local cultural sector. The local governments are, consequently, the main stakeholders in the Croatian cultural sector. This is the consequence of the third phase of the decentralisation process in Croatia, i.e. administrative decentralisation.

From 2001 to 2013, according to the writings of Koprić, the constitutional idea of decentralisation was employed, albeit modest in its application and unsuccessful in the result (Koprić and Đulabić, 2018; Koprić, Škarica and Manojlović, 2018 in Koprić, 2018). By the Constitutional amendment in 2000, Croatia accepted the principle of subsidiarity that guaranteed wide self-government scope of the local units, yet the legislation on the local and regional self-government from that period applies a limited version of the political decentralisation concept (Koprić, 2018). The shift towards the decentralisation towards the sub-national units from 2001 resonated with the Council of Europe's *European Charter of Local Self-Government* from 1985, which considers the local authorities as "one of the main foundations of any democratic regime" and underlines the "right of the citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs" as one of the key democratic principles that can and should be directly exercised on the local level (Council of Europe, 1985). These approaches to power devolution from on the territorial basis in the dominant conception of political decentralisation by which the local self-government is the means and expression of the local population's autonomy, and, as such, a contra balance to the centralisation national authority (Koprić, 2018).

The decentralisation process on a territorial and political level in Croatia was set off with the devolution of authority for four main administrative areas: education, health, social affairs and firefighting (Đulabić, 2018). Culture was included in the package of the areas of public activity of the local administrations and has been included as a category of public activity in the legislation on the local and regional administrative authority since and through all the twelve amendments of the *Law on local and regional self-government* (OG 33/01, 60/01, 129/05, 109/07, 125/08, 36/09, 36/09, 150/11, 144/12, 19/13, 137/15, 123/17, 98/19) since 2001. In that period, there were no strategic planning or orientation on the role of local administrations or the clear rationale for the process of the decentralisation that has been inertly on-going. Đulabić notes that, during the past

period, decentralisation has become a magic word that is used every time the topic of local administration reform emerges (Đulabić, 2018). However, the research conducted throughout 2017 and 2018 on the topic of local administration and decentralisation in Croatia, and which covered 43% of administrative units in Croatia (237 units out of 556), showed that only 1% of the surveyed administrative units assumed the authority over decentralised functions enabled by the process from 2001. This 1% represents counties, big cities and cities that are administrative centres of the county (Đulabić, 2018). The research concentrated on the areas of health, education, social affairs and firefighting, hence there were no indicative data for the area of culture. Nevertheless, the interesting result of respondents' feedbacks explicates that the decentralisation process in Croatia, which can be validated in all areas of public activity, yields numerous responsibilities, mainly financial ones, yet the rights of the administrative units to autonomously govern and manage specific areas of public or administrative activities are limited and hindered by the legislation that is generated on the central or national level (Đulabić, 2018).

The problems and issues surrounding the Croatian “decentralisation package” (Petak, 2012) from 2001 onwards have been a topic of discussion of numerous Croatian social scientists (Antić, 2002; Kregar, 2011; Petak, 2012; Jurlina Alibegović and Slijepčević, 2012; Klarić, 2017; Koprić, 2018; Đulabić, 2018; Korpić and Đulabić, 2018). The practical problem of the decentralisation in Croatia, as Kregar sees it, is the issue of the local self-government as an important element for the reform of the society, economy and politics (Kregar, 2011). Beneath the declarative political support for decentralisation, a whole array of serious political conflicts exists fuelled by the “fear of expensive and negative political consequence for that who decides to make the changes. Those who meddle with the established interests of the leading class on the local level acquire numerous and dangerous opponents, while there is a certainty of the escalation of unpredictable regional and local fervour and identity. Although there is a verbal consensus, the issue lies in distinct political mobilisation and strengths of reforms against the adherents of the *status quo*. Due to these interest-driven and political blockages, true reforms have been missing. Rearranging territorial structure and institutions is not enough and far from being the only thing necessary for reforms” (Kregar, 2011:3).

Petak sees the failure of the decentralisation process in Croatia as a result of the central government bodies not taking into account “the alternative proposals made by various policy ranging from academic institutions, researchers in NGO’s, and associations of local government organisations”, which all contributed to “a relatively negligible influence of the horizontal policy dimensions on the decentralisation outcome” (Petak, 2012:72). For this reason, Petak assesses the whole process of decentralisation as “centrally controlled decentralisation, or decentralisation from above” (Petak, 2012:72). Ultimately, as Ravlić stresses, the state of local democracy in Croatia is under-developed due to low levels of participatory democracy exemplified by weak interactions of local authorities with citizens and total domination of political parties in the local representative process, along with the oligarchic organisation and functioning of political parties that monopolise local political processes with strong political clientelism and corruption (Ravlić, 2011). The space for the proper functioning of representative and participative institutions is hence scarce if any at all.

Decentralisation of cultural policy is one of the segments of the public policy portfolio and has certain similarities with, for example, education and social policy. Although there is no available data on decentralisation processes in cultural policy or the field of culture that would match the other areas such as education, health and social affairs (Đulabić, 2018), decentralisation was featured as a topic in individual chapters of the two key cultural policy publications from the beginning of 2000s: the one that was already quoted in the previous text, *Croatia in the 21st century. The Strategy of Cultural Development* (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2001), and *Cultural Policy of the Republic of Croatia. National Report* (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999).

In *Croatia in the 21st century. The Strategy of Cultural Development*, decentralisation chapter opens with the assessment of the dysfunctional number and operations (or line of functioning) of administrative units in Croatia, and the insignificance of the local levels of decision-making as they were not deemed coordinated or relevant for the cultural development (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2001). Similarly, the formation of counties and their territorial positioning was appraised as being outside cultural boundaries of the Croatian historical regions, and having a cultural offering unfit for international cooperation and generally unapt for any type of development (Cvjetičanin

and Katunarić, 2001). For these reasons, the authors recommend decentralised cultural policy in multiple dimensions, based on the polycentric development that builds on the cultural scope of Croatian historical regions.

In the register of decentralisation, this document recommended:

1. a more balanced dispersion of authority on territorial and administrative levels;
2. establishing and launching public calls and tenders in culture on the multiannual basis, i.e. for at least three years to stabilize cultural planning, achieve a greater autonomy of cultural institutions and strengthen national and international cultural cooperation, as well as provide sufficient time for outreach activities and applying to other funding sources;
3. introducing and affirming sustainable cultural development, encompassing infrastructural needs and heritage protection, the coordination of all levels of administration with a commitment to diverse cultural activities, as well as intersectoral connections and cooperation (with science, education, urban planning, tourism, etc.) that are acceptable to the public, civil and private spheres;
4. making of strategic plans for all administrative levels for mid to long term periods;
5. founding of the cultural councils as independent *quasi*-state bodies made of professionals on all levels where there are possibilities in relation to the size of the cultural sector and number of cultural professionals that can be involved in the work of cultural councils. This step in the decentralisation process transponds territorial and administrative decentralisation into political one in the sense of sharing of political decision-making power with the cultural sector for which decisions are being made. Cvjetičanin and Katunarić state that this line of democratisation of culture “should not grow into cultural populism that leads to relativization and dismissal of high culture values and using of public resources of culture for other purposes” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2001:52);
6. reconstructions and upgrading of the network of open national universities, cultural centres and homes of culture that involves the reconstructions and revitalisation of the existing infrastructure, but also building of the new polyfunctional cultural spaces that will yield interest from

“main proponents of cultural budgets, urbanists as well as civil institutions and private sector. What should be achieved is the balance of public and private, culturally viable commercial interests wherever possible” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 2001:52):

7. foster intersectoral cooperation with the aim of developing and strengthening cultural tourism in coastal and continental areas in order to secure perspectives for additional chances for the development of culture in less developed areas and places;
8. making of cultural indications that will provide guidelines for research work on cultural development and evaluation of decentralisation, i.e. the levels of balances cultural life and development on different territorial levels, and different territorial administrative units.

Cultural Policy of the Republic of Croatia. National Report was published in 1999 but pertains to information gathered for the period of 1996 onwards. In general, the Report underlines some similar issues concerning decentralisation of cultural policy, later addressed by the document *Croatia in the 21st century. The Strategy of Cultural Development*. These involve the issue of unclear meanings to what “public needs” in culture are, and to which standard and priority should they be defined, especially given that the cities are the financial backers of cultural activities. Further issues include “information support for decision making in culture” as “underdeveloped, uncoordinated and not up to date, especially on the county level”; “network of cultural institutions, consisting of popular and open universities, centres for culture and halls of culture” that are not specialised but rather polyfunctional; “the development of non-profit organisations and associations in the cultural sector” proceeding in “much more difficult circumstances in Croatia than in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:67). The recommendation made by this Report accordingly proposed that it was time to start making changes in then valid *Law on Endowments and Foundations*, “so that it can provide the motivation for establishing non-profit cultural organisations....Similarly, full attention should be given to the draft of the new *Law on NGOs*” (Cvjetičanin and Katunarić, 1999:81).

The issues that were brought to the fore by both *Cultural Policy of the Republic of Croatia. National Report* and *Croatia in the 21st century. The Strategy of Cultural Development* are still relevant and up-to-date, even with greater intensity. The decentralisation process of cultural policy

that had its outset at the beginnings of the new millennium, developed through the adoption of new and amendment of the old legislation in culture, while the most significant shifts still pertain to those from the beginning of the past decade.

The period since 2000 was also marked by the effects of Croatia's preparation for and consequent accession in the European Union. With the preparations and the subsequent accession in 2013, Croatian cultural system entered into the realm of European cultural policies that, according to Breznik, "foster two goals that produce conflicting effects: through state interventions in the name of "democratization" they want to broaden access to cultural goods, but through liberalization, once again in the name of "democratization" they destroy the effects of their own measures and impose limits on the access to culture" (Breznik, 2004 in Obuljen, 2006). In the results of the research titled *Global Influences and Local Cultural Changes*, Nada Švob Đokić asserted that Croatian culture has been influenced by its peripheral position in relation to European cultural context (Švob-Đokić, 2010). From that position, conducted research shows that Croatian cultural production imitates global trends and is trying to catch up with European mainstream while relying on the national concepts at the same time (Švob-Đokić, 2010:13). In other words, as described in the publication that presents already mentioned research on Croatian experiences in participatory governance in culture, „the gap that currently defines Croatian social space exists between the attempt toward affirmation in the international and particularly the European context on the one hand, and on the other the absence of tangible clues and modus of democratic behaviour in public policies, from their formulation to evaluation, just like the rules of socio-political behaviour in general. The tension of crossing paths between heterogenization and homogenization is the basis of the discussion about the cultural context (and the entire social condition) in Croatia. The condition is characterized by tensions between "internalization as well as insistence on identity-related symbolic articulations of the importance of culture and the need to dissolve that narrative by expanding, turning to dialogue, exchanging and penetrating the exterior" (Vidović, Žuvela and Mišković, 2018:45,46).

With the accession to the European Union, Croatia has entered a comparative and competitive terrain of cultural policies that features decentralisation as one of the major strategic themes (Heiskanen, 2001). D'Angelo and Vesperini (2000:8) underline culture as taking centre stage in discussing decentralisation in Europe, "not only because it involves – by identifying a geographical area with human activity – citizenship and fundamental rights such as education, the creative capacities of individuals, and sustainable and balanced development of space, but also, because, in the name of this identity and citizenship, it claims respect for minorities and the cultural diversity of peoples as the foundation for European cohesion" (D'Angelo and Vesperini, 2000:8). This is in line with the aim of governance principles that promote both *vertical decentralisation* (moving opportunities, power and resources downward and bringing decision closer to the people) and *horizontal decentralisation*, (delegation of tasks and authority from the centre, e.g. the ministry of culture, to socialised agencies or expert bodies, such as arm's-length bodies) (Heiskanen, 2001:9). The European experience of decentralisation shows that "a process of decentralisation and désétatisation has decidedly taken place (and still is taking place) in accordance with what could be seen as the ideals of the society that have developed in Europe over the last ten years. "The idea is that the state has to hand over much of its responsibility to the second and third sectors, (i.e. to the market and civil society), especially in the cultural field" (Inkei 2001:5). Another feature common to most countries is the increasing opportunity for private individuals, companies and non-profit organisations to take an active part in cultural policy, not only supporting the cultural sector but also operating within it"⁸⁷ (Klamer et al. 2006:9). Most East European countries trend towards decentralisation, but the central government remains powerful in the distribution of funds. Similarly, the prevalence of regional and local autonomy in Europe is much lower in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in comparison to the countries with developed democracies (Heiskanen, 2001:9). From the European perspective, the issues in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe emerge in the context of three problems:

87 A case in point is Italy which, breaking from its long tradition of public dominion of the cultural sector, has "introduced laws to directly involve the private sector in activities connected to heritage preservation and even management of cultural sites" (Klamer *et al.*, 2006:9).

1. “organizing the role of artists’ associations in respect to their autonomy, social and economic functions and channels to influence cultural policy decision-making;
2. solving the problems of the “ownership” of cultural and art institutions...;
3. negotiating, legislating and institutionalising the division of responsibilities for financing the arts and culture between different levels of government (Heiskanen, 2001:38).

One of the solutions that proposes itself is the adoption of the European experience and practices that entail fostering the development of the civil society and encouraging decision-makers “to recognize the role of culture as a cohesive force in society by promoting a new relationship between governments and civil society” (Heiskanen, 2001:38), or in other words, new bottom-up methods of decentralisation become useful when the traditional top-down methods fail (Heiskanen, 2001:38). However, in doing so, caution must be raised to the point that Heiskanen makes on control as the opposite “pole of decentralisation” that does not dissolve that easily, but takes on “new guises” and moves to new locations (Heiskanen, 2001:38). This refers to new methods of controlling resource allocation and managements that are driven by the New Public Management doctrine and demand the total adoption of the business logic to be implemented in the ethos and operational logic of the cultural sector. These new methods are nominally democratic and lauded for their efficient and liberal rationale, but while granting the autonomy, they “emphasise the need for strong unitary leadership and strict management control in return” (Heiskanen, 2001:48)

In the domain of public policy, according to the Article 167. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, culture is one of the fields that is regulated with the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that cultural policy is within the jurisdiction of Member States. Still, Croatia, as a Member State participates in, for example, European Commission programmes like *Creative Europe 2014-2020*, *European Capital of Culture*, *European Union Prize for literature*, as well as in deliberation structures on culture such as *Open Method Coordination*. However, as already stated, the Croatian involvement and eligibility for European Union programmes in the field of culture do not entail prescribed or mandatory changes in cultural policy, which doesn’t exclude the necessity for participation, vigilance in observing the developments, trends and tendencies in cultural policies among the Member States.

One of the significant parts of participating in the European Union's funding schemes and programmes involves cultural funding from the European Social Fund under the Operational programme Efficient human Resources 2014-2020⁸⁸. The programme line "Culture in the Centre – support for the development of the public-civil partnerships in culture" was focused on the development of participatory governance in culture through strengthening partnerships between civil society organisations and public sector. Specific aims of the programme included: further development and the existing and the establishment of new models of participatory governance in culture; strengthening capacities of the actors (employees in the civil society and public sector) that are involved in the equations of participatory governance; fostering links and networking in and of the joint participatory governance ventures; increasing the involvement of the citizens in the processes of decision-making in the local communities; and developing accessibility to arts and culture amenities for citizens. A total of 34 projects were successful in their application to this specific European Social Fund's programme line that brought a sum of 37 million kunas to the projects of development of participatory governance in culture and the development of the public-civil partnerships⁸⁹. The expected outcome of these projects is a shift in the local, and consequently, national directions of cultural policy development towards more open, democratic and inclusive governance arrangement⁹⁰.

6.4. Part four: contouring the system of cultural governance in Croatia

Main contours of the Croatian cultural policy provision, trends and tendencies have been explained in the scope of the main stages of policy evolution and its contextual setting. Many contextual factors influence and shape the governance structures and practices in the Croatian cultural field from 2000 to 2017. The most obvious ones are the socialist legacy, the turbulent and persistent transition period, culminating with the EU accession and the perpetual financial crisis. All of

88 Information obtained online at https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2014-2020/croatia/2014_hr05m9op001 (01.12.2019).

89 Information obtained online at <https://www.min-kulture.hr/default.aspx?id=21406> (01.12.2019).

90 The analysis of the outcomes of these projects is not attainable to be included in this thesis as the project period is not yet over and it surpasses the temporal lines given by the methodological framework of the research.

these factors have imprinted the key characteristics of the Croatian cultural system that defines governance structures, the identification of the key actors along with their role and the position. In the analysis of cultural governance in Croatia, special attention is given to the role of non-political (in sense of political representation), non-institutional actors, such as civil society and non-governmental sector in joint processes of decision-making and implementation of cultural policy. As it has been elaborated in the theoretical framework of this thesis, the involvement of non-profit civil stakeholders and citizens in governance processes not only affirms legitimacy, accountability and openness to participation but also the ideal and quality of *public* in public policy, i.e. cultural policy and the governing of the *public* resources in culture for the *public* benefit.

The analysis on the cultural governance sets off with the quote of Article 69. from the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia that states in the first three lines that:

“The freedom of scientific, cultural and artistic creativity shall be guaranteed.

The state shall encourage and support the development of science, culture and the arts.

[OG 135/97, Art. 5, 15 December 1997]

The state shall protect scientific, cultural and artistic assets as national spiritual values.

[OG 135/97, Art. 5, 15 December 1997]

The protection of moral and material rights deriving from scientific, cultural, artistic, intellectual and other creative efforts shall be guaranteed”

(OG56/90, 135/97, 113/00, 28/01, 76/10 and 5/14, 2014:19).

This Article affirms the role of culture in the remit of Croatian national interests and unmistakably positions culture as an accessible, publicly validated and supported field of general, the public interest. Interpreting culture as a public good that is part of social identity and value, represents the key starting point for the analysis on cultural governance, providing clear guidelines in comprehending what culture or to be more precise what culture (as understood inside cultural policy framework) should be, how public policies are treating it in different processes, with which goals and with what kind of levels of participation of which actors. Stratification of cultural policy and

cultural governance emerges from the shift in understanding culture as an integral part of social development estimate beyond its aesthetic and anthropological dimension moving toward economical resource which, in the context of globalization and forced valorisation by measurable (mostly financial) indicators, is not narrowly limited with the meanings of public, national, common.

6.4.1. Typology of Croatian cultural policy

‘Unwritten’ Croatian cultural policy has a “normal public administration approach” in which national Ministry of Culture⁹¹ is in charge of cultural affairs, starting for a legislative framework to coordination and regulation of the sub-national levels. Accordingly, by typology, Croatian cultural policy can be interpreted as the *Architect* model (Cummings, Jr. and Schuster, 1989) insofar that the Ministry of Culture holds the main governing position over the cultural sector and dictates the regulative framework made of the highly bureaucratized web of decision-making on national and sub-national levels. The fact that culture is a constitutional part of the social welfare rights and objectives affirms this typological bracket. However, there are clear elements and inclinations towards the *Engineer* model in the Croatian cultural policy as the decision-making tends to be politically conditioned and subjected to the obtainment of political goals. The prevalence of this model is dependent on the fluctuations in the political rule on the state of sub-national levels of administrations and is resonant with the explanation of Croatian cultural policy by Dragičević-Šešić and Dragojević classification according to which Croatia has strong indications of a state administrative-enlightening model. This model is characterised by the dominance of the state using its legal-political and ideological apparatus to control the cultural field (Dragičević-Šešić

91 According to the Law on the organisation and scope of national ministries and other central bodies of state administration (OG 93/2016), the Ministry of Culture is in charge of the administrative and other activities in the field of culture that pertain to: the development and progress of culture, encompassing cultural and artistic creativity, cultural life and cultural activities, establishment and founding of institutions and other legal bodies in culture, promoting cultural connections and relations with other countries and organisations, expert and administrative work for the Croatian Commission of UNESCO, administrative work in the field of public communication, fostering cultural needs of the Croatian people abroad, ensuring financial, material and other conditions for on-going and development of cultural activities, especially museums, galleries, libraries, archives, theatre, music and music&drama, publishing, fine arts and film activities. Information accessed online at <https://www.min-kulture.hr/default.aspx?id=348> (01.12.2019).

and Dragojević, 2008). It implies centristically focused and planned culture and, in Croatian case, includes residues of the socialist model, which implied planning of the cultural production besides financial planning (Dragičević-Šešić and Dragojević, 2008). The other model, periodically appearing as dominant, often mentioned in cultural discourse is a national-emancipatory model (Dragičević-Šešić and Dragojević, 2008). This model characterizes focus on autochthonous cultural tradition, neglecting minority culture, repression of the experimental and alternative expressions and tendency towards traditional fundamentalism, nativism, nationalism, revisionism and even chauvinism. Dominant is the policy of preservation and promotion of national identity as created by ethical (and religion) majority, same as the cultural interest, as may be derived, which makes the creation of a truly new cultural concept and modernisation of institutions and system in general, difficult.

6.4.2. Croatian cultural (policy) system: organisational structure and key actors


The organisational structure of cultural policy in Croatia is determined constitutionally by the structure of the institutions of state authority and the legislative framework that sustains that structure⁹². The governance matrix is defined by the structure of the cultural system⁹³ that is defined by, apart from the mentioned structures of state authority, its sub-systems such as cultural heritage and cultural activities that shape and categorize diffuse elements of artistic and cultural creativity. European cultural systems are, in the majority, defined by cultural activities that include visual arts, music, drama, literature, publishing, libraries, museums, archives and other (Dragojević, 2006), which is replicated in the Croatian cultural system.

92 Nevertheless, the organisation structure of Croatian cultural policy should be adaptable to the on-going transformations that surround and interact with the field of culture.

93 Cultural system defines a conceptual-performative-organisational fundament that enables the proper running of cultural activities and cultural life of a specific community (Dragojević, 2006). That system should involve and anticipate all levels of governance, from the national to regional and local, from civil society organisations, professional associations, individual artists, cultural audiences, i.e. all of the actors that constitutes the field of culture and cultural policy.

The governance of the cultural system is presented in the following organigram, which is distilled, clarified and updated version of the organisational organigram featured on the Croatian cultural policy profile at the Compendium of Cultural Policies & Trends⁹⁴. This version does not include the interaction between all national ministries and public bodies in the context of culture but builds on the basic structure of the state structure and organisation of the public bodies, institutions, organisations and actors that have immediate influence and role in the processes of cultural governance.

94 Accessed online at <https://www.culturalpolicies.net/database/search-by-country/country-profile/category/?id=7&g1=1> (14.12.2019).



Picture 3. Organigram of the main components of Croatian cultural system

The central position in the structure of the Croatian cultural system is held by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia as the main legislative state authority that brings all legislation, culture included. The Parliament has its Committees; the ones that relate to the field of culture is the Committee for Education, Science and Culture, as well as the Committee for the Informing, Informatisation and Media. The next level of authority is the executive position of the Government of the Republic of Croatia that proposes the legislation to the Parliament, in the case of culture, the legislation is proposed by the Ministry of Culture. The Government has an adjoining office, encompassing Office for Associations and Office for Human Rights and Rights of the National Minorities that are relevant for the cultural sector and are mostly involved in it through the cooperation with the civil society actors.

Ministry of Culture, as it has been already stated, is the most important actor in the formulation and implementation of cultural policy, as it proposed legislation, contributes to decision-making on the forming of the national budget, makes decisions on the governance of national public institutions and bodies in culture, finances public activities in culture, thus shapes the direction of the overall cultural development, etc. Cultural Councils are advisory bodies to the Ministry of Culture (with the same role replicated at the regional and local levels). Another consultative body is the Croatian Commission for UNESCO. Foundation *Kultura nova* and Croatian Audiovisual Centre are autonomous public bodies that are regulated by the legislation under the authority of the Ministry of Culture.

In the legislative framework for cultural governance, *public institutions in culture* are of the subject of the *primary importance* in the Croatian cultural system, according to which they are guaranteed substantial resources for their functioning (financial, infrastructural, spatial, human, etc.) (Dragojević, 2006). Along with public institutions in culture, *cultural organisations* are important actors in the cultural system. These organisations can be into several categories: professional associations; associations in culture; arts organisations; private institutions and organisations in culture; and individuals (artists, cultural workers, cultural entrepreneurs). All of these organisations and individuals participate in the dynamics and development of the cultural system through different interest-driven objectives – from the motive of protectionism in professional associations

to struggle for better positioning within the framework of cultural policy and a possibility for the advancement of the of governing approaches and practices.

Through the decentralisation processes that started in 2001, the sub-national administrative units, regional and local, i.e. countries, cities and municipalities assumed the focal role in the cultural system. The analysis on the number of public institutions on the level of the entire country shows that the State is the founder to only 10% of the total number of 459 public institutions in culture, while the cities are founders (with all the governing rights) to 68%, i.e. 315 public institutions in culture. Counties are funders to 18 public institutions in culture and municipalities to 79. Out of a total of 7.805 persons employed in the cultural sector, 5.997 persons are employed in the local public cultural institutions. Local authorities contribute 77% to the total share of the funding of public cultural institutions, while the State invests 23 %. On the part of funding cultural programmes, the share of the State is 49% and the local 51%⁹⁵.

The organigram reveals the main scope of Croatian cultural policy as divided into two main areas: cultural heritage and the cultural and artistic production divided into categories of cultural production, creative industries and the media. The scope of cultural policy relies on the same actors from both ends of the organigram – public cultural institutions; non-governmental associations; professional associations and freelance artists; and private organisations. The audience is placed centre stage from both ends and parallel to the levels of two main areas in the scope of cultural policy. This intervention is made by the researcher and is not included in the original organigram feature on the Croatian cultural policy profile at the Compendium of cultural policies and trends. The set of the organigram presents the mirrored structure from the national and sub-national levels, except for arm's length bodies and various governmental commissions and agencies on the sub-national levels.

95 This data was obtained from the Croatian Ministry of Culture's Services for the Strategic Planning and Analytics in 2015. The data was obtained through the written request to the Head of the Service, who then send the requested data via email.

The processes of governance on the regional and local levels fully replicate the governing process from the national level, which will be explained in the following text on the legislative framework on cultural governance.

6.4.3. Legal framework for cultural governance

The most of the Croatian cultural policy legal frame, as well as the propositions of cultural governance, refers to public institutions in culture i.e. the institutional status of cultural activity.

The functioning of public institutions in culture is regulated on two levels. First is related to the so-called general regulations, while the other refers to special regulations. Management of the public institutions is regulated at the level of general regulations, by the *Law on Institutions* (OG 76/93) from 1993, and by *Law on governing the public institutions in culture* (OG 96/01, 98/19) from 2001. Both laws define requirements and modes of the establishment of the public institutions in culture. They prescribe governing structures in the public cultural institutions as explicated in two key points; the role of governing boards and the role of director.

In keeping with the *Law on governing the public institutions in culture*, governing boards steer functioning and development of institutions in culture through making decisions on financial plans, the scope of institutional activities and programme, and are included in the selection and hiring process of a director, as well as withholding governing decision-making authority in all other decisions relevant for the institution. Law specifies criteria for the selection and appointment of the governance boards' members by stating that the majority of the governing board members should be renowned cultural workers and/or artists. The mandate of governing board members lasts for four years. The majority of the governing board's members (can range from three to five members in regional and local institutions in culture to seven members in state's institutions in culture) are appointed by the Minister of Culture (for the state's institutions in culture), or by the representative body of the administrative unit that withholds the founding and ownership rights over the institution in culture (city or county councils). Rest of the members are selected from the

representatives of institutions' employees. The Law on institutions states that the directors of the institutions are appointed and deposed by the governing boards of the institutions, while the *Law on governing the public institutions in culture* states that Minister of Culture appoints and deposes the director in the case of national institutions. In the case of the local or regional institutions, the appointment and deposition of the director are under the authority of the representative body of the local or regional administration that announces and conducts the tender for the position of the institution's director.

Although general regulations emphasize the role of governing councils as key decision-makers in the frame of cultural institutions, the experience shows that the position of local government bodies i.e. political bodies and agencies is critical for processes of decision making in cultural institutions. That implies high levels of politicization and centralization of the decision-making process in public institutions in culture⁹⁶. Politicization and centralization i.e. the excessive concentration of the management and decision-making process in political structures and bureaucratic appointments has, for almost three decades, been continuously endangering quality and standard of cultural life and thus has negatively influenced further development in general (Katunarić, 2003; Dragojević, 2006; Vidović, Žuvela and Mišković, 2018). Additionally, institutions' directors are appointed and disposed by political bodies on the proposal by (politically appointed) governing councils. There have been many appointments that are, contrary to legal provisions in sense that they involve the appointment of the individuals on the position for which they do not fulfil legally set requirements. Examples include the appointment of the Director of the Museum of Modern Arts in Dubrovnik⁹⁷, the Director of the Dubrovnik Symphony Orchestra⁹⁸; the Director of Cul-

96 Although it is a common occurrence that the members of the governing boards are drafted from the political parties, i.e. not in accordance to the legal provisions for their selection, empirically gathered data that could sustain those occurrences is unattainable. The only source of data in that line is the *Strategy of Cultural Development of the City of Dubrovnik* in which it is stated that, out of total number of 35 members of governing boards of the public institutions in culture, 23 members are actual members of the political parties, while 10 members are the representatives of the institution's employees (Obuljen Korižinek *et al.*, 2015:15).

97 More information on the case of the appointment of the Director of Dubrovnik Museum of Modern Arts is accessible online at <https://dubrovackiportal.hr/vijesti/upravni-sud-odlucio-marin-ivanovic-nezakonito-imenovan-na-mjesto-ravnatelja-ugd/> (13.01.2020).

98 More information on the case of the appointment of the Director of the Dubrovnik Symphony Orchestra is accessible online at <https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/dubrovnik-ilegalno-izabrani-ravnatelj-javnih-ustanova-u-kulturi-848208> (13.01.2020).

tural Centre for Life-long Learning Golden Doors in Split⁹⁹; and the members of the Governing Board of the Zagreb Youth Theatre¹⁰⁰, among other. Consequently, in several examples, such as, for example, the appointment of the Director of the Museum of Modern Arts in Dubrovnik and the Director of the Dubrovnik Symphony Orchestra, illegal appointments resulted in public funds being spent on covering the damages from lawsuit expenses, indicating that the court decisions are becoming a part of procedures in the governance of the cultural public sector. Blurry terrain of the governing schemes in the public cultural sector is also the appointments of artistic directors of institutions and national festivals that completely omit public tenders for the candidates that would have to compete for the position with a programme and a work plan according to the publicly announced criteria for selection. Rather, the appointment of artistic directors that manage substantial amounts of public finances for culture becomes autonomous and the arbitrary decision of the national Minister of Culture. Moreover, The Minister appoints the Artistic Director for the festivals that are located outside the capital city, for example in Pula, Split, Dubrovnik, Varaždin, Osor, Šibenik, thus making the executive decision for the artistic content that directly influences the communal and local course of local cultural life and development, while the local community (its political bodies and cultural community) has no legal rights in influencing or participating in the Minister's decision.

One of the key steps forwards in Croatian cultural system in the sense of weakening this political and bureaucratic pressure, and towards democratization, decentralization and professionalization of the decision-making process has been the establishment of aforementioned cultural councils. The key rationale behind the introduction of Cultural Councils into the cultural system was to include independent experts into decision-making processes, instead of omnipresent domination and influence of political and bureaucratic bodies.

99 More information on the case of the appointment of the Cultural Center Golden Doors in Split is accessible online at <https://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/dalmacija/split/clanak/id/601595/danijela-cukusic-imenovana-ravnateljicom-zlatnih-vrata-kotur-tijekom-rasprave-o-depolitizaciji-iznio-porazan-detalj-iz-njenog-programa> (13.01.2020).

100 More information on the case of the appointment of the members of the Governing Boards of the Zagreb Youth Theatre is accessible online at <https://faktograf.hr/2018/03/27/tomasevic-bandic-smjene-zkm/> (12.01.2020).

The establishment of the Cultural Councils began in the early 2000s with the new leftist government that made the objective of introducing a new level of decision making as an attempt to cease with the authoritarian decision-making mode from the 1990s and replace it with more transparent, more democratic and professionally grounded approaches in cultural governance (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:880). However, as Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić noted, the subsequent turn-over of the government with the return of the conservative state administration in 2003, cultural councils “are not abolished, but there are public critiques on the councils’ role becoming formal and that the decision-making on financing culture is again defined by authoritarian and non-transparent approach, while the financing priorities had been changed (proclaimed by giving more attention on cultural institutions, heritage and traditional cultural manifestations) (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2007:880). Verging on the abolishment and relativization of the role of cultural councils, which had been the main breakthrough into the democratisation of the cultural governance in the independent state of Croatia, brought an onslaught of negative reactions from the representatives of the civil society organisations. Namely, the amendment of the *Law on Cultural Councils* (OG 48/04, OG 44/09, OG 68/13) from 2004 abolished the Cultural Council for the New Media that addressed the needs of the alternative arts and youth culture. More than 40 civil society organisations gathered in the protest against the new law amendments. They claimed that abolishment of that particular Council would affirm the ghettoization and marginalisation of the contemporary arts and cultural practices that had been ideologically boxed under the category of the “alternative culture” (Obuljen and Žuvela Bušnjak, 2008). The Law was pulled from the parliamentary procedure.

Current cultural councils’ form, radius and scope has been determined by 2004 *Law on Cultural Councils*, which enables the establishment of councils for different areas of cultural activities on the national level, but also local and regional levels. Since 2004, the *Law on Cultural Councils* went through changes in 2009 and 2013, which assign Cultural Councils as “consultative bodies to the Minister of Culture with reduced autonomy but similar mandate” (Primorac *et al.*, 2014:5). The members of cultural councils are selected through public call upon recommendation from the cultural sector encompassing public institutions, civil society and non-governmental organisations, individual cultural workers and artists and private organisations in the arts and culture. The

procedure for the appointment of the cultural councils' members is the same as the appointment of the governing board member, i.e. reliant on the decision-making authority of the Minister of Culture and the representative bodies of the regional and local administrations. That is to say that, with the changes from 2004, the *Law on Cultural Councils* designated it as mandatory for all counties and cities with more than 30000 inhabitants to appoint cultural councils¹⁰¹. Apart from this territorial aspect of dispersion, Cultural Councils can be seen as an attempt of the national policy in culture in the direction of professionalization and sharing of authority in decision-making between the state and local and/or regional administrations with the cultural sector (i.e. their representatives). This refers to the provision of the *Law on Cultural Councils* that states that the members of the Cultural Councils have to be cultural workers and artists who have the experience and accomplishments relevant for the formulation and implementation of cultural policy and attainment of the objectives for which the particular Cultural Council has been founded. Still, this doesn't imply the autonomy or full authority in the decision-making processes as the role of Cultural Councils is restricted to the advisory capacity, i.e. making recommendations on decisions, while the Ministry of Culture or the legislative body of the administrative unit (i.e. city councils and county councils) approve decisions for them to become valid. Moreover, Cultural Councils *do not* have the authority to make decisions on the cultural programmes of public institutions in culture, but only for the cultural programmes proposed by the non-institutional actors. In 2016, the state administration led by the far-right political coalition attempted to introduce new changes to the *Law on Cultural Councils* (OG 48/04) that contained antidemocratic elements regarding of Council members selection and dismissal, abolishing public insight into Councils' work and additional decreases of the role of councils in favour on strengthening the role of the minister¹⁰². The

101 The process of decentralisation of cultural policy through the establishment of sub-national Cultural Councils was not smoothly implemented. For that reason, as Žuvela wrote: „provoked by the on-going delay of the decentralization process from both national and local governments, an independent organization Clubture from Zagreb started an initiative for decentralization of cultural policies at local levels. Clubture is a non-governmental organization (NGO) that has a network of independent arts organizations throughout the country, hence has direct insight into local states of affairs. The aim of the nationwide project is to challenge the position of cultural institutions owned by the local governments and their actual contribution to the community - to assess the efficiency of local service provisions for culture for citizens and to investigate existing mechanisms of governing culture including the reasoning for both privileged and marginalized positions in the subsidy schemes. Their initiative has been adopted by a number of NGOs in the country which set up projects for developing cultural strategies in nine Croatian cities (Čakovec, Karlovac, Križevci, Dubrovnik, Osijek, Pula, Rijeka, Split and Zagreb)” (Žuvela, 2007:155).

102 The draft of the proposed changes of the Law on Cultural Councils that was sent in the procedure of public consultation is accessible online at <https://esavjetovanja.gov.hr/ECon/MainScreen?entityId=3307> (23.12.2019). Ad-

anticipated changes from 2016 never happened, as the government that proposed the changes, lost the political and governmental rule¹⁰³.

There are seven Cultural Councils currently operating at the level of the state administration: for music and musical-stage arts; for cultural and artistic amateurism; for theatre and dance and other performing arts; for books, publishing and bookshops; for visual arts; for innovative artistic and cultural practices; and for international cultural cooperation. Besides cultural councils, there are other advisory bodies such as the Croatian Council for Cultural Goods, Croatian Museum Council, Croatian Library Council or Croatian Archive Council. Many other professional bodies (selection boards and committees) have also been established such as festival councils, council for contemporary dance and movement, for children's books, for rock music and club programmes and many other for different areas¹⁰⁴.

Although the intention and the rationale behind the establishment of the cultural and other professional councils were, initially, democratization and depoliticization of the decision-making process and increasing transparency of the allocation of public funds for culture according to clearly defined criteriums, their functioning and work has been kept at the advisory level, i.e. devoid of higher levels of influence on the decision-making processes. The functioning of cultural councils, from the appointment of the councils' members to the decisions on the allocation of the public funds given to the cultural activities, is tied with executive and decisive levels of political government.

As already stated, cultural governance is conducted in two basic legal levels – general and special regulations. Special regulations regulate particular cultural fields, e.g. *Law on Museums* (OG

ditionally, more media coverage on the topic featuring the comments and reactions from Croatian cultural workers is accessible online at <https://www.tportal.hr/kultura/clanak/hasanbegovic-mijenja-zakon-i-uzima-jos-vecu-moc-20160520> (23.12.2019).

103 Although the year 2019 surpasses the research period set for 2000 till 2017, it will be mentioned that the new changes in the Law on Cultural Councils was announced in 2019. It is expected that the new changes will try and solve chronic deficits of this law and establish higher democratic standards of the decision-making procedures through empowering cultural councils and/or redefinition in line of achieving higher levels of autonomy and depoliticisation.

104 The list of national cultural councils and Ministry of Culture's cultural councils is accessible online at <https://www.min-kulture.hr/default.aspx?id=13> (14.11.2019).

61/18), *Law on Theatres* (OG 71/06), *Law on Libraries and Librarian Activities* (OG 17/19), *Law on Archives* (OG 61/18), *Law on Audiovisual Activities* (OG 61/18); *Law on Protection and Preservation of Cultural Goods* (OG 69/99); *Law on Media* (OG 59/04), and *Law on Electronic Media* (OG 153/09). The policy analysis does not stretch into each particular law but focuses on those legislative acts that enable decentralisation and participatory governance in culture. Insofar, the decentralisation aspect has been detected and analysed in the general regulations in the sense of where are decisions made and who makes them, while the specifics of the participatory capacities and perspectives in the Croatian cultural policy legislations will be articulated in the part on the participatory governance.

The analytical view into the legislation that forms the cultural policy structure in Croatia shows that while the institutional cultural sector is regulated with numerous legislative acts, non-institutional cultural sector comprised of civil society organisation (associations in culture, arts organisations, individual artists etc.) is sporadically represented in the legal framework that shapes and directs cultural governance provision. The functioning of the associations in culture, on the level of cultural governance, is regulated by the *Law on Associations* (OG 74/14). This legislation is under the authority remit of the *Ministry of Public Administration* and the Public Administration Offices in the counties. The purpose of this Law is to ensure the efficient operation of associations by democratic standards of governance through the management structure defined by the association's statute. Independent artists' status is regulated by the *Law on the Independent Artists' Rights and Support for Cultural and Artistic Creativity* (OG 43/96). Apart from the independent artists, this Law also regulates the founding and the functioning of the arts organisations, encompassing the professional organisations that are also under the regulative scope of the *Law on Associations*¹⁰⁵.

105 At the beginning of the 2019, Ministry of Culture announced drafting and subsequent adoption of the new law that would regulate the status of the independent artists. The proposed draft of the new Law has yielded negative reactions from the professional associations, as well as from the independent artists. The main criticism is targeted towards greater levels of centralisation of the decision-making in the Ministry of Culture, thus overriding the professional association that has been involved in the processes of the decision-making so far, as well as introducing the new categories of *cultural professionals* that would be eligible for the already scarcely available benefits originally meant for the artists.

In the systemic void that does not anticipate functioning or survival of the non-institutional cultural sector, there are two exceptions that are defined as outcomes of the long advocacy processes and efforts of the representatives of the non-independent cultural sector. These are the *Foundation Kultura nova* and *Croatian Audiovisual Centre*.

Foundation Kultura Nova was founded by the Republic of Croatia in a special act adopted by the Croatian Parliament on July 15, 2011, *Law on Foundation Kultura nova* (OG 90/1). The establishment of the Foundation Kultura nova followed a coherent and systemic seven-year-long advocacy action led by the representatives of the civil society organisations that had already advocated for the democratisation and modernisation of the Croatian cultural policy and cultural system since the 1990s through initiatives like the mentioned one on the Cultural Councils in 2004. In the same year of 2004, the organisations started to advocate for the ‘space’ within the cultural system that would provide adequate support for the civil society organizations active in the field of contemporary arts and culture in order to validate and stabilize their position that was continuously endangered by the precarious conditions of survival on the national cultural scene, all awhile dynamically cooperating with the international art scene and representing national artistic talent and potentials abroad. The reasons for the establishment of Foundation Kultura nova were intensively discussed in the public forums, but also directly argued with the Ministry of Culture. Consequently, Foundation Kultura nova was founded in 2011 as a public body with the role in the Croatian cultural system to strengthen civil society organisations for work in contemporary arts and culture and to participate in building their organisational and programme capacities. Foundation Kultura nova is funded from the Croatian National Lottery funds and from the funds of the Ministry of Culture. The governing of Foundation Kultura nova rests on the Governing Board and the Director. The Governing Board is appointed by the Government of the Republic of Croatia and withholds the governing authority in making decisions on the finance, programme and other planning of the Foundation, as well as on the appointment of the Foundation’s Director.

Croatian Audiovisual Centre is “the Government-backed strategy agency for the audiovisual sector in Croatia” that “aims to stimulate a successful, vibrant audiovisual industry as well as

to promote the widest possible enjoyment and understanding of audiovisual works throughout Croatia”¹⁰⁶. Croatian Audiovisual Centre was founded in 2008 by the provision of the *Law on Audiovisual Activities* (OG 76/07). The initiative for the founding of the audiovisual centre started in the middle of 1990s and was then led by Albert Kapović who represented and advocated interests of the audiovisual community in their quest for a public institution that would match similar public institutions and agencies in the democratic parts of Europe. Founding of the Croatian Audiovisual Centre was not only a success in itself, as this agency quickly entered European and global audiovisual networks opening numerous possibilities for the development and affirmation of the Croatian audiovisual arts. Croatian Audiovisual Centre funds “development, production, promotion and sales of Croatian film abroad, festivals, schemes and programmes aimed at widening audience choice, supporting film education, culture and archives, as well as skills and training initiatives”¹⁰⁷. The Centre itself is funded by the State’s cultural budget and by the part of the gross income from the total of audiovisual activities in Croatia, encompassing Croatian Radio Television, operations of the cable televisions, internet providers etc. The governing set-up of Croatian Audiovisual Centre comprises of the Governing Board, the Director and the Croatian Audiovisual Council with the Artistic Director and a team of Artistic Advisors. Minister of Culture appoints three out of five members of the Governing Boards and its president. Governing Board appoints the Director, while the members of the Croatian Audiovisual Council are appointed by the representation of the key audiovisual institutions, agencies and associations in Croatia, all specified by the Article 35 of the *Law on Audiovisual Activities*¹⁰⁸.

As instruments of cultural policy, both Foundation Kultura nova and Croatian Audiovisual Centre are *arms-length bodies* that contribute to the (partial) stability of the part of the cultural field that they cover. As such, these two institutions are the examples of the power devolution from the centralised axis of the Ministry of Culture and can be interpreted as steps towards cultural policy modernisation,

106 Information obtained online at <https://www.havc.hr/eng/about-us/havc> (14.01.2020)

107 Information obtained online at <https://www.havc.hr/eng/about-us/project-funding> (14.01.2020).

108 Croatian Audiovisual Council was institutionally ‘endangered’ in already mentioned period of the far-right government (2016) that attempted to reverse the autonomy of arm’s length decision-making through political surveillance and re-centralizing of the decision-making process back to the Ministry of Culture. Again, with the change in the government, the political, ideologically charged pressure veined.

especially in sense of emancipation of specific sub-sectoral fields, such as civil society organisations in contemporary arts and culture, and audiovisual arts and activities.

However, on the general level, the steep imbalance between the modes and rights given by the cultural governance provisions to the institutions and the non-institutional sector is not only manifested through the analysis of the legislation that focuses on the institutional forms of culture but on the general legislation that regulates the working conditions in the cultural sector. These conditions involve work conditions that are vital for cultural governance, such as issues of labour and space. For example, workers in the cultural institutions are protected and bound with the unions and the so-called collective contracts for the workers in cultural institutions that are financed from the public budget, from the state to local levels. Collective contracts determine the labour conditions for cultural workers and artists in the cultural institutions down to the details from the coefficients for salaries to the, for example, the provisional timetables of the orchestral rehearsals. This type of guarantees for the working conditions of the non-institutional sector is non-existent. Workers in the civil society organisations in culture are exposed to perpetual precariat with the short term, part-time and freelance work contracts, coupled with the longer spans of underpaid and unpaid work, such as research and volunteering. Irregular income and the so-called *atypical forms of employment* place non-institutional cultural workers in the deeply unequal position in the cultural sector in comparison to the workers in the cultural institutions, but also the vulnerable position of the social insecurity (MKW, 2001 in Barada, Primorac and Buršić, 2016).

Cultural institutions are granted public spatial resources for the operation of their activities, while civil society organisation continuously struggle for the spaces, or pay rent for them (Barada, Primorac and Buršić, 2016). Research conducted by Barada, Primorac and Buršić on the labour conditions of the civil society sector in the contemporary arts and culture showed that half of the surveyed organisations pay rent to the public authorities for the public spaces that they use, meaning that part of the grants that they get, they return to the public budget¹⁰⁹. The same research underlined that only up to 30% of organisations have contracts for the spaces that they use, which

109 The issue of space is even more complicated for the organisations that operate in the tourist industry-oriented cities and places.

indicates the high levels of insecurity and instability of the civil society organisations' operation in the cultural sector (Barada, Primorac and Buršić, 2016). It must be noted, though, that both issues of work and space relate to the different levels of legislation and different areas of policy, namely that of labour policy and policy on urban planning and governing of public spatial resources (*Law on ownership and other legal rights* OG 91/96, 68/98, 137/99, 22/00, 73/00, 129/00, 114/01, 79/06, 141/06, 146/08, 38/09, 153/09, 143/12, 152/14) does not permit or the public spatial resources to be given to the non-public parties on a period that exceeds five years), as well as the policy on public administration. According to the *Law on local and regional self-government* (OG 33/01, 60/01, 129/05, 109/07, 125/08, 36/09, 36/09, 150/11, 144/12, 19/13, 137/15, 123/17) the Mayor is granted with autocratic capacity in making decisions on the local, publicly-owned real-estate, as well as the sole authority in the appointment of the members of the Governing Councils in, for example, museums and other cultural institutions where not stated otherwise by the specific legislation. In other words, numerous issues in the cultural sector are a matter of policy transfer and coordination.

New approaches to cultural governance in culture, namely practices of the participatory governance in culture aim to overcome these inequalities that hinder the consistent and comprehensive functioning of the entire cultural sector. One of the attempts to secure funding towards this end was the European Social Fund programme Culture in the Centre. But, on a more consistent basis, Foundation Kultura nova provides institutional support for securing spatial amenities for the civil society organisation in contemporary arts and culture, as well as funds for the salaries of the workers in those organisations. Funds for the salaries are also granted by the *National Foundation for Civil Society Development* that supports cooperation, linking and financing of civil society organisation in Croatia. Considering that financing from the public budgets, aka national, regional and local public budgets for non-institutional actors incorporates programming costs only, i.e. no funds for the material costs, such as salaries, utilities, etc., the institutional support from these two Foundations was a breakthrough in the functioning of the civil society organisations in culture. Still, this support is not sufficient, and the issue of the position of the non-institutional, or non-central cultural actors in the Croatian cultural (policy) system remains open.

These issues have led towards initiatives for the policy change in the direction of new governance approaches, such as participatory governance in culture. In the past decade and a half, these policy initiatives demonstrate isolated attempts to adapt to the changing socio-cultural environment by proposing decentralized modes of governance for separate areas of cultural activities and re-adjusting role of government in supporting culture. These examples mark an attempt to reform cultural policy decision-making in Croatia and bring it closer to the decentralized system which exists in many European countries.

6.5. Part five: Framework of supra-national legislation for participatory governance in culture

The terrain of policies for participatory cultural governance is nothing short but diverse across Europe. As it has already been explained, the aforementioned principle of subsidiarity ensures that the decision-making in the cultural policy happens on national and sub-national levels, and in that sense limits the European Union's and supra-national competencies to influence cultural systems. However, there is a myriad of supra-nationally created and adopted documents and standards that inform national cultural policymaking and set out the framework for encouraging and supporting national, regional and local actions¹¹⁰. Here, we shall mention some of the 'capital' documents that contributed and opened the prospects for the debate of participatory governance in culture. For instance, in 1995 The World Commission of Culture and Development presented its report *Our Creative Diversity*. To draw political conclusions from the report, UNESCO arranged an *Intergovernmental Conference of Cultural Policies* in Stockholm in 1998 that decided on an *Action Plan of Cultural Policies for Development*. The plan presented principles and policy objectives to be adopted by national governments in co-operation with actors at local and regional levels. The *Action Plan* stressed the importance of broadening participation in cultural life, recognized the role of civil society in the democratic framework of cultural policy, and affirmed that cultural policies of coming (this) century "must be anticipatory, responding to persistent problems as well

110 Special role belongs to the documents which have to be ratified by Members States thus assuming obligations to adopt and implement policies and directives defined within documents. Accordingly, some programmes and actions are harmonized between States' policies and decision-making and supra-national bodies and agencies, which contributed to problem solving and agenda setting in cultural policy within the European frame of reference.

as to new needs” (UNESCO, 1998:2). The second objective of the 1998 Action plan of Cultural Policies brings the obligation of ensuring “through cultural and urban cultural policies the development of a local, creative and participatory cultural life and pluralistic management of diversity” (UNESCO, 1998:4).

Following was the document *In from the Margins. A contribution to the debate on culture and development in Europe* published by the Council of Europe in 1996. This document strongly emphasised the role of culture in sustainable development and aimed to entice a debate on bringing cultural policy from the margins of governance. Council of Europe further elaborated the topic of inclusivity as a basis of cultural policies through linking participation to citizenship in the context of the active participation by individuals in the system of rights and responsibilities¹¹¹ and development of Directorate of Democratic Citizenship and Participation, which is focused on democratic development, human rights and the rule of law through education and youth policy and practice¹¹².

However, in the framework of the European cultural policies, integrative trends and tendencies as proposed by the supra-national agencies and bodies, such as Council of Europe, UNESCO, European Commission, etc., the participatory governance in culture are predominantly linked to sectors of cultural heritage and museums. The discourse of participation in relation to cultural heritage has been developing since the early 2000s, with the Faro Convention or The Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society from 2005 is one of the most significant documents from the period. Drawing on “the right freely to participate in cultural life enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and guaranteed by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)”, Faro convention underlines the access to cultural heritage and democratic participation through Section III on *Shared responsibility for cultural heritage and public participation*. Here, public participation is paralleled with shared responsibility and the emphasis is placed on the aspect of develop-

111 More information available online at <https://www.coe.int/en/web/compass/citizenship-and-participation> (accessed on 11.01.2018)

112 More information available online at <https://www.coe.int/en/web/democracy/directorate-of-democratic-citizenship-and-participation> (accessed on 11.01.2018)

ing “the legal, financial and professional frameworks which make possible joint action by public authorities, experts, owners, investors, businesses, non-governmental organisations and civil society”, as well as developing “innovative ways for public authorities to co-operate with other actors” (Council of Europe, 2005a:5). Shared responsibility and public participation emphasise the need for greater involvement of various actors and stakeholders in defining and managing cultural heritage and its use as a resource for sustainable development and affirmation of cultural diversities. As such, cultural heritage becomes a significant point of democratic engagement and citizens’ or communities’ involvement, both on the level of individual and collective responsibility.

Similarly, the *Conclusions on cultural heritage as a strategic resource for a sustainable Europe* from the Council of the European Union stipulate that “cultural heritage plays an important role in creating and enhancing social capital because it has the capacity to: a) inspire and foster citizens’ participation in public life; b) enhance the quality of life and the well-being of individuals and their communities; c) promote diversity and intercultural dialogue by contributing to a stronger sense of “belonging” to a wider community and a better understanding and respect between peoples; d) help to reduce social disparities, facilitate social inclusion, cultural and social participation and promote intergenerational dialogue and social cohesion” (Council of Europe, 2014a:1), among other.

The people-centred approach of enticing the active involvement of relevant stakeholders in the participatory framework of public action, i.e. public authorities and bodies, private actors, civil society organisations, NGOs, the volunteering sector and interested people — in decision-making, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of cultural heritage policies and programmes can be interpreted as one of the solutions to the democratic shortfalls in cultural policies through increasing “accountability and transparency of public resource investments as well as to build public trust in policy decisions” (Council of the European Union 2014b:2). Namely, this approach aims at increasing accountability and transparency of public resource investments, as well as to build public trust in policy decisions (Sani *et al.*, 2015). In that direction, the “Council conclusions on participatory governance of cultural heritage“ of the Council of the European Union, and the EU Commission Communication “Towards an integrated approach to cultural heritage in

Europe”, both issued in 2014, recognize the importance of transparent and participatory governance systems to be shared with the people to whom heritage ultimately belongs. Specifically, the EU Council’s Conclusions of participatory governance of cultural heritage from 2014 underline the “importance to make cultural governance more open, participatory, effective and coherent and invited the Member States to promote a participatory approach to cultural policy-making” (Council of the European Union, 2014b:2) and calls on the Members States to promote long-term policies that are society and citizen-driven. The Conclusions give straight-forward recognition to participation as a building block of the democratic evolution, sustainability and social cohesion in the face of the social, political and demographic challenges of present times.

The European Agenda for Culture does not explicitly target the notion of participatory or shared governance, however, the Agenda introduces the opportunities for the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) calling to numerous field of culture, such as professional organisations, cultural institutions, non-governmental organisations, European networks, foundations, etc., to engage in dialogue with “with EU institutions and support for the development of new EU policies and actions, as well as developing dialogue among themselves” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007:8). Within the OMC operational framework, the topic of participatory governance was approached on several different lines. These include the expert work done on the *Report on Policies and Good Practices in the Public Arts and in Cultural Institutions to Promote Better Access to and Wider Participation in Culture* (Bollo *et al.*, 2012) within the framework of the Work Plan for Culture 2011-2014 and the Voices for Culture Brainstorming Report on Participatory Governance of Cultural Heritage (2015). The Brainstorming Report channelled the voices of the EU civil society, which have been critical of the (sporadically and unsystematic) involvement of civil society in the EU decision making. The Brainstorming Report itself brings a definitional scope on participatory governance of cultural heritage that has been aforementioned and has provided arguments on why participatory governance is needed and important for cultural heritage. Moreover, this document has proposed a comprehensive list of pre-conditions for participatory governance in cultural heritage, which requires “trust, ethics and respect, political will (no tokenism), professional and social will, a legal framework, transparency and access to information,

education/training for all the actors involved and fund for promoting true participation” (Voices of Culture, 2015:12).

The European Agenda for Culture turns to UNESCO and its contribution to the participatory governance in culture outside the demarcation of cultural heritage, the Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression from 2005¹¹³. The importance of this Convention for the development of more democratic and participatory agendas and formats of cultural policy is specifically linked to the Article 11 on the participation of civil society. The role of civil society as participating partners in the design and implementation of policies is underlined in the implementation goal of *support sustainable systems of governance for culture*, derived from the Convention’s guiding principles (UNESCO, 2015). In the second edition of the Global Report on the implementation of the UNESCO Convention, informed, transparent and participatory processes and systems of governance are called upon the States to be adopted and implemented in policies (UNESCO, 2017). Participatory and collaborative governance is seen as a significant direction in policy innovation in the remit of the UNESCO 2005 Convention. The civil society’s role is underlined in the remit of “policy innovation, design and implementation of programmes that serve the public interest, heretofore entrusted to public authorities alone” (Baltà Portolés, 2017:40-41), as well as in raising awareness and building capacities. In the same Report, we find several examples of the participatory cultural governance which make the point that there is no perspective on democracy and sustainability in cultural policy without civic participation. For this reason, national policies and measures should contribute to participatory systems of governance of culture. Firmin underlines that this “goal can only be achieved if civil society is able to play a strong role because civil society offers a key vehicle for people’s participation and can be pivotal in asserting accountability and demanding transparency, which together make it more likely that cultural policies and measures reflect and serve the needs of citizens” (Firmin, 2017:87). What is also observed in Report by Baltà Portolés is the incipient human right-based shift in cultural

113 The Convention was adopted as a tool to protect and foster cultural production that was becoming increasingly monopolised globally with fewer owners than ever before dominating the cultural market, which was not a desirable development from the perspective of human rights (Obuljen and Smiers, 2006). The reduction in the number of owners and the diversity of choices was also seen as a “threat to democracy, since a rich diversity of voices and images is essential for democratic discourse” (Obuljen and Smiers, 2006:3).

policies, which is in line with the Goal 4 of the Convention and evident in numerous European countries (e.g. Finland, France, Norway, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden) where cultural rights have been adopted in cultural policies and measures (Baltà Portolés, 2017). Still, this direction of policy development is unequally represented in most European countries, which suggests that further effort is needed. The same goes for the involvement of civil society and the improvement of genuinely taking into account the representation of civil society, regardless of the political shifts that can bring dramatic changes in the political and policy behaviour towards civil society.

6.6. Part six: Croatian experiences of participatory governance practices in culture – policy provisions and bottom-up practices

In the analysis of the policy framework for participatory governance in culture in Croatia, the main preoccupation was to detect and interpret the legal provisions that concentrate on the participatory governance in culture, i.e. the *power-sharing* in planning, (co)founding, (co) governing of the institutional and organisational formats in culture. The participation in the sense of having the right to access to culture and to produce arts and culture is guaranteed by the Constitution, as it has already been stated. Cultural participation as a *taking part* in cultural activities, i.e. the discourse on the various dimensions and levels of audience development and engagement is not in the focus of this research. However, according to the research presented by Vidović, Žuvela and Mišković “only two legal documents pertaining to cultural policy explicitly state stipulations that refer to cultural participation, but neither document defines the responsibilities of public bodies and administration, which would ensure the basis for citizen participation in decision making for the creation and implementation of cultural policies, either on the national or on regional and local levels. In the Bylaws on selection and allocation of public needs in culture (OG 55/2016), Article 7 explicitly states, among evaluation criteria for submitted proposals, that there should be ‘promotion of programmes for children and the youth’ and ‘participation of the disabled in the programme, and the programmes’ suitability for the disabled’. Cultural participation, in the sense of audience development and support for attracting new audiences, is explicitly mentioned as the task of the Directorate for cultural and artistic development in the Directive on the internal struc-

ture of the Ministry of Culture, adopted in 2017, which is an improvement in comparison to earlier directives” (Vidović, Žuvela and Mišković, 2018:54).

The possibilities for participatory governance in culture in the form of the joint founding of and governing of public institutions in culture are found in the following legislation:

- the *Law on Institutions* (OG 76/93, 29/97, 47/99, 35/08, 127/19), Article 7, Section 1, Point 3 states that public institutions can be founded by a number of founders explicated by the previous points (the Republic of Croatia; local and regional self-government; legal or physical entities), which explicates that public institution can be founded by the partnership between different actors. For example, Croatian Library for the Blind and Pogon was founded upon the legal foundation in this legislation. The former was founded as a civil-public partnership between the Republic of Croatia and Croatian Association of the Blind in the ratio 50 to 50% (five members of the governing board of this institutions are: one representative of the Ministry of Culture; one representative of the Ministry of Labour and Pension System; two representatives from the Croatian Association of the Blind; and one representative of the Library’s workers¹¹⁴) based on the *Bylaw on the founding of the Croatian Library for the Blind* (OG 115/99)¹¹⁵. The latter was founded as a civil-public partnership between the City of Zagreb and Alliance Operation City, based on the contract on the founding of the institution between the two partnering sides. The details on the Pogon case of participatory governance in culture will be presented in the following case study section.
- Joint founding and governing of a public company is stipulated by the Article 68, Sections 1 and 2 of the *Law on Companies* (OG 111/93, 34/99, 121/99, 52/00, 118/03, 107/07, 146/08, 137/09, 125/11, 152/11, 111/12, 68/13, 110/15, 40/19), which enables the possibility of co-founding a company between legal or physical entities. The public companies in culture are not a regular occurrence in the Croatian cultural policy, but the example is found in Dubrovnik

114 Information accessed online at zakon.poslovna.hr/public/uredba-o-osnivanju-hrvatske-knjiznice-za-slijepe/18801/zakoni.aspx (13.01.2020).

115 More information on the Croatian Library for the Blind is available online at <https://www.hkzasl.hr/o-knjiznici/povijest> (accessed at 13.01.2020) and <https://www.min-kulture.hr/default.aspx?id=13032> (accessed at 13.01.2020)

with the founding of public company Dubrovnik Heritage Llc., which was founded to manage built heritage objects in the ownership of the City of Dubrovnik. The governing structure of the company does not involve participatory governance aspects, but the company is involved in the management of the heritage complex of Lazareti where one of the participatory governance of culture examples is found. This will be more expounded in the case study section.

- The *Law on Foundations and Funds* (OG 36/95, 64/01) stipulates in the Article 3, Sections 1 and 2 that “the foundation can be established by one or more Croatian or foreign natural or legal persons. This Law does not provide for the establishment of public foundations, even though in practice they are established on the national level according to laws of each foundation passed by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia and on regional and local levels according to a special act passed by the county or city assembly” (Vidović, Žuvela and Mišković, 2018:55).
- The *Cooperatives Act* (OG 34/11, 125/13, 76/14) states, in the Article 6, Sections 1 and 2, that the cooperative can be founded by” no less than seven persons having full capacity to exercise rights, or by a legal person” (Vidović, Žuvela and Mišković, 2018:55).
- Law on Associations (OG 74/2014) prescribes that the association may be established by no less than three natural or legal persons. However, it does not prescribe the legal form of legal persons (Vidović, Žuvela and Mišković, 2018).

Although it stretches outside the temporal perimeter of the research in this thesis, it will be noted that in 2018 and 2019, Croatian cultural policy system had two changes in the legislation that are significant in the sense of their proclivity towards participatory governance in culture. One refers to the changes in the *Law on Museums* (OG 61/18, 98/19) in which Article 17. Section 4 states that public museum can be founded by more than one founder explicated by the previous points (the Republic of Croatia; local and regional self-government; legal or physical entities), while their partnership is regulated by the founding contract. The second one is the *Law on Libraries* (OG 17/19, OG 98/19). Similar to the *Law on Museums*, in Article 9. Section 4, the *Law on Libraries* states that more founders can jointly found a public library (the Republic of Croatia; local and regional self-government; legal or physical entities), while their partnership is regulated by the founding contract.

In the register of cultural heritage, the analysis of Croatian legislation in the domain of protection and preservation cultural heritage does not result in detection of any provisions that promote, address or encourage participatory governance in culture. However, in the past decade, a number of the so-called Management Plans began to emerge as new instruments in the horizon of Croatian cultural governance. The rationale behind management plans rests on the UNESCO requirement¹¹⁶ and the aim of protection of cultural heritage and introduction of smart and sustainable modes of governance. A comprehensive list of existing or in-the-making Management Plans in Croatia is unattainable. However, the internet search results in a number of Management Plans that are disperse, geographically and typologically differentiated and diverse in scope. Namely, detected Management Plans have a span from cultural goods and monuments on local and regional levels, such as the example of Šibenik and the Management Plan for cultural goods on the local and regional level¹¹⁷, Roman city of Siscia¹¹⁸ – Sisak, to Management Plans for specific heritage objects such as Euphrasian Basilica in Poreč¹¹⁹ and heritage complex such as Lazareti in Dubrovnik¹²⁰ and whole heritage cities like Dubrovnik and Split.

The examples of Split and Dubrovnik are idiosyncratic insofar that they attempt to grasp extremely complex formation of heritage sites that (still) function as live urban city centres. The strong pressure from the tourism industry has caused profound transformations in these two cities and heritage localities economising steep demographic decline, functional degradation, *apartmentisation*, musealisation, faked authenticity, and whole other spectre of commodification processes that inevitably lead to the devastation of aesthetic and anthropological cultural values that originally, hence paradoxically, made these two cities universally valuable and recognizable. While the

116 UNESCO requires that all World Heritage Sites have Management Plans created upon the methodology set by UNESCO.

117 More information available online at <https://www.tvrdjava-kulture.hr/media/27651/euplanupravljanjakulturnim-dobrimanalokalnojiregionalnojrazini.pdf> (13.01.2020).

118 More information available online at https://www.min-kulture.hr/userdocsimages/Bastina/Ljubljanski%20proces%20II/MP_Croatia_RomanTownSiscia_HRV.pdf (13.01.2020).

119 More information available online at <http://www.porec.hr/sadrzaj/dokumenti/točka%205.%20prilog%201.Plan%20upravljanja%20Eufrazijanom.pdf> (13.01.2020).

120 More information available online at www.dubrovnik.hr/gradsko-vijece/2016/11/plan-upravljanja-spomenickim-kompleksom-lazaret-2016-2020.pdf (13.01.2020).

analysis in this thesis will not read into the details of Management Plan genesis in both of these cities, it will be said that both these Management Plans have had a jarring process in which the participation of citizens as equal actors with rights to decision-making in the process was greatly disregarded. The struggle to be included in the decision-making process as well as to have the right to use the public resources in culture, particularly those in the form of public space that is or can be used for cultural and artistic activities has been in the core of the formation of participatory governance in culture practices in several Croatian cities.

6.6.1. The trajectory of bottom-up practices of participatory governance in culture in Croatian cities

As it has been explained in the previous parts of this chapter, since the 1990s, civil society organizations have played an important role in Croatian cultural realm by advocating and promoting the more open and democratic approaches to cultural governance and cultural policy development. Due to their marginal position in Croatian cultural policy system in sense of decision-making capacity and accessibility to public resources, as well as work conditions, civil society actors used self-organizing, tactical actions and program sharing and exchanging to promote various forms of progressive cultural practices, to actively advocate the necessary changes in the cultural system as well as to establish models of shared cultural leadership. As it has been previously written, decades of advocacy network actions and negotiations with the public authorities on the national and local level, resulted in the creation of a first-ever public foundation dedicated to funding civil society in contemporary arts and culture (Foundation *Kultura nova*), as well as a new format of hybrid cultural institution based on participatory governance (*Pogon – Zagreb's Center for Independent Culture and Youth*). These upgrades in the cultural policy provided guidance and perspective for further development of the alternative concepts of cultural leadership and governance befitting for needs and expectations of present and future generations. However, around these policy upgrades and initiatives, a myriad of practices have been growing into the examples of innovative practices in Croatian cultural policy framework in the sense that they involve governance schemes of public cultural spaces with the constellations of groups of civil society organisations extended towards local communities and citizens. As the case study of *Lazareti* in Dubrovnik will show, some of these initiatives have been on-going

and struggling for their 'space' for three decades, which indicates that both strength and struggle for the democratisation and modernisation of cultural policy has been persistent before the noted policy upgrades in the form of new institutions such as Foundation Kultura nova and Pogon.

Foundation Kultura nova placed these initiatives centre-stage in the research that has been written about in the methodological chapter of this thesis, as well as in this one. The idea of pursuing the topic of participatory governance as a means of democratic enforcement in cultural policy and governance came out of Foundation's continuous efforts in monitoring and juxtaposing organisational needs of the civil society in contemporary arts and culture with the opportunities and deficits in cultural policy provision. This led the Foundation towards following and investigating adequate, possible and available responses applicable in various contexts and adaptable to local circumstances through its development programmes. Through the process of providing support to civil society organisations, what became noticeable were advocacy platforms created to develop socio-cultural centres based on the participatory governance and civil-public partnership. The Foundation recognised the relevance and the innovative aspects of policy change that these initiatives were aiming for and has since invested efforts to provide additional support besides financial one. In that line, Foundation Kultura Nova developed a research project on participatory governance in culture intending to strengthen the links and interconnections between civil society sector, public sector and the local community, thus fostering participatory designs in cultural policy and governance as a possible approach for more democratic and sustainable development of the cultural sector. The emergence of new forms of cultural institutions that directly tackle the challenges and fails of democratic traits in the contemporary cultural system entails the creation of new relations and networks based on open, participatory, effective and coherent processes and brings to the fore the issue of cultural resources, most specifically that of the spatial infrastructure. This type of development highlights the role of localities or the local levels as nuclei of an array of innovative and experimental concepts of cultural development.

The research was conducted in seven locations: Lazareti Socio-Cultural Centre in Dubrovnik, Community Centre Čakovec in Čakovec¹²¹, Socio-Cultural Centre in Karlovac¹²², Molekula in Rijeka¹²³, Rojc Community Centre in Pula¹²⁴, Youth Home in Split¹²⁵, and Pogon — Zagreb Centre

121 „Čakovec Community Centre puts great emphasis on various social and social-entrepreneurship programmes. Such programmes combine civil society activism, responsible business practices, social awareness and entrepreneurship, thereby creating a wider basis and the potential to produce a certain degree of self-sufficiency in a relatively short period of time” (Sutklović, 2018:135). The initiative for Čakovec Community Centre “brings together around twenty civil society organizations, social and cultural activists and citizens. Key elements of the Platform’s activities are non-profitability, participation, inclusiveness and solidarity, the main idea being to preserve public spaces, many of which have already been turned into private properties due to the commercial policy of the public authorities. Therefore, Platform promotes and advocates democratic and participatory practices in designing public policies, creates conditions for the development of participatory democracy, for the participation of citizens and civil society organizations in decision making processes at the local level and, as already mentioned, addresses issues related to the use of public spaces in the city and the region. Consequently, the Platform is aimed at creating spaces for social exchange and cultural activity, places where citizens are able to discuss the rights and responsibilities of living together in a city, and finally, to participate in its development” (Sutklović, 2018:124).

122 In Karlovac, Associational Alliance KAoperativa took over the managing of the *Small Stage (Mala Scena)* and is included in the governing of the Croatian Home. KAoperativa participated in the refurbishment of the space of *Small Stage*, in which it “invested its own resources as well, being both the user and events manager from 2013 to April 2016. At the time, despite KAoperativa’s advocating the creation of a governance model including an umbrella organization of associations, a slightly different governance model was established. The initial model included appointing Mladost (a company which was generally in charge of maintaining and managing the city’s sports facilities) as both the manager and coordinator of activities of Mala scena and the Program Council (composed of representatives of the City of Karlovac as well as representatives of civil society organizations) as the predominant users of the space. Soon, however, this model proved to be inadequate and was abandoned, mostly because Mladost showed no interest in the arts agenda and the association was not satisfied with the work performed by the company. Following negotiations between City and Federation representatives, a pilot project was signed, whereby the City entrusted the governance of the space to an independent manager, KAoperativa, on a trial basis. After such a governance proved to be adequate, a public-civil partnership was established, within which the model of participatory governance was created” (Sutklović, 2018:141-142).

123 Molekula is the name of a cultural centre and an association alliance that was formed in 2007 in Rijeka. Lead by the idea of shared spatial and technical resources, and in the lack of work, production and presentation spaces, 6 non-profit organizations that are active in different artistic fields formed the Molekula Association Alliance in order to manage together the cultural centre under the same name. The centre was situated first in a former dockside warehouse. After the City of Rijeka issued calls for managing three large spatial venues situated in different locations in the city, the Alliance composed a program and proposal to take over these venues in which the Centre could carry on with its activities. The City of Rijeka appointed all the spaces for use and management without fee to the Alliance, they signed a 5year contract and took it upon themselves to cover the maintenance costs. The Alliance came up with a model for use of all the Centre spaces, and their members have moved their offices into new spaces and use spaces for their programs according to their areas of work. They also work with organization outside Alliance in providing the space for their activities.

124 The former military facility Karlo Rojc is the largest single building in the city Pula - it has the surface of 16739 square meters. For many years now, it is home to numerous civil society organizations. The organizations began with appropriation of abandoned public property in the late 1990s after refugees that found temporary shelter in the military facility left the space. After a number of organizations squatted parts of the building, the city government issued a call for appointing spaces to non-profit organizations without paying rent and utilities, while the associations took it upon themselves to maintain the spaces. Users of Rojc and the City of Pula established the Working group for coordination and it consists of representatives of the City of Pula and the associations and it is in charge of common decision-making process. In order to establish more efficient communication with the City of Pula about 20 associations situated in Rojc formed formal Rojc Association Alliance.

125 Youth House is situated in unfinished building of Socialist Youth House in Split. The owner of this impressive

for Independent Culture and Youth in Zagreb. The examples feature socio-cultural centres that were set up by civil society organizations (non-profit and non-governmental associations), which self-manage various types of publicly-owned buildings where they organize cultural activities and experiment with governance and management. All cases are a result of the bottom-up approaches and they should be considered as emerging operations evolving towards participatory governance between various stakeholders. The examples bear witness that the model of participatory governance of (still informal) institutions can be designed in different variations, depends on the local context, on the strengths and weaknesses of existing cultural operators, local policy administrations, representatives of the local community, etc. But all of these spaces were established with the same orientation. Opposite to the traditional formats of cultural centres that are characterized by centralized management, the new models of socio-cultural centres are based on the experience of self-organization and the idea of social solidarity and equity, resources sharing, participatory governance and balanced urban development that is closely connected and dependent to the civic engagement. Furthermore, the examples follow the path of institutional innovation in the domain of shared or participatory governance whereby the citizens are directly involved through civil society organisations in the deliberative policy discussion on the modes and purposes of public cultural resources. What makes these shared creative spaces in Croatia different to their predecessors (i.e. cultural centres that have been sustained from the pre-1990s period) are not only the approaches and modes of governance but the entire rationale towards the main purpose, functioning and development of these spaces. While the older ones were made for the people, the emerging ones are made with the people.

The following section of the empirical framework of the thesis focuses on two units out of the seven locations that were encompassed, that of Lazareti in Dubrovnik and Pogon in Zagreb.

building that has a couple of thousand square meters is the City of Split. In the late 1990s separate parts of the building began to be gradually inhabited by the CSOs. After 2000, the House began to be used more after some of the rooms were given for use to a number of youth and cultural organizations that formed a coalition and instigated a six months long campaign to obtain spaces in the Youth House. Since 2005, the city cultural institution Multimedia Cultural Centre Split has been managing the House.

7. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: LAZARETI AND POGON

This chapter is dedicated to the in-depth analysis of two examples of participatory governance in culture - that of Lazareti in Dubrovnik and Pogon in Zagreb. The methodological framework of the thesis brought the explanation as to how the case study was generated and how was the research for the compilation of the case study conducted. Two examples or case study units are here presented as they have been originally written by the researcher for the research conducted by Foundation Kultura nova titled “Approaches to Participatory Governance of Cultural Institutions”. Both case study units are structured in the same manner and according to the same research protocols. However, in some parts, the case study units have been extended with additional information obtained through the research process. Also, given that the ‘life-span’ of each case study unit is different, Lazareti case spreads over thirty years and Pogon over ten, the scope of the analysis differs, as does the insight into the involved actors or groups of actors and the genesis of the entire case. Accordingly, the main aim of these two case studies units is to provide an in-depth insight into the practices of participatory governance in culture, along with their main contextual and conceptual differences and systemic hindrances.

7.1. Case study unit 1: Lazareti

The case of Lazareti is idiosyncratic in many aspects. Most specific ones are the context of the city in which Lazareti are situated and the fact that Lazareti have a long-standing tradition of three decades as a space of socio-cultural activity, which makes Lazareti one of the first examples of artist-led cultural initiatives and centres in the country. Accordingly, the case of Lazareti has a complex trajectory of evolution and a rich history that is aligned with the main interests of this thesis. The first part of this case study gives an overview of Lazareti’s context. The second part provides a more in-depth analysis of existing and emerging tendencies of participatory governance in culture and the devolution of rights and responsibilities in the development of Lazareti socio-cultural centre.

7.1.1. The contextual setting of Lazareti socio-cultural centre

The context of Dubrovnik may seem self-explanatory because it signifies a globally recognizable picture-postcard image of a historic city that attracts millions of tourists annually. It is one of the few global cities with UNESCO's universal value status of tangible and intangible cultural heritage¹²⁶. Commercial exploitation of rich pool of cultural heritage resources for tourism has been the foundation of the local economic progress; today, Dubrovnik is the second most developed city in Croatia, right after capital city Zagreb¹²⁷, with the average personal income being even higher than in Zagreb. The development based on the heritage resources and narratives is corroborated with the highest national index in cultural tourism (more than 30% of tourists visit Dubrovnik for cultural purposes), as well as with the highest cultural investment per capita¹²⁸. Consequently, the meaning of „culture“ in Dubrovnik is articulated as a synonym of „heritage“, and heritage is understood as an identity marker and an asset for economic gains. This creates a steep dichotomy that defines Dubrovnik as a context of abundance resource-wise and the scarcity of new and contemporary strata of local identity and resource. As observed in the text for Dubrovnik's candidacy for European Capital of Culture 2020: “Dubrovnik is a city that is endowed with high cultural visibility and substantial resources for culture. Simultaneously, it is marked by substantial deficits in artistic creation, along with the deficits in dynamics of cultural production, cultural exchange and wider cultural cooperation. Local cultural resources are not managed in a sustainable way while the dominant models of cultural consumption based on commercial exploitation of cultural goods diminish the access and right to culture” (Dubrovnik2020, 2016:5).

126 The historical core of the city was included on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1979, while the Festivity of St. Blaise was included on the UNESCO Representative List of World Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2009.

127 Data has been taken from www.gradonacelnik.hr/od-10-najrazvijenijih-hrvatskih-gradova-cak-7-morskih (04.03. 2018).

128 Dubrovnik's cultural investment per capita is by far the largest in Croatia and amounts to 1,730 HRK (233 Euro), while national expenditure on culture is 535 HRK (72 Euro) per capita. While allocations for culture from the city budgets in other Croatian cities average 6.18% and the level of the state allocation is approximately 0.71%, Dubrovnik sets aside more than 15% of its overall budget for culture. The information on ratios and levels of public cultural investment were obtained from the City of Dubrovnik's Department of Culture and Heritage.

As such, Dubrovnik is a very challenging setting for innovative cultural policy models and new institutional frameworks in participatory governance in culture. Here, we shall underline some of the key facts as determinants of the context in which cultural planning should enable perspectives for the development of more democratic and participatory governance methods and approaches. These key facts include:

- Geographical positioning as a marker of insular mentality: the city is situated at the far South-east corner of Croatia, completely isolated by the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the West and North, Montenegro on the South-east and sea border with Italy. This is the only part of the sovereign European Union (EU) soil that is cut-off from the rest of the EU territory¹²⁹ (Dubrovnik2020, 2014; 2016).
- Declining rates of citizens and the issue of citizenship: according to the National Population Census from 2011, City of Dubrovnik has 42.615 inhabitants, which indicates a decline of 2.58% when compared to the census from 2001 when the number of inhabitants was 43.770. The decline in the number of citizens is juxtaposed with the influx of seasonal workers. According to the report from Dubrovnik's branch of Croatian Employment Service, the number of seasonal workers is continuously increasing since 2007 and has reached its highest peak in 2013 with 3700 seasonal workers. The numbers for more recent years have been unattainable, but it can be speculated that they are in constant rise. Vigilant observation of the fluctuations in city's population is crucial for understanding and analyses of notions of community, citizenship and urbanity, i.e. the sense of cultural capital (in the wider framework of social and human capital) needed as a resource fundamental and strata for creation of socio-cultural centres based on participatory governance.
- From city to destination: the most profound change that Dubrovnik has been experiencing during the past decades is a definite shift from urbanity and *cityness* towards tourist resort or destination. This is corroborated with the huge disproportion between the numbers of citizens versus the number of tourists, which now stands at 42.615 citizens to 1.036.402 annual tour-

129 The city is not connected by motorway and is regularly covered by air-traffic only in the months of the tourist season, which adds to the logistic and financial demands on cultural and artists' mobility and cooperation.

ists¹³⁰. For illustration, the density of tourists in the Dubrovnik, in relation to the size of the city and the number of local citizens, is significantly higher than in Venice and Barcelona¹³¹.

- The misbalanced concentration of city's reconfiguration with cultural content and activity: most cultural institutions have their premises in the Old City, which just nominally withholds the status of the city's centre. The speculations suggest that there are no more than 800 inhabitants in comparison to the number of 2000 inhabitants in the 2000s. The issue of concentration of cultural infrastructure and offering in the rapidly depopulated and increasingly commodified historical core of the city is one of the main points made by the city's cultural administration and generally in most of the interviewees. It is considered that the future development of much needed inventive artistic and cultural work should find its place in the areas outside heritage and tourist-laden zone. The questions were raised about the purpose of the public cultural institutions that are increasingly oriented towards tourist market as a cultural offering in the central part of the city notes declining numbers in cultural participation of the local citizens who perceive the city centre as an overcrowded and overpriced tourist zone. Besides, the commodification of the historic core has been endangering the cultural activities that have had the traditional traits of ambientality (i.e. the Dubrovnik Summer Festival programmes) and the use of open public space that is no longer open and accessible for culture.
- Local Cultural Policy: Dubrovnik has The Strategy of Local Cultural Development of the City of Dubrovnik 2015 – 2025. In line with the mentioned dichotomous nature of the local articulations and values of culture, the strategic document on local cultural development underlines the need for sustainable modes of cultural governance and management, especially in the register of heritage, as well as the preservation of space and development of new (or re-activation of the

130 The stated information refers to the number of tourists in 2017. The data has been taken from <https://dubrovacki.slobodnadalmacija.hr/vijesti/turizam-i-gospodarstvo/clanak/id/461218/dubrovnik-lani-posjetilo-vise-od-milijun-turista-a-broj-nocenja-se-popeo-na-37-milijuna> (07.02.2018).

131 According to the research findings provided by the civil society organisation Placa, a collective for spatial research, impact on the historical city centre due to the annual number of tourists is more dense in Dubrovnik than in Venice or Barcelona. To explain, Venice has 22 million annual visitors on 11 km² of historic city, which results in an impact of 2 million visitors per km². Barcelona has 7.8 million annual visitors on 4.37 km² of historic city, resulting in density of 1.8 million of tourist per km². Dubrovnik has 2.1 million annual visitors on 0.18 km² of historic city which results in a staggering impact of 11.6 million visitors per km². The data refers to tourist numbers from 2016 and include the number of visitors from cruise tours from the Dubrovačko-neretvanska county area, considering the fact that the data for Venice and Barcelona refers not only to the narrow city areas, but to the metropolitan areas.

old) cultural infrastructure. The ‘hardware’ aspects of cultural development, i.e. that of cultural infrastructure, serve as a grounds for attaining the central goals of addressing the ‘software’ deficits through developing cultural creativity and cooperation, with the emphasis given to the encouragement of public participation in the development of culture (Obuljen Koržinek *et al.*, 2014).

- Local Cultural Sector: local cultural infrastructure consists of twelve public cultural institutions established by the City of Dubrovnik with over 300 permanent employees; six public cultural institutions founded by the State and the County; over hundred cultural civil associations, encompassing regional and local branches of the national professional associations, branches of national institutions and networks and international associations. There are no cultural centres in Dubrovnik, or any type of diffuse forms of cultural activities gathered in a single physical and/organisational entity. This lack of cultural infrastructure in the form of the cultural centre is addressed in the strategic document for cultural development. In the register of creative industries, Dubrovnik is quite impoverished and dependent mostly on the creative industry sector that functions as a support service to the tourist industry, especially in sense of design and architecture. The situation changes for the better in the domain of IT and programming. Out of the local educational sector, we must mention Luka Sorkočević School of Arts, the Inter-University Centre (IUC) and the International Center of Croatian Universities as important stakeholders of cultural life. In addition, religious organisations actively participate in cultural life and the promotion of inter-religious tolerance and intercultural dialogue.
- Financial resources for Culture: In absolute terms, the planned budget for culture in the City of Dubrovnik for the year 2018 was 135.800.000 kuna (18.3 million Euro). Out of this amount, the income from cultural resources was 108.500.000 kuna (14.4 million Euro)¹³². More than three-quarters of the annual budget of the City’s Department of Culture and Heritage goes to the funding of 12 cultural institutions founded by the City, including their capital expenditures. Capital investments from other departments of the city administration are related to reconstruction and purchase of valuable historical buildings and the maintenance of the monuments. The pur-

¹³² The stated data includes income from the tickets to the city walls (62 million kuna/€8.4 million); income from Dubrovnik Card (12.5 million kuna/€1.7 million); income from tickets to Dubrovnik museums (10 million kuna/€1.3 million); and income from EU funding for Lazareti project (24 million kuna /€3.2 million).

chasing and renovation of the infrastructure for culture are not substantiated by the analytical foundation and assessment and without proper planning directives. This causes a vulnerability in the actual cultural planning cycles and leaves much decision-making to the ad-hoc political interventions and one-off solutions that seldom become permanent, yet inadequate models in cultural governance¹³³.

- Local structures for governing and managing culture: City of Dubrovnik's administration has a Department of Culture and Heritage, which is the main administrative unit for governing of the local cultural sector. The local trends in cultural governance show considerable issues and resilience towards participative, depoliticized and decentralized modes of governance. To illustrate, Dubrovnik was one of the last cities in Croatia to introduce Cultural Councils in the decision-making procedures in 2009 and has repeatedly obscured the full legal potential of Cultural Council's contribution to more participatory decision-making. Namely, since 2013, Dubrovnik has had a single Cultural Council. The decision to re-introduce five Cultural Council has been made in January 2018 but with three members per council only. This scarcely widens the scope of inclusion and participation of cultural scene in the decision-making processes and limits the number of individuals that can be involved in the policy decision-making processes. Overall, the governance system is highly politicised and characterized by cronyism that is adverse for the introduction and implementation of open, inclusive, equitable and sustainable modes of governance.

The context of Dubrovnik poses a great challenge for non-institutional, non-traditionalist cultural expressions, as well as for the development of new institutional and organisational models that will critically address and work with the (regressive) socio-cultural environment. Context as a place of departure for such engagement in arts and culture was perseveringly present in the work

133 One of the best examples is the use of the Revelin Fort that was first envisaged as a multifunctional cultural centre with its primary purpose focused on multimedia cultural information services, an archaeological museum, as well as a performing arts and folklore venue; the Dubrovnik Museums, folklore ensemble Lindo and the Dubrovnik Summer Festival were to be its primary users. The erratic and unsystematic governance and management of the fort by the City led to the fort being rented to local entrepreneurs who then converted this heritage monument into a nightclub entitled Culture Club Revelin. Today, a heritage fort renovated with public funds from the Ministry of Culture and the City of Dubrovnik is a privately-run nightclub, which is the main use of this heritage site.

of the arts-led initiative that found its place in the heritage complex of Lazareti where it created from heritage space the only (and last) place of cultural action in Dubrovnik.

7.1.2. Lazareti: from artistic-led cultural space to socio-cultural centre

The complex of Lazareti¹³⁴ consists of ten interconnected buildings with five inner courtyards that trace their origin to the 17th century. This heritage complex is situated right at the east gate entrance to the Old City and is one of few historical quarantine objects that has remained intact in its original shape in Europe and the Mediterranean. Its original function was health institution, a place where all people and goods coming to Dubrovnik had to spend 40 days (lat. *quaranta*, forty) in order to prevent a possible spread of diseases (Žuvela *et al.*, 2015). Throughout the centuries, public authorities (that changed their structures and configurations according to the socio-political transformations) provided support for the functioning of Lazareti, and this has been sustained until today. The City of Dubrovnik is the owner of the space of Lazareti, hence withholds ownership rights, responsibilities and duties in maintaining the space, investing in it up-keep, utilities, etc., as well as in making decisions on leasing and renting the space with the temporary or more permanent users.

7.1.2.1. The genesis of Lazareti as a space of arts and culture and the role of Art Workshop Lazareti

The space of Lazareti has had through numerous functions and purposes – from storage to slaughterhouse to military barracks, farmers market and bars, etc. At one point, during the 1960s, there was a plan to build a hotel complex in Lazareti with winter wellness centre (Žuvela *et al.*, 2015). This plan was dismissed, and since the last decades of the 20th century, the key concept of free, open space for artistic expression and cultural activity that bares critical, inspirational and discursive edge remained consistent as an overall ethos, a necessity and an (unattainable) ideal for use of

134 Included in UNESCO's World Heritage list in 1979, along with the Old City of Dubrovnik and Fort Lovrijenac.

Lazareti. However, the perseverance of this concept has not been sustained without much dispute and controversy over time. Space of Lazareti has a memory and legacy of being a youth centre in the times of socialism. However, the period pre-1990s and during the 1990s was of defining importance for the development of Lazareti. The year 1989 marks the beginning of Art Workshop Lazareti (AWL). AWL is one of the most famous organisations in the field of contemporary arts and culture on the local, national and international level. Since the 1980s up until today, AWL opens space and works intensively on the presentation and development of contemporary artistic practices. It operates inside Lazareti, and with numerous partner organisations co-creates the only cultural-artistic centre in Dubrovnik with a year-round programme that includes contemporary art exhibitions, performing arts, artistic residencies, performing arts, talks, open discussions and numerous workshops. AWL was founded upon return of a number of young artists and thinkers to Dubrovnik after completing their studies in other cities and countries, which will be explained in more detail in the following text. Fully aware that the era of socialism was coming to an end, and in light of the chronic lack of radical contemporary arts, they embarked on creating a space of artistic action and socio-cultural agency. Separation with the conventional norms of the socialist regime and turbulent period of the 1990s marked by nationalist ideology, cultural homogeneity and antagonism towards difference and otherness set the new era of the development of Dubrovnik's contemporary scene around the nucleus of AWL (Asturić, 2017:V). Occupation of the space in the 1990s was less concerned with the physical dimensions and more with the addressing the 'urgency for difference'¹³⁵, different modes of cultural existence seeking alternative activation of the space that could enable this "difference" to be realised and anticipated anew.

A lot of the operational and conceptual grounding of the socio-cultural centre in Lazareti can be found in the initial idea, an ethos of the AWL founding. The critical point of departure for the work of AWL, which then later overspilt to the concept of the socio-cultural centre in Lazareti, is found in the text of a newspaper article from 1989 (the year AWL was founded). In the article, the au-

¹³⁵ "Urgency for difference" were words used by renowned Macedonian theatre director Slobodan Unkovski in conversation with the author of this thesis when he was explaining why he, along with his colleagues, initiated the struggle to discover, activate and maintain a space for 'different theatre' in 1990s Skopje. For the author of this thesis, "urgency for difference" is relevant to and resonates with the context of the entire Southeastern 1990s and post-1990s experience, especially in the cultural field.

thor Dragica Šoškić assesses the programming logic of the domestic creative scene as somewhat limiting to the openness. She found the reason for this in the typology of culture (upon which it depends whether the city is open or closed), the flow of information and the levels of operability. The automated resistance towards the openness was present in the places of the certain physiological constituency, which created, what Šoškić called, the paradigmatic islands. It was logical that such places would easily become the bastions of conservative conservation of the „good old times“. The description of a city as an island is consistent with the Dubrovnik's insular geographical position, but also with the socio-cultural mentality that has been described in the explanation of a city as context. As Šoškić states, the city encircled with the medieval walls is like an island, a zone of physiological retardation.

The main question behind the challenge of starting a contemporary arts organisation in such insular, conservative and backward oriented surroundings was why should Dubrovnik be defined only by the image of a medieval city, and why should the classical patterns of culture and artistic creation be the only possible cultural emotion? As stated in the Šoškić's article „if the 15th century city wishes to live in all periods and times, it has to confront the contemporary times; openly and without the issue of logocentrism and historical pedigree. For this to happen, it is necessary to give trust to the unpredictable, to new ideas without mystification of the past (that becomes anew the topos of autoreferentiality). In the arts, this entails opening towards creativity with the definition of modern and futuristic urban life.....From this point (as a referential critical stance) starts the attempt of the founding of an institution (new institution) for cultural action of promotion of contemporary creativity, “new artistic practice”; “Art Workshop Lazareti” - a realistic place of opening and releasing of (conservative) mentality; scene for production and presentation of the Contemporary Creative (visual, music, drama, theory....) that will establish the perimeter of cultural co-existence and communication (and with the same material cost that is spent on the cultivation of the retrograde in the arts)”¹³⁶.

136 The quote is from the text that has been accessed from the archives of Art Workshop Lazareti in a form of digital scan of a newspaper article. There is no precise data on the name of the newspaper or exact date of publishing, but the information that it is from 1989.

AWL was initiated by Dubrovnik-born artist Slaven Tolj and a group of then just-graduated artists mainly from Dubrovnik with the inspirational and conceptual support from Serbian artist Ilija Šoškić and his partner Dragica Šoškić. It was constituted by the Municipal conference of the Socialist Alliance of the Croatian Youth. The initial funding for the first programmes of performance art projects was granted by the Self-management community for culture (*Samoupravna interesna zajednica za kulturu*). Right from the outset, the programme featured local, national and international artists. The beginning of the Art Workshop Lazareti marks and animates, as artist Antun Maračić notes, Dubrovnik with completely different artistic content. Not only did this make Dubrovnik a place of challenging artistic events that contribute to its gradual de-provincialisation, but the possibility of a shift had been given to the artists in relation to their work in a form of the realisation that could not happen in other milieu and circumstances. This endeavour of contemporary artistic ‘renaissance’ or an ‘emancipation’ developed in the most part due to the work and role of Slaven Tolj who advocated and relentlessly struggled for space, finances and all other needed resources. This struggle did not only include the advocacy for the means and resources, but also the dealing with the suspiciousness and hostility from the groups of residents, and local authorities, towards the unusual artistic content and different artistic programmes. In Tolj’s words, the quest for gaining the space of action through AWL was “...the struggle for survival, a struggle for context. Since the very beginning, there was no alternative. To adapt to the situation that we found in Dubrovnik after returning from the studies would be equal to giving up”¹³⁷.

The narrative on the very beginnings of AWL unwraps the conceptual rationale behind whole Lazareti as an arts-led space with a public purpose: a place in which non-homogenised artistic expression and cultural activity have the freedom to happen and develop. Over time, the so-called Dubrovnik Scene of contemporary conceptual artists formed around AWL and Lazareti (Asturić, 2017). Slaven Tolj recollects that the intention behind Lazareti was to form a recognizable, visible and accepted point of contemporary arts that was subversively juxtaposed to social and institutional frameworks (Marjanić and Rogošić, 2005). Great accentuation was given to the parallel processes of artistic work and theoretical thought that served as a critical and reflexive

137 The quote is from the text that has been accessed from the archives of Art Workshop Lazareti in a form of digital scan of a author’s conception of the exhibition 5+ from the 1999. The author of the concept note was Tihomir Milovac.

backbone to defining and (re)thinking the position of AWL and Lazareti in the local, national and international context. The beginning of the 1990s brought the discontinuity in the support that was given for the AWL programme from the Socialist Alliance of the Croatian Youth to the extent of withholding the permits for the exhibitions to happen in the public space and places. AWL spent the war years of the early 1990s in the improvised artistic space of Kovačka 3, in a foyer of a private residential building while producing exhibitions and artistic actions in many parts of the city that was under siege and then devastated by the war. AWL's work kept vital links between besieged Dubrovnik and the world, which is visible from the numerous correspondence, notes and media articles available in the AWL archives. In the middle of the 1990s, AWL found another semi-permanent space for their work in the space owned by the Socialist Alliance of the Croatian Youth (but later returned to the rightful owner, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Dubrovnik). There, they set up a gallery called *Otok* (Island in translation) that became a renowned national arts hub with international relevance. Simultaneously, *Otok* became a space of gathering, a club for a non-conventional, alternative, urban social groups, predominantly of young people.

The relevance of the AWL's role in the cultural and arts field was greatly accentuated and facilitated with the role of Slaven Tolj's work that was featured in some of the most prestigious global art events such as *documenta X* in Kassel in 1995. In 1995, AWL became an official association with the main aim, as it is written in the AWL Statute from that year, of developing, steering and popularizing cultural and artistic activities, as well as developing the perspectives for the youth to express and enrich their cultural and artistic capacities as well as their social behaviour and betterment of the life quality in general. Since the mid to late 1990s, the work of AWL was funded and supported by the aforementioned Soros SCCA-Zagreb and by the FACE Foundation - "Fund for the Arts and Cultural Exchange" from New York City.

By 1997, AWL moved to the heritage complex of Lazareti in a space they named *Quarantine* (which was also the name of the annual festival that AWL initiated and produced) and started to diversify their activities to more community-oriented programmes, mostly in a form of educational art workshops but also opening an internet centre and a reading room. This opening of the AWL's work towards the community did not, however, lessen the intensity and conceptual

course of the art activities of the organisation that continued to produce work in a more radical and non-compromising cultural grammar. This thesis is not inclined towards the analyses and interpretations that probe into the field of art history, hence the analysis does not include a list and overview of the names of the national and international artists and imminent figures from the non-traditional, non-institutional art world, although the trajectory of the development of Lazareti as art and cultural space is paved with the artwork, art cooperations and exchanges with hundreds of infamous and cutting-edge artists and artistic projects that were produced in the space of Lazareti.

Towards the end of the 1990s, the space of Lazareti was under the provisional plans for becoming a casino, which would secure the needed funding for the renovation of the complex, but also the income for then impoverished city budget. The dispute over the purpose of the Lazareti space was resolved with the abandonment of the casino idea. Rather, the work of the AWL was recognized by the administration led by Croatian Peasants Party and the Mayor of Dubrovnik, Vido Bogdanović who approached Tolj with the suggestion to institutionalise the work of AWL and solve the puzzle of the use of the entire Lazareti complex, as the city's public institutions can use public space with no lease charge and with no temporal limitation. AWL, or namely Slaven Tolj declined the offer on institutionalisation but proposed a project that would activate the entire complex of Lazareti. This project involved moving the local art school in the complex of Lazareti, the founding of the residential programme and units for the accommodation and work of the artists on the residency programmes, etc. The project was accepted by the local government. Based on this, in 2000 AWL signed a contract with the City for use of the three-building and two terraces on the period of 25 years. This contract was approved by the City of Dubrovnik City Council. Consequently, the long term aims and objectives of AWL, as written in their mission statement from 2001, note that AWL's plan for the Lazareti complex is to "preserve the historic significance and architectural integrity of the site by preventing its imminent commercialisation. We intended to expand the cultural use of the site to the whole complex through an international collaboration, which would vertically integrate: a school for visual arts and dance; a temporary and permanent international artists' residency programme; facilities for the production and exhibition of work including artists' studios, performing art and exhibition spaces; and related commercial uses such as internet café and restaurant, art supply store, bookstore, craft store; thus creating a vibrant cul-

tural community while preserving the history of the site and enhancing the appeal for the City of Dubrovnik as a year-round cultural, rather than purely commercial tourist destination”¹³⁸. Up till restoration¹³⁹ that was undertaken in 2014 in seven out of ten bays of the complex, the remainder of the space in Lazareti was used as a storage for a number of cultural institutions, and as an *ad-hoc* community space.

What followed during the 2000s and up until 2017 was the permanent dispute with the local administration. The dispute has been fuelled with the rapid increase in the economic value of the Lazareti space, but also with the deep misunderstanding of the value of cultural activities that have been created in Lazareti during the past three decades. The disputes were raised to the level of threats of the termination of the contract for the 25-year lease and persistent hindrances and administrative obstacles that were making the regular operation and work of AWL very difficult. This type of behaviour from the local administration started with the change in the local government and the institution of the Croatian Democratic Union in power. Up to that time, AWL invested significant funds through the international sources into the renovation of the part of the Lazareti complex, which AWL used for their activities. Also, the international and national relevance and visibility of the AWL’s work made AWL an uneasy target of the political prosecution. AWL and Lazareti survived the period of the political pursuit on their activities, but the downfall of this behaviour from 2001 is that the relationship with the city administration remained uneven, controversial and tense.

The artistic backbone as driving and affirming aspect of Lazareti is still present, yet the backlash from the mainstream traditionalist and conservative notions and meanings of what culture in Dubrovnik is and should be perpetuates the crisis in which Lazareti cannot reach the level of affirmation and full potential of an arts-led space with a strong community orientation. This was obvious in the interviews with the representative of the city administration who use somewhat pejorative

138 The quote is from the text that has been accessed from the archives of Art Workshop Lazareti in a form of digital scan of a internal AWL document titled „The AWL Mission Statement“. The document is from 2001.

139 From 2012 to 2015, 7 out of the 10 buildings were completely reconstructed and renovated as multifunctional spaces and designated for cultural purposes and activities, which have yet to be defined. A total of €4.5 million Euro was invested by the City of Dubrovnik in the restoration and reconstruction works.

intonations in reflecting on the cultural activity in Lazareti. In parallel, the representatives from the Lazareti, from AWL, in particular, note that representatives or members of the city administration rarely attend the artistic and cultural programmes AWL produces. The representatives from other organisations that use the space of Lazareti underline the same uninterested and, to an extent hostile, treatment from the city towards the organisations that operate in the space of Lazareti:

“I must admit that we’ve always had a difficult relationship with the City. The City never thought much of us. I can’t say that even today the City recognizes the role of the civil society as much as it should be thinking of us as partners, not only as critics. We are critics, the civil society is their critics, but somehow they only see us as dangerous” (A2).

The gap between different perceptions creates sample space of prejudice that makes one of the main obstacles of establishing needed partnerships, mutual understanding and trust as foundations of participatory governance design that should be implemented in the case of Lazareti. This gap was widened with the coming of the political rule of the infamous Dubrovnik’s Mayor Andro Vlahušić from the Croatian People’s Party and the gradual progression of the total economic dependency of the entire city on the tourism industry that was supported and fostered by the local government. This progression heightened the pressure on the all available resources: cultural, spatial, historic, symbolic and resulted in the transformation of the city into a destination and culture and art assets and values into representational attractions for the tourist:

“...the City has the impression that someone hijacked this turbo valuable space with which they would otherwise know what to do with, but, alas, here we are, doing some art, or, as mister Vlahušić said, some old women weave, knit and some other people do performances... while the whole city is set for the coming of the tourists hence this space should be spent, consumed, turned to entirely representational aspect. There is a lack of awareness about the processes, about the production, about the long-term effects of something, no matter how insignificant that might seem in the present moment, as in twenty years it might have a completely different effect” (A1).

The re-conceptualisation of Lazareti from arts-led space towards the socio-cultural centre is (partly) due to the growing number of civil-society organisations (CSO) that ‘inhabit’ the space of Lazareti through the collaboration with AWL and it happened, as stated by an interviewee:

“almost spontaneously. We were right there in those derelict building of Lazareti trying to find sources for the renovation of the space to keep it open from the community. We managed to keep it open – it is open during the day, during the night, over the weekends” (A2).

The formation of the socio-cultural centre has been provoked by shrinking opportunities for physical localisation of CSO’s activities in Dubrovnik. The inhabitation of Lazareti with CSOs has led to the diversification of programmes in originally arts-centric place. The programmes by the organisations and institution that reside in Lazareti are frequented by over 24.000 visitors and programme participants on an annual basis, which is more than half of the entire Dubrovnik’s population. The community component of Lazareti rests also on space being positioned *en route* between two local high schools that count over 1400 young persons from the ages of 10 to 18. Creating relationships with this population is one of the main challenges and tasks for the current occupants of the space.

A gradual transformation from arts-led to socio-cultural centre in Lazareti is foremost a bottom-up response to the profound distortion in the local context, which is inseparable from changes on the global and national scale. Thereupon, the alterations in Lazareti’s concept have been compliant with enticing more democratic and open institutional and decision-making formats in culture on national and international levels. Yet, even in this respect, the aspect of differentiation should not be omitted. In other words, the arts-led character of Lazareti as the only space in the city of Dubrovnik that still signifies free and open zone that is open towards anticipating new configurations and directions or what arts and culture could become, should not be diluted in the attempt to comply with the socio-cultural centre typology. However, there are strong elements of the polyprogrammatic nature of socio-cultural centre in the diverse character of the cultural activities

in the space of Lazareti¹⁴⁰. These encompass socially responsive programmes in Deša (predominantly engaging vulnerable social groups), contemporary art programmes in AWL, amateur folk dancing in Lindo, amateur theatre in Lero, dancing classes for the children, numerous workshops for the community, etc. All of these activities are unique insofar that AWL is the only organisation in Dubrovnik that produces, co-produces and hosts local, national and international contemporary art programme, while Lindo is the only cultural institution that has a programme entirely reliant on the work of amateurs, and that mobilises hundreds of young people from Dubrovnik and its vicinity and Deša is the only non-governmental organisation that consistently works with the vulnerable social groups and deals with the vital environmental topics. Hence, although the primary vision and orientation of Lazareti are in the direction of contemporary arts and critical socio-cultural practices, there is evident potential for Lazareti to be dedicated in part to more wide-spread socio-cultural action. This division of artistic credo and socio-cultural mandate is a sensitive and complex issue that is possibly present, in one form or another in most initiatives that emerge from succinct initiatives with clear orientation. As Asturić notes, the intensity of enthusiasm for artistic rebellion and drive for pushing the social, political and cultural boundaries is in decline (Asturić, 2017). For this reason, the policy deliberation on new modes of participatory designs, new organisational and institutional models, and new configurations of the partnership should take account not to additionally endanger what is already chronically endangered. At the same time, the inclusion and partnering of more active actors, namely civil-society organisations that use the space of Lazareti add to resilience, strength and legitimacy of the socio-cultural centre project.

7.1.2.2. Space and its people: recent status

A section consisting of five out of the ten-bay complex (namely, the bays 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) in Lazareti has occupants (AWL, NGO Deša, Lero Theatre, Lindo Folk Arts Ensemble) while the other five bays (namely, bays 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) are still open for the new socio-cultural purposes. These

140 The long-standing commitment by AWL towards socio-cultural work in Lazareti and its contribution to the framework of local and national socio-cultural development was recognised with the Award for Social Integration by Erste Foundation in 2009. More information can be found at the kulturpunkt.hr site, at the following address: www.kulturpunkt.hr/content/dubrovčani-su-marginalizirani-gradani (07.03.2018).

first five bays are managed by the city's public company Dubrovnik Heritage LLC that uses the space for both commercial purposes (weddings, conferences, congresses, tourism incentives, etc.) and public purposes (cultural events, exhibitions, concerts etc.). Dubrovnik Heritage LLC mainly leases the space for use and co-produces a smaller part of the events that take place in the first five bays of the heritage complex of Lazareti. Dubrovnik Heritage LLC manages the space according to the decision made by the City of Dubrovnik City Council and the subsequent contract between the City of Dubrovnik and Dubrovnik Heritage LLC., first for the short-term duration (from 2017 to 2019) and then for the long-term period (from 2019 to 2029).

Contracts for the use of space have been given to AWL for the period 2000-2025, which was the first example of such a long-term contract made between the local authorities and civil society organisations in Croatia. The second contract with the duration of five years has been made between the City and folklore ensemble Lindo¹⁴¹ (Žuvela *et al.*, 2015). The AWL included two additional CSOs in their contract as users of part of the space; Student theatre Lero¹⁴² and charity organisation DEŠA¹⁴³. In addition to permanent users, space is shared with a number of the local non-governmental organisations, programmatically ranging from audio-visual amateur activities to ballet classes for children and citizen initiatives¹⁴⁴. Both permanent and temporary users have formed Platform for Lazareti as an organisational supra-arrangement for deliberation, negotiation, collaboration and decision making on the level of the spaces that are occupied with the ongoing activities. The Platform for Lazareti is a non-formal association of the CSOs that have an operational connection with the space of Lazareti, namely with the last three bays (8, 9 and 10). The Platform consists of six organisations that are permanent and temporary tenants of the space. It has the purpose of establishing and developing collective action and activities in the direction of the long-term sustainability of the CSOs in the field of underrepresented forms of social and

141 More information on Lindo and their activities is available at their website <http://www.lindjo.hr/> (24/12/2017).

142 More information on LERO student theatre and their activities is available on their Facebook page at <https://www.facebook.com/LERO-Theatre-169495556540/> (24/12/2017).

143 More information on DEŠA and their activities is available online at <http://desa-dubrovnik.hr/o-nama/?lang=en> (24/12/2017).

144 The Lazareti space served as a platform for the evolvement of a citizen initiative SRĐ JE NAŠ (*Srđ is Ours*) that yielded the first ever referendum in Croatia on the basis of citizens' demand.

community work and artistic and cultural creativity, as well as advocating open and accessible perspectives and possibilities for cultural, artistic and social work. The platform for Lazareti was expected to formalise its status for negotiations with the city administration and the role of the members of the Platform in the future participatory set up of governance in Lazareti's socio-cultural centre.

7.1.2.3. Governing schemes and comparative examples

The founding of the socio-cultural centre in Lazareti is embedded in the local strategic plan of cultural development and adjoining Action plan (Obuljen Koržinek *et al.*, 2014:67). Accordingly, in November 2016, the City Council adopted the Management Plan for the Heritage Complex of Lazareti (Žuvela *et al.*, 2015). The main aim of this Plan was to secure more coherent, informed and open process to planning for the cultural amenities and development in the micro-location of Lazareti. The process of consultation during the devising of the Management Plan indicated that there was an evident danger for Lazareti to become disowned from the community for the purposes of “entrepreneurial” endeavour that irreversibly transforms and takes over the sense, image and purpose of the space. The Plan was created in participation with the key stakeholders (the ‘tenants’ of the Lazareti space, the City of Dubrovnik, the representatives of the cultural sector of the city of Dubrovnik, etc.) and according to the UNESCO’s methodology for the heritage management plans. However, along with the focus on the heritage aspect and value of the space of Lazareti, the management plan brings some comprehensive guidelines for the establishment of a socio-cultural centre based on the principles of participatory governance. Participatory governance is introduced at the level of the management of the heritage site, as well as at the level of the socio-cultural centre. It is determined through collaborative decision-making between the existing occupants of the space, and representatives of the City administration.

In alignment with the national framework and legislative possibilities, the Plan proposed three models for the organisational format of socio-cultural centre: the public institution in culture, the public foundation and public company (LLC). All three options allow for the adoption of the

participatory principle in the governance structure of either institution, foundation or company. Upon adoption of the Plan, the City Council gave the period of three months for the city administration and users of the space to deliberate and choose between the given options. An Advisory Body consisted of the representatives from the City and the representatives from the organisations and institution from Lazareti took on the responsibility to decide on the model that would be most appropriate. In the process of dissonant, yet participatory decision-making, the Advisory Body engaged many experts and had consultations with the Foundation Kultura Nova team and national and international research associates. The consensual decision made was to establish a socio-cultural centre in Lazareti as an institution, but the decision was brought before new administration and new Mayor who singlehandedly opted for the model of a public company. In the City Council meeting in August 2017, public city company Dubrovnik Heritage LLC has been entrusted with the governance and management of the Lazareti complex in accordance with the previously adopted Management Plan for the period until the end of 2019. This period encompasses the implementation of the EU funded project titled “Lazareti – creative quarter” that received 3.2 million Euro from the Operational programme competitiveness and cohesion 2014 – 2020. This project is led by the Institute for the Restoration of Dubrovnik with organisations that use the space in Lazareti as project partners¹⁴⁵.

The governance scheme of Lazareti is decided within the framework of the mentioned situation and decision on Dubrovnik Heritage LLC taking over the city’s authority in managing the space for the extended duration up till 2029. Dubrovnik Heritage LLC appointed a Director who is affirmative for the inclusion of the participative principles in the governing structure of Dubrovnik Heritage LLC. The company has eight employees. According to legislative possibilities, participative aspect of governance can be achieved by appointing a representative of the occupants of the space in the Supervisory Board of the Dubrovnik Heritage LLC, as well as in the establishment of the joint Programme Board for Lazareti. In his interview, the Director of the Heritage showed an interest to comply with the Management Plan of Lazareti and with the participative design, but only in accordance with the legislative framework. The issue of the inadequate legislative

145 More information on the project is available online at <http://dubrovnik.hr/clanak.php?a=12917> (04.01.2018).

framework for the introduction and application of participatory governance design was a matter of discussion with the Head of the Culture and Heritage Department. The Head noted that the legislative system is not “mature enough” to sustain that level of democratic power-sharing. This was corroborated in the interviews with the city officials that indicated that the participatory design and principles as a method of governance are still misunderstood and confused with collaboration or cooperation. In addition, the levels of mutual trust, understanding and antagonism between the city administration and the organisations from Lazareti are fluctuating (more on the negative side of the pendulum), which is potentially detrimental for the future development of the socio-cultural centre, as are the intermittent breaks and lack of communication. However, through the work of Platform for Lazareti and attempts to establish firmer partnering with the Dubrovnik Heritage LLC, these issues could potentially turn for the better.

7.1.3. Development perspectives instead of concluding reflections on the case of Lazareti

In the process of writing this case study, the actual situation on Lazareti has changed once again. The aforementioned EU funded project “Lazareti – creative quarter” was completed in a way that the organisations tenants (AWL, Deša and Lero) from the last three bays of the complex were moved in the first bays during the renovation and then returned to a different set of up renovated spaces.

In the meantime, Platform for Lazareti applied and received funding for the project “The community place” from the European Social Fund “Culture in the Centre” programme in partnership with the public cultural institution Dubrovnik Summer Festival, and with the remote partnership of the City of Dubrovnik. The requirements of the applications explicate the development of the participatory designs and public-civil partnership¹⁴⁶, as well as the capacity building of the relevant stakeholders and partners. In the case of Lazareti and Dubrovnik, this is an urgent necessity. Local authorities, much like the local cultural sector, are generally aware but still lack informed proficiency about the participatory governance. For example, when asked how do they perceive

146 More information available online at <http://www.esf.hr/natjecaji/dobro-upravljanje/kultura-u-centru-potpora-razvoju-javno-civilnog-partnerstva-u-kulturi/> (03.12.2017).

and understand participatory governance in culture, respondents representatives from the local authority responded to the question with the usage of the term “cooperation” rather than “participation” and continued to explain their view on the potentials of participatory governance of culture as forms of cooperation. Accordingly, there is insufficient understanding about different models of public-civil partnership, about the importance of sharing responsibility in usage as well as governance of spaces, which are under the jurisdiction of public authority. The city authorities’ respondents almost synchronically perceive problems around the processes of civil-public partnership rather than solutions, often blaming the strict legislative rules and describing their position as ‘unable to act’, without awareness that they could initiate some changes. In general, the issue of legislation is a stumbling block for planning and implementation of the shared governance schemes and requires synchronisation of various trans-policy frameworks and legal provisions between, for examples, legislation on local and regional (self)authorities and legislation in culture, as well as legislation on ownership and fiscal responsibility, etc.

Finally, the canonised nature of Dubrovnik’s cultural profile, which is, paradoxically, prosperous yet stagnant, defines the inner logic and modes of functioning of the entire local cultural sector. This pertains to resilience to new ideas and new approaches in cultural planning, governance and programming. As stated by the respondents from the local authorities, there are not many, if any, new initiatives coming from the cultural sector in line of developing more open collaborative and participative governance schemes apart from the case of Lazareti. Quite the contrary, even the levels of collaborations are conditioned by rising cronyism in-between the cultural actors. It has been repeatedly mentioned during the interviews that local cultural sector is missing new nexuses for reflection and deliberation on how should cultural sector operate in future, as well as people who would mobilize the discussion on a new perspective of cultural development. The representatives of the local authorities have stated that the local government is more than welcoming to new ideas and initiatives for much-needed modernisation and democratisation of the local cultural system. Yet, the example of initiatives like Lazareti and responses from the representatives of the civil society organisations indicate that this claim is not entirely substantiated with the matching policy action and establishment of new partnerships with the local public authority. The concept of participation is closely interrelated to the sustainable cities, culture-based sustainably develop-

ing places that create their own developmental logic within the city itself but often go beyond city “walls” by expanding their regional, national and international networks, thus offering more opportunities and cultural services for both citizens and visitors. This can be seen as the starting point of the common agenda for the development of socio-cultural centre in Lazareti. The development of socio-cultural centre or any form of institutional/organisational entity in culture based on principles of sustainability and participation unfolds the perspective for experimentation in new hybrid governance in culture, establishing multiculturalism and interculturalism as a backbone of the increasingly depopulated tourist city. In this way, the transient nature of the seasonal workforce and tourism can become a driving force for creating new forms of citizenship as the connective tissue of intercultural planning. Aside from the equality of opportunity, this implies critical respect for other cultures, reflecting the cultural diversity in public policy, public space and institutions, provoking pluralist transformations of public space, institutions and civic culture, and allowing for the development of policies that will prioritise support for projects and initiatives where different cultures intersect, contaminate each other and hybridise.

7.2. Case study unit 2: Pogon – Zagreb Centre for Independent Culture and Youth in Zagreb

The Zagreb case study conveys the significance of illustrating the trends and tendencies for the development of participatory governance in culture on two levels. It provides a cursory overview of the context of a nation’s capital and additionally gives insight into the first example of a hybrid public cultural institution based on the principles of partnership between a local authority and civil society in Croatia and the surrounding regions. Through explication of the context, the example of Pogon includes an insight into the development of the independent cultural scene in the nation’s capital, which has had a profound influence on the dynamics and directions of the progression, role and relevance of the independent cultural scene in the democratisation and modernisation of the Croatian cultural policy, from local to national levels.

7.2.1. Zagreb: the capital city as a context for new models of governance in culture

In the points which follow, the context of Zagreb will be explained as the backdrop for the development of participatory governance in culture design in the example of Pogon—Zagreb Centre for Independent Culture and Youth.

- City and its citizens: Zagreb became the state capital city in the 1990s. Since then, it has been enhancing its metropolitan role, combining the weight of its administrative functions with urban growth and ambition for wider international visibility, relevance, cooperation and investment (Švob-Đokić, 2007). Although the data on the number of inhabitants show a constant increase since 2011 when Zagreb had 790.017 inhabitants to 802.338 in 2016¹⁴⁷, Zagreb is an ageing city with an ageing index of more than 125.4 %; this is claimed to be one of the main problems for the vitality statistics of this city. There is a growing proportion of the younger and middle-aged population that emigrate from Zagreb to various European countries, who thus form part of the general depopulation trend in Croatia where on average 36.000 people, half of those from younger generations, leave Croatia annually¹⁴⁸.
- The multicultural character of the nation's metropolis: Zagreb displays a rather homogeneous ethnic and 'national' population structure despite being the largest city in the country and regardless of the heavy population influx during the first parts of 1990s and 2000s (Švob-Đokić, 2007). The cultural diversity of the population in Zagreb relates to the intra-national immigration¹⁴⁹.

'Zagreb is primarily the symbol of Croatia and its independence and they are not interested in a possible multicultural character of their metropolis. Since this new immigration is international mainly

147 Information obtained from the annual studies on the social affairs of the City of Zagreb accessed online at www.udruga-gradova.hr/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Socijalna-slika-Grada-Zagreba-za-2016.-PPT-CERANEEO.pdf (18.02.2018).

148 Information obtained online at <https://www.lupiga.com/vijesti/oni-odlaze-ovdje-se-kriju-neki-od-odgovora-zastomladi-napustaju-zemlju> (18.02.2018).

149 Information obtained online at <http://www.ceraneo.hr/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/CERANEEO-Socijalna-slika-Grada-Zagreba-za-2015.-godinu.pdf> (18.02.2018).

because the neighbouring countries are now independent, it appears that the intention to homogenize on the city level is much stronger than the vision of Zagreb in the international multiculturalist perspective. Thus, independence is reflected much more as an effort to homogenize nationally and even ethnically than to develop new approaches to multiculturalism or establish new types of intercultural relations. Now that immigration has stabilized at a low level, national and ethnic homogenization has become even more transparent' (Švob-Đokić, 2007:120).

However, the dynamism and diversity of various cultural habits and expressions that reside in Zagreb make its image, at least on a national level, metropolitan. This image, however construed, serves as a powerful pull especially for cultural and creative workers and various subcultural groups from Croatia seeking greater opportunities for professional (or personal) fulfilment.

- Finances and the economy: According to data from January 2018¹⁵⁰ Zagreb is the most developed city in Croatia with the average annual citizen income of HRK 44.773 and the lowest unemployment rate on a national level. Almost 20% of the Croatian population is concentrated in this city, as well as 35% of the active national entrepreneurial capital¹⁵¹ and 33% of the Croatian GDP¹⁵². Zagreb's expenditure for culture from the city budget is larger than that of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia. The 'Guideline to Proposal of Zagreb Annual Budget for 2018' groups culture by type of expenditure with recreation and religion and denotes cultural expenditure as 'costs for cultural institutions, assisting various cultural programmes and activities, co-financing sports, subsidy for Zagreb Arena, etc¹⁵³. Culture is included in the list of development programmes and capital investments for 2018 with an amount of 35 million kunas (€ 4.7 million) for protected cultural heritage and 32.5 million kunas (€ 4.4 million)

150 The Decision on Categorization of Local and Regional Self-governance Units Based on the Level of Development (Official Gazette 132/2017) is available online at: https://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/2017_12_132_3022.html (18.02.2018).

151 Information obtained online at www.zagreb.hr/UserDocsImages/arhiva/MakroekonomskirazvojGZ.pdf (18.02.2018).

152 Information obtained online at www.zagreb.hr/UserDocsImages/arhiva/MakroekonomskirazvojGZ.pdf (18.02.2018).

153 Information obtained online at www.zagreb.hr/UserDocsImages/financije/proracun%202018/Vodic_Prijedlog_proracuna_ZGB_2018_final.pdf (18.02.2018).

for culture allocated to four public cultural institutions¹⁵⁴. In 2018, a sum of 425 million kunas (57 million euro) will be distributed from the city's budget for public needs related to culture in Zagreb. The majority of the funds will be divided among the public institutions in culture (342 million kunas or 46 million euro), while over 10% of the financial resources (47 million kunas or 6.3 million euro) will provide subsidies to the non-institutional cultural sector¹⁵⁵. After further analysis, it appears that the programmes of independent productions are scattered across several subcategories of the programme of public needs in culture, i.e. among different cultural councils. Nevertheless, the dominant presence of the programmes of independent productions is found under the heading of innovative artistic and cultural practices in the "Programme of Public Needs in Culture for 2017", where they receive support in the total amount of 2,138,500 kunas (287,265 euro). This profound imbalance between funds invested in the institutional and non-institutional cultural sector has created an intensely negative tradition in Zagreb's cultural provision that is defined by a tense political grip over the distribution and allocation of public resources in culture.

- Local governance of culture: since January 2018, the City of Zagreb has had a City Office for Culture. Until that time, Zagreb did not have an autonomous administrative unit for culture. Rather, culture was a sub-administrative unit in the city office for education, culture and sports. The main decision-makers in culture are the City Council with its Board for Culture and the Mayor's Office as the executive level of government. Zagreb has had the same mayor for 18 years, which has caused a major political infestation of the entire public sector with high levels of cronyism, nepotism and controversies in the processes of decision-making and governance generally, especially in the allocation of public resources. The structure of governance encompasses nine cultural councils¹⁵⁶ that are the central points of decision-making in culture, but also the space for participation and inclusion of non-institutional stakeholders in the decision-making processes.

154 These include the Theatre Gavella, the Technical Museum, the Ethnographic Museum, and the Museum for Arts and Crafts.

155 Information obtained online at www.zagreb.hr/userdocsimages/arhiva/financije/proracun%202018/02%20Pri-jedlog%20proracuna%20Grada%20Zagreba%20za%202018.002.pdf (18.02.2018).

156 The list of cultural councils is available online at <https://www.zagreb.hr/javni-poziv-za-predlaganje-clanova-ica-kulturnih-v/115508> (18.02.2018).

- Cultural sector and resources: As the nation's metropolis, Zagreb has a dominant position in culture. Many national/state cultural institutions are located in Zagreb, e.g. the national opera and ballet, the philharmonic orchestra, a number of national museums, archives, galleries, etc. (Švob-Đokić 2007). With vast cultural resources and the highest amount (in absolute terms) of public expenditure for culture, Zagreb's cultural capacity overshadows that of other Croatian cities despite the wealth of their cultural scenes and infrastructure. This City is the owner and founder of 35 public institutions that can be categorised into thirteen cultural centres, seven theatres, nine museums, one library, three music institutions and one visual and one audio-visual institution¹⁵⁷. The City of Zagreb is the co-founder of the Croatian National Theatre and Museum Klovićevi Dvori and is a co-founder of Pogon with the alliance of the civil society organisations¹⁵⁸. The state's Ministry of Culture resides in Zagreb, as do all the key stakeholders in national cultural policy (e.g. Foundation Kultura nova, Croatian Audio-Visual Centre, etc.), as well as all the head offices of the professional cultural and creative associations from theatre, to design, to architecture and restoration. Zagreb is the centre of the nation's educational and scientific sectors, meaning that the cultural development of the city has a much wider remit when it comes to resources related to social and intellectual capital.
- Civil society is in its strongest form in Zagreb compared to the rest of the country. In the above-mentioned programme of innovative artistic and cultural practices, there are 117 organisations and independent artists listed, while there are numerous organisations in other categories of cultural activity that are financed from the local public budget. According to the Registry of Associations¹⁵⁹, in Croatia, there are 52.294 non-governmental organisations, out of which 12.094 are situated in Zagreb, while 1286 that work in the field of arts and culture.

157 The list of cultural councils is available online at <https://www.zagreb.hr/javni-poziv-za-predlaganje-clanova-ica-kulturnih-v/115508> (18.02.2018).

158 The total of cultural resources includes state, independent and private cultural resources encompassing 785 registered cultural goods, 53 independent and private theatres, 46 book stores, 3 public cinemas, 46 galleries, 2 concert halls, 17 museums and 96 artists' studios. The average cultural production in the capital city counts 270 festivals, 550 exhibitions, 228 concerts, performances, etc., totalling almost 5000 artistic and cultural productions per year, encompassing the activities of public cultural institutions, civil society organisations, private organisations and numerous festival and cultural events (Grad Zagreb 2015).

159 The registry is available online at <https://uprava.gov.hr/uvid-u-registre-14567/registar-udruga/826> (01.03.2018).

- Concerning cultural and creative industries, Zagreb is the obvious centre of national work and potential in that domain. More than 90% of national cultural and creative industries are concentrated in Zagreb, yet the development of creative industries is fragmented, dispersed, untracked, disorganised and without any form of systemic support (Jelinčić and Žuvela, 2010). Systemic oblivion and the sheer quantity of small entrepreneurs in the creative and cultural industries have led to an increase in the number of co-working spaces, i.e. commercially rentable spatial modules shared among a number of individual and/or small businesses. The rise in the number of small creative entrepreneurs and freelance workers adds to the pressure for spatial resources and working conditions that are a matter of contestation between the political and institutional actors and the non-institutional cultural scene. The overstepping of the boundaries between the freelance creative workers and independent cultural workers and artists yields numerous positive developments, especially with respect to collaboration. However, it also creates numerous issues, the most obvious one being the systemic equalisation of market-oriented creative workers with independent cultural workers invested in the safeguarding and the progression of the public (cultural) realm.
- Cultural policy: Since 2015, Zagreb has had the Strategy of Cultural and Creative Development 2015–2022. The Strategy emphasizes the collaborative work of the cultural sector and the city in safeguarding cultural heritage resources and in developing creative industries and cultural tourism. The “participatory” aspect of the strategic objectives implies conventional notions of cultural participation, i.e. increased and quantifiable citizen engagement and interest in cultural activities (e.g. audience development), but it does not mention involvement in decision-making or any type of authority devolution in cultural governance. The Strategy was a consequence of an imperative of the Zagreb candidacy process for the European Capital of Culture in 2020. Until then, Zagreb as the dominant, referential locus of the nation’s culture did not have a cultural policy document. There was no expressed vision for the city’s cultural development and no evaluation of the existing potentials (Švob-Đokić 2007, Vidović 2012). Even with the new strategy for cultural development, the city’s cultural policy remains unelaborated, and under-rated on the scale of urban development priorities. As in the other case studies, the case of Zagreb shows that the trend of culture-led urban regeneration has never been a priority in the policies of Croatian cities. Rather, the general tendencies of instrumentalised approaches to cul-

tural governance indicate short-term planning and a chronic lack of consistency, (public) consultation and communication in setting, formulating and implementing cultural policy actions and directives. This type of “policy behaviour”, or politically driven short-term development agendas situate the case of Zagreb in the context of Central-Eastern European cities that mostly see the “problem of urban regeneration as a field for attracting investors” (Keresztély, 2007:98). Some of the major operations in urban planning in Zagreb, such as the “renovation project” of the central area of Varšavska Street, corroborate such claims and illustrate that these modes and approaches to urban and cultural planning in Zagreb result in polarisation that provokes spatial and social conflict in the city. The case of Varšavska Street is emblematic for the analysis of new democratic models of governance in culture as the roots of the Right to the City movement in Zagreb stem from a declaration signed between civil society organisations in culture and among the youth signed in 2005 entitled Independent Culture and Youth in the Development of the City of Zagreb. In the same year, the “Invisible Zagreb”¹⁶⁰ the project mapped abandoned industrial sites in the city with the objective to “show the public that they have the right to claim the city, the city is the exclusive right of its citizens, and that they have the right and the opportunity to use it creatively” (Dolenec, Doolan and Tomašević, 2017:8).

- Contemporary development trends in culture: On the mainstream level, in Zagreb, we follow several attempts to modernise and adopt dominant typologies of urban renewals with the arts, culture and creative industries. These include a wide array of projects and new institutions ranging from Design District¹⁶¹ to state-led and privately owned flagship institutions and organisations, such as the Museum of Contemporary Art and the private gallery/museum/co-working space Lauba—House for People and Art. We also find several formal and informal organisational and institutional models that somewhat resonate with participatory governance designs,

160 The mapping research undertaken in this project showed that 34% of the civil society organisation in culture had no spatial infrastructure for their work. Out of 66% of organisations that did have the space for their activities, 43.2% of them paid a market-value rent, while 60% of organisations used inadequate spaces (Vidović, 2012).

161 More information on Design District is available online at <http://designdistrict.hr/hr/> (18.02.2018).

such as the theatre cluster “Dragon’s Nest”¹⁶² and the cultural centre “Home of the Histrions”¹⁶³. Both of these examples are particular in the sense that they represent a specific genre of cultural activity (theatre and dramatic arts) and the narrow scope of the organisations and stakeholders that can be involved in the governance schemes. Finally, one of the interesting initiatives that have been developing over the past several years is the “Zagreb: Open City? — Campaign for an Intercultural Social Centre”¹⁶⁴. Unlike previously mentioned examples, this initiative advocates for an institution that would represent the ideal city as an open platform that is responsive and reactive to the citizens’ needs and strives to improve the quality of life in the city.

In an attempt to summarise the demanding context of the capital city, we have to remark that socially irresponsible and market-oriented spatial transformations in Zagreb have been interlinked and consonant with the city’s social restructuring; this rise is characterised by a deepening polarization and growing spatial and social disparities. The priorities for cultural sustainability and social inclusion have been weakening with the growing perception of cultural programmes and resources as factors for the economic competitiveness of the city. The chronic neglect of cultural policy and the long-term domination of a single political option that assumed omnipresent decision-making authority in distributing cultural resources and in allocating public support for culture led to growing discontent among the non-institutional cultural sector. The “internal reality” of continuous budget cuts and the shrinking of physical spaces for the non-institutional cultural scene is paralleled by an “external reality” in which non-institutional cultural actors carry the majority share of international cultural cooperation and bring invaluable experiences, exchanges and funds from abroad which are strategically used for the modernisation of the local and national cultural system. This bipolarity has become a standing arrangement and a point of conflict in Zagreb’s as well as the nation’s cultural system that keeps on perpetuating the state of crisis, thus hindering any feasible visions and options for more equitable cultural development. The indiffer-

162 More information on the theatre cluster is available online at <http://www.novilist.hr/Kultura/Kazaliste/Sedam-zagrebackih-neovisnih-kazalista-osniva-prvi-hrvatski-kazalisni-klaster> and <https://www.teatar.hr/196036/zmajevog-nije-zdo-prvi-hrvatski-kazalisni-klaster/> (18.02.2018).

163 More information available online at <http://histrionski-dom.hr/i/339/centar/o-nama/> (18.02.2018).

164 More information available online at <https://operacijagrad.net/upgrade/zagreb-otvoreni-grad-kampanja-za-interkulturalni-drustveni-centar/> (18.02.2018).

ent and general approach to cultural planning and development from the city administrations and ruling political parties have been counteracted by the vibrant and internationally acclaimed “independent cultural scene” that exerts pressure on the local government by the continuous generation of new ideas and policy solutions for democratising the cultural policy of the nation’s capital. Specifically, aligned civil society organisations in culture have addressed the urgency for space for common use with criteria, infrastructural management arrangements and institutional models that differ from the local practice of cultural and urban planning. The main orientation behind these ideas was (and still is) to secure adequate resources, both physical and financial, in order to create new institutional formats based on the principles of participation, social solidarity, resource sharing and democratic resource management. This has resulted in a focused advocacy process that has mobilised a large number of actors from Zagreb’s independent cultural scene, and which has progressively led to the founding of the first, and still the only—not only in Zagreb but also in Croatia—a hybrid cultural institution based on the principles of participatory governance and civil-public partnership.

7.2.2. Pogon: trajectory of creating of new cultural (policy) context

Pogon is the first Croatian example of a hybrid institution that is founded on the basis of public-civil partnership and is the result of a long advocacy process by a number of Zagreb’s independent cultural and youth organisations (Vidović, 2014). The advocacy process for Pogon was not a singled-out process or a result of a sudden action from the civil society organisation. What preceded advocacy process for Pogon was one of the unique examples of cooperation and networking of civil society organisations active in the sub-sectoral niche of the independent cultural scene.

The emergence of the number of civil society organisation and actors in forming of the independent scene in culture can be followed from the 1990s, gathered around the support given by the Soros Open Society Foundation. Višnić calls this period “the first phase” in which “new organisations and initiatives producing specific programmes appeared, giving rise to a diversification in the field of cultural activities. The organisations were mostly self-centred they worked

more or less independently, and the whole field of independent culture became atomized” (Višnić, 2008:12). This was the beginning of what Vidović called “a parallel world” in culture that was critically juxtaposed with the established concept of culture that glorified nation and the national identity and perpetuated traditional patterns of cultural and artistic work (Vidović, 2007). Originally, some of these initiatives first started to operate in an informal status and were perceived as an ‘alternative culture’, which was then used more as a derogative rather than an affirmative term. The first formalised position and role of the Zagreb’s independent cultural scene is noted in “the second phase” that can be pinpointed to the turn of 2001 and 2002 when there was an exponential rise in the number of the organisations of “emerging culture” (Vidović, 2013:103). Similar to the example of Lazareti in Dubrovnik, the path of the independent cultural scene’s maturing in Zagreb is paved with a strong presence and involvement of the independent artists and insistent contemporary art production that created a mesh of subcultural practices as resistance and reaction to the dominant canons of cultural creativity and policy (Vidović, 2013). A myriad of subcultural practices and artistic expressions that involved activism opened a space for the hybridisation of social engagement in the cultural and art field and sought a different type of social communication. Throughout the first part of the first decade of 2000, the terrain of the independent cultural scene in Zagreb is marked by work of ever-relevant cultural organisations such as *Centre for Drama Art – CDU*, *Multimedia Institute – mi2*, curatorial collective *WHW/what, how and for whom*, *Attack!*, *Fade In*, *Kulturtreger Association*, *Domino*, *The Shadow Casters*, *KONTEJNER bureau of contemporary art praxis*, *Local Base for Refreshment of Culture - BLOK*, etc. These organisations have left, throughout the years, a significant imprint in the cultural field in a sense of step forward of not only local artistic production but also national and international one. A number of these organisations opened new spaces for culture – WHW curatorial collective and Gallery Nova; Multimedia Institute and MaMa club, Kulturtreger and Booksa bookclub – which brought afore new spatial configuration in the capital’s map of up-and-coming social, cultural and artistic content (and concept) that preceded the founding of Pogon. Insofar, these organisations were the core of the Zagreb initiative – a collaborative platform that will be a vital net for exerting pressure for cultural policy upgrades and change.

The beginning of 2000s brought new political rule and climate in the country that did invest a certain amount of political will into the democratisation of cultural policy yet the international support gradually withdrew and the independent scene actors were left to exist and survive in a limited space that opened in the cultural system. As Višnić notes: “in spite newly created funding policy instruments, the independent cultural scene is still lacking recognition and support for its new models of cultural productions and collaboration. It is still seen as “alternative”, to the institutions of the so-called dominant culture, and remains in a sub-servient relationship in which public authorities “provide for” the realization of the programmes and “support” individual actors. public support provided for the independent scene solely at the level of the limited financing of the programme cannot have a significant positive influence on its stability, sustainability and long-term development” (Višnić, 2008:14). One of the most pertinent issues in the on-going struggle for attaining perspectives of sustainability and stability was the issue of space: “almost in all cities the limited availability of space resource – unsolved problems of existing (or recently existing) independent spaces and the lack of adequate venues for the activities of a number of other organisations, forced to work in private apartments or in premises paid at marked prices (using up a substantial part of their programme budgets) or temporarily using spaces with limited access owned by other institutions – causes a specific form of instability and can lead to the disappearance of these organisations. This situation makes impossible not only the long-term stability of the organisation but also the development of any long-term programming” (Višnić, 2008:14). Consistently, a response from the interviews situates the start of the advocacy for space that will be a service for independent culture and youth in the sense of offering a place of production and presentation of their programmes at the beginning of 2000s:

“Actually, I find it interesting that we talk of Pogon as a socio-cultural centre, which is a big shift that happened in the last several years, as predominantly, Pogon is actually a centre for the independent culture and youth, the mission of Pogon is actually a service for the independent culture and youth in a form of providing space for production and for the presentation of the programme in that segment of the cultural scene, given that in the past 10 to 15 years that scene does not have spatial support in the city of Zagreb and that was urgently needed” (C1).

The quest for space and resources was a reaction of a simple urge and need to work and create in conditions that are adequate and conducive for some semblance of stability and progress. The advocacy process became more insistent and visible in by mid-2004 that Višnić notes as a “third phase” (Višnić, 2008). This phase involved the formation of new networks and policy initiatives at grassroots levels with the focus of changing the system in order for the system to recognize the transformative potentials of the independent cultural scene: “Since the system cannot recognize the dynamic models of programming and collaboration, the key players of the independent scene...have begun to understand that they need to start talking in terms that system “understands”. By engaging in the infrastructure and institutional framework, by proposing a possible long-term solution, by organising public debate and media campaigns, the independent scene will not only ensure its own development but also act as a transformative player within the overall cultural system” (Višnić, 2008:16). The change in the mode of operation and action entailed an intricate networking endeavour, hence the third phase of the evolution of the independent cultural scene that has had a profound effect on the founding of Pogon was not exclusively located or linked to the context of the capital city. Rather, it connected civil society organisations in culture that conceptually fit the independent scene frame across the country. Intensified collaboration and strategic networking resulted in creating, as Teodor Celakoski defined them, *tactical networks* and *collaborative platforms* that represented new forms of socio-cultural practices with two main purposes “expanding the definition of cultural actions and developing new collaborative practices and models” (Višnić, 2008:17). Celakoski explained the main characteristics of these networks and platforms in four categories: “The first refers to the activities based on projects, meaning that they do not primarily engage in exchange of information and communication, but in structurally guided processes determined by thematic, procedural, or other interests of the network members. In line with this type of orientation, the second characteristic implies their focus on a social and/ or political agenda, while the third refers to interdisciplinarity or connection to other fields, outside of the mostly cultural and artistic activity. It is clear that this role of tactical networks requires a complex organizational structure (their fourth characteristic) based on “communicational and managerial principles, regulations and protocols” (Vidović, 2010:25). Here, we will mention collaborative platforms and networks such as *Clubture*, *Zagreb - Cultural Kapital of Europe 3000*, as well as collaborative policy and advocacy activities such as *POLICY_FORUM* and *Zagreb’s*

initiative of independent cultural and youth (Višnić, 2008; Vidović, 2010; 2013). The joint action that involved the implementation of diverse actions in lobbying and advocacy was geared towards securing fair working conditions for the independent cultural scene through participation in the decision-making processes. This involved advocacy work on several policy fields – from obvious cultural policy to urban planning and space management policy and youth policy. Also, the Zagreb advocacy network was not only based on the “connections among cultural organisation already described but also on the collaboration and work in common with yet another sector – the youth sector – set in place through a partnership with the Croatian Youth Network, the national youth umbrella organisation. The partnership between these two sectors was initiated in order to strengthen the position of both parties in accomplishing their mutual interests” (Višnić, 2008:49). The partnership between the two sectors was based on equality and trust. The assembled organisations “defended public spaces from certain deterioration and set forth a request to the city government that one of the abandoned factory spaces located in the centre of the city be appointed to them in order to establish and open the centre” (Vidović, 2014:5). The quest for space can be understood not only as a fight for survival, but also as a struggle for cultural context, i.e. cultural space that is not only physical but is also an abstract, symbolic field of cultural identification¹⁶⁵ (Švob-Đokić, 2004). The advocacy process included “different activities, ranging from public discussions, happenings, public actions, protests, public statements, documents etc., and it proved successful at the end of 2008 when the Mayor of Zagreb just before the upcoming local elections decided to found the Zagreb Centre for Independent Culture and Youth, later named Pogon. At the suggestion of representatives of independent culture and the youth, the centre was co-founded by the City of Zagreb and the Alliance for the Centre for Independent Culture and Youth (today called Association Alliance Operation City) as a mixed or hybrid institution. This innovative model of shared ownership based on the civil-public partnership was created to provide new models of cultural governance and institutional formats that will adequately respond to the needs of the local (non-institutional) cultural sector, as well as to develop new frameworks in cultural policy formation and imaginations thus ensuring the long-term adaptability and sustainability of a new

165 Švob-Đokić notes that processes of identification are ever more diverse and dynamic, encompassing old identities and traditional (ethnic and national) cultural identification “which is no longer seen as absolutely necessary or dominating, but only as one possible choice among many choices” (Švob-Đokić, 2004:11).

institutional format such as the centre. As explained in more detail by one of the responses on the question about the motivation for the development of participatory governance and civil-public partnership:

“On one side the motivation is securing a resource and enabling the equal access to that resource that has to be stable, and on the other side, I think that it is important that that is a place, which, along with the possibility of decision-making and governing, offers a guarantee that there is public supervision. The motivation for development is also to demonstrate a way for the resources to remain in collective ownership and for the common good, to refute all those voices that are trying to prove that resources must be privatised in order to be efficient, so the motivation is against privatisation” (C2).

The involvement of the City of Zagreb as one of the founders provided a stable institutional framework for the functioning of the centre because it ensures the space resources for the centre’s placement and the basic funds for its maintenance and basic functioning. On the other hand, the alliance members create and finance the production of the programmes. This way “long-term sustainability is established, and it is the result of a balanced relationship between public financing and oversight on one side and independent programming and participative decision making on the other” (Višnić in Vidović, 2014:6).

7.2.2.1. Locating Pogon

In order to avoid ghettoisation of independent culture and to answer the diverse programme needs of the organisations (offices, production, education, diffusion, research, residencies, mediation, information etc.), the alliance insisted on the “Centre being placed in multiple locations of deserted factory spaces” (Vidović, 2014:6). Today, Pogon has at its disposal two spatial resources: the centre’s office, a smaller conference hall and temporary office space for the users, and the former factory Jedinstvo that contains two halls which are used for different cultural and artistic programmes (performing arts, visual arts, music, film, etc), totalling 500 square meters of the ac-

tive space, while the location in the city, in Mislavova street, has a smaller conference hall and offices. The factory Jedinstvo was an industrial site that has had not only industrial history, but more recent social and cultural one through several years of space squatting by a club Močvara, and then artistic production by Damir Bartol Indoš (who had some contractual arrangement with the City of Zagreb), yet space was in bad form for regular and safe work. This was before 2008 when Pogon, a newly founded institution, took over the management of the space. The Jedinstvo factory is “owned by the City of Zagreb and the rent does not have to be covered; only the utilities. The fact that the spaces within the factory are not fit for use and are not equipped represents a serious problem; the spaces do not meet all the conditions for the centre to be an excellent production-presentation service provider. The basic technical conditions (ventilation and heating system) are deficient and malfunctioning, but the centre’s management ensured minimal prerequisites for realisation of the programmes” (Vidović, 2014:6).

Unlike the factory, the office space in Kneza Mislava Street is fully functional and is owned by the Republic of Croatia and it also requires the paying of rent. Since Croatia joined the European Union, the possibility of applying for structural funds has materialised, and Pogon is currently preparing for a reconstruction project of the former factory that should be partly financed with EU funding. The investment amount to 90 million kunas (plus VAT) and it is planned that 85% of the reconstruction costs be covered from ESI funds (Integrated Territorial Investments mechanism), while the City of Zagreb would cover the remaining 15% of the costs. Pogon is currently trying to find additional funds for covering the equipment costs. Additionally, Pogon received funding from the already mentioned European Social Fund “Culture in the centre” programme for the project titles *All for Pogon – Pogon for All!*. As it is written on the Pogon’s internet pages, “the project aims to improve the current governing model of Pogon by including educational, research, cultural and promotional activities for all those who are managing or using it”¹⁶⁶. The amount received for this project is 2.5 million kunas (330.295 euros) and the project is led by the Alliance Operation City with partners City of Zagreb and Kurziv – a platform for questions on culture, media and society.

166 Quote from the information accessed online at <https://www.pogon.hr/hr/projekti/svi-za-pogon-pogon-za-sve/o-projektu> (13.03.2020).

7.2.2.2. Organisational structure

The organisational structure of Pogon reflects the hybridity of its constitutive principles. The decision-making authority is equally divided between two founding bodies: the City of Zagreb and Association Alliance Operation City. The Alliance is responsible for creating a strategic framework for the institution's operation, participating in the creation of the programme and financial plans, as well as being actively involved in the advisory bodies of the Pogon's governance scheme. The City of Zagreb is responsible for upholding and developing the financial and infrastructural stability of the institution. It secures the funds encompassing the employees' wages and running costs (i.e. utilities, etc.) for the core operation of the institution. The funds for the programme strand of the operation are secured through various modes of financing obtained by the institution, or by the organisations that use the space. The organisational structure adapts to the changes in the civil sector and remains open to the fluctuation of number and profile of organisations that implement their activities in Pogon in order not only to maintain the fluidity and flexibility but the concept of institutional hybridity and permeability. Thirty-one civil society organisations took part in the organisational structure of Pogon in the period from 2009 to 2017.

The core decision-making is conducted equally between Zagreb's City Assembly on one side and the Assembly of the Association Alliance Operation City on the other. These two assemblies make the most important decisions related to Pogon, including the appointment of the members of the Governing Board that has the capacity to make substantive decisions, such as the distribution of Pogon's funds. The assemblies also decide on the appointment of the director in charge of operational activity, and who represents the institution. Both Governing Board and the Director are appointed for four years. In addition to these levels of organisational structure, two other important levels are the Programme Council and the team of employees that includes four full-time and two part-time employees, and one external associate¹⁶⁷. The Programme Council is an advisory decision-making body consisting of representatives from the civil society organisations that are appointed by the Assembly of the Association Alliance Operation City for a duration of three

¹⁶⁷ More information available online at www.pogon.hr/en/o-nama/tko-smo/pogonov-tim/ (18.02.2018).

years. It contributes to developing the methods and formats for the use of space, as well as to programme development and long-term programme planning. The Programme Council represents, in the institutional scheme, the voice of the civil society organisations, and also indirectly, the voice of existing and potential users. This voice streams up to the Governing Board and ensures the two-way communication, i.e. the hybridity of the governance structure that sustains its uniqueness on the aspect of two opposing by nature yet interpenetrating logics of functioning—that of a political and bureaucratic mind and that of (socially engaged and responsive) cultural and artistic sense. The inclusion of the civic platform in the decision-making structure in Pogon through the Governing Board and Programme Council is the farthest that a Croatian system related to culture has reached since the 1990s.

7.2.2.3. The functioning of Pogon

The function of Pogon is to “govern the space that is then provided to cultural and youth organizations of the city of Zagreb for use and the implementation of their programmes without compensation”¹⁶⁸. Accordingly, Pogon primarily functions as a production and presentation service for independent cultural and youth organisations that can use the technical and spatial resources of the centre for the representation of their activities for free. Pogon is not curated or defined by aesthetic criteria but is an open platform of cultural creativity and expression. In other words, “considering the basic purpose of Pogon and its openness to the needs of the independent cultural and youth organisations, a firm concept of Pogon’s programme does not exist and it functions as one of the instruments that bridges the gap between the public and civil sector” (Višnić in Vidović, 2014:6). The efficiency of the Pogon model stems from the fact that “the rules were not imposed from above, the users themselves are involved in the finding of the solutions, and their representatives control their implementation through the Programme Council” (Vidović, 2014:10). This functioning logic of the centre has created an institution that treats all its users as equal partners who build and invest in the space, and the users themselves treat Pogon as a

168 Information accessed online at <http://www.pogon.hr/en/o-nama/otvorena-platforma/> (17.03.2018).

common space that everybody has access to and the right to use. The representatives of the Association Alliance Operation City developed this rationale and the model that has now been in a solitary existence, unfortunately, for ten years. Digital tools that “employees use in communication allow a transparent and efficient manner of spatial resources use, where all users of the spaces can shape their activities independently” (Vidović, 2014:10). A great number of organisations that use the Pogon space are part of the independent cultural scene and implement their programmes in the field of contemporary arts and independent culture. Space is also being used by civil society organisations that deal with education and civil rights. A number of youth organisations that use the space organise their programmes, educations and workshops for this audience profile. The number of organisations that use the Pogon space has been in a continuous growth up to 2015 (e.g. Pogon was used by 80 organisations in 2015) and after that, a decline was recorded of 42% (from 80 to 56 organisations). According to Pogon’s representatives, it is possible to interpret these space usage fluctuations based on two relevant factors: a) most of the organisations establish long term relations and continuous programmes in the space by which the conceptual and functional recognition of the space and sustainability of the organisations are secured, but this results in longer space occupation; and b) considering the fact that the available dates are being taken more rapidly each year, new users often do not have the opportunity to sign up for the available dates because the existing users are faster and more acquainted with the space usage system. As one of the representatives from Pogon stated, although there is a wish to rotate more users in the space and to open the space to new users, the awarding system and spatial resources limitations allow for this to a certain extent. Also, the responses from the interviews revealed that the decline of the number of organisations does not mean that space is any less used or that there is less content in Pogon. Actually, Pogon records a continuous increase in space usage so space was used every day except during summer break in 2017. The increase in using the available dates refers especially to the small hall and backyard spaces. When it comes to audience, Pogon has appr. 8000 visitors on an annual basis, out of which 60% are young people (from 15 to 29 years), while the space in Mislavova street counts 724 visitors out of which 70% are young people (from 15 to 29 years). In 2014 the overall number of visitors of Pogon Jedinstvo was over 25.000. Due to inadequate technical and security conditions for holding of concerts and club programmes, this number has decreased to 10.000 visitors, after the bigger events stopped being organized.

Despite the quality management and use model, Pogon faces a number of problems. Considering the fact that the City of Zagreb still has not awarded Pogon other spaces to manage and the fact that the factory halls in Jedinstvo are still not equipped and the reconstruction project is still in its preparatory phase, the current spatial resources of Pogon do not meet the needs of independent cultural and youth organisations. This is combined with the fact that the equal and simple method for use of space¹⁶⁹ entices a growing number of organisations to apply to Pogon. Ultimately, there is a lack of free space for the realisation of the programmes, i.e. Pogon is becoming insufficient in its spatial capacity. As the representatives of Pogon state in their interview responses, considering the demand, another Pogon could easily be filled with activities, or other institutions like Pogon will become increasingly necessary in the cultural landscape of the capital city. In accordance with this, the City of Zagreb increased the amount of financing for the basic functioning of Pogon in 2016 and 2017 which was necessary taking into account the growing number of programmes and the public who frequent Pogon in the building and neighbourhood because any kind of social activities is offered only by Pogon. The former factory is not located in the city centre; hence, it is not possible to provide bar services in the factory complex (due to legislative decrees). This has hindered the possibility of attracting an audience that is not solely the intentional, programme-driven public. After completion of the programmes, the audiences leave the centre's premises shortly thereafter, especially during the winter. Solving all of the above-mentioned problems would make the Pogon model function more efficiently. This could have positive repercussions on the overall independent culture in Croatia's capital. The upcoming reconstruction which should upgrade the existing conditions of the Jedinstvo building¹⁷⁰ is one of the steps in that direction.

Pogon sets an example in which all other centres can find inspiration for defining management and a model of use. In the Croatian context, Pogon represents a "pioneering attempt" because the civil-public partnership, in opposition to the one based on private-public relations, "enables the

169 The use of Pogon is achievable and straightforward through a simple yet coherent online procedure that involves the careful perusal of the terms of reference, the filling out of a form and the signing of a contract. The space occupancy is presented in an online calendar. The maximum period of occupancy is 21 days for festivals. More information available online at <http://www.pogon.hr/rezerviraj-prostor/> (17.03.2018).

170 More information on the reconstruction project is available online at <http://www.pogon.hr/kvart/pogon-rekonstrukcija/> (01.03.2018).

ever so needed maintenance and improvement of the public/social role and the purpose and meaning of arts and culture in the context of growing consumption and political pressures” (Žuvela in Vidović, 2014:11). In this kind of model, shared responsibility is distributed equally and the formalisation of the partnership between the public government and the civil sector contributes to the shaping of a participatory cultural policy. For these reasons, it is necessary to implement institutional changes in the public policy system and to develop new examples of hybrid institutions. Pogon cannot remain a mere “experiment” but should become a “standard” for such institutional arrangements.

7.2.2.4. Concluding remarks on the example of Pogon

Zagreb has all the necessary elements for cultural policymaking which will be at the forefront of national trends in cultural development. This includes its number of inhabitants, the available financial and cultural resources, as well as its metropolitan character that acts as a magnet for cultural and creative workers from across the entire country. Accordingly, Zagreb is the national centre for the dynamic convergence of diverse cultural ideas, sectors, actors, expression and imitation of global trends. In the context of this case study and the research to which it pertains, it is important to highlight that the first and the only Croatian example of a hybrid institution based on the principles of participation is located in Zagreb. Nonetheless, the analysis of the local cultural documents, especially the city’s budget, unequivocally suggests that Zagreb’s cultural policy faces great challenges, especially when it comes to providing support and establishing cooperation with non-institutional and politically autonomous cultural actors and initiatives.

Interviews with the city officials illustrate that culture in Zagreb is seen as an important segment of local development. However, there is an unmistakable turn towards a market or tripod economy model of cultural provision which builds on the assumption of inability and inadequacy of public funds (both state and local) to support culture. Hence, participation is considered as one of the approaches for the establishment of the partnership. At the same time, in their interviews, the local officials mention public-private partnerships that should improve economic interest in

cultural policy and planning instead of public value. In other words, culture is, from a political perspective, considered very pragmatically for what it can or cannot achieve or contribute to the development of Zagreb, according to the principle of lowering the support for culture while increasing the expectations from the effects of culture on urban development. This is consistent with the most banal recipe in local cultural development that relies on making the city more attractive with the culture, which in turn attracts more tourists. Various attempts in this direction have contributed to the high increase in tourism in the city of Zagreb, evident in the rise in the percentage of tourists by 73.5% from 2007 to 2016.

While it is the only example of a hybrid cultural institution founded on the principles of participatory governance in Croatia, local politicians perceive Pogon as a newer model of the cultural centres that existed in the times of socialism; hence, the innovative aspect of the participatory governance model is disregarded (or misunderstood) in favour of the actual organisational status. This misunderstanding of the fundamental concept and principles that define Pogon is evident in the claims by city officials in which they see Pogon as a new home for creative industries, as well as the place that should be supported (financially) by the citizens and/or crowdfunding. Local politicians and city officials are adamant about withdrawing public funds from culture in favour of private financing. This issue surpasses the topic of participatory governance in culture concerning the case of Zagreb and seeks serious deliberation on the directions and trends in cultural development, cultural policy and governance in Croatia generally. Otherwise, we are facing a profound remodelling, a repurposing and a repositioning of the cultural field that will not be a result of deliberative policymaking but a consequence of creeping shifts which arise from ignorance on the part of local political actors and factors.

Some of the representatives of the local authority stated that they see Pogon as a beacon of Zagreb's development — a model that should serve as an inspiration and a blueprint for many other open spaces for culture that the capital city needs. The enthusiasm extends to understanding the civil-public partnership as a “fantastic” and “innovative” model in which the city gains reliable and productive partners in civil society organisations. Moreover, with the expansion of Zagreb's urban areas, the need for cultural centres is growing; this opens up new opportunities for both

citizen engagement and experimentation with the new governance formats. However, the growth and development of new formats of governance, institutions and organisations call for reconsideration and adjustment of the existing legal frameworks that do not accommodate innovative policy upgrades which could ensure a more democratic cultural policy and hybridity as an integral part of the new form. The hybridity of Pogon should not be a mere light post for the orientation of cultural policy progression. Rather, the growth of such spaces should lead the capital city out of its peripheral position on a European scale to a more confident tier where Zagreb will have an opportunity to become a site of new cultural typologies and hybrid cultures.

7.3. Concluding summary of the empirical framework

The empirical chapter has provided an in-depth analysis of the Croatian cultural policy throughout the main stages of its evolution that encompass the period preceding the research scope, but which was invaluable for the recognition of the dominant patterns and modes of cultural policymaking. The analysis probed into the cultural policy ethos, rationale, structure, and mode of operation from the socialist times up to the end of the research period in the year 2017. It examined the channels and prowess of cultural policy towards decentralisation and the inclusion on diverse actors in the decision-making processes, ultimately influencing and reshaping the meanings of culture and the positioning of the cultural field within the societal framework and transformations. There are two main strands in this direction of interpretation of empirical data; first pertains to the consistency of policy legacy in the sense of policy being construed in a top-down, centralized manner and the other addresses the rise of the role and relevance of non-institutional, civil society actors in the modernising upgrades of cultural system and policy in the post-socialist, post-transitional period. The policy analysis and case studies have demonstrated strong and consistent attempts to modernise cultural policy in the direction of the changes that closely correspond to the main characteristics of the New Public Culture as described by Katunarić. This mostly pertains to the quest for the emancipatory politics or the politics of equality that would balance out the steep divisions in the cultural policy treatment and position between institutional and non-institutional actors.

The examples indicate that the Croatian cultural system has been experiencing the profound changes in the cultural policy evolution that entail the association and the role of the civil society actors and the rise of the locale, i.e. the city as the origin of the progressive cultural policy changes. Both Dubrovnik and Zagreb are urban contexts laden with the commodification pressure on the public resources, which gradually, yet consistently shrinks the availability of spatial infrastructure for arts and culture. In that line, the cases of Lazareti and Pogon can be interpreted as a quest for securing, maintaining and developing, what Katunarić calls, a “continuum of public spaces” that facilitate the shift from Old to New Public Culture, exemplified through expanding margins of creativity and productivity of artistic and cultural work coupled with the equivalence, reciprocity, mutual care, cooperation and expansion of numbers and kinds of participants in decision-making via enlarged and mixed bodies of governance (Katunarić, 2004). The mutual elements of providing space for contemporary cultural and artistic practices and the work of the independent cultural scene and providing the structural setting for the inclusion and participation of diverse actors in the decision-making processes are reflected in both macro and micro levels on inquiry, i.e. in the examples of the systemic upgrades in the form of new arms’ length institution (Foundation Kultura nova) and bodies (Cultural Councils), as well as in the examples of innovative forms of governing socio-cultural centres Lazareti and Pogon in the case study. The “providing of space” denotes the actual usage of the spatial infrastructure for chronically marginalised cultural actors and forms of cultural activity, as well as approaches in governance, but also responds to the institutional cracks or voids (Hajer, 2003 in Fischer, 2006:20) and inept policy design. Both examples show that the networking and cooperation between civil society actors, evolving around aesthetically non-dominant forms of artistic and cultural expression, aim to establish new connections and create social impacts and social change that is an inherent part of artistic and cultural work. This debunks and challenges the standing imperatives and instrumentalities of cultural policy by abandoning the comfort zones of systemic *status quo* for a more advanced, and simultaneously more conjectural options. Participation is used for breaking down the barriers crossing the institutional and cultural thresholds, as an enabler for new opportunities in creating public spaces, new space for public initiatives, civil society platforms and alliances driving the public side of the cultural policy developments. With enabling the space of artistic, cultural, governing and institutional innovation, both Lazareti and Pogon demonstrate potentials of cultural policy change in the wider

remit of social transformation, affirming culture as a key element of change in the social framework. Although there is no sufficient evidence in the empirical analysis that attests to the social transformation yielded by the two investigated cases, the empirical evidence contributes to the argument that the role of civil society actors in the devolving power in the cultural policy adds to the potentials of social mobilisation and self-actualisation through the development of new structural, institutional and cultural features and formations (Deutch, 1961 in Eisenstadt, 2010:1). However, the issue remains whether civil society actors can be the sole beacons of change, or do the effects made by the decentralised and participatory governance methods of operation have to overspill into the rest of the cultural sector, cultural system and ultimately cultural policy.

8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis presented a case for analysing the trajectory of cultural policy evolution in the two lines of decentralisation and introduction and development of participatory governance in culture in Croatia. In order to investigate and expose key changes in those interconnected domains of cultural policy, the analysis involved text-based policy discourses or rhetoric *vis-à-vis* the framework of real-life cases that illustrate the policy practice, thus pointing towards the gaps between policy rhetoric and practice. The dual approach to analysis was construed to reveal main tendencies in the cultural policy formation in the period of almost two decades and the levels of power devolution that define cultural policy matrix. To this end, cultural policy is deconstructed in its constituent parts but is analysed from the perspective of its dynamic nature, i.e. positioning, balancing and fluctuating power of decision-making and authority dispersion. In this mode of functioning, the authority and power are not only attached to the logic and procedures of decision-making, but to the establishment of meaning on what is culture, what is cultural policy, what does it entail, who makes it, what are the relationships between cultural policy actors and what effect does it have on the levels of cultural policy modernisation and democratisation adding to the legitimacy of the cultural policy, but also to the democratic legitimacy of its source, i.e. the state.

In order to answer the posed research questions that address the devolution of power and sharing of authority in cultural policy, several layers of analysis were conducted. The first comprised of an in-depth review of literature sources compiled in the theoretical framework of the thesis. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the cultural policy research, the theoretical framework concentrated on the theoretical sources that a) sustain the sociological validity of the cultural policy research and that simultaneously; and b) provide a theoretical grounding for the exploration of the decentralisation and participatory cultural governance against the backdrop of wider societal changes, such as processes of modernisation, transformation, transition and democratisation. The theoretical framework extended into the unravelling and examination of the key concepts that define and constitute the field of cultural policy encompassing the intricate power affiliations and fluctuations. Ensuing chapter of the theoretical framework probed into the exploration of the concepts behind the main topic of the thesis: from decentralisation to a more nuanced view of

decentralisation in the specific case of cultural policy with the theoretical considerations of the impetus and objectives of the decentralisation process in form of new visions and constructions of what public culture can be in the form of Katunarić's *new public culture*. The investigation of the key theoretical concepts that thesis pertains to continued into the analysis of the assessment of governance through to cultural governance and participatory governance in culture.

The second tier of analysis involved empirical investigation done on two levels: in-depth policy analysis that reached into the period preceding the set research time-frame and the conducting an embedded case study with two units that demonstrate the examples of participatory governance in culture, both in formal and informal form of legal status and functioning. The multitiered analysis provided in-depth detection of what Croatian cultural policy is and established the relationship between the rhetoric of cultural policy and the practice, or implication of the cultural policy. To establish this, the research focused on the investigation of the policy framework on the temporal scale encompassing the stages of transformation, i.e. the phases of stages of cultural policy evolutions. The historical analysis was undertaken to recognize the complex interrelations between movements and tendencies both within and beyond "a specific and effective dominance" and "examine how these relate to the whole cultural process rather than only to the selected and abstracted dominant system" (Williams, 1977:121). Using the Giddens' and Touraine's views on the agency and actors, the analysis of the policy framework underlined the status of the civil society actors within that framework and continued to focus on the capacity of their role concerning the systemic possibility given to their status and the systemic opportunities for access to decision-making versus the effects that these actors make with their intervention and influence on the processes of cultural policy development. This line of examination is sustained throughout the case study on the participatory governance in culture and the genesis of the new formations of cultural institutions, encompassing logic of shared usage of public spatial resources for socio-cultural and artistic purposes. Experimental in many ways, yet corresponding to European cultural policy trends and tendencies in the direction of participatory governance in culture, and in line with the decentralisation as a thesis' research preoccupation, the case study units analysis probed into the state-of-art of local cultural policy-making and the terrain of power-sharing between actors and factors of cultural policy.

8.1. Main research findings

Cultural policy in Croatia is a challenging subject of research due to its fragmented and unsystematic nature that is additionally made difficult with the inferior positioning of cultural policy in the scale of other public policies. Cultural policy is complex, demanding and important, however, in practice, it is the “backseat” policy, inferior to the more “vital” and “pressing” policies of economy, commerce, defence and internal affairs, to name a few. This is sustained with the traditionally meagre portion of the public budget allocated to culture on the national level. The national level (i.e. the Ministry of Culture) is the main source of Croatian cultural policy in the scope of key legislative power, while the local levels are nominally main bearers of the Croatian cultural sector, which is sustained with the numbers of public cultural institutions that are founded and owned by the local governments in comparison to the national government, as well as to the relative ratios of cultural expenditures from the local levels in comparison to the national level. Here lies one of the key paradoxes of Croatian cultural policy – the national level holds the main control and power of the decision-making, thus withholding and exercising the power position of defining the framework for the cultural policy formation (and consequently) development on the sub-national levels while not retaining (direct or executive) responsibility for the sub-national cultural sector, development and policy. This positioning of the main power structure in the Croatian cultural policy assumes, in correspondence to Bourdieu’s view on relations of power in the cultural field, the role of the state as withholding the monopoly of “legitimate violence” in imposing the norms of the dominant culture and providing normative, i.e. regulative frameworks for its creation, affirmation and dissemination. This outcome of the analysis in Croatian cultural policy’s structure and trends is linked to its main legacies in exerting the meanings, values and dynamics of culture. When discussing Croatian cultural policy, we have to take into consideration the breaks and ruptures in the continuity of Croatian cultural policy over longer periods and in the framework of vast societal processes and changes that happened in the period exceeding the research timeframe. The structure of cultural policy and the question of the decentralised devolution of power among the state and the actors constituting cultural field is similar to before the institution of the democratic state in the 1990s, which mostly refers to the modest instances of structural differentiation that is seen as the most important structural dimension of modernity (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007). This asser-

tion brought to the fore the question of transition, not in its thoroughness on the level of the more narrow understanding of the systemic change that has reached the stages of (post) late transition, but on the levels of change that encompasses all kinds of values and redefinitions of contextual structures providing new meanings and new types of organisations and functioning (Švob-Đokić, 2004b), as well as on the levels of cultural change (Katunarić, 1997). As the policy analysis indicated, the attempts to develop and diversify the main axis of the Croatian cultural policy system remains limited to the instances of semi arm's length bodies in the form of cultural councils and two institutions: Foundation Kultura nova and Croatian Audiovisual Centre. The prefix of "semi" to the arms' length classification underlines the partial power dispersion as cultural councils have no fiscal or executive autonomy, and are kept at the level of the advisory bodies. As per the other two institutions, their founding, and especially that in the case of Foundation Kultura nova, is attributed to the civil society-led grassroots advocacy processes that proved to be successful. The state did legitimize and legalize those advocacy argumentations in a form of new state-level institutions in culture, but the values informing the process of the founding that resonate with the values underpinning modernisation processes, such as pluralism, equity, accountability and diversity stemmed from "below", i.e. the actors that had invested interest in creating new systemic upgrade of cultural policy for the collective benefit.

Decentralisation issue is a question of the tension between policy and politics and the balance that is almost impossible to achieve between the two in favour of the policy. The research brought us back to the point that the levels of decentralisation depend on the levels of the systemic maturity, or the participatory and flexible nature of a policy that is persuasive and consistent. So, the decentralisation as a method, a means to a much bigger objective of new cultural policy that is adequate, custom made to the cultural, public, political and social space under its authority pertains different meanings and roles of culture with regard to other spheres of community life, such as attracting more and more people to participate in cultural life and cultural policymaking. The extension of the state's affairs in culture, i.e. the power devolution in the cultural forms and/or in the form of organisational differentiation and opening of the new systemic junctions of governance, points towards another concomitant of modernisation, as propounded by the theories of modernisation of Inglehart and Welzel. Grassroots levels, led by the civil society actors push towards the introduc-

tion and establishment of organisational differentiation and mobilization of cultural resources – from public spaces/venues to finances and ultimately to talent and content. This was demonstrated in the analysis of the case study units showcasing examples of participatory governance in culture as a structural effort to democratize norms and ways of cultural policy and governance.

The thesis did not explicitly analyse the value aspects or underpinnings of the decentralisation process of power devolution and their correspondence to the modernisation processes. However, the empirical evidence gathered in the policy analysis and from the case studies corroborated the tense valuative stretch between traditional inclinations of cultural policy versus the attempts to modernise it through democratisation. The analytic arguments sustaining this are found in the several lines that have been consistent in the Croatian cultural policy from decades ago and are still present during the research period up to today. The first line concerns national aggrandisement in the form of the primary purpose of cultural policy. This has been present since the 1990s with the use of culture for construction of national identity framed on the assumption that the nation-state is a sufficient and convincing model “in which officially-sanctioned, territorially-bounded culture is thought to generate among the population a sense of belongingness to a shared community, thereby consolidating the legitimacy of policy” (Yuzurihara, 2004:11). The rhetoric of national unity that emerged and was affirmed in the 1990s has since been promoting an idealised vision of national cultural homogeneity that conditioned the understanding of culture and cultural policy, overlooking the politics of representation involved in establishing and maintaining the idea of “official” culture. As a result, traditional cultural formats and narratives illustrated and presented in the institutional settings controlled by the political power got accepted as nationally-codified cultural knowledge and values. Accordingly, the second line of analytic arguments that arises from the research findings is the political exposure, vulnerability and conditioning of the governance of culture. The analysis in the empirical framework of the thesis has shown that all of the decision-making processes and governance designs are ultimately dependent on the political bodies and enforcement of political interests. The third line is the institutionality of cultural policy or the inherent institutional protectionism of cultural policy. The phenomenon of institutionalism and the unequal treatment of the actors in the cultural sector has been consistent throughout the cultural policy in Croatia – from the very first stages of cultural policy in Yugoslav times till today.

The investigation into the state-of-art in cultural governance in Croatia indicated lapses in cultural policy evolutions and policy resistance to change in line with the contemporary societal transformations and needs. Croatian cultural policy trends arise from internal concerns of the cultural sector itself, which is traditionally defined by steep differences in cultural policy positioning and treatment between institutional and non-institutional cultural sector. The analysis of the cultural policy's legal framework undoubtedly confirmed that Croatian cultural policy is focused on the institutional frame of arts and culture, which implies that the position of cultural institutions is privileged in cultural policy's scope, and structure from organizational status (including the employment arrangements for workers in cultural institutions) to established allocations of public budgets and appointment of management boards and directors. On the other hand, the research demonstrated that the cultural system is unaccommodating to civil society initiatives and more progressive protagonists of the cultural scene who have a more difficult path into the cultural field in sense of obtaining necessary resources and cultural valorisation.

Another obvious lag that is visible from the analysis of cultural policy is its devolution in the sense of its scope. The definition of the Croatian cultural policy's scope is limited to the most specialized expressions of culture such as libraries, archives, museums, theatres and other traditional institutions, while the measures and instruments for new approaches and formats cultural work and governance are omitted. This approach to anachronistic structuring and functioning of cultural policy indicated that the cultural decentralisation of cultural policy in Croatia, much like political decentralisation, which is guaranteed by the system of regional and local governments, is declarative and consonant with decentralisation objective of *Titanic* (Katunarić, 2003). This implies, as evidence in the research showed, that the reduction of central competencies in cultural policy foresees only an exclusive set of actors by status and scope of a cultural activity maintaining the protections of state and a (privileged) place within the cultural system (Katunarić, 2003). Subsequently, the analysis in the case study units expounded that the 'unconventional' modes of cultural governance continuously confront the exclusionary structure and processes of cultural policy. Moreover, cultural policy inadequacy is no longer a matter of linear investigations of internal, national or specifically local circumstances. Rather, cultural policy has been confronted with a myriad of factors that challenge policy change from an external position, as it was dem-

onstrated by the policy analysis of the European cultural policy frameworks for decentralisation and participatory governance in culture. The situation for the participatory governance in culture on the level of the European policy framework is different in view of provision for decentralisation (which is a standard in most of the European countries) and participatory governance., while Croatian cultural policy framework for the participatory governance in culture proved to be very narrow and the decentralisation tendencies as structurally sustaining centralised decentralisation.

8.2. Contributions to knowledge

The research has contributed to the repository of knowledge with the new considerations of the theoretical and empirical underpinnings between the general field of cultural policy and the specific constructs of decentralisation and participatory governance in culture. This investigation has created a better understanding of cultural policy, both as an interdisciplinary field of scientific inquiry and its intersectional relationship with the field of sociology. To this end, the research posited the assessment of the cultural policy concept and practice with the analysis of its power devolution against the sociological theories of modernisation, transition, transformation and structuration.

One of the key intents of the research was to capture the changes that occurred in Croatian cultural policy, which are propounded as main modernisation steps in the process of its evolution. Collecting evidence about decentralisation and participatory governance in Croatia thus also served as scientifically grounded documentation of the key cultural policy movements following the role and contributions of civil society actors to the changes of cultural policy and implicitly to the changes of the urban cultural landscapes. In the past two (and more) decades, significant changes and alterations have happened in the framework cultural policy. Some of those changes were successfully implemented, some are still under progress, while both are attributed as *attempts* to modernize Croatian cultural policy provision, and as such highlighted the nature of wider modernisation processes in Croatia that have been summarized as „attempts“ (Rogić, 2001). The difference in the approaches to the modernisation process captured by this research is that the attempts to

modernise cultural policy are not enforced „top-down“ but emerge from the „bottom-up“. This points towards more plausible attempts for modernisation that seek to step out of the shadow of traumatic and regressive transition processes. The detected evidence on civil society action in the attempts to modernize cultural sector and policy contribute to overcoming issues of the crisis of legitimacy of the state and political rule (Kalanj, 1998), but also to the emancipation of civil society actors and free forming and expression of democratic political culture (Kalanj, 1998).

The case study demonstrated that employment of participatory governance designs contributes to the relationship between local situation, accessible cultural spaces and endogenous creative processes (Duxbury and Murray, 2010). This becomes more vital in the circumstances of commercially driven exploitation of city capital of public spaces, which is an acute issue for both cities in which the case study units were examined. The focus on the context of the case study units demonstrated that decentralisation is necessary devolution of policy structure and affirmed that cities are the nuclei of new policy directions and developments, despite the nominally state-driven policy processes. The examination of the formation of socio-cultural centres based on the principles of participatory governance revealed that de-fragmentation of particular cultural policy narrative or format contributes to the opening of the prospects of more extensive and inclusive cultural differentiation (Volkering, 1996) enforcing the application of cultural democracy. This, in turn, affirms the perspectives of both cultural and political decentralisation through the pressures and attempts of new cultural strategies instigated by, originally, ‘alternative’ cultural sector turn independent cultural scene. The thesis has shown that Croatian experience of urban cultural policy-making does not reflect examples of the globally present concepts like the creative city that are consequential to the creative economy paradigm. Moreover, there are no detected typologies of culture-led urban development (or vice versa). This can be articulated as an advantage and disadvantage and raises the question for further mining of directions, rationales and conceptions of local cultural policy development. However, the research equally detected the unplanned, *ad hoc* and short-term nature of local cultural planning driven by exogenous factors (i.e. tourism industry and speculative real-estate development) that leads to hyperinstrumentalisation of cultural policy. The disproportion between the long-term action and planning between the civil-society actors and government-led responses in cultural policy is palpable, which revealed yet another contradic-

tion in cultural policy-making – actors who do not have the authority of policymaking maintain more awareness about the social responsiveness and sustainability of cultural policy planning and development, coupled with the persistent pressures to democratize and pluralize cultural policy structures, procedures and processes. These issues effectively call to attention to the operation of cultural policy as internally unconsolidated and deeply divided public policy, which contributes to its instability and fragility. It also draws attention to the resilience of the civil society actors, namely independent cultural scene in decades-long processes of multi-layered work in cultural and artistic production, national and international networking and advocacy work for the democratisation of cultural policy.

This thesis was built on thick strata of theoretical sources. However, aligning its theoretical and empirical frameworks, the research underlined theoretical perspectives and developments that have been conceived in Croatia throughout the past three decades. These include the elaboration of the under-explored line of thought that define Croatian societal context as the *mixed society* defined by simultaneous undergoing of first and second modernity phenomena (Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b:18), i.e. continuously swaying in a systemic back and forth movements and exploring the plausible outcomes of the decentralization process in the hypothesis of new public culture (Katunarić, 2004). The research confirmed the case of cultural policy evolution as moving forward at a slow, unwilling and constraining pace. Discourse on cultural policy change and institutional reformulation in a context where culture becomes a public priority only when instrumentalised for purposes of political or economic agendas gained additional significance when grounded in the concrete examples of initiatives that create new horizontal shapes of institutional models.

Finally, this thesis brought forth the knowledge on the decentralisation trends and tendencies in Croatian cultural policy, which is severely under-researched and underrepresented area of scientific inquiry. This is corroborated with the policy analysis that detected secondary data from decentralisation processes from non-cultural areas, such as health, education, social affairs, but with no data or insights into the field of culture. As per participatory governance in culture, participatory governance is still a novel topic in the academic discourse in Croatia, while in the field

of culture it is still indiscernible, yet with the irrefutable potential to become a widespread topic of research and practice. Thus, with its topic, this thesis brings a *sui generis* comprehension of the cultural policy field and the changes that continuously challenge and redefine it.

8.3. Implications for cultural policy and future directions

The research in this thesis was not instigated and conducted with the intentions to propound new norms for cultural policy and its development through more democratic modes of decentralisation and establishment of new forms of participatory governance in the cultural domain. Given the deduced view of cultural policy as a vehicle to deliver government (or political) agendas, positing new normative understandings of cultural policy is unrealistic, undesirable and perilous. Rather, the aim behind this thesis was to interpret what cultural policy in Croatia is and how is power distributed within cultural policy. What analysis revealed was that numerous issues continuously arise from the on-going conflict of the understanding of modernization in the cultural domain with the democratisation of the cultural sphere not being substantially endorsed or implemented in the actual cultural system. The contemporary governance schemes still reflect albeit repressive political influence of the political authority on cultural field, that being the state or local government, which was a “natural” *modus operandi* for the previous socialist system. The treatment of the non-institutional cultural sector and favouring of the institutions in culture and representative cultural forms and artistic expressions to safeguard national identity and symbolic values prevail as the main preoccupation of the policy in culture. Maintaining the “residual” rationales in the “dominant” modes of policy provision inhibits or limits the space for the progression of “emergent” practices that have the proven track record in advocating and infusing democratic traits into cultural policy (Williams, 1977).

Despite the non-democratic character of the pre1990s situation in Croatian society, there were some attempts to modernize cultural policy through the sequential development of cultural policy according to the phases of cultural policy paradigms’ evolution. The analyses showed that attempts towards the devolution of power, as one of the markers of democratisation and modernisation processes, as well as the favourable consequence of the transition and transformation, are still

problematic, mostly so in the register of policy staleness and lags coupled with the chronic mistrust in the state-culture relations. These relations were in the core of the research in the register of decentralisation and introduction and/or legalisation of participatory governance in culture in Croatia, however, it is impossible to overlook and not to underline the research findings from the interviews that indicated mistrust, misunderstandings and overall unhealthy communication. This becomes even more problematic when power of dealing with resources is concentrated on one side only, in the case of this research, on the side of government. This raises the question are the civil society driven initiatives genuine cultural policy upgrades or are they considered as *strategies of survival*, in reference to the chronically marginal position of the civil society actors in the cultural policy structure. To this end, the research inevitably highlighted the wide disproportion in the position of the civil society in the cultural policy structures and processes in relation to their role and contribution to the cultural policy and its evolutionary changes. In response to the question on why are decentralization and participatory governance of culture necessary, the analysis showed that those approaches to emancipating cultural actors and diversifying cultural system contribute to a greater sense of collective responsibility in using public spaces for cultural and artistic purposes. The case study has indicated that this, in turn, enables and promotes freedom of the contemporary cultural and artistic expression and intensifies partnering between independent cultural scene actors, both internally, among the actors of independent cultural scene locally and nationally, and externally, between the independent cultural scene actors and other cultural actors and public sectors. This can promote the sustainability of the cultural organisations involved (Sani 2017). Yet, for participation to produce benefits, it has to be facilitated with regulative support and reliability of the cultural policy structure and legislative framework. As mentioned in the theoretical framework of this thesis, the aims and methodologies of subsidiarity and decentralisation are consonant with those of participatory governance. In respect to new institutional frameworks, both in a formal and informal form, the shared responsibility for management and governance is further instilled with the understanding of cultural goods as ‘common good’ that is shared and beneficial for all (or most) members of the community. As common goods, cultural resources require an evolved framework of collective and participatory governance that recognizes the role of all public and civil actors and the rights of groups of interested citizens to actively participate in the maintenance, management and development of those resources.

The overview of the supra-national policies showed that the path has been set in sense of policy agendas and providing a direction for forming participatory policy provisions, acknowledging the need for plural governance of culture (involving several levels of government and civil society) and the link between culture, human rights and sustainable development (Villaseñor 2017 in Baltà Portolés, 2017). In that sense, the design of cultural policy and legislation for enabling participation should be considered as a norm for cultural policy-making and decision-making, especially in the context in which the partnerships and relationships between governments and civil society actors are still scarce and characterized with the low levels of trust. Nonetheless, there are serious discrepancies between and in translating the policy narratives into policy practices. While there are several (yet limited) policy provisions that can accommodate participatory designs, the examples of proper participatory governance in culture are deficient. The existing participatory endeavours such as Pogon in Zagreb remain a one-off example and fail to be integrated into the fabric of the cultural policy development. Reflecting on the assertion made by Dubois in which he claims that the evolutions of cultural policies are results from the interaction between political and cultural levels that consist of adding new layers of institutions, orientations and discourses rather than in radical changes, in “a way that contemporary cultural policies can be viewed as the sedimentation of previous ones” (Dubois, 2013:2), the research showed that Croatian cultural policy is faced with serious challenges, the most obvious one being the challenge of creating new layers rather than reshuffling the sediments.

8.4. Conclusion

This research brought to fore issues of decentralisation and participatory governance in culture as challenges of cultural policy evolution. To this end, the research has unravelled new insights into the old problems of cultural policy legitimacy, incomplete modernisation, transition and transformation that all indicate towards partial democratisation of the Croatian cultural policy. Ultimately, the research has asserted that investigating policy framework in respect of decentralisation and participatory governance in culture reveals problems within the devolution of decision-making processes and inherent power protectionism that is reflected in the rationale and governance structures of cultural policy. From the intersections of findings from policy analysis and examination of policy practice through the case study, the research extrapolated main traits of cultural policy and its proclivity towards change in the direction of decentralisation and participatory governance in culture. These extrapolated traits demonstrated that the structural weakness and consequent endemic ambiguity and instrumentalism of cultural policy in Croatia point towards power protectionism instead of sharing, which leaves devolution of cultural policy authority on the levels of normative and not valiative concepts. This is, as research indicated, translated into inconsistencies, imbalances and disparities between policy rhetoric and policy practice. The fixation on the state and political actors as the source of power indicates the democratic immaturity and affirms the peripheral nature (Rogić, 2001; Katunarić, 2003) of the Croatian socio-political context. This underlines the need for further excavation and dealing with the cultural policy, especially with the role of civil society actors and their relentless attempts to overcome the limitations in access, inclusion and participation in cultural policy discourses. This could, ideally, facilitate the invention of cultural policy that is more „*overt* and thus subject to public validation“ (Shapiro, 1990). This thesis is based on interpretative and qualitative work, hence, the posed interpretations and consequent implications remain open to challenge. However, the thesis concludes with the conviction that it contributed to the scale of new knowledge, but also with the confidence that it will progress the debate about the complexity and pressures inherent to such a simultaneously useful and marginal area of cultural policy.

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10. ABSTRACT

This thesis studies decentralisation of cultural policy and participatory cultural governance in Croatia from 2000 to 2017. Decentralization as a process implies territorial dispersion of cultural policy's competences and resources but is also a method for devolution of power/authority, enabling amplification of cultural democracy and participative governance practices (Katunarić, 2003; Kawashima, 2004). Participatory governance is situated in "institutional voids", or institutional cracks of the traditional state where the practices of participatory governance are reflected in a "proliferation of new forms of social and political association" (Fischer, 2006:20). This implies the rise of political and social relevance of the civil society and non-governmental actors that, by questioning the legitimacy and accountability of the state, open new organisational spaces taking over public activities to "such a degree that some see them as reconfiguring public sector" and affecting policies of the mainstream institutions (Fischer, 2006:20).

The examples of decentralised power in the Croatian cultural system are found in a small number of arm's length bodies and institutions, while the selected examples of participatory governance in culture situated in Dubrovnik (Lazareti) and Zagreb (Pogon) follow the evolution of socio-cultural centres involving the use of public space/infrastructure by platforms of civil society organisations based on the principles of sharing, inclusion, social engagement and sustainability. These main lines of research interests respond to the key concerns of cultural policy development that critically reflect and question the levels of democratization in cultural policy needed for securing and widening public traits, access and participation in culture. Detected concerns indicate the issues of representation, which has been ever-present *maladie* of the cultural policy discourse and practice in Croatia. Its most blatant manifestation is found in the limited permeability of cultural policy processes and the disparate levels of inclusion of institutional (politically controlled) vs. non-institutional cultural sector representatives in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of cultural policy. In the process of the decentralising shift from government to governance, the overarching questions address the issues on who makes the decisions in the cultural field in Croatia, who is represented in the process of decision-making and in what capacity, what is the balance between „top-down“ and „bottom-up“ approaches

in the cycles of Croatian cultural policymaking, and how decentralised and participatory are the decision-making processes in culture?

The decentralisation and participatory governance are analysed through interdisciplinary theoretical lenses, with a distinctively sociological approach encompassing the analysis of the social changes that influence dynamics, direction and extent of shifts within the framework of cultural policy and its progression towards a more balanced and democratic form (Katunarić, 1997; Švob-Đokić, 2000; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015). To this end, the thesis unravels the links between the cultural policy research and sociological inquiry, exploring the key concepts of the thesis through the theories of structuration, modernisation, transformations and transition both from a general theoretical perspective (Giddens, 1984; 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; 2007; Eisenstadt, 2010) to a more contextual one (Kalanj, 1998; Rogić, 2001; Švob-Đokić, 2004b; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015; Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić, 2005b).

Building on the literature sources that amalgamate Giddens' (1984) and Touraine's (2000) clarifications on the role and position of actors by with specific social processes of transition and transformation from the sources of Croatian scholars to the analysis of the discourses of power in cultural policy through the theoretical readings of Foucault (1978;1995), Bourdieu (1990; 2012 [2014]) and Habermas (Kellner, 2000; Fernander, 2008; Wang, 2017) and their contesting interpretations by Bennet (1992; 1995; 1998) and McGuigan (1996; 2004), the thesis focuses on these changes and tracks their influence on the dynamics and directions of cultural policy evolution and change. Through the detection of structural position and role of main actors involved in the power play and struggles for cultural policy modernisation in Croatia, attention is given to bottom-up initiatives for cultural policy change detectable in normative policy provision for decentralisation of authority and the emergence of new modes of governance.

The research findings indicate that the Croatian cultural system has been experiencing the profound changes in the cultural policy evolution that entail the association and the role of the civil society actors and the rise of the locale, i.e. the city as the origin of the progressive cultural policy changes. The empirical evidence from the policy analysis and investigation of the Lazareti and

Pogon cases contributes to the argument that the role of civil society actors in the devolving power in the cultural policy adds to the potentials of social mobilisation and self-actualisation through the development of new structural, institutional and cultural features and formations (Deutch, 1961 in Eisenstadt, 2010:1). However, the thesis shows that while the non-institutional, civil society actors do retain power in sense of the transformative capacity of their actions, the extent of that transformation is limited due to cultural policy constraints in the devolution and sharing of authority. This is amplified with insufficient knowledge about what participatory governance means as a principle and what it should entail in practice, which exacerbates difficulties amongst relationships between key actors, especially on the side of public authorities. To this end, this thesis results in new considerations of the role and implications of decentralised cultural policy and participatory governance in culture as a necessity in achieving structural modernisation and democratisation of the rationales, values and norms of Croatian cultural policy.

10.1. Sažetak

Ova disertacija proučava decentralizaciju kulturne politike i sudioničko upravljanje u Hrvatskoj u razdoblju od 2000. do 2017. godine. Primjeri sudioničkog upravljanja pojavljuju se u hrvatskom kulturnom sustavu i kulturnoj politici kroz proliferaciju nove generacije kulturnih centara, tzv. društveno-kulturnih centara u kojima organizacije civilnog društva upravljaju javnim prostorima i infrastrukturom po načelu civilno-javnog partnerstva što uključuje sudjelovanje, dijeljenje prava i odgovornosti te uključivanje i održivost. Sudioničko upravljanje podrazumijeva uspon političke i društvene važnosti civilnog društva i nevladinih aktera koji, propitivanjem legitimiteta i odgovornosti države, otvaraju nove prostore za javne aktivnosti “do takvog stupnja da ih neki smatraju rekonfiguriranjem javnog sektora” (Fischer, 2006:20).

Pojava novih oblika kulturnih institucija koje se izravno bave izazovima i neuspjesima demokratskih vrijednosti u suvremenom kulturnom sustavu zahtijeva stvaranje novih veza i mreža koje se temelje na otvorenim, sudioničkim, djelotvornim i dosljednim procesima. Ovakve promjene ističu problem upravljanja i raspodjele kulturnih resursa, osobito javne prostorne infrastrukture naglašavajući ulogu (mikro)lokaliteta kao ishodišta inovativnih i naprednih koncepata suvremenog kulturnog razvoja. Primjeri sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi potiču promjene u kulturnoj politici i pratećim osovinama decentralizacije i devolucije ovlasti i moći.

Tema decentralizacije i nastanka sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi se u ovoj disertaciji analizira kroz interdisciplinarni teorijski okvir s naglašenim sociološkim pristupom u analizi društvenih promjena koje imaju utjecaj na dinamiku, smjer i opseg pomaka unutar okvira kulturne politike, kao napretka kulturne politike prema uravnoteženom i demokratičnijem obliku (Katunarić, 1997.; Švob-Đokić, 2000.; Tomić-Koludrović, 2015.). Naime, decentralizacija podrazumijeva teritorijalnu disperziju nadležnosti i resursa kulturne politike, no ona je ujedno i metoda za prijenos vlasti koji omogućuje afirmaciju i primjenu paradigme kulturne demokracije te omogućuje uvođenje praksi sudioničkog upravljanja. Kao sredstvo za smanjenje političke centralizacije u donošenju odluka, decentralizacija se temelji na načelu supsidijarnosti. Supsidijarnost je norma u kulturnoj politici mnogih nacija i može se smatrati najprimjenjivijom metodom za sudioničko

stvaranje politika i upravljanje, pri čemu se to odnosi na odnos između centra i lokalne razine, ali isto tako i na odnos između vlade i ne-vlade (Katunarić, 2003.; Kawashima, 2004.). Strukturalni i teritorijalni aspekti decentralizacije spajaju se u suvremenoj ulozi gradova koji su se “uzdignuli kao glavni komandni centri svijeta; ne samo ograničeni unutar nacionalnih zemljopisnih granica, već i sa proširenom i složenom međunarodnom ulogom” (Sarikakis, 2012.:17). Uz gradove koji su identificirani kao «ključna mjesta djelovanja u inicijativama globalne politike kako bi se prepoznala važna uloga kulture u održivom razvoju i integrirala kultura u kontekste politike na svim razinama»(Duxbury, 2015.: 69), znakovite promjene u procesima devolucije moći unutar okvira kulturne politike prate se u rastućoj važnosti uloge organizacija civilnog društva u procesima demokratizacije i modernizacije kulturne politike. Lokacija i akteri koji rastvaraju okvir i strukturu kulturne politike su u samoj srži istraživačkog interesa zastupljenog u ovoj disertaciji.

Promjene kulturnih politika u smjeru decentralizacije i sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi proučavaju se kroz metodološki okvir koji se temelji na kvalitativnom istraživanju postavljenom na dva osnovna stupa dizajna istraživanja: *policy* analizu i tzv. ugniježdenu ili kompozitnu studiju slučaja s dvije jedinice analize. Točnije, prvi dio istraživačkog procesa obuhvaća analizu hrvatske kulturne politike u postavljenom istraživačkom razdoblju, ali i pregled faza razvoja kulturne politike prije istraživačkog perioda te provođenje studije slučaja kroz odabrane primjere sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi u Dubrovniku (Lazareti) i Zagrebu (Pogon). Ova dva pravca istraživanja odgovaraju na ključne probleme razvoja hrvatske kulturne politike te se kritički analiziraju razine demokratizacije kulturne politike potrebne za osiguravanje i proširivanje javnog karaktera, pristupa i sudjelovanja u kulturi. Ključni problemi se odnose na pitanje zastupljenosti u procesima kulturne politike, a što je sveprisutna boljka diskursa i prakse kulturne politike u Hrvatskoj. U osnovnom obliku, to uključuje ograničenu propusnost procesa kulturne politike i disparatne razine uključenosti i zastupljenosti institucionalnih (politički kontroliranih) aktera naspram izvaninstitucionalnih aktera kulturnog sektora u formulaciji, implementaciji i evaluaciji kulturne politike. U procesu decentralizacijskog pomaka od vladanja (eng. *government*) prema upravljanju (eng. *governance*), postavljaju se sveobuhvatna pitanja poput: kako je postavljena kulturna politika u Hrvatskoj; tko donosi odluke u kulturnom polju; tko je zastupljen u procesima donošenja odluka i u kojem kapacitetu; koji je odnos u pristupima „odozgo“ i „odozdo“ u ciklusima donošenja od-

luka i formulaciji kulturne politike; kako je kulturna politika decentralizirana i koliko je otvorena sudjelovanju i donošenju odluka u kulturnoj politici?

U cilju utvrđivanja sociološki utemeljenih odgovora na ova pitanja, disertacija se temelji na teorijskom okviru koji započinje s analitičkim razmatranjem poveznica između istraživanja kulturne politike i sociologije te postavljanjem teorija strukturacije, modernizacije, transformacije i tranzicije kao teorijske podloge. Ove se teorije razmatraju iz širih, tj. općih perspektiva kako ih vide Giddens (1984.; 2000.), Inglehart i Welzel (2005.; 2007.) i Eisenstadt, (2010.) te iz kontekstualne perspektive kako je artikuliraju Kalanj (1998.), Rogić (2001.), Švob-Đokić (2004.b), Tomić-Koludrović (2015.) i Tomić-Koludrović i Petrić (2005.b).

Međupovezanost promjena u kulturnoj politici sa širim društvenim okvirom se u disertaciji prati kroz kombinaciju Giddensovih (1984.) i Touraineovih (2000.) shvaćanja uloge i pozicije aktera uz proučavanje specifičnih procesa transformacije i tranzicije te analizu diskursa moći u kulturnoj politici kroz teorijske ideje Foucaulta (1978.; 1995.), Bourdieuaa (1990.; 2012. [2014.]) i Habermasa (Kellner, 2000.; Fernander, 2008.; Wang, 2017.) kao i njihovih teorijskih sljedbenika Beneta (1992.; 1995.; 1998.) i McGuigana (1996.; 2004.). U detekciji strukturnih pozicija i uloga ključnih aktera unutar raspodjele moći i napora za modernizaciju kulturne politike u Hrvatskoj, posebna se pozornost daje inicijativama „odozdo“ koje ulažu napore u promjenu normativnih postavki kulturne politike prema decentralizaciji ovlasti i stvaranju novih oblika upravljanja.

Nalazi istraživanja ukazuju na to da je hrvatski kulturni sustav iskusio značajne promjene u evoluciji kulturne politike koje uključuju pomake u tome *gdje* se kulturna politika stvara i *tko* je stvara. U tom smjeru se ističu, kako je već navedeno, pozicija grada i uloga aktera civilnog društva kao ishodišta progresivnih promjena (i pritisaka za promjene) u okviru i strukturi, ali i vrijednostima kulturne politike koji se usko uvezuju s koracima ka modernizaciji i demokratizaciji kulturnog sustava. Empirijski dokazi iz analize kulturne politike i istraživanja primjera Lazareta i Pogona u studiji slučaja nadograđuju argumentaciju o ulozi aktera civilnog društva u raspodjeli moći u kulturnoj politici i njihovom doprinosu potencijalima društvene mobilizacije i samo-aktualizacije kroz razvoj novih strukturnih, institucijskih i kulturnih značajki i formacija (Deutch, 1961. u

Eisenstadt, 2010.: 1). Međutim, disertacija jednako tako pokazuje da su velike razlike između systemske pozicije i uloge civilnih aktera u kulturi. Premda izvaninstitucionalni, civilni akteri u kulturi zadržavaju određenu moć u smislu transformativnog potencijala i kapaciteta njihovog djelovanja, raspon posljedičnih učinaka transformativnog djelovanja civilnih aktera je uvjetovan i znatno otežan ograničenjima koje postavlja kulturna politika u mogućnostima raspodjele i dijeljenja ovlasti. Ova su ograničenja dodatno ojačana s nedostatnim razinama znanja o tome što sudioničko upravljanje znači kao princip rada te kako bi trebalo biti primijenjeno u praksi, a što uzrokuje poteškoće u odnosima između ključnih aktera, pogotovo kod javnih vlasti. U tom smislu, disertacija rezultira novim saznanjima o ulozi i implikacijama decentralizirane kulturne politike i sudioničkog upravljanja u kulturi kao potrebnih nadogradnji kulturne politike u smjeru postizanja strukturne modernizacije i demokratizacije postavki, vrijednosti i normi hrvatske kulturne politike.

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11.1. List of tables

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11.2. Questions for the interviews with the representatives of the socio-cultural centres

QUESTION	QUESTION INTENT
How would you describe the mission/purpose of your socio-cultural centre?	To disclose the history and specificities of the socio-cultural centre.
When did you start using the space?	
How would you describe the type of space? (e.g. cultural centre, community centre, socio-cultural centre, residency centre, etc.)	
In which area of cultural work are you active? (art disciplines: visual arts, performing arts, film, ecology, human rights, etc.)	
What type of activities are undertaken? (exhibition, performances, studies, training, conferences, round tables, etc.)	
How big is space?	
What is the typology of the space? (open, closed, communal, separate use, etc.)	
Who owns the space?	
Is there a legal foundation for the use of space? (is there a contract for the use, on what period and signed by who)	
What was the previous purpose of the space?	
How did the usage of the space start and how did it develop?	

Who manages the space?

Who are the actors included in the governing of the space?

What is the devolution of responsibilities between actors included in the governing?

Who is authorised for decision-making? How is the system of decision-making defined?

How are the modes of communication defined between included actors?

What are the other executive and/or consultative, permanent or temporary bodies?

How and in which document are the rules of engagement defined for all the established bodies?

Can you describe the changes that you underwent during the introduction and development of the participatory governance in culture?

What are the three most important lessons learned during the process of the introduction and development of participatory governance in culture?

Do you think that your case of participatory governance in culture should be further developed? If yes, in what way?

To determine the specificities of the participatory governance in culture and civil-public partnership.

<p>Who are the users/tenants of the space?</p> <p>Can you describe the audience and consumers of the programme and services?</p> <p>What is the typology of space usage? (temporary, permanent, periodically)</p> <p>What are the rights of the users of space?</p> <p>What are the procedures for the attaining the space for use?</p> <p>What are the conditions and criteria of the temporary/long-term use of the space?</p> <p>Are the regulations for the use of the space defined (opening/closing of the venue; use of the technical equipment; working time, etc.)</p> <p>How is the typology of the space usage defined? (single use, collective use, shared use, open use, multifunctional use)</p> <p>How are the users of the space included in the definition of the rules, conditions, criteria and procedures for space usage?</p> <p>How is the local community involved?</p> <p>How are the aspects of development and infrastructure maintenance defined? (facade, roof, windows, basement space, outer space, hallways, stairways, public toilets etc.)</p> <p>How are the security aspects of the space usage defined?</p> <p>How are programmes and content defined?</p> <p>What are the methods of monitoring space usage?</p> <p>Who oversees and supervises the usage of the space and to what level of responsibility?</p> <p>Are the mechanisms for solving conflict defined? Who solves conflicts?</p> <p>What are the sanctions and who defines them? Who executes sanctions and oversees their implementation?</p>	<p>To determine the specific approaches in the usage of the space.</p>
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What are the sources of financing?	To determine the modes of space usage.
Is there self-financing?	
In which way is the attained income used, who and how decides on the spending/investing of income?	
Can you state which social/cultural services do you provide?	
Can you present your strategy of participatory governance development?	
How would you define participatory governance?	To clarify the understandings of participatory governance and civil-public partnership.
How would you define civil-public partnership?	
What is your main motivation for the development of participatory governance?	
What is your main motivation for the development of participatory governance?	
What are the main obstacles and challenges in future development and work?	To uncover how is the role of socio-cultural centres understood in the context of cultural and sustainable development of the city.
What potentials(social, economic, cultural, environmental) of the space do you perceive?	
Can you describe the influence on urban development (emphasis on the neighbourhood and the services for the local community)?	
How would you define values that are created by your space and for whom?	
How do you measure the success of your cultural space?	
Where do you see your space in the temporal perspective, which opportunities do you perceive (in 3/5/10 years)?	
Anything to add?	

11.3. Questions for the interviews with the representatives of the local public authorities

1. How do you perceive participatory governance?
2. Do you know of examples of such practice in your city?
 - How you perceive the purpose of the space like.....
 - How would you describe the space....
3. What is, in your opinion, the ways of including citizens in the governance of public resources, institutions?
 - Which types are there?
 - What types do you see as the best?
 - How do you perceive civil-public partnership?
 - In which way does the city perceive its position in the civil-public partnership?
 - Do you think that there is a need for a socio-cultural centre in your city?
4. Which opportunities and hindrances do you see for the development of such practices?
 - In which way could such practices contribute to the development of culture?
 - What legislation is an obstacle?
 - How would you improve the cultural sector?
 - How does the city perceive its tasks and interests?

11.4. The official confirmation letter from Foundation Kultura nova

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UNIVERSITY OF ZADAR
JOINT DOCTORAL PROGRAMME IN SOCIOLOGY
OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT

Class: 7313-01/19-01/01
Ref.no.: 1001-19-01
Zagreb, October 8th 2019

CONFIRMATION LETTER

To whom it may concern

Kultura Nova Foundation conducted the interdisciplinary research project titled "Approaches to Participatory Governance of Cultural Institutions" from 2016 to 2018 with the support of UNESCO's International Fund for Cultural Diversity. The research involved investigation of existing and emerging practices of participatory governance in culture which are realized through various socio-cultural centres in the Republic of Croatia.

With this letter, we hereby confirm that Ana Žuvela was the Head of Researcher Team that conducted the research and that her involvement included authorship in the two case studies: the case of Lazareti Socio-Cultural Centre in Dubrovnik and the case of Pogon – Zagreb Centre for Independent Culture and Youth in Zagreb. The research materials, encompassing all research protocols and outcomes, are under the ownership of the Kultura Nova Foundation. However, for the purposes of Ana Žuvela's postgraduate doctorate thesis done within the framework of Joint Doctoral Programme in Sociology of Regional and Local Development at the University of Zadar, we grant the permission for use of the research results obtained in the said case studies of Lazareti and Pogon.

Please do not hesitate to contact me directly if I can be of any further assistance.

Yours sincerely,



dr. sc. Dea Vidović
Director

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A small version of the 'Kn' logo, consisting of the letters 'Kn' in a stylized font.

12. SHORT BIOGRAPHY

Ana Žuvela is a Researcher Assistant at the Institute for Development and International Relations. She received her Bachelor of Music Honorary degree at the Birmingham Conservatoire, University of Central England and holds a Master of Arts in Cultural Policy and Arts Management from the University College Dublin. Ana has over twenty-five years of professional experience in the field of culture, involving consultancy and advocacy work in cultural policy, engagement in public authorities and government bodies, non-governmental cultural organizations and cultural institutions, leadership positions in projects of international cultural cooperation encompassing research projects with the supra-national national and local authorities and organisations such as European Parliament, European Commission, Council of Europe, UNESCO, Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia, Foundation Kultura nova, etc. Her research interests include development and change of cultural policies, local cultural development, decentralization of cultural policy, devolution of authority in the processes of decision-making, as well as new and participatory models of cultural governance. Ana Žuvela served as the Co-Chair of the LabforCulture Steering Committee, as Advisor for Cultural Affairs in the City of Dubrovnik, is a member of Editor's Team of Culturelink Network, was a Board member of independent organizations Cuter and Art Workshop Lazareti, and is a member of European Cultural Parliament. She regularly publishes books, articles, papers and delivers lectures at academic conferences worldwide. Ana lives and works from Dubrovnik.

